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Economic globalization 1 promises growth and success in development of the 
international community. There has been a huge increase in transnational 
economic activity such as foreign direct investment, and the international capital 
flows in global financial markets are enormous. Economic globalization has been 
realized not only through supranational legal regimes such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), but through reforms to regulatory regimes and national laws 
advocated by international institutions including the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund. These reforms have furthered deliberate policy 
choices to liberalize trade and capital mobility, deregulate markets, increase 
commercial participation, and eliminate cross-border transactional barriers. 
1 See Vito Tanzi, Globalization, Tax Competition and the Future of Tax Systems (IMF, Working 
Paper No. 141, 1996), summarizing the benefits of economic globalization as: (a) world resources 
are better allocated and output and standards of living rise; (b) individuals enjoy a greater range of 
choice in goods and services because of the greater access to foreign goods; (c) individuals are 
able to visit faraway places because the cost of travel has fallen significantly; (d) the amount and 
range of information available to individuals has increased enormously while the cost of getting 
information has fallen dramatically 
The post-World War II development strategy of many developing or transitional 
economies has included a special role2 for tax policy, which is employed as a 
means of intervention into the economy. 3 All types of taxes, particularly trade 
related taxes, are legitimate tools of the state in monitoring the development 
process. Today, tax reforms mainly aim to establish a diverse mix of taxes that 
will encourage savings and capital investment in open market economies, because 
development priorities have shifted from promoting self-sufficiency and 
subsidizing domestic industry to encouraging export-led growth and improving 
global market participation. At the same time, driven by a need to fund 
government activities and reduce debt or government deficits, another key focus 
of tax reform has been tax revenue growth and socially conscious wealth 
redistribution. 4 In particular, following the epidemic debt crisis in the 1980s, 
developing countries were forced to achieve and maintain a fiscal surplus in order 
to clear their debts to international financial institutions and other creditors5 as 
well as strive for a healthy economic settings. 
A key feature of modem tax reforms is the prioritization of tax administration 
including resident registration, computerized compliance systems, stricter 
2 See Dharam Ghai, Introduction to the IMF and the South: the Social Impact of Crisis and 
Adjustment (Dharam Ghai ed., 1991), noting that states use tax reform to manage the process of 
economic growth, giving high priority to the goals of industrialization, diversification, and 
modernization 
3 See I d., stating that in part the tax policies meant tariff protection for domestic industry, input 
subsidies, and favorable domestic tax regimes (containing tax concessions or incentives) for 
industry. The agricultural and mineral sectors are highly taxed through mechanisms such as export 
taxes, heavy taxation of mining surpluses, and low expenditures). 
4 See Malcolm Gillis, Tax Reform in Developing Countries 16-17 (Malcolm Gillis ed., 1989) 
[hereinafter Tax Reform (Gillis)] 
5 See generally Glenn P. Jenkins, Tax Reform: Lessons Learned in Reforming Economic Systems 
in Developing Countries at 293-95 (Dwight H. Perkins & Michael Roemer eds., 1991) 
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collection efforts, auditing, evasion control and tax law enforcement.6 Therefore, 
tax reforms have been regarded as a subcategory of public finance or economic 
policy. At the same time, legal system reforms typically involve transplanting 
legal theories and institutions across borders. Tax governance, with its focus on 
institutional reform and (re )construction, has been a focal point to facilitate legal 
system construct. 
As tax reform has been a crucial component of economic development initiatives 
and structural adjustment programs for developing countries, the sheer number 
and scope of international institutions has dominated developing countries' tax 
reforms. Tax reforms usually focus on universal development goals including a 
single-rate, broad-based VAT to replace older-style sales taxes, a low-rate, broad-
based corporate and personal income tax, tax neutrality, and the reduction or 
eventual elimination of tariffs. Moreover, the WTO distinguishes its role by 
indirectly interfering in domestic tax law reforms of its member countries under 
the aegis of protecting free trade in domestic tax systems. The recognized, 
comprehensive advantages of WTO accession provide a rational for the 
globalization tax standards that other international institutions could not require. 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) underlying all WTO 
activities includes the key principles of non-discrimination and liberalization of 
trade, which drive much of developing countries' tax reforms. The non-
discrimination obligation is comprised of the Most-favored-nation (MFN) 
6 See Vito Tanzi & Howell H. Zee, Tax Policy for Emerging Markets: Developing Countries, 3-4 
(IMF Working Paper No. 35, 2000), http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft!wp/2000/wp0035.pdf 
(last visited on March 15, 2011) 
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principle, 7 which demands that trade concessions granted to any country be 
extended equally to all other WTO members, and the National Treatment (NT) 
principle, 8 which requires that no internal tax, charge, law, regulation or other 
measure should discriminate between domestic and foreign suppliers. 
A decade after China formally became the 143rd member of the WTO on 
December 11, 2001,9 its developing country status does not substantially relieve it 
from its obligations as a member of the WTO. The WTO provides technical 
advice and certain concessions to existing or potential developing economies, 
including China. Although these concessions supposedly allow for extended 
transition periods to implement principles of the WTO Agreements, only rarely 
has any country been allowed to use the extended transitional grace period, which 
has essentially been reserved for developing countries that were founding 
members ofthe GATT. 
The WTO's technical assistance is about more than plugging up loopholes or to 
crafting an implementation structure; rather, it aims to imbue tax reforms with 
broader legal theories and structures conducive to international trade. Before this 
thesis develops a discussion of the tax system reform, an overview of China's rule 
of law order and post-WTO legal reform is necessary. These narratives are crucial 
underlying factors even in the analysis of reforms of specific areas ofthe tax laws. 
In particular, the establishment of a "socialist rule of law order" and commitments 
by the government to act "in accordance with law" have been incorporated as 
7 See General Agreement on Tariffs And Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, Art. I, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 
55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
8 Jd, Art. III 
9 For detailed description of China's efforts for WTO accession, see http://www.wto.org (last 
visited March 15, 2011) 
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amendments into China's Constitution. Consideration is also given to contested 
rhetorical conceptions of the rule of law. Debates between instrumental and 
substantive, positivist and natural law, and thin and thick models of the rule of 
law, as well as the economic development rhetoric discussed ad infinitum in the 
literature are all reviewed. This thesis aims to prepare a reasonable, handy and 
realistic foundation with which to evaluate the progress of the Chinese tax law 
reform. Pushing this goal further, this thesis tentatively submits - on the basis of 
debates on the rule of law and understanding of the WTO principles applicable to 
China - a tailored, pragmatic and practical set of proposals for the tax reform 
under China's current legal infrastructure. The proposals are underpinned by 
instrumental notions of, inter alia, generality, clarity, consistency, enforceability, 
stability, congruence, and substantive notions of judicial independence, human 
rights and the limitations of bureaucratic government with regard to the nonprofit 
sector. 
However, one inescapable attribute squeezed into debates on China's legal reform, 
in which the tax law reform is embedded, is the imposition of a standard based 
upon a specific conception of the rule of law. Is there a need to conceptualize a 
"rule of law-Chinese tax laws reform rhetoric?" This theoretical challenge is too 
grand and too premature to undertake, even though the tax law context is viewed 
as one of most receptive sectors to legal transplant. The development of a socialist 
rule of law is a paradox, being receptive to market economy principles and 
modernizing state and private enterprise governance on the one hand, while 
unabashedly preserving an autocratic form of socialism on the other. Such a 
5 
paradox can only be described as "the socialist rule of law with Chinese 
Characteristics." with vague description of "characteristics" and re-interpretative 
conceptions of "socialism". The tax law reform, which contains elements of 
traditional conceptions of the rule of law, cannot be understood independently 
from China's social, political, economic and legal inheritances. Different from 
Western jurisdictions with liberal democratic frameworks, under China's quasi-
socialist, soft authoritarian system, the social-political evolution influences the 
theory and interpretations of the rule oflaw in many ways. 
China's accession into the WTO has been a double-edged sword. Optimists 
maintain that China's entry will benefit the global community as well as China's 
domestic economy and society by promoting the rule of law, undercutting the 
state's control over administration, and accelerating the transition to a market 
economy. In addition, the WTO membership helps modernize accounting 
practices, banking frameworks, taxation systems and environmental protections, 
while at the same time, bringing hostility to bear on corruption and protectionism. 
By contrast, pessimists contend that China has agreed to more than it can deliver. 
This is evidence, they say, of its lack of commitment to abide by WTO rules, and 
its plan to free-ride on the benefits of the global trade system and export its socio-
economic problems. 
A close examination of China's accession commitments reveals that effective 
economic reform and trade liberalization call for substantiations from a matching 
legal infrastructure reform. For example, taxpayers' rights protection should be 
viewed in terms of broader political and civil rights reform. Indeed, a number of 
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the values featured in the WTO principles and the rule of law framework 
encourage China's further integration into both the global trade network and the 
international human rights regime. This is particularly evident in the Chinese tax 
law context. WTO principles and the rule of law requirements must be introduced 
and evaluated together in tax law reform proposals. WTO principles of 
transparency, uniform and impartial administration, judicial review match the 
instrumentalist's rule of law elements of consistency, generality, predictability, 
enforceability, stability and congruence, and the substantive rule of law 
framework's requirements of democracy, limited government, accountable 
administrative decision-making, and judicial independence. 
China's accession to the WTO requires reform not only of China's substantive 
laws, but also of its institutional arrangements, to which the Chinese government 
has given inadequate consideration. Without real institutional reforms creating an 
independent and functional administrative framework or judiciary, any 
substantive economic reforms are likely to fall in nascent or vague - the 
tremendous economic success will be held back when ill-designed incentives are 
spoiled or exploited. The transparency requirement scattered in various provisions 
of the WTO Accession Agreement is an elevated burden for China. The uniform 
and impartial administration principle demands the removal of subtle trading 
barriers such as local protectionist practices. More importantly, independent 
judicial review of administrative actions challenges the status quo of slow judicial 
reform in China - requiring that China's courts meet WTO standards of 
independence, impartiality and non-arbitrary enforcement of judgments. 
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China's tax law system is administrative in nature but this characterization is 
complicated by legislative and judicial functions in the tax law. In this sense, the 
tax law reform benefits from as well as is circumvented by the post-WTO legal 
reform. The accession to WTO bounds China calling for transparency, 
consistency, simplicity and certainty in terms of tax legislations at both national 
and local levels. The hierarchical tax administration structure should not impede 
enforcement of tax laws. Uniform and impartial administration of tax regulations 
at various local levels should be improved to a level acceptable to guarantee well-
grounded tax administrative decisions and facilitate tax judicature independence. 
Given the growing awareness of taxpayers' rights, tax authorities should not dwell 
at the stereotype "monitor" position proclaiming obligation to pay tax, rather, a 
workable system of protections should be established and honored. Moreover, the 
tax treatment of the nonprofits sector as the third sector of the society should be 
formulated and enforced. 
China's tax reform cannot be expected to fit any pre-designed, transplanted model. 
The project here is to build a versatile tax system, which takes opportunities to 
streamline, track, and propel economic development. 
II. Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a framework for post-WTO tax law 
reform in China. A historical overview of China's current tax system is an 
important starting point. It sets out the scope from which a reform proposal or 
8 
policy orientation may derive, and ensures that the analyses are historically 
balanced but not constructed to cater to any particular viewpoint or political 
stances. Realistically, this thesis is founded on a theoretical notion of the rule of 
law rhetoric, which provides indispensible background to understand the Chinese 
tax law reform. Moreover, it provides a discussion of the impacts of WTO 
accession on China's legal system construction in general and applications to 
China's tax law reform in specific. In addition to its discussions of the relevant 
historical and theoretical bases of China's tax reform, this thesis provides targeted 
analysis of tax legislation, tax judicature, taxpayer's rights, and tax treatments of 
the nonprofit sector from a comparative law perspective, all considering the 
administrative nature and hierarchical structure of China's tax law system. 
Space limitations preclude detailed analysis of each of the major topics covered in 
this thesis. However, the whole provides a comprehensive discussion on historical 
background, theoretical overview, origins of problems, interpretations of 
proposals, and feasibility of implementation. The thesis employs a mix of 
synopsis and analysis drawn from a wide variety of materials across disciplines 
and jurisdictions. The goal is to bring together threads of legal theories with 
consideration of the realities of China's tax system. This thesis therefore seeks to 
proyide practical understanding of China's tax law system for the sake of further 
reform. 
The selection of topics, rules and standards is not comprehensive. Rather, it aims 
to make connections across different sectors of the tax law system, which have 
been under-discussed or neglected, sometimes from comparative or international 
9 
perspectives. In many parts, it is more than summarizing the limited extant 
literature on the Chinese tax system. The proposals for reform herein are often 
nuanced to suit the current Chinese tax law context and limited to what is 
meaningful, reflective or practical with appreciation of applicability in China's 
actual position. 
III. Limits and Assumptions 
This thesis relies significantly on the common law jurisdiction in cases or 
examples it furnishes and the theories it refers to. This is a typical weakness 
behind the analysis of China's law and legal institutions, although for certain 
ideas the thesis uses Japan or Germany as reference points. This thesis is also 
limited by a dearth of materials in English to certain extent. However, this 
weakness does not undercut the analyses, which reflect a compilation of 
international treaties, surveys and documents discussed. Although this thesis 
covers certain comparative review, it has a strong U.S. emphasis or bias, partly 
because the U.S. tax system provides justification to this thesis and is widely 
valued as one of the best examples of tax system operation and structure. 
Analysis in this thesis is also constrained by a dilemma created by a scarcity of 
available materials on many of the topics covered and a vast overabundance of 
literature on others. In particular, literature on China's tax judicature, taxpayers' 
rights and its nonprofit sector is very limited. However, the rule of law, WTO 
principles, and Chinese legal reform in general are all covered in great depth and 
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breadth. Therefore, this thesis has to selectively lay particular emphasis on 
generally accepted principles or discussions to provide a basis for analysis while 
developing its own analysis of certain of the topics covered. 
The target of this thesis is not to summarize existing literature on specific topics 
or theories. It is also unnecessary to provide detailed tax codes or render exact 
wordings of tax regulations to substantiate the proposals raised herein except 
insofar as they are directly relevant. This thesis also provides a wide survey of 
relevant literature but certain significance references are contained in the 
footnotes. 
IV. Data Analysis 
Before this chapter develops an outline or synopsis of its theories, principles and 
analyses or raises reform proposals on specific tax law topics, it is useful to 
engage a brief empirical survey of relevant data. The short statistical analysis 
below in every means does not pretend to expand topics to be covered in this 
thesis, rather, it aids understanding of the rationales behind the discussion. In this 
sense, the overall circumstances of social and political settings, economy size, 
position in global trading, international voicing power, national treasury scale, 
and composition of tax revenue call for a set of quality proposals in the Chinese 
tax context. 
The past decade of China's economic development is eventfully marked. In 2010, 
China's GDP was valued at approximately $5.87 trillion, surpassing Japan's 
11 
$5.47 trillion, and became the world's second largest economy after the U.S. 
(Figure 1). China's currency reserves came close to approximately $2.82 trillion 
at the end of 2010, about half of which is in U.S. dollars (Figure 2). In 2009, 
China celebrated the 60th birthday of the People's Republic. In 2008, china 
celebrated 30 years of economic growth and the holding of its first Olympic 
Games. Considering China's starting point with a GDP of approximately $60 
billion in 1978 and its intermediate, pre-WTO GDP of approximately $1.15 
trillion in 2001, the enormous economic development is remarkable, and without 
a doubt, the accession to the WTO is a primary contributor in the past decade. 
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After China's accession to the WTO in 2001, its utilized foreign direct investment 
doubled from approximately $46.9 billion in 2001 to approximately $97 billion in 
2010 (Figure 3). Meanwhile, China's trade balance increased about 10 times from 
approximately $22.6 billion to approximately $197 billion by the end of 2010 
(Figure 4) from mostly five largest trading partners including the U.S. and Japan, 
but not the European Union (Figure 5). To this end, given the revenue-wise 
contribution made by China's accession to the WTO, there is a set of legitimate 
reasons to keep the Chinese tax law reforms in line with WTO principles. First, 
China's economic development remains export driven. As probably the largest 
"global" manufacturer and distributor of products, China's tax mix must keep it 
attractive to, for example, the European Union markets. -Second, China's tax 
regime started as FDI-oriented and investment-friendly, however, formulas of tax 
incentives should be adjusted for keeping FDI but circumventing profit transfers 
after exploiting tax preferential policies. Third and more importantly, the tax law 
system should comply with WTO principles or requirements in terms of providing 








II• Total Trade 
(Figure 4) 
China's Top Five Trading Partners: 2009 (billions) 
~I . .. -
I =--=1----•- •--· --
United States Japan Hong Kong South Korea Taiwan 
298.3 228.9 174.9 156.2 106.2 
(Figure 5) 
At the same time, a careful reading of the numbers above reveals that China's tax 
revenues beat out GDP growth. China's tax revenues jumped to $1.17 trillion 
(RMB 7.74 trillion) in 2010,22.64% more than that recorded in 2009 (RMB 6.31 
trillion) and doubled that of2005 (RMB 3.76 trillion) (Figure 6). 
14 
(Figure 6: Tax Revenue vs. GDP, 1990-2010) 
In terms of the composition of tax revenue in overall treasury income in China, 
surprisingly, there is a declining trend since China's accession to the WTO 
(Figure 7). The weight of tax revenue in the treasury dropped from approximately 






f~-· ___ -_-_ ·-··· -- - --- ------~- - --- ----~-------
80.0% 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
11-Weight (Tax/Treasury) 93.4% 93.3% 92.2% 91.5% 90.9% 89.8% 88.9% 88.4% 86.9% 
(Figure 8) 
15 
Meanwhile, such weight displayed a fluctuation due to various factors such as the 
SARS and global financial crises, which influenced exportation and domestic 
needs (Figure 9). There are three major causes in this connection. First, extra-
budgetary revenue such as educational surcharges, urban real estate surcharges 
and tariffs contributed a relatively larger share of the treasury during this period. 
Second, the roaring local real estate market kept a larger share of revenue within 
localities. Certain localities have adopted protectionist local tax exemptions or 
incentives, which also decrease overall tax collection. Third, the redistribution of 
revenue was twisted by an increased focus on low-growth or weak tax-generating 
needs such as urban infrastructures and government expenses. 
On the other side of coin, considering the "smaller government, larger society" 
movement in China since the 1990s, the illustrations show that revenue 
contributed by the non-taxable, or nonprofit, sector now plays a much larger role 
in social wealth distribution. More importantly, it helps reduce the notorious 
expansion of government scale in terms of expenses, benefits of public servants 
and the shrinking allocations for public services. As long as the non-taxable 
nonprofit sector manifests a balance between slightly lower revenue contribution 
and much larger role in reducing government expenses, its development should be 
encouraged with appropriate tax preferential policies. 
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llWeight 
0.0% ;;;-~ -- ----··-
-0.5% ......... 
~· .......-.-o~~~~~~ ~. ··~· -1.0% ;;;·· ~· - ~· -1.5% -
-2 .0% 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
li-e. Weight N/A -0.1% -1.1% -0.6% -0.6% -1 .1% -0.9% -0.5% 
(Figure 9) 
Returning to the tax revenue itself, its composition deserves further analysis, 
which suggests the direction tax law reform may head (Figure 1 0). A few 
observations can be drawn therefrom. First, China's tax revenue is still dominated 
by turnover taxes including the VAT, Business Tax and Consumption Tax. Based 
on the revenue sharing formula between the central and local governments in 
China, any reform of the turnover tax will have important ramifications in terms 
of tax administration and enforcement. Second, the enterprise income tax 
contributes a steadily growing portion of tax revenue after unification and 
simplification. Third, quite different from Western tax jurisdictions, revenue 
contribution made by individual income tax is quite undersized. Fourth, taxpayer 
rights protection and tax judicature reform must consider the impacts they may 








In summary, the overall circumstances of China's economic size, position in the 
world market, trade balance, national treasury scale, and composition of tax 
revenue have dramatically changed over the past three decades, especially after 
China's accession to the WTO ten years ago. The tax law system, although it has 
had some success overhauling in legislation, needs a more tailored and guided 
reform to fulfill challenges from both the WTO and the socialist rule of law in 
which it is embedded. 
V. Outline and Synopsis 
Chapter II 
Chapter II of the thesis provides an overview and analysis of China' s taxation 
system since the establishment of the People's Republic. It sets out the scope and 
rationale for subsequent chapters to develop a formulation of China's tax law 
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system reform. For decades of political, economic and social upheaval and strife, 
China's taxation system is shaped by China's political and economic settings as 
well as is influenced by the western or capitalist ideological raiding (Figure 11 ). 
Chapter II summarizes a two-pronged reform agenda contributed by the Chinese 
tax law system and policies: (1) reforming domestic economic system with 
increased revenue and macroeconomic control, and (2) opening China up to 
outside world. Both prongs are commingled with political concerns of increasing 
social welfare, reducing income disparities and monitoring foreign investment. In 
particular, a key objective is to be internationally competitive, granting various 
tax incentives to promote investment in designated areas or industries but being 
cautiously aggressive in contracting bilateral or multilateral tax treaties with 
trading partners to address foreign investors' concerns regarding double taxation. 
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Chapter II firstly reviews the drastic and recurrent changes experienced by 
China's tax law system in adapting to political-economic philosophies and m 
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strengthening its revenue designation by way of steady incorporation into the 
international tax norms. Mostly, for the Chinese tax context, it discusses the 
evolution from a centralized, planned and closed "socialist economy" to a market 
driven, open economy and then to China's accession to WTO in 2001 and 
thereafter. The tax law system has intertwined with other laws contributing to the 
development of competent and internalized legal institutions in China. Tax mix in 
China, as part of the macroeconomic regulatory system, has its singularity and 
irreplaceable function in adjusting commercial activities of corporate and 
individual taxpayers. It is even said that the tax law field is the only field brought 
in line with and integrated into the international norms. 
Chapter II outlines the evolution of the Chinese tax law system and structures 
shaped by China's socio-economic forces, fiscal and governmental reforms, 
administration reforms, fiscal decentralization, and the implications of its WTO 
accession. It introduces the four broad stages of China's tax law system 
development since 1949: the pre-1978 period (1949-1978); the economic reform 
period (1979-1993); the market economy period (1993-2000); and the post-WTO 
accession period (2001-present). Three major phases of tax law reform in China, 
especially those associated with FDI, enterprise governance modernization and 
legislation consolidation in the 1980s, the indirect tax reform and establishment of 
a revenue sharing system in 1994, the merge of the two-track enterprise income 
tax treatments, and WTO related tax policy adjustments, all have improved the 
structure of Chinese tax law system. Chapter II further emphasizes that China's 
tax system is administrative and hierarchical in nature, therefore, the reform of tax 
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administration would be better targeted by discussing it in specific sectors in the 
Chinese tax law context, such as tax legislation, tax judicature, taxpayers' rights 
and nonprofits tax treatment in this thesis. 
The thesis then discusses social and economic policies that have influenced the 
development of China's tax law system by documenting the framework of 
China's tax law system. In particular, the SOE modernization process is shown to 
have had a decisive impact in structuring the painful process of China's tax law 
reform. 
Chapter II also explores the fiscal decentralization reforms over the past three 
decades and outlines possible reform orientations in tax administration, especially 
regarding how to structure a tax framework for improving efficiency and equity. 
In this connection, China has experienced cycles of fiscal and administrative 
decentralization and recentralization dominated by a socialist legacy and 
alignment of political compromises with a significant consideration for 
transactional costs and budgetary constraints. China's decentralization efforts 
have been endogenous to the centralized, planned economic system featured by 
heavy industrialization development strategy to a market economy-oriented 
revenue sharing scheme with international inputs. Although fiscal decentralization 
for market-oriented reforms helped strengthen provincial and local incentives to 
foster economic growth, it was plagued by impotent central redistributive powers 
and growing interregional inequality. Bearing only a rough articulation of the 
division of intergovernmental expenditure responsibilities and egalitarian fiscal 
transfer provisions, the recentralization since 1994 has significantly impaired 
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local capacity to provide decent public goods and services, and witnessed serious 
local governance issues such as land-requisition-based local GDP growth and 
scattered social unrest. Moreover, tax farming by the central government on the 
one hand fortifies central revenue and authority. On the other hand, 
decentralization allows for the growth of local autonomy in designing local-
friendly tax incentives and flexibility in carrying out centrally authorized tax 
policies. The game of intergovernmental bargaining resulting from this balance of 
power employs the tax administrative hierarchy. Local jurisdictional competition 
for (foreign) investment and local development leads to inefficient and irrational 
local tax concessions such as over-extended contractual land leases for plant 
constructions. It also creates a detrimental fiscal culture of fortifying local GDP 
by concentrating tax levies on only a few tax bases such as real estate 
development and land sale. 
Chapter II notes that China's local autonomy and intergovernmental balance is 
not a westernized federalism model based on separation of powers. Rather, 
decentralization is a regulatory compromise to align different political and 
administrative hierarchies. Since the rural tax was officially repealed in 2004, 
some local governments in agricultural regions have increasingly relied on 
government transfers and off-budgetary revenue sources. Such reductions in local 
tax bases suggests how the central government can provide sufficient transfers 
and also how it can maneuver transfers and end local notions of a soft budget 
constraint without discouraging local resource mobilization. A centralized party-
sate bureaucratic system inevitably leads to a shortage of local government 
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accountability due to the central government's inability to monitor widespread 
corruption and distorted local tax practices. In the long run, a robust tax 
governance system will only result from a more decentralized administrative and 
fiscal system that includes a sound inter-governmental transfer arrangement. Such 
an arrangement must entail wider local political participation and competition 
under free elections, and ultimately, of stronger capital mobility across regions. 
Chapter II further posits that the central-local two-track tax administration is not 
uniformly institutionalized across the nation. Diversity or irregularity in local tax 
administration especially at sub-provincial levels evidences the cooperation or 
competition between local business and governments to evade central control or 
to avoid contributing taxes upward in favor of serving local economic interests. 
Local administrations may lose their incentive to provide locally adequate public 
goods and services as long as more shares of transfers are not assigned for 
specific local needs. Moreover, the inflated but untailored extra-budgetary and 
off-budgetary revenues are a responsive effort to seize more resources outside 
central control and to keep larger tax revenues for local development. Such extra-
budgetary and off-budgetary revenues translate into consequential informality in 
the system, which exacerbates interregional disparity and rampant corruption, and 
therefore inevitably erodes the tax base. 
Chapter II concludes that, the past six decades of tax law reform in China are 
embedded in the context of enormous economic development, ups and downs 
with overall legal reform, a socialist political system, efficiency concerns, tax 
equity considerations, cultural factors, assimilation to internationally accepted 
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accounting standards, and fulfillment of WTO principles and international tax 
norms. This varied context contributed to the evolution of a modem and 
internationalized Chinese tax system, albeit one with Chinese characteristics. The 
tax authorities reshuffled. An ever-growing need for transparent, uniform and 
impartial tax administration pose vital challenges and opportunities for tax reform. 
Tax laws in China, in the first place, are designated to promote revenue collection 
with the hope of enlarging tax bases and improving living standards of citizens 
with sound enforcement and compliance regimes. Meanwhile, the concerns of 
balancing tax treatments of domestic and foreign enterprises and minimizing 
interregional disparities consist of underlying considerations for tax law 
administration, enforcement, and fiscal transfers. Returning to fiscal and 
administrative decentralization, tax farming by the central government increases 
central authority and revenue collection, even as it increases local autonomy by 
allowing local bargaining in an intergovernmental compromise, which can be 
seen as a result of ex ante limiting while developed into a hotbed for ex post 
opportunism. The central-local two-track tax administration system fails to 
institutionalize a framework to manage growing extra-budgetary and off-
budgetary revenues. The abolishment of rural tax and perverse local GDP 
development practices add another layer of complexity to fiscal decentralization 
and transfers. From this perspective, the large scale of China's economy creates 
urgency to adopt fiscal policies and develop China's tax system in terms of 
legislation, administration, judicature and internationalization. 
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Chapter III 
Chapter III summarizes the theoretical debates regarding conceptions of the rule 
of law, the evolution of the Chinese socialist rule of law rhetoric, and progress 
that Chinese legal reform has made to date. In this sense, it attempts to evaluate 
how the rule of law rhetoric has impacted Chinese legal reform, particularly on 
the post-WTO accession framework and the major implications of this impact. 
Because materials on these topics are voluminous, discussion in this chapter is 
cautiously limited to those directly relevant to this thesis. This chapter posits that 
China's legal system, in which China's tax law and its reform are embedded, has 
experienced dynamic evolution and reform in an expansive, novel, and globalized 
fashion for the past three decades in China. However, China's unprecedented, 
ongoing legal reform is intertwined with its enormous economic development, 
and more importantly, burdened by a deep introspective ambivalence on the part 
of its reformers. After ten years of WTO membership, China has rigorously 
overhauled its legal system to a postural stability by incorporating both 
international and domestic norms. 
Chapter III argues that discussions of Chinese legal system development should 
not be ahistorical. China's contemporary legal system is neither fundamentally 
inherited from its imperial tradition nor entirely a western transplant - various 
eventful turning-points in the 20th Century are critical to evaluating the progress 
and troubles arising from China's legal reform. 1° China's adoption of a "Socialist 
10 China endured critical turning points such as massive foreign invasion and semi-colonization 
from the late nineteen century by western forces, republican democratic revolution, various civil 
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Market Economy" in 1992 and "protection of property rights" in 2004 
Amendments to the Chinese Constitution signaled a breakthrough in China's self-
conscious westernization. The CCP also officially endorsed such notions in its 
Party Charter. 11 China's WTO commitments have driven China's immense, if 
disorganized, legal infrastructure increasingly into compliance with a decidedly 
non-Marxist international legal order. 
Chapter Ill introduces the significance of another turning point in Chinese legal 
reform - the triumph of the "rule of law" ("fa zhi" ¥t1i:J) over the "rule of men" 
("ren zhi")di:J). The CCP's commitment to subject itself to law finally offers 
domestic reformers and foreign observers a limited but expanding arena, in an 
authoritarian society, to advocate liberal ideals of limiting the arbitrary use of 
power, establishment of the rule of law, and possibly democratic political reform. 
Market economy development has been a crucial stimulus for creating the rule of 
law in the contemporary Chinese legal system. 12 This is primarily because the 
market economy requires "the establishment of legal rules governing the rights 
and duties of those carrying out transactions." Chapter III also argues that, for the 
past three decades, the Chinese legal system development has focused on 
wars and wars against Japanese fascists, Communist revolution (civil war with the KMT Regime), 
socialist construction and transformation in the 1950s, Cultural Revolution, opening to the outside 
world and consequent globalization, the development of market economy, and accession to the 
WTO, among other major transformations. However, several important elements of China's 
traditional legal system survived this century-and-a-half of uncommon upheaval and 
transformation 
11 Political slogans such as "performing in accordance with international standards" and 
"assimilation or harmonization with international practice" materialized in the official propaganda 
agenda and daily political and legal settings 
12 From Deng's "reform and open door" orientation to its WTO accession in 2001, China has 
arguably implemented a setting in which "acting according to law" is conceived as the "objective 
demand of a socialist market economy." The economic reform, based on autonomy, equality, 
credit and honesty, and fair competition, needs to be maintained primarily by legal tools 
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absorbing westernized legal norms, modernizing legal practice, and conforming to 
the demands of a globalized market-based order. 
Chapter III further suggests that an objective assessment of China's legal reform 
should acknowledge the successes of China's law reforms in laying the 
foundation for constructing the rule of law, albeit ''with Chinese characteristics." 
Notably, China agreed to initiate sweeping reform measures "designed to 
implement the WTO market access, national treatment and transparency standards, 
to protect intellectual property rights, to limit the use of trade-distorting domestic 
subsidies and to make other changes to bring its legal and regulatory system in 
line with those of other WTO members." China has put tremendous effort into 
honoring such commitments. 
Chapter III critically analyzes the rule of law rhetoric developed by western 
jurists and philosophers in order to show the rule of law for the contested concept 
it is. It then questions whether identifying and designing a rule of law model for 
China is necessary. Usually, literature authored by western jurists and theorists 
selectively creates and insinuates a rule of law model into the Chinese legal 
system. This methodological setting is not without merit, but it risks reifying a 
biased and contested standard in mind in advance before making quality 
evaluation. There are a number of debated categorizations of the rule of law 
rhetoric in general and formulations for China's legal system in specific. For 
example, the instrumental and substantive definitions, positivism and natural law 
ideals, the bifurcated thin and thick models, the rule of law - development 
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rhetoric, views of futility in application 13 or radical proponents of overhaul 
reconstruction, all advocate different approaches to developing the rule of law. 
Chapter III submits that conceptualizing a perfect model of rule of law for the 
China's legal system is not practical for its current social, economic, and legal 
settings. Rather, notions of necessary elements of the rule of law are considered 
and suggested as reasonable priorities for China's legal reform. 
Chapter III further presents that democracy is still a sensitive, but not untouchable 
topic in China. It suggests that democracies benefits should be explained and 
arrived at through a practical lens such as a discussion of taxpayer rights. It notes 
that China's rule of law reform has strong inner political, economic and social 
drives and support from top glitterati, a growing middle class, and broader 
constituencies including farmers and low-income groups. However, China does 
not enjoy the luxury of the historical, religious, and philosophical traditions out of 
which western and American models of democracy organically arose. When 
discussing the relationship between democracy and the rule of law, especially in 
the Chinese context, a normative conception of Chinese rule of law should 
13 The legal orientalism rhetoric in part may present an example. It is over the capacity of this 
thesis to detail discussion on legal orientalism given the voluminous theoretical discussion on this 
subject. Therefore, this thesis respectfully disregards the radical and partially distorted 
categorization charged by the legal orientalism rhetoric against Chinese legal system. This thesis 
also respectfully notes that Professor Ugo Mattei now serves as the editor-in-chief, and together 
with Professor Teemu Roskola, owns editorships of the latest (7th) version of the remarkable book 
"Schlesinger's Comparative Law" (2009). For instance, orientalism favored by Professor R. B. 
Schlesinger (Mattei's advisor) by itself is an unsubstantiated concept contaminated by limited 
knowledge of historical civilization development and unfounded ethnocentric discrimination. 
Moreover, the understanding and description of Chinese legal system, ancient or contemporary, 
are inaccurate and intentionally twist deep-rooted morality law in China. Professor Mattei mostly 
advocated the "tripartite taxonomy": rule of professional, rule of political law and rule of 
traditional law, which is contrast with stereotyped common law - civil Jaw bifurcation. Thesis 
fails to accept the notion of"rule oftraditionallaw", to which Mattei purposefully disregard legal 
system diversity and evolution by non-analytically grouping the Islamic legal regimes and most of 
Asian or Confucian-based legal systems together which all bear pre-designed traditional 
orientalism stigma. 
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therefore be confined to discussions of judicial independence, while democracy 
has to be viewed from a historical and developmental perspective. This approach 
may seem over-simplistic, but it is realistic. The rule of law as a political and 
democratic theory should not be exaggerated and abused, and should be used 
carefully in a comparative context. After all, empirically and conceptually, a full-
scale Chinese conversion to a western style of politics and democracy may not 
translate into a stable political and economic order, on which the establishment 
and development of rule of law is conditioned in China. It is difficult to 
substantiate whether a democratic government that might invite social turmoil and 
political chaos is better than failing to implement certain political ideals or 
romanticized legal conceptions, so this thesis will limit its focus to legal and 
judicial reform independent from democratic developments. 
Chapter III tentatively offers the following positions regarding China's legal 
reform. First and foremost, securing the independence of legal system as an 
institution, even in a relatively self-sufficient manner, is the foundation for 
transformation to the rule of law. Political barriers in China are evidently against 
reaching the autonomy ofthe legal system because "political science" and "law" 
conceptions (zhengfa !& $ ) have never been officially separated in the 
governmental reform agenda. One notorious example is the CCP controlled 
"politics and law committee" (zhengfawei !& $ ~ ), which has the highest 
authority in the legal and judicial system administration. In this sense, the Chinese 
legal system as an independent infrastructure promises considerable reform 
opportunities. Second, transparency and public accountability are normative 
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catalysts for promoting the publicity oflaws, judicial decisions and administrative 
processes. The very limited success of "law dissemination campaigns" (pufa 
yundong l1ff $ill iW) and the prevalence of "black box" practices including 
"backstage operations", affiliated trading and secret deals all have plagued the 
legal system in China. Third, the independence of the judicial system and the 
autonomy of legal professionals, especially those presiding in lower courts, are 
threatened by many sources. Finally, the sensitive role of human rights in China's 
rule of law development should be addressed in a flexible and realistic manner. 
Although the Chinese government claims that it acknowledges and respects 
meaningful, universally accepted human rights and values, it caveats that cultural, 
economic, historical and social facts must be accounted for in order to understand 
and to honor basic human rights. China's government with political withering and 
ideological rigidity has to identify a balanced and healthy relationship among 
goals of economic development, human rights protection, and related substantive 
norms of the rule oflaw. Human rights can be interpreted in various ways, but at a 
minimum level- for example, a citizen's ability to contribute to and benefit from 
the economic behaviors she chooses - a citizen has the right to know into which 
area her taxes go and how they are distributed. Flexible and strategic 
interpretations of human rights can therefore be a boon to efficient administration 
and contract enforcement protection. Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, a 
list of pragmatic and proactive taxpayers' rights walks a middle ground on the 
issue ofhuman rights, which is both morally defensible and politically viable. 
Chapter III concludes by examining the often-paradoxical forces exerted on 
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China's rule of law development - historical roots, ideological interferences, 
economic development, and dynamic reforms in the past thirty years. China's 
young modem legal system suffers from infrastructural deficiencies, domestic 
political intrusions, understaffing, and difficult demands from the outside world. 
But it has already embraced many traditional rule of law characteristics, albeit in a 
somewhat unique socialist rearticulation, respectfully acknowledging universal 
basic human rights, creating room for scholastic submissions and debates, and 
more importantly, inviting foreign observation and attempting compliance with 
international norms. Chapter III further shows that, despite valid critiques, 
Chinese legal system does embody both a normative and an instrumental sense, 
which must be respected and accommodated. Solutions and upgrades are essential 
to tackle technical misidentification, but implementation (zhixingf}L :f]) and 
enforcement have priorities in nursing difficulties arising at all times. When 
outlining a meaningful tax law reform structure, an objective assessment of 
China's historical, political and social traditions is necessary for targeted, 
objective and meaningful promotion of China's rule of law construct. 
Chapter IV 
Chapter IV assesses the impacts of the accession to the WTO on China's legal 
reform in general. The analyses continue those in Chapter III by considering the 
normative impact of WTO accession in order to better understand the factors 
underlying China's post-WTO tax law system reform. The objective of this 
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chapter is twofold: (1) presenting the progress that has been made to bring China 
in line with WTO principles and China's commitments; and (2) considering the 
extent to which the elements of the rule of law rhetoric and the WTO setting 
together may impact China's legal reforms. 
Chapter IV posits that China, overall, benefits from its accession to the WTO. The 
benefits encompass productive reforms in many aspects driven by accession to the 
supervisory and adjudicative oversight of the WTO. The Protocol contains 
extraordinary concessions in terms of intensifying economic reforms, improving 
administrative efficiency and transparency, localizing international norms, and 
removing trade barriers. In many respects, China accepted much higher and 
carefully calculated accession standards than any other WTO member state. 
Analytically, the accession to the WTO is driven by political reliance on external 
forces and international outreach to sustain economic development and foster 
global competitiveness in Chinese industries. China's post-accession development 
is also coupled with serious issues such as cross-region disparities, fluctuating 
trade scales, financial market turbulence, an irregular labor force, overheated local 
infrastructure construction, environmental degradation and shortages of natural 
resources. China's continuous endeavor to overhaul its legal system in preparation 
for and compliance with the accession is obvious including a completed pre-WTO 
massive legislative clean-up and marvelous resources engaged in promulgating 
new WTO-compliant laws for a national and local synchronization of WTO 
practices. On the other hand, the integration into the globalized trading system 
also brings in heightened complaints over perceived violations of national 
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treatment and fair competition in terms of protectionism, economic nationalism 
and profit transfer constraints. Following the WTO principles, China's legal 
reform embodies a long list of international pursuits and domestic ambitions, 
which would better its participation in the international legal order and realization 
of domestic legal reform targets. Moreover, the scope of China's undertaking of 
WTO obligations and principles is remarkable and unprecedented. Improving 
market access and fulfillment of WTO principles requirements obligates China's 
market economy development to conform to international standards through its 
legal system to a much greater degree. This swift liberalization process has 
brought dynamic yet astringent changes and reforms to China's legal system in 
many areas. 
Chapter IV further argues that China's WTO accession impacts its tax law reform 
in several ways. First, China's market economy designation is not acknowledged 
by a few major economies such as the U.S. and EU. Certain "WTO-plus" 
obligations requiring market economy behavior, foreign investment, and domestic 
governance may complicate the legal reform as those provisions contain 
discriminatory measures against Chinese exports. Second, the jurisdictional reach 
of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism requires that China develop its 
capacity to litigate before the WTO Appellate Body as well as adept participation 
of international legal order. Gradually dropping its passive approach to 
international participation, China has been diplomatic in resolving trade crises 
with its trading partners. The Chinese government, on one hand, takes cooperative 
steps with domestic enterprises in resolving discrepancies before cases are 
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submitted against China under the WTO, but it also preemptively initiates 
complaints to seek protection of its own national interests against peer WTO 
members, mostly the U.S. and EU. Third, fulfillment of China's commitments 
also invites the fore issues of domestically financed competition with FDI. 
National treatment requirements have given rise to demands by domestic 
enterprises to enjoy privileges usually enjoyed exclusively by foreign 
investments, but overall China's approach remains focused on attracting foreign 
investment. It is also observed that, after "spoiling" FDI for thirty years, China 
increasingly imposes tightened controls to monitor the foreign investment in 
terms of quality, performance, and eliminating local graft. As per the TRIMs, to 
liberate capital mobility and promote free trade, China must eventually eliminate 
performance requirements or supervisory measures on technology transfers, 
foreign exchange, and R&D acts. Meanwhile, China earnestly honors its market 
access commitment by culling the list of restricted industries. All these impacts of 
WTO accession contribute to a well-rounded legal framework from which to 
conduct reform in specific areas of law including the tax law. A key example is 
the enactment of the new Enterprise Income Tax law, which unifies treatments for 
foreign and domestic enterprises. Fourth, the accommodation to FDI aggregates 
an overhaul of the trade law framework, which is more directly associated with 
the WTO regime. The Chinese government did significant work in upgrading the 
trade laws with pragmatism and essentialism, such as substantially reducing 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers, enacting a new Foreign Trade Law and full-scale 
legislative suite to conform to its TRIPs obligations. Implications for the tax law 
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in this context are vividly apparent, but in many aspects tax law reforms start 
from the trade law regime and end with a better-formulated statutory framework. 
Fifth, the normative implications of the WTO accession are not limited to the 
trade regime. Although the WTO system does not demand a well-established 
modem or westernized legal system, it requires various key features of such a 
system, which directly impact the tax laws reform. The requirement of 
transparency applies to all aspects of the legal system. Although foreign investors 
are plagued by concerns as to transparency in making commercial and operational 
decisions, observers should be optimistic regarding the prospect of refining 
transparency in legislation, administration and procedural compliance. Another 
normative value is the uniform and impartial administration of laws. Because the 
Chinese legal system generally inherits the imperial tradition of the over-reaching 
arm of the state and people still typically have a consciousness of obedience, 
compliance with this norm in large part depends on the political determination of 
central and local governments to honor it by, for example, instituting a reporting 
system to eliminate noncompliance. Judicial review is also an established 
compliance requirement- an independent, effective and true judicial authority is 
essential to remedy discretionary administrative actions. It is not realistic for 
China to set up an American style system of judicial review, however compliance 
with the WTO judicial review requirement should be prioritized to ensure 
impartiality and uniformity in administration, and to foster judicial independence 
and the competency of judges. 
Chapter IV further specifies that WTO accession as a whole has two major 
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impacts on China's tax law system. First are the direct implications of WTO 
commitments in specific tax law legislation and administrations. In particular, tax 
issues such as export subsidies, tariff or non-tariff barriers, and FDI related tax 
matters based on principles including the national treatment and most-favored-
nations commitments will directly impact tax reform. This implication is 
relatively straightforward and identifiable. Jurisprudentially, even those trade-
related laws that might ,not directly implicate the tax laws may have far-reaching 
and frequent encounters with the tax laws. For example, intellectual property 
protections under TRIPs invite a full set of tax considerations on transfer pricing 
and international technology transfer. Therefore, the second prong goes to 
comprehensive or normative changes in the tax law area in terms of substantive 
characteristics of the rule of law, such as transparency, uniformity, impartiality, 
judicial review and procedural justice, which once were hard to insert into the tax 
system. Although this part of the ramifications should not be exaggerated or over-
romanticized, it bears significant jurisprudential value to incorporate them into 
studies of specific sectors of Chinese legal reform -such as the tax law. In this 
sense, the overall tax law structure including tax legislation, tax judicature, 
taxpayers' rights and tax treatment in the NGO sector is considered. 
Chapter IV further summarizes that the impact of WTO accession on the rule of 
law development in China is profound. The force of WTO principles and rules is 
sharp and straightforward in conforming China to both instrumental and 
substantive conceptions of the rule of law: legal institutions, transparency, 
uniformity, impartiality, judicial independence, limited government, and a culture 
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seasoned with "common law" principles of stare decisis, and judicial review. In 
this sense, the WTO system and the rule of law order are meaningfully 
intertwined to incorporate positivist implications to the Chinese legal system, in 
which the tax laws reform is embedded. 
Chapter V 
Chapter V involves a detailed discussion of post-WTO tax legislation reform 
based on discussions in chapters II, III and IV. Considering the administrative 
nature of China's tax law system, tax legislation manifests the impacts of the 
WTO principles and the rule of law in a straightforward and formal manner. For 
tax legislation, China is unique in a number of respects as the largest developing 
economy and a communist sovereign. Chapter V further points out that the 
voluminous literature on the WTO's implication for China's legal reform usually 
falls in to one of two traps - either fantasizing about the WTO's capacity to 
overhaul the whole Chinese legal system or by imagining the CCP out of China's 
political reality. Some are more instrumentally oriented by fine-texturing details 
in specific areas of law such as transplanting banking regulations or 
environmental protection measures. As it applies to the area of tax laws, Chapter 
V suggests that all these paradigmatic discourses are wrong. 
Chapter V acknowledges that the traditional distinction between trade law and tax 
law is vague under multilateral trading agreements such as the WTO. Meanwhile, 
the line between tax administration and tax legislation is somewhat blurred in 
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China. Chapter V further submits that the Chinese tax law reform embodies the 
WTO principles in a visible but constrained manner, however, the normative 
value targeted and contributed by those WTO principles would accommodate the 
tax law reform for the rule of law construct effectively - it richly applies to tax 
legislation which is embedded in the tax law system of administrative nature. 
Chapter V draws two inferences for the Chinese tax legislation framework. First, 
starting from the pre-WTO massive regulation clean-up, tax legislation reform is 
particularly evident in trade related areas, such as lowering tariffs or non-tariff 
barriers, turnover tax reformulation, income tax compliance updates, and 
transplantation of international tax practices. Without any doubt, this aspect of tax 
legislation is popular for scholars concentrating on WTO or trade related areas. 
Although certain tax legislation updates are not ideal or are subject to fairly 
constant change, tax laws generally remain stable and enforceable. Second, 
modem tax thoughts should be adopted in a more vibrant way. For example, 
advanced pricing agreements for curbing tax evasion should be employed or the 
actual enterprise tax payment should be lowered. It is not without merit or 
political substantiation to take cautious steps in transplanting modem tax 
conceptions; however, such vigilance might be better achieved by experimental 
practices in appropriate localities or industry lines. Given China's marvelous 
expansion in revenue collection over the past three decades, the time is ripe to 
introduce reform measures on certain types of taxes. Another dissonance in tax 
legislation is the irregular orientation of tax administrative documents. Local tax 
administrative rulings, notices or directives are out of true "legislation", however, 
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the administrative nature and centralization efforts somewhat validate the 
enforcement of local tax legislation given China's nascent tax judicature system. 
Chapter V also briefs the binding tax-related provisions of the WTO Agreement 
in terms of the nondiscrimination principles and the dispute settlement 
procedures, but it divides its discussion into normative and formal implications. 
Chapter V argues that the tax law system is not isolated; rather, it intertwines with 
other sectors of law. The normative impact of WTO agreements on China's tax 
legislation interlaces China's tax system with more general areas of legal reform. 
Tax legislation also contributes to improving tax administration and protection of 
taxpayers' rights through the Tax Collection Law, which sets forth clear rules for 
combating inconsistency in tax collection and promoting transparency to assure 
predictable tax consequences of transactional behaviors. In addition, it requires an 
improved tax judicature system to review tax administrative decisions and 
legislative actions. In particular, the binding effects of the WTO agreements 
manifests in three WTO principles: transparency, impartial and uniform 
administration, and judicial review. 
Chapter V suggests that the transparency principle raises three separate issues: (1) 
secrecy and lack of transparency in the tax legislation system partially stem from 
China's basic hierarchical organization structure. The process of tax legislation as 
to policy orientation and opinion collection should be open to public review 
before final promulgation; (2) although the SAT released the "New Measures for 
Normative Documents," reckless or manipulative inconsistency or irregularities in 
local tax legislation in different localities still creates ambiguity; (3) intervention 
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from other administrative apparatuses at different hierarchical levels also 
complicates tax legislation reform by issuing overlapping and less formal notices 
and supplemental circulars. 
The uniform and impartial administration requirement sets a high standard for 
China's tax legislation: (1) tax authorities usually suffer from insufficient 
discretionary capacity to administer ill-designed tax laws: those drafted in vague 
terms and those of too much details with narrow applicability; (2) modem 
legislative techniques are missing in local tax legislation, which leads to a 
proliferation of overlapping, repetitive, ambiguous or contradictory tax laws at 
various hierarchical levels of government; (3) various extra-legal factors impede 
the neutral and righteous implementation of tax laws, such as political 
intervention, corruption oflocal tax officials, and local protectionism; (4) China's 
favorable economic policies toward coastal areas create unbalanced uniformity 
and predictability. Given the political stakes put on local economic performance, 
many ill-drafted, ambiguous and contradictory tax laws and regulations are 
enforced for local benefit, which causes disparity and unpredictability. 
The judicial review requirement creates its own specific issues in the Chinese tax 
context. A key concern is the amount of independence that China's judges can 
exert to review and correct tax administrative decisions. 
Chapter V further details implications of the national treatment and the most-
favored-nation principles. First, certain inconsistencies with the national 
treatment principle are diagnosed even after a few major tax legislative pieces 
came into place in the decade after WTO accession. However, the irregular 
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treatments for Chinese domestic enterprises may be validated. The benchmark is 
that the national treatment principle by and large serves to restrict, not to enlarge 
state's taxing powers. Second, while China has made tremendous efforts in its tax 
legislation to accord with the MFN principle, even the definitions of many key 
words or commonly accepted practices thereunder are subject to broad 
interpretation. Two inferences are made based on a mix of different tax treatments 
towards FIBs and DEs: (1) the economic structure and development priorities 
incentivize flexible treatment of specific industry lines. Tax preferential measures 
are direct and enforceable without necessarily resulting in discrimination; (2) 
complaints from foreign investors over non-transparent government procurement 
processes may simply be a response to the fact that preferential treatments are not 
available to foreign investors in negotiated procedures with competition bidding 
for government contracts. The tax implication of the government procurement 
process is not given enough attention according to the MFN principle of 
eliminating barrier to facilitate the mobility of goods and services among member 
countries. 
Chapter V then considers, from a formal perspective, the impacts of WTO 
accession to China's tax legislation system at length. In particular, rules and 
principles of WTO Agreements call for China's turnover tax, enterprise income 
tax and individual income tax legislation and reform to incorporate non-
discrimination principles and the transparency requirement to a significant extent. 
However, a careful review of tax legislations in China reveals that some basic 
elements of the instrumentalist concept of the rule of law are missed. This is 
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specifically evident in the liT legislation reform, which is in need of immediate 
attention - Chapter V provides a detailed account of current drawbacks and 
related reform proposals. Meanwhile, even the 2008 EIT Law contains modem 
tax concepts, it remains unclear how to realize both tax equity and efficiency by 
balancing central and local tax authorities. Another aspect of Chinese tax 
legislative reform is setting up a tax administration system with efficiency with 
internalized rules and structure. 
Chapter V further contends that the WTO regime has limitations in pushing tax 
legislative reforms. Although the WTO principles and rules impose constraints 
such as the adoption of export subsidies and enforcement of AB decisions, a 
member country may, by literally complying with WTO principles, provide same 
economic benefit by manipulating domestic tax policies. Lessons learnt from the 
US FSC/ETI and the Sino-US semiconductor cases exemplify the inherent 
weakness of the WTO for compelling substantive tax reform. 
Chapter V concludes that the tax legislation reform has endured a painful process 
of simplification, unification and the revenue sharing scheme. Tax legislation 
started as FDI driven and incentive-focused, and so the structure of tax legislation 
was imbalanced from the very beginning without honoring tax equity and 
efficiency. For example, the dual-track enterprise income tax system for aroused 
frustration from both DEs and FIEs. The design of liT Law does not manifest 
revenue contribution and social wealth redistribution as it should be. Even as 
turnover taxes dominate tax revenue in China, the structure of VAT and Business 
Tax is still plagued by a few fundamental issues such as the transition to a 
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consumption type VAT. Chapter V further summarizes that China's tax 
legislation reform is complicated under WTO Agreements and the rule of law 
order. In particular, rules and principles of WTO Agreements call for China's 
turnover tax, enterprise income tax and individual income tax legislation and 
reform to incorporate non-discrimination principles and the transparency 
requirement. 
Chapter V further shares and agrees with Avi-Yonah's proposal that, answers to 
fine-tune China's tax legislation system might be found in an international tax 
arena through a multilateral solution. It is essential that the fundamental goals of 
taxation and WTO principles should be achieved in terms of revenue collection, 
social wealth redistribution, transparency, uniform and impartial administration, 
and judicial review. Equally important is to incorporate elements of the rule of 
law order as well as to integrate China's tax legislation with an international 
persp~ctive of facilitating development and institutionalization of the tax system. 
Chapter VI 
Chapter VI continues along the same lines as Chapter V to analyze another sector 
of China's tax laws- the tax judicature reform. This chapter is disadvantaged by 
the scarcity of materials available in relevant topics. Similar to other chapters, the 
administrative nature of China's tax system encourages the preference to 
incorporate related tax administration topics in this chapter. The Chinese tax 
judicature is a complicated interaction between three objects of study: tax 
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administration, the general Chinese judicial setting, and taxpayer rights. Tax 
judicature reform is not an isolated undertaking. China's tax law framework has 
its peculiarities. The role of tax judicature should not be prolonged for 
overhauling the whole tax law arena or be left until the end of the tax reform. 
Flaws and institutional propensities of China's judicial system translated into the 
tax judicature must be carefully examined and evaluated. All tax judicature 
reform proposals must be proactively reviewed in light of the judicial institution 
in China. Under China's socialist legal system construct, the tax judicature should 
ground itself in honoring the rule of law order emphasizing a fair, transparent, 
certain, consistent, equitable, effective, and clear consideration of cases before it. 
Meanwhile, the WTO principles of transparency, uniformity and impartiality and 
judicial review should be incorporated to the utmost extent with a set of niceties 
and convenient courses of action, even those principles might not directly apply to 
the tax judicature. Overall, "China's tax judicature should account for China's 
social and economic development settings before introducing pragmatic reform 
proposals" .14 
In general, the tax judicature structure consists of two layers: the dispute 
settlement between tax authorities and taxpayers as to an assessment of tax; and if 
a settlement is not achieved, a tax lawsuit is presented to a court against such tax 
administrative decision. Different from a common law system such as the United 
States, tax controversies in China are mostly litigated as administrative cases, 
supplemented by civil and criminal proceedings as necessary. The awkwardly 
14 See Xu Shanda Zhongguo Shuiquan Yanjiu [China Tax Jurisdiction Research] 6, (China 
Taxation Press, 2004) 
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small number of tax-wise lawsuits in China makes the tax judicature reform one-
sided. That is to say, Chinese tax authorities dominate related reform proposals 
while taxpayers are quite noiseless in initiating advanced rights protection. 
Meanwhile, there is a legitimate need to advance the reform in terms of fulfilling 
the WTO principles that China has committed under the socialist rule of law 
construct. 
Chapter VI suggests that China's tax judicature system falls in the general 
judiciary framework permeated with controversies and deficiencies. Paralleled 
with alleged shortage of administrative impartiality, judicial review and a system 
of elaborated rights, remedies and procedures for taxpayers would be of little 
merit in the absence of an independent, impartial and competent judiciary in 
general. The reality is that the independence of Chinese tax judiciary was 
inextricably linked to or disadvantaged by the system of formal courts. The 
independence of the China's judiciary sector has been notoriously plagued by the 
judges' insecurity of tenure as well as the judiciary's own traditions of 
knowledge, integrity and technique and the law of contempt. Therefore, the ideal 
undertaking that China's tax judicature properly exercises its jurisdiction 
presupposes at least three broad intertwined features: technical competence; 
commitments to the rule of law; and finally; institutionalized independence 
embracing domestic causes and international demands such as the WTO 
principles. Regrettably, all these three factors are neither substantiated nor even 
straightforwardly identifiable. 
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Chapter VI further sets out three parts analyzing the following questions for 
China's tax judicature reform before contributing a few reform proposals: What is 
the procedure for administrative and judicial appeal and how predictable for the 
taxpayer to process a reasonable case? Is all or a portion of the tax to be paid 
pending appeal, and if so, how secured the taxpayer is in obtaining relief from this 
requirement? Is there any realistic need to establish a judicial tribunal for tax 
cases specifically, if so, why and in which format? Is the appeal process impaired 
by corruption? 
For the first part, Chapter VI discusses the rationales for structuring the tax 
judicature system as it is. Chinese tax judicature reform is substantiated by 
various legitimate drives. The administrative law reform expects tax authorities' 
discretion to be efficiently limited by a functional judicial review process. 
Taxpayers' awareness raises the request to find a more taxpayer-friendly and just 
judicial setting for rights protection. At the same time, legislations in the tax areas 
are comprehensive, verbose, and arcane, and thus embrace an assimilation of a 
sophisticated judicature system. More importantly, the market economy and the 
rule of law order urge the tax judicature to accommodate diversified economic 
interests and social needs in a fair, impartial, accessible, efficient and clear-cut 
manner. Pressures from international interests such as the WTO principles raise 
the bar high for Chinese tax judicature reform according to transferable practice 
from other tax jurisdictions. In addition, a tax judicature system contributes 
competitive advantages to Chinese overall economic setting in keeping foreign 
investments and improving revenue collection. 
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For the second part, Chapter VI imports a comparative approach to expand and 
justify potential proposals for China's tax judicature reform. It submits that there 
is no uniform model that could be globally applied in tax judicature system. It 
discusses the U.S. tax judicature system but does not initially aim to furnish a 
critical review of the U.S. judicial model. Rather, a few factors in the U.S. tax 
judicature system are identified and put together as reference to submit a 
meaningful proposal catering to potential reform needs of China's tax judicature 
system. In particular, Chapter VI offers a selectively tailored description of the 
U.S. tax judicature system where taxpayers and the tax authorities share similar 
concerns. Those concerns are the discretion ofthe court, timelines, cost-efficiency, 
complexity of the issue, settlement potential, trial and appeals. And these 
takeaways should be considered under the general framework of the judicial 
system, overall financial capacities and social policy needs. 
For the second part, Chapter VI further describes three co-existing factions of 
thoughts to exemplify current "wretched" debates in terms of the imaginary 
Chinese tax court system: oppositionists, supporters and a midlist view, but each 
has its merits and drawbacks. Equally important is that they share a few similar 
reform proposals such as removal of the pre-trail administrative reconsideration 
and abolishment of the full-payment rule. Overall, the oppositionists prefer a mild 
but pointed plea without inviting an overhaul of the current system. The 
supporters, on the other hand, are more aggressive or optimistic to take the tax 
court as a rare breakthrough opportunity to reform both the judicial system and 
tax administration framework. A middle ground midlist but slacker view looks 
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good at the first glance, but its transitory nature and over-conformism misidentify 
a few key considerations in the construct. Again, this chapter notes that there is no 
right or wrong answer to the speculative pursuit of upgrading the tax judicature 
reform. The establishment of the tax court system co-opted for political and social 
policy pursuits rather a solemn focus on the Chinese legal reform agenda. 
For the third part, Chapter VI discusses the "triple whammy" embarrassments of 
Chinese tax judicature reform, i.e. deficiencies in the three pillars of tax judicature: 
tax administration, the Chinese general judicial situation and taxpayers' rights. 
Historical improvements of the Chinese tax judicature system were an irregular 
adaptation of the general administrative procedures in the tax context, a lack of 
thoughtful attention to taxpayers and intractable interference from political and 
administrative intricacies. The tax dispute resolution system uncontrollably takes 
over and absorbs similar problematic deficiencies of the general administration 
judicature framework into which it is embedded. Therefore, the Chinese tax 
judicature reform primarily falls into two prongs: the peculiarities built in the tax 
system and the upgrade of the overall Chinese judiciary reform for dispute 
resolution. Due to space limitations, Chapter VI focuses on the first prong, i.e., 
the flaws and debates about the current tax judicature; and to a much less extent 
the second prong, i.e., the competence, autonomy and independence of Chinese 
judiciary in general. In terms of peculiarities, Chapter VI summarizes that 
Chinese tax disputes generally includes two strides: tax administrative 
reconsideration and tax administrative litigation. However, the tax judicature 
system is plagued by a few flaws in practice. The condition of the pre-trial tax 
48 
administrative reconsideration renders tax authorities' discretion too expansive to 
avoid arbitrary administration. The full payment requirement for disputes arising 
from tax collection holds scarce jurisprudential substantiation and receives 
vehement criticism from both judges and scholars. Moreover, due to limited 
number of less complex tax cases (Figure 12) accepted by the administration court, 
the competence of judges in tax laws is not markedly improved, nor is the 
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(Figure 12) 
All these defects, coupled with tax authorities adamant efforts to increase revenue 
collection, call for an upgrade of the Chinese tax judicature reform from three 
respects: 
fil Chapter VI shows that tax judicature reform IS a legitimate need of 
Chinese tax administration, which composes probably the foremost pillar 
in structuring modernization of China's tax system. In China, tax law 
remains heavily reliant on tax administration. The enforcement and 
reconsideration of adverse decisions of the tax administration are 
inherently hierarchical. Subordinate tax officials' position in tax 
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administrative hierarchy determines that superior's reconsideration is the 
simplest, direct or the most cost-efficient manner to seek reliefs. 
Therefore, tax administrative reconsideration has its tradition within 
China's general administration framework. China does not have a court 
hearing tax cases only; rather, the administration tribunal within the 
People's Court system is the only available channel to seek judicial 
remedies. Taxpayers' position therefore is disadvantaged given the 
dominance and authority of tax administrations. In spite of various 
prescribed rights, taxpayers are hindered in filing tax disputes against tax 
authorities in terms of procedure, financial capacity and political pressure. 
Chapter VI then summarizes that tax administration has failed the tax laws 
reform in a few ways despite progress it has made. ( 1) The irregular local 
enforcements of tax laws and regulations applicable nationwide creates 
discrepancies, which invite tax disputes. Moreover, provincial and local 
tax bureaus are entitled with too expansive discretion in handling tax 
collection and dealing with taxpayers. (2) The expertise and independence 
of tax authorities are subject to challenge and improvement in many ways. 
The dualism of superior and subordinate tax officials may make taxpayers' 
claims seem futile and impractical. Records of such hierarchical internal 
communication such as reports, requests, instructions and directives were 
mostly kept out of pubic availability. Therefore, taxpayers' right to know 
is severely discounted by tax authorities' persuasion to encourage a 
settlement. (3) Tax administration's resourcefulness and commitment to 
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preventing tax controversies cause distortions in the system. The issue is 
how committed it is to honoring taxpayers' legitimate requests. Advance 
ruling, in this sense, exemplifies one of the cost-efficient approaches 
available to tax administrations. 
Q} Chapter VI also expands discussion on the tax judicature through the lens 
of judicial review - the second pillar. In this connection, the rule of law 
order in terms of judicial review 15 requires that only an ordinary court can 
punish criminals but equality must be guaranteed regardless of social, 
economic, or political status in terms of substance and procedure. Raz 
further details that uniformity, independence, transparency and procedural 
justice should be established in the judicial review construct towards a rule 
of law order. Meanwhile, an independent, effective and true judicial 
authority is essential to compliance with China's WTO commitments. The 
Protocol mandates the establishment of tribunals, contact points and 
procedures for the prompt review of all administrative actions relating to 
the implementation of the laws, regulations, judicial decisions, and 
administrative rulings of general application referred to in the WTO rules. 
Obviously, the tribunals must be independent of administrative organs and 
thus are required to be "impartial and independent of the agency entrusted 
with administrative enforcement and shall not have any substantial interest 
in the outcome of the matter." The tribunals may be administrative or 
judicial, however, right to appeal must be granted if the case is originally 
submitted for an administrative review following due process. 
15 See generally Albert Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885). 
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Chapter VI further notes that judicial review of tax administrative 
discretion is doctrinal. Tribunals hearing tax cases with judicial review 
power should examine tax authorities' actions that are incompatible with 
the constitution, written tax laws and regulations, and related procedures. 
Meanwhile, the tax judicature system is a key component of modem tax 
governance. Since China does not embody a polity of separation of powers, 
the tax judicature is a strong impetus for improving the general judiciary 
system associated with the Party-state's hierarchy of administration 
structures. However, expectations of the role of the tax judicature must be 
realistic. The tax context has its peculiarities and is colored by a pragmatic 
bent in Chinese legislation and administration. 
Chapter VI then reviews, to a limited extent, flaws in the general judicial 
review system in China that are attached to China's tax judicature 
deficiencies. First is the non-uniformity of tax law application. Distorted 
understanding and peculiarities of the tax laws and locality self-interests 
create non-uniform adjudication of tax disputes. Cross-jurisdiction 
irregularity in judgment may be brought against the same taxpayer and 
lead to jurisdiction shopping for tax adjudicators. However, there is a 
possibility to reach national uniformity under the supervision of the 
Supreme People's Court and the SAT. Second regards political 
intervention under the aegis of supervision from the local People's 
Congress and local tax authorities. Third it considers impartiality in terms 
of the flawed disparity in favor of tax administration in the adjudication 
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practice. A few factors contribute to such a disparity such as assignment of 
the burden of proof, merits of tax cases, litigation experience and 
techniques, and over-expansive discretion enjoyed by the tax 
administration. Fourth involves in the tax expertise of local tribunal 
judges. Deficiency of tax expertise is caused by weakened training, 
shortage and irregularities of the caseload, and dominance of expertise 
concentrated within the tax administration. Fifth goes to the arguably 
narrow scope of judicial review in the tax context. This flaw has two parts: 
(l) the scope should include abstract administrative acts such as local tax 
rulings, notices and directives, if they clearly violate laws of higher 
authority; and (2) tax disputes derived from uncontrolled, over-meticulous 
and voluminous local tax administration acts should not be 
unconditionally filed. The "case-merit control" should be incorporated but 
not limited to an upgraded pre-trial tax administrative reconsideration 
"filter". 
£). Chapter VI also includes a very brief discussion of taxpayers' rights, third 
and last cornerstone of a robust tax judicature framework. 16 As to China's 
tax judicature reform, the most substantive reforms concern taxpayers' 
right to know, right to plead, right to a fair hearing and right to appeal. The 
right to know guarantees predictability of tax consequences after a 
taxpayer learns details of applicable tax laws and regulations. The right to 
plead refers to tax authorities' responsibility to explain details and 
evidences for reaching an adverse decision against a taxpayer. The right to 
16 See infra Chapter VII for details on the protection oftaxpayers' rights in China. 
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a fair hearing envisions a process in which taxpayers and tax authorities 
can present arguments during a pre-trial process. Usually, this happens 
when an administrative reconsideration is filed. The right to appeal is the 
last resort that a Chinese taxpayer may rely on; however, in many cases it 
leads to a settlement between the taxpayer and tax authorities. To this end, 
the issue centers on the realization of taxpayers' protections but not those 
listed in legal documents. 
Chapter VI further reminds that it might be overly cynical to understate 
the progress and merits as to rights protection present in China's tax 
system even if some frustrations of taxpayers' rights protection do exist. 
Overall, China's tax system still provides a formulated, yet promising, 
framework to channel available legal remedies, administrative and judicial, 
for taxpayers. In particular, the administration lawsuits filed by taxpayers 
attain more respect and identification all the time, although such 
awareness is discounted by the "non-contentious" or "settlement-preferred" 
culture in China. 
Chapter VI then contributes the theoretical and details of a few proposals for 
China's tax judicature after discussing the "triple whammy". Mostly, Chapter VI 
structures these proposals based on the following theoretical analysis: (I) the tax 
context is particular. The tax judicature's role therefore should not be exaggerated 
in overhauling or extending to the whole tax law field. (2) Flaws and established 
settings of China's judicial framework translated into the tax law must be 
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carefully examined and evaluated. (3) The tax judicature should ground itself in 
the rule of law order emphasizing a fair, transparent, certain, consistent, 
equitable, effective, and clear consideration. (4) The WTO principles of 
transparency, uniformity and impartiality and judicial review should be fulfilled 
to the utmost extent possible, even those principles might not directly apply to the 
tax context. 
Chapter VI submits the following proposals for China's tax judicature reform (1) 
Similar to many other tax scholars, I contend that the full-payment rule should be 
abolished. For an adverse tax collection decision, a taxpayer does not need to pay 
the assessed payment or provide guarantee at the first place before filing an 
application for a tax administrative reconsideration. (2) This thesis contributes the 
novel notion that a summary judgment procedure should be established for small 
tax cases as a tax collection procedure. Summary judgment has several 
advantages: keeping the current reconsideration procedure untouched, promoting 
tax expertise of judges, lower burden of proof, Jess discovery practice, relatively 
cooperative procedural standards at trial. (3) China should design a better scheme 
for administrative reconsideration, but the structure must be calculated and 
designed. (4)Tax expertise can be strengthened by teaming up more experienced 
personnel with specialty in tax. (5) At county or lowest hierarchical government 
levels, abstract administrative acts should be subject to judicial review, and this 
reform may start as experimental at a few coastal localities with better tax talents. 
(6) Echoing the debates regarding the imaginary Chinese tax court system, this 
chapter submits a tentative proposal. The desirable structure is to adopt a circuit 
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tax courts framework exercising both original (conditioned first instance) and 
appellate jurisdiction sitting permanently in six to eight regions covering 
nationwide territory and reporting to the SPC Tax Tribunal based in Beijing. The 
designated High Tax Tribunal should be an SPC subsidiary and should have the 
ultimate appellate jurisdiction over tax cases appealed at circuit tax courts and 
provincial high courts, and perform tax court system administration or 
management. Meanwhile, the transitory, costly and overhauling midlist "spin-off' 
structure should be denounced based on tax policy routines. 
Chapter VI concludes that the tax judicature reform in China should consider both 
the idea of permanence and that of flexibility. It must balance the dynamic 
between tax administration, the general judiciary framework, and taxpayers' 
rights. As law supports the government's political authority as well as the power 
of the legal system, the principles and tenets of the tax judicature system should 
be enshrined in a jurisprudential manner, honoring the rule of law order. 
Chapter VII 
Chapter VII endeavors to review China's taxpayer's rights framework and 
proposes reform guidelines to examine mechanisms for enforceable taxpayers' 
rights. The discussion has two prongs. First, it contributes a review of the status 
quo of China's taxpayer's rights framework. Taxpayers' rights are based on a 
dynamic interaction between State, the tax mix and taxpayers. Second, it 
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examines China's mechanisms for enforcing taxpayers' rights under the rule of 
law conception and WTO principles and offers a reform proposal. 17 
Chapter VII starts the discussion by giving historical background on Chinese 
taxpayers' rights protection. First, the awareness of taxpayers' rights has 
fashioned China's tax law reform in the past decade. A recent wave of taxpayer 
consciousness sparked a movement to challenge the rights protection status quo in 
China. As China was charged as the most miserable Asian country in terms of tax, 
Chinese taxpayers are increasingly burdened by various tax levying coupled with 
the inflationary currency and high CPI sensed. Moreover, enlarged tax bases 
enrage taxpayers who compare them with the public benefits they receive in 
return. Second, the Chinese government's official endorsements of universal 
values and generally accepted human rights principles advance the debate on 
reframing China's legal and social settings. However, traditional tax policy 
discourse lacks a framework for exploring whether or how a taxpayers' rights 
paradigm may guide and encourage China to pursue the sensitive human rights 
protection goals that would help promote social order and international image in 
which individual rights and freedoms can be fully realized. 
Chapter VII contributes that the perspective of taxpayers' right protection could 
help articulate a responsive approach to the problems of social welfare and 
economic inequality in China. For instance, a list of pragmatic and proactive 
taxpayers' rights promotes human rights protection, which is both morally 
defensible and politically viable. Chapter VII suggests that the concept and 
protection of taxpayers' rights presumes a generalized enabling framework of 
17 See infra Chapter VII Section 4.2.4. 
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human rights. At the same time, approaching human rights through the lens of 
taxpayers' rights supports a focus on fairness in social policy orientations, and 
brings in efficiency aspects in evaluating of a social policy by considering the 
potential obligation against taxpayers. Ultimately, human rights protection might 
be better served if a set of taxpayers' rights tends to uphold a professional 
institutional order that balances state and taxpayers' interests. In this connection, 
the situation of China's taxpayers is awkward: the human rights framework is not 
fully embodied in the legal system, and the tax laws system itself is in its 
nascence. 
Chapter VII contends that the concept of taxpayers' rights is not isolated. It is 
generally defined to limit the state power to promulgate, administer and enforce 
the tax laws and to bindingly obligate uniformity, transparency and procedural 
justice. The setting of rule of law in this sense warrants taxpayers' reliance on 
creditable rights protection. On an international level, the protection of taxpayer 
rights has received widespread attention and legislation from various sources is 
available to define, provide, and defend taxpayer rights. Many tax administrations 
and international organizations have formulated bills, declarations and manuals 
specifically designed for the protection of taxpayer rights. The competitive 
advantage from an international market further ensures that interference to 
taxpayers' rights is limited, and the WTO exemplifies a robust multilateral regime 
embracing capital mobility and free trade. Rights exercised by taxpayers demand 
an internationally formulated standard to be incorporated into China's tax law 
system to safeguard both revenue collection and fuel economic development. 
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Chapter VII further briefs the rationale for taxpayers' rights based on the 
relationship between taxation and the state. The discussion is founded on the state 
theory that legal rights are meaningless unless they are honored with accessibility 
and enforceability to enjoy, and therefore, taxpayers' rights are primarily part of 
civil and political rights as to harmonizing taxpayers' rights and duties to the 
state. 
Chapter VII also reviews the status quo of taxpayers' right protection in China 
and suggests the legitimate need to develop a set of rules for scoping and 
protecting taxpayers' rights, the awareness of which emerge in a meaningful and 
pragmatic manner for bettering outcomes of economic behavior and social policy 
implementation. Chapter VII critically assesses the Chinese taxpayers' rights mix 
in terms of constitutional interpretation, primary rights and secondary rights, 
administrative rights and the principles of good conduct of tax authorities 
available for Chinese taxpayers. An examination of the primary and secondary 
taxpayers' rights in China reveals that almost all deficiencies and drawbacks of 
human rights protection and the tax laws system fall onto the taxpayers' rights. 
Chapter VII then proves why such deficiencies are not surprising. The 
constitutional fortification of primary taxpayers' rights is weak because of an 
absence ofthe word "taxpayers' rights" in China's Constitution, but also because 
of a discontentedly misunderstanding of how to situate taxpayers to claim or 
interpret primary legal rights. Secondary taxpayers' rights are supposed to be 
enriched with enough clear-cut rules in detailing taxpayers' administrative and 
legislative rights, while China's current framework fails to contribute those 
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details. Rather, somehow it misidentifies the roles played by administrative 
primary rights and secondary legal rights. Following the positivist rule of 
recognition, the result is that an amalgamation of laws, rulings, and notices is 
displayed out-of-order, and there lacks a systematic certainty to elevate protection 
of taxpayer's rights. Although the Tax Collection Law, the Proclamation of 
Taxpayers' Rights and Duties and relevant administrative procedural laws all 
facilitate, to some extent, the clarification and expansion of rights available to 
taxpayers at first glance, those stipulated rights remain short of jurisprudential 
significance and practical value, showing the necessity to identify each category 
of taxpayers' rights in detail. Paradoxically, taxpayers' rights are expanding 
simultaneously with the expanding economy scale and a larger tax enforcement 
force. 
Chapter VII identifies the necessity to design each category of taxpayers' rights 
with enough details. Chinese tax authorities should feel the insufficiency to set up 
a hasty comprehensive framework of tax without polishing taxpayers' rights and 
obligations. The connection between the general administrative law framework 
with the tax law context should be better solidified to determine whether an 
application in taxpayers' circumstance is appropriate or not. This comprehensive 
approach should include both legal and administrative rights, embracing diverse 
factors that may affect taxpayers. 
Chapter VII then evidences that Chinese taxpayers' rights are limited by the 
inherent deficiencies in the general tax framework. This is particularly manifested 
by the discrepancy in the internal management of tax authorities. Moreover, 
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because secondary legal rights, administrative rights and the principles of good 
conduct of tax authorities are put together in the Tax Collection Law and the 
Proclamation, the protection of each right is not guaranteed with enough 
singularity and attention, and the separation of those rules and its impact should 
be considered. 
Chapter VII summarizes that, being mindful of deficiencies in taxpayer rights 
protection in China, it is excessive to understate or neglect the progress and merits 
as to the rights protection regime in China's tax context. Overall, China's tax 
system still provides a problematic, yet promising, framework to channel 
available legal remedies, administrative and judicial, for taxpayers. From the Tax 
Collection Law and the Proclamation, continuous efforts and attention are put 
forward by China's tax authorities to advance taxpayers' awareness and rights 
recognition. In particular, the administrative lawsuits filed by taxpayers attain 
more respects and identification, although such awareness is discounted by the 
"non-contentious" or "settlement-preferred" culture in China. Chapter VII also 
acknowledges the frustration due to the paucity of resources in modulating related 
research, since many questions of this topic left unaddressed in full extent or some 
questions are just not answerable given current development stage of the tax 
legislation reform. 
Chapter VII supports the protection of taxpayers' rights centers as a key element 
substantiating China's construct of the rule of law order and fulfillment of WTO 
principles. Chinese taxpayers' rights should theme with a fair, transparent, 
certain, consistent, equitable, effective, and clear manner within the framework of 
61 
the tax laws. Meanwhile, the WTO principles attach assimilation into 
international taxpayers' rights routine and vitality in designing and rectifying 
Chinese taxpayers' rights in terms of administration and adjudication. China's tax 
laws should embody and honor the transparency, uniformity and impartiality and 
judicial review principles with a full set of niceties and convenient courses of 
action in taxpayers' protection. 
Chapter VII concludes a summarized proposal for refining China's taxpayers' 
rights protection, based on the positivist view in jurisprudence for taxpayers, the 
rule of law order, and WTO principles. This proposal balances practical 
significance and largely is underpinned by points of consensus among tax 
authorities and taxpayers alike. In this sense, it is not a reordering or 
rearrangement of existing prescribed rights, rather, it is submitted being reflective 
of daily practice. 
Chapter VIII 
Chapter VIII contributes a comparative study of the tax treatments for the 
nonprofit sector in the U.S. and China for three reasons. First, the development of 
China's nonprofit sector 18 has been tremendous in the past two decades, but much 
less comprehensive studies have been initiated on reforming China's nonprofit tax 
18 See Evelyn Brody, Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector, 41 Vill. L. Rev. 433-440 
(1996), discussing that when referring to the third sector, the terms "charity" and "nonprofit" are 
often used interchangeably. See also generally D.B. Reobertson, Should Churches be Taxed? 40-
68 and Chapters II, III and IV (Westminster Press, 1968). The same problem exists in the limited 
research in China as to the definition or description of"cishan" or "gongyi", i.e., "charity". 
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system -the crucial component that clinches an attainable nonprofit sector as a 
partner of the state. Echoing China's success in economic growth in the past 
decades, literature on Chinese tax typically focuses on tax incentives for foreign 
direct investment and tax policies catering economic development. Second, 
collaterally, the rule of law construct in the past decade invites some ambitious 
scholarship as to modernizing China's charity sector with an "all-in" charity code 
or cultivating expansive grassroots NGOs. This idealized study, however, suffers 
from ignorance of the tax treatment for the nonprofit sector and an unrealistic 
understanding of China' legal and political situation. Third, this analysis has 
strong commercial implications that are often neglected by many commentators. 
China's integration into the WTO or the globalized trade system arouses 
heightened complaints on national treatment and fair competition from both 
foreign and domestic enterprises. A key issue arising is that the profitability of 
foreign investment shrinks as the tax preferential treatment is gradually being 
phased out. 19 However, there is no materially meaningful tax law as to the nascent 
NGO sector- how NGOs, as foreign investment vehicles, might be profitable. 
19 See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of 
the Welfare State, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1573 (2000), presenting the relationship between tax 
incentives and revenue; Professor Avi-Yonah examines the increased use of tax incentives as 
weapons in the international competition to attract investment. Professor A vi-Y onah argues that 
the establishment of tax havens allows large amounts of capital to go untaxed, depriving both 
developed and developing countries of revenue and forcing them to rely on forms of taxation less 
progressive than the income tax. Professor Avi-Yonah contends that both economic efficiency and 
equity among individuals and among nations support limits on international tax competition, and 
he presents a proposal that accommodates the competing concern for democratic states' ability to 
set their tax rates independently. He proposes the coordinated imposition of withholding taxes on 
international portfolio investment, with the goal of ensuring that all income may be taxed in the 
investor's home jurisdiction. Professor Avi-Yonah also proposes that multinational corporations 
be taxed initially in the jurisdictions where their goods and services are consumed. Professor Avi-
y onah outlines that, both developed and developing nations would be able to preserve the 
progressivity of the income tax and to broaden and stabilize their tax bases in time to stave off the 
fiscal threat to the welfare state 
63 
Chapter VIII takes two positions are methodologically and jurisprudentially 
meaningful to a comparative study20 of Chinese tax. 
First, modem tax studies are debated predominantly in Western terms such as 
progressivity, equity and efficiency, but the scarcity of decent comparative legal 
tax scholarship fails to generate a "lively debate on comparative tax works and 
their methodologies". Meanwhile, "a shortage of paradigmatic discourse in 
comparative tax invites the simultaneous existence of bluntly conflicting 
arguments, taking parallel courses, yet never engaging each other". Although 
some frameworks of comparative tax studies are proposed or compiled, the 
formulas enclosed therein remain hypothetical than practical- a pragmatic 
concern is that only very limited areas of tax are forcefully analyzable by tax 
comparativists. This embarrassment is particularly challenging to scholars in the 
Chinese tax context who want to exploit the "tax transplant" methodology. In this 
connection, this chapter contributes that a comparative tax study relating to China 
might be better achieved by focusing on a "tax law sub-discipline" rather than on 
a specific tax concept. One reason is that a tax concept, usually a transplanted 
vocabulary of western tax origin, is too narrow to substantiate a patulous 
comparative analysis. The other reason is that it lacks full-range expandability to 
scrutinize other subsidiaries of tax law - an international tax concept at the 
2<The literature on comparative tax and federalism is voluminous. See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Preface 
to Comparative Fiscal Federalism: Comparing the European Court of Justice and the US 
Supreme Court's Tax Jurisprudence, by R.S. Avi-Yonah, J. R. Hines Jr. and M. Lang, co-editors, 
xvii-xviii. EUCOT AX Series on European Taxation, 14. Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: 
Kluwer Law International, 2007; Michael A. Livingston, From Milan to Mumbai, Changing in Tel 
Aviv: Reflections on Progressive Taxation and "Progressive" Politics in a Globalized but Still 
Local World, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 555 (2006). Professor Livingston is one of the major 
contributors of the comparative tax literature and has conducted extensive research. See also 
Victor Thuronyi, Comparative Tax Law, Kluwer Law International (2004) for a detailed account 
of comparative tax methodologies and comparison of tax systems of over 20 jurisdictions 
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maximum can only throw in scrappy value to other major tax areas such as 
turnover tax or income tax. 
Second, the tax cultural traditions and social, political and legal settings of a 
systematic tax governance framework usually are much less discussed or even 
purposefully excluded from tax comparativists' theorizations. This "snooping" 
methodology unavoidably provokes abundant "contemptuousness" and skeptics 
from orthodox tax scholarship against tax comparative studies. A tax study 
ultimately has to be accommodating to the general cultural, social, political and 
legal systems in which a tax system is embedded. Otherwise, a comparative study 
may easily turn into a descriptive, mechanical, and perfunctory analysis. The 
practical and scholastic significance of comparative tax studies cannot be 
achieved by way of a limited comparison falling on the technical elements of tax. 
The "big-picture" setting perspective must be addressed to formulate a 
comparative study of Chinese tax. The same rationale applies to both the rule of 
law construct and assimilation to the WTO system as well. This thesis tentatively 
incorporates comparative tax culture considerations to compare prime elements of 
nonprofit tax schemes of U.S. and China. 
Chapter VIII argues that the development of China's nonprofit sector in the past 
decade has been remarkable, especially following recent natural disasters, the 
2008 Beijing Olympic Games, and celebrity donation scandals. Regulatory 
deficiency regarding the treatment of nonprofit organizations demonstrates the 
Chinese party-state's failure to maintain its rich tradition of philanthropy and the 
exacerbation of the disparity between rural and urban livelihoods. Surges of 
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grassroots NGO activity, millions of affectionate "netizens" at the time of natural 
disasters, and faithful volunteers for the Olympic Games demonstrate the poor 
administration and misallocation of charitable resources. Meanwhile, the Chinese 
government has seriously identified the indispensable role played by the nonprofit 
sector in alleviating bureaucracy, downsizing government, stimulating wealth 
mobility, reducing regional inequalities, and, ultimately, promoting a harmonious 
society. 
Chapter VIII highlights the current dysfunctions in the Chinese legal framework 
in establishing an enabling an operative nonprofit sector- namely that the state 
fails to regulate it through a potent tax system which creates various tax 
preferences and ensures no abuse of those preferences. Even though it has been 
suggested that a comprehensive charity law should be enacted, the existing charity 
tax laws and regulations remain discordant, anachronistic and inoperative. Worse 
is that bureaucratic mismanagement and unprofessional administration have 
jeopardized the incentives and confidence for reforming the nonprofit sector. 
Chapter VIII aims to examine comparison between current nonprofit tax rules in 
China and U.S. in practice, and highlights suggestions that may benefit charity tax 
law reform in China. From a comparative point of view, the United States system 
of tax treatment for nonprofit organizations is well established and sought-after 
model for decades. Although there is no single pattern fitting in various global 
needs, the U.S. model includes established principles of federalism, fiscal 
incentives, and economic adaptability which are markers of a powerful system. 
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Chapter VIII also presents a brief overview of China's current charity laws and 
regulations -the historical development of charity tax laws and those in practice -
especially of charitable tax exemptions. In addition, Chapter VIII outlines a 
number of institutional and theoretical backgrounds of the current U.S. charity tax 
exemption systems. The U.S. tax system for the nonprofit sector arguably 
embraces maturity, objectivity, flexibility, and accountability. Evolving 
throughout the course of U.S. history, the U.S. scheme relies solidly on regulatory 
authority, checks and balances, and confidence in the rugged individualism of 
American democracy. The prerequisite to enjoying the benefit of the tax 
exemption is objective and subjects to minimum level of discretional review. 
Meanwhile, as an outcome-based set of measures, it enables the nonprofit sector 
to adapt to new economic developments and strike a continuous balance between 
external regulation and internal government. 
Chapter VIII then suggests that the expansion of the nonprofit sector in the past 
decades has caused many problems in China's tax framework. Dubious of the 
suggestion of promulgating a comprehensive charity law, Chapter VIII does not 
yield any unrealistic idea of transplanting all valid and enabling values under the 
U.S. tax exemption system to China. The prime incentive oftax deduction has not 
been solidly rooted in the general public. There is a lack of stimulating push for 
the tax authorities and MCA to adopt a systematic responsive reform measures. 
However, some positive reforms especially on the tax exemption and tax 
deduction in the nonprofit sector are more implementable and manageable. 
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Chapter VIII contributes the following observations after comparing the tax 
treatment in the U.S. and China on nonprofit sectors. First, the public benefit or 
charity purpose of nonprofit organizations has not been coherently defined. This 
confusion predictably inhibits the development of the nonprofit sector by stalling 
interested corporate and individual donors from taking exemptions and tax 
deductions. Second, China has not set up an enforceable fiscal incentive system to 
promote charitable donations. The administrative procedure of obtaining a tax 
exemption certificate is arduous and discourages donors either to donate or 
withdraw from obtaining the certificate, which worsens the efforts to modernize 
the scheme. Third, there are still burdensome requirements for the application and 
registration of nonprofit organizations, such as dual management, high thresholds 
of capital endowment for foundations, and a prohibition on cross-regional 
development. Fourth, the administration and supervision of the internal 
management, human resources, and financial and accounting management of 
nonprofit organizations is very weak. China's complex administration system on 
the nonprofit sector, including the MCA, MOP, and SAT, is mismanages fund 
raising, the appropriate usage of donations, and profit-making from donations. 
Corruption also became a major concern of the general public to make donations. 
Fifth, the determination of tax-exempt status and review of such status is ad hoc 
and different from locality to locality. Such irregularities, on the one hand, invite 
unethical manipulation of tax preferential policies, and create resistance to 
making donations through locally available venues. 
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Returning to a jurisprudential focus, Chapter VIII contributes a new methodology 
in terms of situating comparative law in the Chinese tax context. In this 
connection, this chapter holds that a comparative tax study relating to China 
might be better achieved by focusing on a "tax law sub-discipline" rather than on 
a specific tax concept. A western-originated tax concept might be too narrow to 
substantiate a comprehensive policy orientation, and it lacks full-range of 
expandability to scrutinize other subsidiaries of tax law. Moreover, the tax 
cultural traditions and social, political, and legal settings of a systematic tax 
governance framework should be included in tax comparativists' theorizations. A 
tax study ultimately has to be conducted from a "big-picture" perspective in 
which a tax system is embedded. This chapter holds that a comprehensive tax 
transplant effort of valued ideas and practices, although it may seem bold and 
uncomfortable at the beginning, is what China needs to build up a robust 
nonprofit sector embracing broad visions rather than incremental, piecemeal 
reforms. 
Chapter IX 
Chapter IX concludes the whole thesis by reiterating a few remarks. First, this 
thesis aims to prepare a reasonable, handy and realistic foundation with which to 
evaluate the progress of the Chinese tax law reform. Second and pushing this goal 
further, this thesis tentatively submits - on the basis of debates on the rule of law 
and understanding of the WTO principles applicable to China - a tailored, 
pragmatic and practical set of proposals for the tax reform under China's current 
legal infrastructure. The proposals are underpinned by instrumental notions of the 
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rule of law rhetoric, inter alia, generality, clarity, consistency, enforceability, 
stability, congruence, and substantive notions of judicial independence, human 




An Overview of the Chinese Tax Law System 
I. Introduction 
Formed over decades of political, economic and social upheaval and strife, 
China's taxation system reflects its own political and economic experiences as 
much as its interactions with western, capitalist systems. Since its inception 
shortly after the founding of the People's Republic of China in late 1949, China's 
tax law system has experienced drastic and recurrent changes to adapt to new 
political-economic philosophies and to strengthen its revenue designation by way 
of steady incorporation of international tax norms. Evolving from a centralized, 
planned and closed "socialist economy" to a market driven, open economy and 
then to China's accession to WTO in 2001, China has gradually emerged as a 
market oriented economy. As such an equitable market framework for 
investments has taken shape, embracing a series of vigorous system restructurings 
completed after enormous foreign capital entered China upon implementation of 
the "reform and open door" policy in 1979. Moreover, the tax law system has 
intertwined with other laws contributing to the development of competent and 
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internalized legal institutions in China. 
Tax laws and policies in China have been important instruments for Chinese 
government in realizing a two-pronged reform agenda: (1) reforming its domestic 
economic system with increased revenue and macroeconomic control, and (2) 
opening China up to outside world. Both of these prongs are commingled with 
political concerns of increasing social welfare, reducing income disparities and 
monitoring foreign investment. Tax law in China, as part of the macroeconomic 
regulatory system, plays an irreplaceable role in adjusting commercial activities 
of corporate and individual taxpayers. It is even said that Chinese tax law is the 
only area of Chinese law brought in line with and integrated into the international 
norms1• 
For instance, one of China's key tax policy objectives is to be internationally 
competitive. The Chinese government has adopted practical approaches to realize 
this goal. Particularly, China has designed tax rates that are competitive with 
those in neighboring Asian Countries, granting various tax incentives to promote 
investment in designated areas or industries. Tax incentives are used liberally, 
despite limited empirical research showing their direct effect on foreign direct 
investment in China. 2 Moreover, China has been strategically aggressive in 
contracting bilateral or multilateral tax treaties with trading partners to address 
foreign investors' concerns regarding double taxation. Chinese tax authorities are 
also receptive to international tax norms such as the arm's length principle, which 
serve foreign taxpayers. 
1 See generally, Jinyan Li, The Rise and Fall of Chinese Tax Incentives and Implications for 
International Tax Debates, 8 Fla. Tax Rev. 669 [Hereinafter Rise and Fall] 
2 Id., at 670 
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This chapter aims to examine briefly the evolution of the Chinese tax law system 
and structures shaped by China's socio-economic forces, fiscal and governmental 
reforms, administrative reforms, fiscal decentralization, and WTO accession. 3 
3 For an overview of China's taxation system since the WTO accession, see Li supra 1; See Xu 
Shanda Zhongguo Shuiquan Yanjiu [China Tax Jurisdiction Research] (China Taxation Press, 
2004) (Xu was the ex-Vice-Governor of the SAT). For an overview of the early China's taxation 
on foreign investors, see Michael J. Moser & Winston K. Zee, China Tax Guide 105-06 (2nd ed., 
1993). For tax changes since the 1990s, see Jiang, infra 4; Stephen C. Curley & Darren R. 
Fortunato, Tax Considerations for Investors in China, 20 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 531 (1995) ; 
Jeri C. Weber, Note, Foreign Investment in the People's Republic of China: Tax Law Attempts to 
Provide Incentives, 46 Tax Law. 275-93 (1992); Gerald A. Wunsch & Dingfa Liu, Recent Chinese 
Tax Legislation Affecting Foreign Investment in China, 2 Ind. Int'l L.& Comp. L. Rev. 415 (1992); 
Allison E. Wielobob, Note, China's Choice: Tax Incentives to Fund Economic Development, 9 
Temple Int'l & Comp. L.J. 413 (1995). For the development of the tax regime governing foreign 
investment during the 1980s, see, e.g., Jinyan Li, Taxation in the People's Republic of China , 
Praeger, New York (1991); A.J . Easson & Li Jinyan, Taxation of Foreign Investment in the 
People's Republic of China (1989); Alex Easson & Li Jinyan, Taxation of Foreign Business and 
Investment in the People's Republic of China, 7 Nw. J. Int'l L.& Bus. 666 (1985) , Richard D. 
Pomp eta!. , The Evolving Tax System of the People's Republic of China, 16 Tex. Int'l L. J. 11, 16-
40 (1981); Paul D. Reynolds, Doing Business with the People's Republic of China: Tax 
Consideration , 14 Int'l L. 49 (1980) . For tax enactments on foreign investment in the early 1980s, 
see William P. Alford & David E. Birenbaum, Ventures in the China Trade: An Analysis of 
China's Emerging Legal Framework for the Regulation of Foreign Investment, 3 Nw. J . Int'l. & 
Bus. 56 (1981); Carl A. Nordberg, Jr. & Irene Price, The Income Tax Law of the People's Republic 
of China Concerning Foreign Enterprises, in Legal Aspects of Doing Business in China 1983 191 
(Practising Law Institute 1983); Don R. Castleman, Taxation in the People's Republic of China: 
The System and Its Function, 46 Albany L. Rev. 776 (1982); David R. Simon, Note, Taxation of 
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This will provide a concise description of the specific economic, political, social, 
and cultural factors impacting the evolution of China's tax system after WTO 
accession. Subchapter II briefly explains China's tax law system development 
since 1949 in four broad stages: the pre-1978 period (1949-1978), the economic 
reform period (1979-1993), the market economy period (1993-2000), and the 
post-WTO accession period (2001-present). Subchapter III discusses social and 
economic policy orientations that affect the development of China's tax law 
system. Subchapter IV outlines the framework of China's tax law system. 
Subchapter V discusses the fiscal decentralization reform for the past three 
decades and outlines directions for possible reforms in tax administration, 
especially with regard to how to improve efficiency and fairness. Subchapter VI 
concludes briefly. 
II. Historical Development of the PRC Tax Laws 
Right after the Communist Party of China assumed governance of mainland 
China, taxes were imposed and collected to regulate the economy and rebuild the 
fragmented country. The reform and restructuring of China's tax system can be 
broadly divided into four stages: the pre-1978 period (1949-1978), the post-open-
Joint Ventures in the People's Republic of China: A Legal Analysis in the Context of Current 
Chinese Economic and Political Conditions, 15 Vand. J. Trans'! L. 513 (1982); Anna M. Han, 
People's Republic of China's Foreign Enterprises Income Tax Law and Regulations, 6 Hastings 
Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 689 (1983). Timothy A. Gelatt & Richard D. Pomp, China's Tax System: 
An Overview and Transactional Analysis, in Foreign Trade, Investment, and The Law in the 
People's Republic of China 42 (Michael J. Moser ed., 1987); James W. Harrison, Tax Aspects of 
Doing Business in the People's Republic of China- A Comparative Summary for U.S. Investors, 5 
Fla. lnt'l L.J. 381 (1990) 
74 
door period (1979-1993), the market economy period (1994-2000), and the post-
WTO accession period (2001-present). 
2.1. Pre-1978 
For historical and political reasons, the pre-1978 tax law system had developed 
through political turmoil, economic mismanagement, and stagnation of popular 
living standards that marked China's Soviet economy as interpreted by Mao. 4 
Ideological debates and a ponderous copy of the Soviet Union's industrial 
structure made the taxation system a tool for class struggle and political control.5 
Political interference during this period twisted and deprived the taxation system 
from developing according to modem theories of public finance and legal 
articulation. Taxation was "a vestige of capitalism destined from oblivion"6 and 
4 See Zhaodong Jiang, China's Tax Preferences to Foreign Investment: Policy, Culture and 
Modern Concepts, 18 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 549 (1998), at 559 [hereinafter Jiang: China's Tax 
Preferences to FDI]; see, e.g., Thomas J. Klitgaard & Mayre Rasmussen, Preferential Treatment 
for Foreign Investment in the People's Republic of China: Special Economic Zones and Industrial 
Development Districts, 7 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 377, 384-90 (1984) (noting that various 
preferential measures as investment incentives). For a general discussion of Chinese measures 
intended to attract foreign capital in the 1980s, see Jerome Alan Cohen & Stuart Valentine, 
Foreign Direct Investment in the People's Republic of China: Progress, Problems and Proposals, 
1 J. Chinese L. 161, 169-78 (1987) 
5 This understanding is strengthened by Professor Whitmore Gray at the University of Michigan 
Law School, noting that China mostly follow Soviet Union's model for codification of important 
laws and such heritage still plays a huge part in jurisprudent research settings) (discussion notes on 
file with the author); See also Walter Gellhom, China's Questfor Legal Modernity, 1 J. Chinese L. 
1, 6 ( 1987) (observing that China has relied heavily upon Soviet Union for content of law, and 
training of judges, lawyers and legal staffs). for discussions in Chinese, See generally, He Qinhua, 
Reexaminations of China's Transplantation of Soviet Union Legal System [Guanyu Xinzhongguo 
Yizhi Sulian Sifa Zhidu de Fansi],2008) ( fiiJIIJ#< 0~-T*'TJ:f::l ~~~n;Jm'lS]~$JJJ3i!¥gjj,i~D 
2008) http://www.china-review.com/sao.asp?id=2836 (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
6 From 1950 to 1997, China's flagship newspaper The People's Daily in total used the term "a 
vestige of capitalism destined from oblivion" for around 400 times. The usage ofthis term had two 
goals (1) strengthening the ruling of CCP and (2) discussing which direction that China's 
development may occupy. At the beginning, tax was specifically referred to as a "vestige". See, 
How the History Gets Rid of the Vestige of Capitalism Destined from Oblivion [Cong Renmin 
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was therefore used to depress industry and commerce held by private ownership. 
China's economy during this period hardly had any tie with the rest of the world 
and operation of foreign entities was rare. 7 Tax laws were domestically oriented, 
applying to domestic and local enterprise, which induced a simplification of the 
tax regime to build up and implement a centrally planned socialist economy. 
Under the then existing socialist system of State Administration of Income and 
Expense, in all State-owned enterprises (SOEs) the government retained all 
earned profits (after reserving employee welfare), and then received governmental 
subsidies for operation and production. Most of the taxes during this time were 
levies on natural resources and in particular on individual wealth and 
• 8 consumptiOn. 
2.1.1. The Foundation ofthe Socialist System 1949-1952 
Right after the foundation of the PRC, the CCP faced a fragmented, or vacant, 
fiscal system left over from the KMT government, where the poorly functioning 
central government had to a significant extent lost control over localities, and the 
big bureaucratic capitalists and landlord classes levied taxes in their local 
jurisdictions. Therefore, in order to finance and solidify its ruling, the CCP had to 
design a tax system to unify localities and centralize fiscal control. To affect this 
the Chinese central government promulgated the Major Rules Implementing the 
Ribao Kan Lishi Shi Zenyang Gediao Ziben Zhuyi Weibade] ( {M.<A~ S j!X>~It.i~~:"&~"Jl 
~~;ES(~ES"B'il?} ), China's leftists website http://www.maoflag.net/?action-viewthread-tid-
291762 (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
7 See Li, Rise and Fall, supra I at 670 
8 See Jiang supra 4 at 560 
76 
National Taxation System by the Government Administration Council in 1950, 
listing 14 types oftaxes to be collected nationwide.9 They then adopted a uniform 
agricultural tax in March 1951 to protect farmers from exploitation by landlords. 
In the early 1950s, almost half of the Chinese government's revenue was 
generated through taxes. 
2.1.2. Socialist Transformation (1953-1957) 
China's first Five-Year Plan (1953-1957) was successful in achieving a Socialist 
social, political, and economic transformation. Capitalists were either asked to 
surrender their assets to State treasury or were forced to jointly operate their 
businesses with central or local governments as minority shareholders. Farmers 
were put together to form cooperatives or communes giving their surpluses to the 
government. Following the Soviet Union socialist model, taxation did more than 
simply generate state revenue to finance socialist industrialization, but also served 
as a class struggle tool to eradicate the exploitative class. During this period, 
state-owned enterprises were exempt from taxes, but recalcitrant private 
enterprises were squeezed through high income taxes to accept the CCP's ruling 
and reorder themselves to follow the larger transformation. 10 As the Chinese 
government adopted a socialist transformation of ownership towards the end of 
the first five-year plan in 1953, taxation was used as a weapon to restrict 
capitalistic industry and commerce and transform them into socialistic or semi-
9 These 14 taxes are industrial and commercial enterprises tax, transaction tax, salaries tax, land 
tax, building tax, slaughter tax, salt tax, interest tax, inheritance tax, stamp duty, special excise tax, 
customs duties, commodity tax and vehicle license tax. For a general review of taxation over this 
period, see Jinyan Li, Taxation in the People's Republic of China, Praeger, New York (1991), at 
25 supra 3 
10 ld., Li supra 1 
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socialist units and private enterprise were taxed more than SOEs." 11 By 1956, 
private ownership of means of production was basically eliminated and SOEs 
were revitalized and supported as the dominant force ofthe socialist economy. A 
major change, enterprise income tax for the SOEs, was also introduced at this 
time. Under the established enterprise bonus system, SOEs could retain a portion 
of their surplus if there was excess production, or if their sales exceeded their 
target levels. 12 The retained surplus would be transferred to a bonus fund to pay 
for bonuses to workers or for improvements of the cultural and living conditions 
for all workers. SOEs were responsible for almost all aspects of their workers' 
welfare, housing, medical treatment, education, and retirement, etc. 13 
2.1.3. Further Simplification ofTaxation System (1958-1966) 
After the socialist transformation, the CCP firmly controlled the political, social 
and economic status of the nation. 14 Tax laws and policies started playing a 
diminished role in the centrally planned economic order. 15 First, all earnings 
generated by SOEs belonged to the state treasury and private enterprises could 
only serve as distributors or agents of SOE products. Second, due to the 
simplification of economic activity and actors, the industrial and commercial tax 
was levied as the only major turnover tax, and industrial and commercial income 
tax was the only income tax in the modem sense. Such major taxes were 
simplified and consolidated as evidence of the success and totality of socialist 
11 
See Wang Yanlai, China's economic development and democratization (Ashgate, 2003) at 87-89 
12 See generally, Li, supra 1 
13 ld. 
14 See Wang supra 11 at 63-65 
15 ld. 
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transformation. In fact, as a result of the failure of the Great Leap Forward 
movement (late 1950s)16 and the Great Famine (early 1960s), 17 tax revenues alone 
could not finance and support state operations, and the tax administration system 
stalled. Therefore, although the national taxation system was nominally retained, 
it was not an effective institution during this period. When China entered its 
second five-year plan in 1958, most taxpayers were SOEs and the emphasis of 
1958 reforms were influenced by the Soviet "tax less" concept. 18 Tax law was 
further simplified so that enterprises had to pay as few types of taxes as possible. 
The Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax (CICT) was introduced to 
combine all turnover taxes, and enterprise income tax was imposed for the first 
time. However, the enterprise bonus system that was applicable to the SOEs 
remained, as retained profits of the SOEs had increased significantly. The bonus 
system was retained until its replacement by the profit-contracting system under 
which the SOEs could hand over a pre-determined proportion of the surplus and 
retain the balance. 
2.1.4. Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) 
Rampant political turmoil and a stagnant economy meant that the Cultural 
Revolution period hardly witnessed any new promulgation of tax law except the 
16 Id., at 67-69 
17 Id., at 71 
18 Following the period of reconstruction, the phase of socialist transformation (1953-1956) is 
perhaps best characterized by the consistency with which the majority of the CCP leadership 
subscribed to those norms. Borrowing from the Soviet Union was also reflected in the extent of 
practical Russian participation in the form of financial aid and scientific and technological 
guidance. See, e.g., Roy W. Bah!, Jr., Fiscal Policy in China: Taxation and Intergovernmental 
Fiscal Relations (The 1990 Institute and the University of Michigan Press, 1999), see also M. 
Bakes, Tax Reform in Central and Eastern Europe, Australian Tax Forum 8(1) 117-128 (1991) 
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Draft Regulations on the Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax, enacted in 
1972,19 which had a special political purpose of strengthening the military and 
machinery industries. Other than this small piece of tax law, the administration, 
collection, and adjudication the taxation system all collapsed with the downturn of 
social and economic order. After the "Gang of Four"20 was removed from the 
political arena, the Chinese government reorganized the Ministry of Finance to 
coordinate all taxation related matters nationwide.21 
During the early period of the Cultural Revolution ( 1966-1970), reflecting the 
increasingly negative perception of modern economic organizations as symbols of 
Western capitalism, China's tax law system was again simplified in the 1973 
reform by consolidating different types of taxes, reducing taxable items and tax 
rates, and unifying the obsolete tax collection system. The Industrial and 
Commercial Tax (ICT), a turnover tax, generated a major portion of the total 
revenue during this period.Z2 
Although the tax law was revamped repeatedly and played a definite role in 
China's economic development before 1978, all such restructuring functioned to 
simplify the tax law system, streamline the socialist economy, consolidate similar 
taxes, reduce number of taxes and tax rates, and most importantly, to safeguard 
and build up a socialized economy deeply rooted in political and class struggle. 
Tax laws and policies, played an auxiliary and insignificant role in the financing 
of government and development of the socialist economy. 
19 See Li supra 3 
20 See generally, William Brugger, China Since the Gang of Four (Croom Helm,1980) 
21 See History of Ministry of Finance of the PRC, http://www.mof.gov.cn (last visited on March 15, 
2011) 
22 See, e.g., Li supra 3 
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2.2.The Economic Reform Period 1978-1992 
After nearly three decades of political strife and socialist, central economic 
planning, China encountered serious image problems due to its previous policies 
and political polarity. In the early years of implementing reform and "openness" 
policy, Deng Xiaoping' leadership in China sensed the gravity of crisis the 
country faced: a stagnant economy, very low living standards, and increasing 
mismanagement by the government. 23 Deng launched enormous construction 
plans to accelerate the country's development. While such efforts turned out to be 
too ambitious in their first attempt, as indicated by the period of retrenchment that 
followed, the mentality of pursuing fast economic development persisted and was 
later translated into various reform programs including tax law and policy. 
China's economic underdevelopment and poor technological infrastructure were 
an impetus for the openness policy, which aimed to improve conditions for 
foreign investment and reassert central control over localities. Preferential tax 
treatment, as a result, was considered vital to attracting foreign capital and 
technology. "Foreign taxation" (Shewai Shuiwu) became a specialized branch of 
state tax authority with the main objective of promoting foreign investment.24 
23 This thesis benefits from Professor Jiang's review of China's tax regime since the 1980s. See 
generally Jiang, supra 4, at 561 and accompanying footnotes, presenting that, despite heroic 
investment rates and rapid growth since the late 1950s, the Chinese people's living standards were 
still lagging because of stagnant productivity; see also e.g., Carl Riskin, China's Political 
Economy: The Quest for Development Since 1949 261-66 (1987); Robert F. Dernberger, The 
Chinese Search for the Path of Self-Sustained Growth in the 1980s: An Assessment, in China 
Under The Four Modernizations Part I 19, 20-27 (Joint Economic Committee Congress of the 
United States ed., 1982), from which Jiang drew his notion 
24 See Jiang supra 4 at 562, discussing the adoption of foreign taxation to promote foreign 
investment; see, e.g., Niu Licheng et al., Zhongguo Shuishou Zhinan [China Tax Guide] 158 (1990) 
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A prominent attribute of China's legal system throughout this period was the 
different treatment under law for purely Chinese commercial activities and those 
transactions involving foreign interests. 25 Rather than promulgating a new 
package of income tax rules to govern foreign direct investment, however, the 
Equity Joint Venture Law (EJVL), promulgated in 1979, created preferential tax 
treatment for investments involving foreign actors.26 Just as corrective rates under 
the ICIT were the legacy of policies that reflected past hostility toward foreign 
and private capital, the claimed preferential tax treatment in this first foreign 
investment legislation since 1949 was a milestone suggesting a favorable policy 
change. As confirmed by its implementation, the very word youhui, meaning 
preference, conveyed an encouraging signal. "Low tax burden, expansive 
preferences and high competitiveness" soon dominated official statements meant 
to convey the perception of a friendly and accommodating environment for 
foreign investment. 27 The Chinese government spent "a great deal of time and 
effort propagating new tax preference" 28 provisions overseas, not only for 
attracting investment, but also to send a strong message to the outside world of 
(discussing China set up a separate foreign taxation branch for the opening-up policy); Du 
Mengkun, Zhongguo Shehui Zhuyi Shuishou Jingji Lilun Yu Shijian [The Theory and Practice of 
China's Socialist Taxation and Economy] 187 (1989) (emphasizing that the role of foreign 
taxation in the implementation ofthe opening up policy must not be underestimated) 
25 see infra Chapter III 
26 On July 1, 1979, the Chinese legislature adopted the Law on Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures 
(P.R.C.), which permitted private foreign capital investment in Mainland China. See Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Zhong Wai Hezi Jingying Qiye Fa [the Equity Joint Venture Law of the 
PRC][hereinafter Equity Joint Venture Law or EJV Law]. Article 7 of the EJV Law stipulated tax 
reductions and exemptions for joint ventures using advanced technology by world standards as 
well as tax refunds for reinvestment of joint venture profits. Flexible approaches had been taken 
by the Chinese prior to the adoption of the JVITL, including the reduction of foreign investors' tax 
burden through contractual arrangements between the Chinese government and individual foreign 
interests. 
27 See Art. 7 EJV Law 
28 See Jiang supra 4, at 604 and accompany footnotes 
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China's intention to improve its economic development. "Widespread 
dissemination of preferential rules was viewed as necessary to the success to the 
promotion and execution of foreign investment projects."29 Various preferential 
tax schemes were then set up over the next several years. Some supposedly 
applied nationwide and others were available only to those foreign investors 
settled in designated areas 30 with additional industry-specific fiscal benefits. 
Moreover, the government handed out special concessions that promoted 
investment projects by Overseas Chinese. 31 With overlapping and sometimes 
inconsistent regimes, foreign taxation in general and tax preferences in particular 
looked so complicated and confusing that a prominent commentator at the time 
stated "calculating which tax provisions provide any single enterprise or 
investment possibility the most favorable treatment has become a considerable 
burden, and expense, for foreign investors."32 
In addition to the very significant changes on reforming tax law to cater to foreign 
investment, there are two additional revenue crisis concerns that forced the 
Chinese government to adopt a modem tax system to raise revenues and balance 
development. The first was the burgeoning of private economies after the early 
1980s. The second, probably more significant, was the corporatization of SOEs. 
The previous model of submission of all profits to the state treasury - the primary 
29 ld. 
30 I d., at 567 
31 ld., at 586, Professor Jiang specifically discussed how the factor of overseas Chinese influence 
the local tax incentives especially in designated special economic zones 
32 See generally, James V. Feinerman, Chinese Law Relating to Foreign Investment and Trade: 
The Decade of Reform in Retrospect, in China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s: The Problems 
of Reforms, Modernization, and Interdependence 828, 832 (Joint Economic Committee, Congress 
of the United States ed., 199l),quoted by Jiang supra 4 at 562 
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source of state revenue - was denounced as leaders of SOEs sought to retain 
larger shares of profits for their own business expansion and modernization. 
2.2.1. Foreign investment related tax law33 
The Equity Joint Venture Law (EJVL) promulgated in 1979 promised income tax 
preferences in two ways. ENs were eligible for a reduction of or an exemption 
from their income tax for the first two to three profit-making years if they had 
advanced technology by world standard.34 A foreign joint venture could apply for 
a refund of a portion of the income tax paid if it reinvested its net profit in China. 
The Joint Venture Income Tax Law (JVITL),35 instituted an enterprise income tax 
for EJVs, in addition to providing normative rules and a regulatory framework for 
tax administration, the legislation included a number of tax preference measures. 
36 Although the JVITL imposed an attractive nominal thirty-three percent tax rate 
before any preferential measure is adopted, in practice, due to many tax incentives 
and exemption offered to foreign investment, the actual tax rate was around 
33 For detailed description on development of China's foreign investment related tax laws, see 
Jiang supra 4, at 563-567; see generally, Li: Rise and Fall, supra 1; Gerald A. Wunsch & Dingfa 
Liu, Recent Chinese Tax Legislation Affecting Foreign Investment in China, 2 Ind. lnt'l L.& Comp. 
L. Rev. 415 (1992); Allison E. Wielobob, Note, China's Choice: Tax Incentives to Fund Economic 
Development, 9 Temple Int'l & Comp. L.J. 413 (1995) at 415-418 
34 Art. 7 ofEJV Law 
35 For discussion about JVITL, See generally Li, Harrison and Pomp, supra 3 
36 See Jiang supra 4, at 563-564, and Li: Rise and Fall, supra 1, at 671-679, for example, (1) 
newly established EJVs could apply for an exemption from income tax in the first profit-making 
year and a fifty percent reduction of income tax in the second and third years, provided that they 
were scheduled to operate for at least ten years; (2) following the expiration of this initial 
exemption and reduction, EJVs engaged in relatively low-profit sectors like farming and forestry 
or established in remote and economically underdeveloped regions were eligible for fifteen to 
thirty percent income tax reduction for ten more years, subject to the approval of the Ministry of 
Finance; (3) joint venture enterprises that reinvested their shares of profit in China for a period of 
at least five years could obtain, upon approval, a refund of forty percent of the income tax paid on 
the reinvested funds; (4) two provisions for computing the taxable income of EJVs were 
characterized as "preferential," including the use of accelerated depreciation of fixed assets in 
special circumstances upon approval, and the carry-over of losses to offset profits for five years 
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twenty-five percent rather than the nominal rate of thirty-three percent. 37 
By promulgating The Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China 
Concerning Foreign Enterprises 38 (hereinafter FEITL) in December 1981, 
Chinese government sets up a separate income tax to echo foreign investors who 
chose the investment form of wholly-owned foreign enterprise (WFOE) and Sino-
foreign contractual joint venture (CJV). The FEITL offered fewer preferences to 
foreign enterprises than the JVITL does towards EJV s39 and the tax on the income 
of a "foreign enterprise" was computed on a progressive rate schedule with five 
brackets 40 • 
A significant move forward unifying enterprise taxation in China came a decade 
37 See Li: Rise and Fall supra 1, at 675, noting that thirty percent plus an additional three percent 
local surcharge, and this rate is said to designed because corporate income tax rates were around 
fifty percent in most developed countries and between thirty-five and forty percent in many 
developing countries 
38 The Implementing Rules for Income Tax Law of the China Concerning Foreign Enterprises was 
promulgated by the Ministry of Finance and became effective as of January 1, 1982. See Jiang 
supra 4, at 565, presenting that "Foreign Enterprises" are distinct from "foreign-invested 
enterprises" (FIEs) in the following ways: FIEs include Sino-foreign cooperative (contractual) 
joint ventures ("CJVs"), Sino-foreign Equity Joint Ventures ("EJVs"), and Wholly Foreign-owned 
Enterprises ("WFOEs"), all of which are characterized as having some form of physical presence 
inside China, whether it be production nor service oriented, but more importantly possess 
domestic legal person status. A foreign enterprise, on the other hand, may have a permanent 
establishment within China territory engaged in production or other business operations, or 
otherwise may derive income from sources inside the China without such an establishment; see 
also Li: Rise and Fall, supra 1, at 672-675 
39 See Jiang supra 4, at 566-569, briefing that (1) there was no general income tax exemption or 
reduction for newly established foreign enterprises; (2) only foreign enterprises engaged in 
farming, forestry, husbandry or other low-profit operations and scheduled to operate for ten years 
or more could apply for an exemption in the first profit-making year and a fifty percent reduction 
in the following two years. A fifteen to thirty percent reduction in income tax for another ten years 
could be available after the expiration of the foregoing exemption and reduction, subject to the 
approval of the Ministry of Finance; (3) unlike EJV s, foreign enterprises received no tax benefits 
under the FEITL for reinvesting their profits in China; (4) in computing taxable income, foreign 
enterprises like EJVs could carry forward losses for five years; (5) foreign enterprises could also 
use accelerated methods of depreciation of fixed assets, provided that the operation did not involve 
exploitation of offshore petroleum or other natural resources and subject to the approval by the 
Ministry of Finance; ( 6) foreign enterprises with small-scale production and low profit, provincial 
governments may waive or reduce local income tax to promote investment 
40 
See Arts. 3 and 4, FEITL, the thresholds range from twenty percent for the annual income of up 
to RMB 250,000, to forty percent for the annual income exceeding RMB 1 million, and an 
additional ten percent local tax was levied on the taxable income 
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later, with the promulgation of the China Foreign-Invested Enterprises and 
Foreign Enterprises Income Tax Law41 (the FIE Income Tax Law) on April 9, 
1991, which replaced the JVITL and FEITL 42 and no longer distinguished based 
on the investment vehicle chosen. 43 The FIE Income Tax Law liberalized tax 
preference rules and practice. As a result of the FIETL's official sanctioning of 
various previously promulgated State Council regulations, 44 the two-year tax 
exemption and three-year tax reduction are available to productive WFOEs and 
CJVs,45 which was previously offered to EJVs exclusively. The FIE Income Tax 
Law adopts a thirty percent flat rate to all PIEs, plus a three percent local surtax,46 
combining to effectuate a nominal rate of thirty-three percent in total. PIEs 
engaged in productive sectors and scheduled to operate for ten years or more are 
entitled to a two-year tax exemption, after they make a profit, followed by a three-
year, fifty percent reduction. 47 PIEs engaged in agriculture, forestry, or 
husbandry, or those PIEs located in economically underdeveloped, remote regions 
41 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waishang Touzi Qiye He Waiguo Qiye Suode Shui Fa [Income 
Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Foreign Investment Enterprises and 
Foreign Enterprises] 
42 "Foreign investment enterprises" generally refers to EJVs, CJVs and WFOEs, see Jiang supra 4, 
at 565-566 and accompanying footnotes; see also generally, Li: Rise and Fall, supra I; Gerald A. 
Wunsch & Dingfa Liu, supra 3; Allison E. Wielobob, supra 3, at 4I5-418 
43 see generally, Li: Rise and Fall, supra 1, discussing that "foreign enterprises" are divided into 
two categories: foreign companies and business entities that set up an establishment in China and 
those maintaining no establishment in China, but having earned an income with a source in China 
44 See Arts. 7-9, FIE Income Tax Law of the P.R.C.; see also Art. 68-75, Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Waishang Touzi Qiye he Waiguo Qiye Suodeshui Fa Shishi Xize [Detailed Rules on 
the Implementation of the Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Foreign-
investment Enterprises and Foreign-owned Enterprises][hereinafter, Detailed FIE Income Tax 
Implementation Rules] which authorize provincial governments can waive or cut down local 
surtax for all kinds of FIEs in designated industries or sectors, not just for small scale and low 
profit foreign enterprises as under the FEITL 
45 Arts. 7-9, FIE Income Tax Law of the P.R.C. 
46 !d., Art. 10 
47 Art. 8, FIE Income Tax Law of the P.R.C., but the tax holidays are not available, however, to 
petroleum, natural gas, rare metal, and precious metal exploitation projects, which are governed by 
separate government regulations; see Jiang supra 4, at 565 and accompanying footnotes; see 
generally, Li: Rise and Fall, supra I; Allison E. Wielobob, supra 3, at 415-4I8 
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may obtain, upon application and approval, another fifteen to thirty percent 
reduction in income tax for ten more years after the expiration of such exemption 
and reduction.48 The new regime retains provisions permitting carrying forward of 
losses49 and the use of accelerated methods of depreciation. 50 While the JVITL 
allowed only EJV s to apply for the forty percent refund of the tax paid on the 
portion of any reinvested profit, the FIE Income Tax Law extends eligibility of 
this refund to all PIEs. 51 The FIE Income Tax Law also raises the amount of 
deduction for business entertainment expenses52 and permits businesses to write 
off bad debts. 53 One change that adversely affects foreign investors is the 
revocation of tax holidays that the JVITL granted to EJVs engaged in non-
productive and service sectors. 54 Pre-1991 EJVs may still retain JVITL tax 
holidays, until the end of the term of their joint venture contracts. 55 
2.2.2. Domestic enterprise income tax law 
Changes were also made over this period (1979-1993) to the taxation of Chinese 
domestic enterprises (DEs),56 especially SOEs, which are divided into two groups: 
large and medium scale charged at a 55 percent tax rate, and small scale charged 
at an eight-step progressive rate (ranging from 10 percent to 55 percent). The 
48 Art. 8, FIE Income Tax Law of the P.R.C. 
49 !d., Art. II 
50 Arts. 34 and 40, Detailed FIE Income Tax Implementation Rules, supra 44 
51 Arts. 8,IO and I9(I), FIE Income Tax Law of the P.R.C., approving that qualified FIEs are 
automatically granted the two-year exemption and three-year fifty percent reduction without any 
prior application and approval, and profits received by foreign investors from FIEs are tax exempt 
52 Art. 22, Detailed FIE Income Tax Implementation Rules, supra 44 
53 !d., Art. 25 
54 See Jiang supra 4, at 567 
55 Art. 40, FIE Income Tax Law of the P.R.C. 
56 
Another key aspect of China's tax reform during this period of time is the restructuring of 
separate income tax regimes governing domestically-owned enterprises; see generally Li, supra 3 
and Jiang supra 4, at 567 
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1983 tax-profit substitution system introduced the State-owned Enterprise Income 
Tax (SOEIT) (effective from 1984), which subjected SOEs taxes on their profits, 
and replaced the then existing profit-contracting system.57 However, the profit-
sharing mechanism under the previous profit-contracting system 58 remained under 
the SOEIT as the central government's share of the after-tax profits from the 
SOEs. Furthermore, a regulatory tax, known as the State-owned Enterprise 
Income Regulatory Tax (SOEIRT), was imposed on the after-tax profits of the 
SOEs. The amount oftax was determined on a negotiated basis between the SOEs 
and the central government. In this sense, both the SOEIT and SOEIRT were 
taxes which were not based on taxing actual profits but a set of redesigned 
implementation schemes based on the previous profit-contracting system. In the 
case of non-SOEs which took three forms of ownership, namely, collective, 
private, and individual, 59 three different sets oftaxation rules were promulgated to 
replace the previous ICIT.60 
Until 1984, all enterprises operating in the China were subject to a turnover tax 
known as the Industrial and Commercial Tax (ICT). In 1984, domestic turnover 
tax reform was launched and the ICT was replaced by four separate taxes, 
namely, Product Tax (PT), Business Tax (BT), and Resource Tax (RT) and a 




60/d. related rules include but not limited to Provisional Rules for the Collective Enterprise Income 
Tax (CEJTL) (enacted in April 1985). Provisional Rules for the Individual Industrial and 
Commercial Households Income Tax (IICHITL) (enacted in January 1986); and Provisional Rules 
for the Private Enterprise Income Tax (PEITL) (enacted in June 1988). The IICHITL applied to 
the profits of individually owned domestic enterprises and hence was a quasi-personal income tax. 
The CEITL and PEITL applied to the business profits of collectively or privately owned domestic 
enterprises and hence a quasi-enterprise income tax 
88 
"trial" Value Added Tax (VAT). The trial VAT, however, was different in nature 
than a modem conception of VAT; instead it served as a sales tax at a twenty-four 
percent rate on select items. 61 However, foreign enterprises continued to be 
subject to the ICT, which was once again renamed as the Consolidated Industrial 
and Commercial Tax (CICT) in 1984.62 Over this period (1979-1992), the tax 
system went through several phases characterized by many new, scattered, 
inconsistent and constantly changing taxes such as the VAT, PT, BT (for 
domestic entities) and ICT (for foreign entities), generating the major portion of 
the total revenue. 
2.2.3. Individual income tax law 
The Chinese government introduced the concept of personal income tax soon 
after 197963 to accommodate the disparity of income and foreign individuals 
working in China, 64 therefore, the Ministry of Finance adopted the Individual 
Income Tax Law on September 10, 1980 while the targeted subjects were mostly 
foreign taxpayers with high incomes65 • As of 1986, Chinese citizens were subject 
to income tax under the Individual Income Regulatory Tax Law (IIRTL)66 and 
61 See generally A.J. Easson & Jinyan Li, The Evolution of the Tax System of the People's 
Republic ofChina, 23 Stan. J. Int'l L. 399 (1987) 
62Id. 
63 See Jinyan Li, China's Individual Income Tax- A 26 Years Old Irifant, Tax Notes Int' I, July 24, 
2006,297 
64 One important reason for doing so was that many individuals, including domestic Chinese 
citizens, built up their income and wealth following the adoption of "open door" policy in China. 
Starting with the IITL in 1980, a personal income tax was levied on income earned by foreign 
individuals working in the China 
65 Foreign citizens in China are subject to Individual Income Tax Law of the PRC 
66 Chinese citizens are subject to Individual Income Regulatory Tax Law of the P.R.C. (IIRTL) 
((~~A~~~~~A~A~~--fi~ffl)) 
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most private Chinese enterprises are subject to a different income tax.67 
Without a doubt, such classification is based on three legal complications creating 
many problems in enforcement and administration. First, the definitions of citizen 
and residency requirement are far from clear. There are many Chinese 
entrepreneurs who earned a salary comparable to foreign entrepreneurs but were 
still subject to the lower citizen tax rate. Foreign taxpayers also usually stayed in 
China for a quite short period of time. The residency requirement also lacked 
instructions for dealing with common situations such as temporary absences, 
business domiciles, and management centers. Second, due to administrative 
deficiencies, these laws were not applied consistently across different regions. 
Even in the same local tax jurisdiction, there were various approvals or special 
treatments applicable to different taxpayers. Finally the local tax administration 
had to set up three or more auditing teams for the collection of taxes given 
different treatments and various tax rates applied, and this creates huge 
administrative resource waste and irregularities. Therefore, a consolidated 
individual income tax law was passed in October 1993 according to the NPC's 
Decision on the Amendment of the Individual Income Tax Law. 
Overall, individual income tax laws and regulations experienced a process of 
differentiation and consolidation, to achieve the goal of standardization of the 
individual income tax laws. However, given rapid economic development and 
improvement of individual income, many problems arising were suitably handled 
by the consolidated liT Law, even as the old challenges of opaque 
67
Chinese private entrepreneurs and sole-proprietorships are subject to the Entrepreneurs and Sole-
Proprietorship Tax Law ofthe P.R.C.( ~l=j:I~A.~:#:.fll~~~-1'-f*Ii§l.illt..FfiJH~miaHT~'f?~} 
) 
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implementation and discretionary administration remained. 
2.3. 1994 Tax Reform 
In terms of tax policy, the 1994 tax law reform continues the Chinese tax system's 
most important joint objectives: raising revenue and stimulating the economy by 
encouraging exports and FDI. In comparison with the uncoordinated and 
inconstant changes made in the previous fifteen years, the 1994 tax law and policy 
designed a better synchronized system with determinative plans. A standardized 
revenue-sharing scheme was established and implemented in large part to adjust 
and balance the twisted and inconsistent relationship between the central and 
provincial government. This decentralization effort coincided with the most 
dynamic stage of SOE reform, which pushed SOEs to competitiveness through 
"true" market participation and resulted in millions of layoffs. 
In addition, there were two phases of changes during this period reflecting 
China's shift to a market economy system: (1) the unification and modernization 
of accounting standards to determine the base for indirect tax and income tax; and 
(2) the comprehensive overhaul of the indirect tax laws and regulations and 
rudimentary tax administration echoing the tax revenue-sharing regime. At first 
glance, the changes appear to have emerged to modernize China's fiscal and 
economic system to a market economy driven model. However, tax equity and tax 
neutrality were still less emphasized than the economic benefits generated by 
these tax policy changes. 
The objectives of the 1994 tax reform were to unify the tax laws or rules, to 
spread the tax burden more equitably, to simplify the tax system, and to share the 
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tax levying power more reasonably between the central and local government. 
The tax reforms brought changes in the areas of turnover taxes, personal income 
tax for all individuals, and Enterprise Income Tax (EIT) for domestic enterprises. 
As a result of this reform, the number of taxes has been reduced from 32 to 18. 
Following this reform, the rapid increase of foreign trade and FDI also pushed 
China to improve its tax system to conform with international tax best-practice. 
The 1994 tax system consists of indirect taxes (VAT, business tax, and 
consumption tax), enterprise income taxes (the FIE Income Tax Law and DEIT), 
an individual income tax, property taxes, and payroll taxes among others. Indirect 
taxes account for about 60 percent of the total tax revenue, while enterprise 
income taxes account for about 30 percent. Of all of the instrumental changes 
made to the tax law, the reform of accounting standards is the most important. 
2.3.1. Accounting Standards 
The lack of codified, standardized and uniform accounting rules has plagued 
China's tax law reform since the early 1980s. There was no established private-
sector accounting standard ever released by government authorities before 1992. 
While, in general, taxable income cannot be solely determined on the basis of 
accounting profits, the accounting standards are indispensable when applied to 
obtain a straightforward understanding of taxable transactions. Accounting 
standards usually provide the means to measure revenue and cash, cost allocation, 
accounting period, and realization requirements for profits that are then adjusted 
to apply incentives set out in tax legislation to determine taxable income, all of 
which is subject to auditing assurance. A set of standardized accounting rules has 
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been a conspicuous hole in the tax law system. 
An important piece of legislation enacted to fill in this gap is a new set of 
financial accounting rules for domestic enterprises, the Standards for Business 
Enterprises (ASBE), promulgated by MOF in 1992. Based on the generally 
accepted international accounting standards model, implementation of the ASBE, 
although it was loosely enforced, became particularly important given that most 
SOEs, following decades of public ownership of the means of production and 
expenditure, had developed a mixture of different accounting and booking 
routines. Measurements of taxable income varied across sector and even among 
different enterprises within the same sector. To be fair, the ASBE included many 
"socialist" provisions, as it was designed for domestic enterprises, and was later 
revised with sixteen supplemental detailed standards, all of which contributed to 
reducing distorted and discretionary reporting practices by taxpayers and tax 
administrators. 
2.3.2. Value -added Tax 
The Chinese VAT is a production-type VAT. 68 It has a broad tax base with 
limited exemptions, it applies to all taxable goods and services supplied in China, 
and the standard rate is 17 percent. A lower rate of 13 percent is applied to sales 
and imports of certain products.69 VAT is collected at each level of trade on all 
68 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zengzhishui Zanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Regulations of the 
PRC on Value-Added Tax](effective as of January I, 1994, as amended) [Hereinafter VAT 
Regulations] 
69 See Art. 2, VAT Regulations, stipulating that the scope includes necessities such as grain and 
edible oil, running water, hot water, gas, residential coal products, and air conditioning; print 
publications, and agricultural related products such as feed, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, farm 
machinery and agricultural plastic film 
93 
taxable goods and services. To avoid cascading, suppliers are entitled to a 
refundable input tax credits for taxes paid on goods and services to the extent they 
were acquired for use in commercial activities. The effect of the input tax credit is 
to remove any VAT from the cost of business supplies. Only consumers pay the 
tax. 
Exports are zero-rated, which means that while no output VAT is chargeable, all 
VAT charged at the interim stages in the production chain is effectively refunded 
to the exporter. Moreover, a special VAT rebate applies only to certain domestic 
production, 70 partly to encourage foreign investment. 71 However, China does not 
grant a full VAT refund on the export of many products 72 due to its fiscal 
deficiency and administration concerns. It is hard to argue whether VAT refund 
policies stimulate or restrict exportation by China, therefore whether the VAT 
refund is a WTO non-compliant policy is open to debate. 
2.3.3. Business Tax 
The business tax (BT) 73 applies to business activities that are not subject to VAT. 
Taxable activities include commercial activities, including but not limited to: 
70 See Notice on Improving Measures for the Implementation of Import-Replacement of Steel, Guo 
Shui Fa [ 1999] No. 68, April 16, 1999; see also Cai Shui Zi [1998] No. 117 
71 See Circular on Enterprise Jcome Tax Credit for Purchasing Chinese-Made Equipment by 
Enterprises with Foreign Investments and Foreign Enterprises", Cai Shui Zi [2000] No. 049, 
January 1, 2000; See also, Notice on the Trial Measures for the Administration of Tax Refunds to 
Foreign-Investment Enterprise Purchasing Chinese-Made Equipment, Guo Shui Fa [1999] No. 
171, September 20, 1999 (encouraging FIEs in using Chinese-made equipment by offering VAT 
refund) 
72 For a review of export refund rate, see Xue Jianlan "Analysis and Overview of China's VAT 
Refund Policies", presented at the Michigan-Peking Tax Conference, October 1, 2010, in Ann 
Arbor, Michigan. For earlier discussions on this topic, see generally, MOF and SAT on Acijusting 
Export Refund Rates, Cai Shui [Finance and Taxation], 2003 
73 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yingyeshui Zanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Regulations of the PRC 
on Business Tax] (effective as of January 1, 1994, as amended) [hereinafter Business Tax 
Regulations] 
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transportation services, construction, banking and finance, insurance, post and 
telecommunications, cultural and sports activities, and entertainment and services, 
the transfer of intangible property, and the sale of immovable property within 
China. BT is imposed mostly at rates of 3 percent, 74 5 percent, 75 and 5 to 20 
percent.76 
2.3.4. Consumption Tax 
The Consumption Tax (CT) is an excise tax levied mainly on manufacturers and 
importers in addition to the VAT. Exports are usually exempt. Generally, taxable 
goods are luxury goods - petroleum products (gasoline and diesel), tobacco, 
liquor, cosmetics, extravagant vehicles, fireworks, firecrackers, tires, and 
motorcycles. 77 
2.3.5. Individual Income Tax 
For Individual Income Tax (liT), the 1994 reform program standardized the 
income tax imposed on Chinese citizens and foreigners. The revised Individual 
Income Tax Law (IITL)78 replaced all the previous tax laws for personal income 
taxation. The tax position of foreigners working in China remained the same 
74 Art. 2, Business Tax Regulations, and BT Tax Rate Chart, activities in this category include 
transportation, construction, postal communication, and cultural and athletic activities 
75 !d., activities in this category include banking, insurance, services, and the transfer of intangible 
property and immovable property 
76 Jd., activities in this category include entertainment and those determined by the local 
government 
77 !d., for example, the tax rates range from 45 percent on top quality cigarettes to 3 percent on 
non-luxury cars, gasoline and diesel are taxes on an ad valorem basis at the rate of RMB 0.2 per 
liter for gasoline and RMB 0.1 per liter for diesel 
78 The Individual Income Tax Law of the P.R.C., (effective as of January 1, 1994, as amended); as 
of December 31, 2010, the IITL had been amended 5 times since it was firstly promulgated on 
September 10, 1980 
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under the revised liTL. The revised IITL has removed inconsistencies, which 
existed in the previous tax laws applicable to Chinese citizens. It aimed to provide 
uniform tax treatment for all individuals. One of the most fundamental changes to 
the IITL is the formal inclusion of the concept of residence and physical presence 
as the criteria to determine individual income tax liability. 
Article 1 of the liT Law stipulates that the liT is charged on "the income obtained 
within or outside China by an individual residing for one year or more in the 
PRC." For non-residents and individuals residing in China for less than one year, 
only Chinese-source income is taxable. Individuals residing in China for one year 
or more, but less than five years, pay tax on their Chinese-source income and the 
portion of their foreign-source income that is remitted to China, and those 
residing in China for over five years pay tax on all their income irrespective of its 
source. Temporary absences from China are disregarded in counting an 
individual's period of stay in the country. 
China also adopted a list of categories of income subject to liT, 79 namely: (1) 
wages, salaries, and bonuses from any office or employment; (2) compensation 
for personal services, e.g., legal, medical, and accounting services; (3) royalties 
from patent rights, copyrights, the right to use proprietary technology and other 
rights; (4) dividends and bonuses from investments and interest; (5) income from 
leasing property; and (6) other kinds of specified income. Moreover, the monthly 
deduction is RMB800 for wages and salaries, and income in excess of RMB800 is 
taxed at progressive rates ranging from 5% to 45%. For compensation received 
from personal services, royalties and income from leasing property: a deduction 
79 !d., Art. 2 
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of RMB800 is allowed for expenses if a single payment is less than RMB4,000; 
and a deduction of 20% is allowed for single payments in excess of RMB4,000. 
The balance remaining after the deduction is taxed at a flat rate of20%. Payments 
in kind or in marketable securities are taxed according to the market price at the 
time of acquisition. 
In addition, Article 4 of the liT lists various categories of tax exempt income, 
such as prizes and awards, interest on savings, welfare benefits, insurance 
indemnities, diplomatic related earnings, and deduction according to international 
tax treaties. 
A highlight of the 1993 amendment to the liT Law is the appeal procedures for 
aggrieved taxpayers regarding local tax authorities' decisions. However, although 
the taxpayer may appeal to higher level tax authorities or the people's court, the 
tax due must be paid in advance notwithstanding the result of the appeal. 
Moreover, a stringent tax audit procedure was designed to curb tax evasion with 
high penalties, and serious tax evasion behaviors will be handled and criminalized 
by people's court. 
2.3.6. Enterprise Income Tax 
As discussed in subchapter 2.2, the NPC enacted the FEITL for foreign 
enterprises and enterprises with foreign investment (PIEs) to replace three pieces 
of income tax laws relating to foreign enterprises. Although the FIEIT appears to 
be incomplete, it sent out a vivid signal about China's intention to modernize its 
tax law system through simplification and consolidation. As discussed, the FIE 
Income Tax Law provides numerous incentives for PIEs to do business in China 
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or earn income from China. FIEs are subject to tax on their worldwide income, 
whereas foreign enterprises are taxable only on their Chinese-source income. 
Foreign enterprises operating in China through an "establishment" are taxable on 
the net income derived through the establishment at thirty-three percent. Foreign 
enterprises without operations in China are taxable only on Chinese-source 
investment income and capital gains at twenty percent. The FIE Income Tax Law 
is levied on taxable income, which is the amount of income net of costs, expenses, 
and losses. The rules for calculating income largely follow internationally 
accepted accounting principles. 
The 1994 reforms did, however, introduce the Provisional Rules for Enterprises 
Income Tax for domestic enterprises (DEITL), and this consolidation marks an 
encouraging step along the road to modernization. Prior to the DEITL, there were 
four separate sets of rules for domestic enterprise income tax purposes. 80 The 
DEITL standardized the income tax charged on various types of domestic 
enterprises and provided a tax treatment for domestic enterprises as closely 
aligned to the tax treatment of foreign entities as possible. One noticeable change 
for domestic enterprises was that the tax rate was reduced from 55 per cent to 33 
per cent - the same rate applicable to foreign entities under the 1991 Foreign 
EITL. It is notable that China undertook a remarkable reform aimed at the SOE 
sector, which contributed more than half of the state's revenue for the first four 
decades of the existence of the PRC. On the one hand, the reform reduced the 
80 Rules for the State-owned Enterprises Income Tax (Draft) (enacted in September 1984); The 
Collection Methods for the State-owned Enterprise Income Regulatory Tax (enacted in September 
1984); Provisional Rules for the Collective Enterprise Income Tax (enacted in April 1985); and 
Provisional Rules for the Private Enterprise Income Tax (enacted in June 1988). 
98 
domestic enterprise income tax rate from between 55% and 60% to 33%, the same 
rate as FIE income tax, in order to lower the burden shouldered by SOE sectors. 
SOEs were also challenged by BT and other forms of fees such as education 
surcharges, real estate surcharges and urban expansion fees, among others. 
Rather, SOE's payments related to tax and other social security benefits in total 
were not reduced to the same extent. 
On the other hand, the central government removed most meaningful preferential 
policies for SOEs under the central, planned economy. For example, SOEs had to 
demonstrate commercial performance in order to obtain commercial loans from 
banks, while previously SOEs could take loans up to quota amounts assigned to 
them and received little pressure to repay or risk of bankruptcy. Moreover, SOEs 
had to reengineer their internal management structures to reflect modern corporate 
governance principles and financial independence. Since many industries 
occupied by SOEs were copied from the Soviet industrial model, such as 
machinery, manufacturing, and mining, these corporations faced challenges 
meeting consumer needs and organizing effective distribution channels after the 
Chinese government threw them into the market. To deal with this challenge, over 
90% of SOEs began their transformation processes by laying off millions of 
workers, designing early-retirement plans, removing housing stipends and various 
other benefits programs. This sudden push of SOEs into an immature market 
aroused many social problems, but it also freed up enormous labor resources to 
the market for FIEs and private start-ups. Moreover, the revenue-sharing scheme 
deepened this problem by depriving government support to SOEs from local 
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budgets. SOEs instead had to survive by themselves, bearing the difficulties of 
drained financial sources. 
2.3.7. Revenue Sharing 
Another important aspect of the 1994 tax reform is the establishment of a revenue 
sharing regime intended to shift the revenue base from the provincial level to the 
central government, which was suffering an imbalance with provincial 
government. According to the revenue sharing formula, 100 percent of revenue 
generated from business tax on the supply of services, 25 percent of revenue from 
the VAT on the sale of goods, and half of the revenue from enterprise and 
individual income are allocated to provincial governments. 
Given the inconsistent and incoherent accumulation of rules, formulas and 
processes regarding the revenue split in the 1980s, the 1994 fixed revenue sharing 
formula, as a non-legislative agreement reached after complex negotiations 
between central and provincial authorities, was an enforceable scheme to alleviate 
the central revenue deficiency. Moreover, with regard to the transfer payment 
system, the central government guaranteed to the provinces that they would 
receive the same base revenues they had in 1993. This revenue sharing formula, 
on its surface, appeared quite alluring to provincial government, however, it 
favored the central government by directing more high-yield and growing tax 
revenue bases from provincial governments to the center. 
2.3.8. Tax Administration 
To echo the fixed revenue sharing formula designed m 1994, the tax 
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administration was adjusted accordingly to accommodate such change for tax 
assessment and collection. Primarily, provincial tax authorities aimed to firmly 
control the taxes, e.g., business tax and part of VAT, that were entirely allocated 
to them. The division of tax administration responsibilities was acceptable to both 
central and provincial authorities as an enforceable approach to implement the 
new revenue sharing scheme. 
Ultimately, the creation of provincial tax bureaus or branches was achieved by 
assigning half of the administration's power and structure from provincial offices 
ofthe central government's tax branches. The final tax administration structure in 
the provinces is now comprised of two limbs: the local tax offices under control 
of provincial governments, and the local branch of central state tax 
administration. The operation and management of the local tax bureau of a 
province are supervised by provincial governments, which provide operating 
funds through a retention formula. 
The local branch of the centrally administered SAT mostly serves as a conduit to 
collect the central government's share. In particular, they are responsible for 
assessing and collecting enterprise income taxes (PIEs and centrally-owned 
SOEs), VAT and consumption taxes from all enterprises, and business tax from 
selected industries such as insurance, banking, railway, and infrastructure, and 
individual income taxes from non-citizens. The head of the local branch of SAT is 
appointed jointly by the SAT and the provincial government. On the other hand, 
the central SAT is generally responsible for administering centrally-owned 
enterprises, public listed companies and foreign-owned enterprises with a few 
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prescribed exceptions. 
Provincial tax offices, as a result of the revenue sharing fonnula, pay more 
attention to taxes that are entirely controlled by them, such as business tax and 
individual income tax. In addition, they are responsible for assessing and 
collecting enterprise income tax from provincial and private enterprises. 
2.3.9. Summary 
Tax law from 1992-2001 experienced rigorous reform to match China's economic 
development changes in its political climate. In addition to a non-legislative 
revenue sharing scheme, a relatively modem and equitable tax system has been 
established in China through turnover taxes (namely, VAT, CT, and BT) 
generating the major portion of the total tax revenue, and a set of consolidated 
income tax laws. The refonn mostly simplified previous over-classified, 
ideologically complicated and discriminatory sets of tax laws and regulations. For 
example, three individual income tax laws targeting taxpayers on citizenship and 
residence were consolidated into one piece of law with a clear definition of 
residency and source requirements. Different types of foreign investment-related 
enterprise income tax regimes were reorganized to formulate a systematic code. 
Noticeably, the adoption ofVAT followed the international trends of putting more 
focus on the balance between production and consumption. Although the Chinese 
government suffered complaints from the SOE sector that they were pushed too 
harshly into market participation, the tax law refonn strongly assisted in achieving 
goals within the SOE refonn. 
In terms of legislation drafting techniques, almost all tax laws promulgated by the 
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NPC were sketchy and over elementary in form, and the implementation 
regulations issued by the State Council were not that helpful in providing further 
operative guidelines. Circulars, rulings, and notices issued by the MOP and the 
SAT instead compose the operational body of tax laws and policies, but on an ad 
hoc basis when unforeseen issues or causal political initiatives pop up. These 
irregularities in legislation not only failed in structuring a modem tax law system, 
but also frustrated taxpayers and, at times, officials in implementation. 
2.4. Post-WTO Accession 
In conjunction with the transition from a central, planned economy to an open, 
market-oriented economy, China's new tax reform initiatives were designed and 
formulated by its accession to WTO on December 11, 2001. This celebrated event 
for both China and the international community presented China with the 
laborious task of adjusting economic and tax policies to accommodate challenges 
required by its WTO commitments and general WTO principles. Given the 
complexities of China's legal, economic and social settings, finance and tax 
authorities faced a daunting task ahead to cure and restructure tax law system to 
lodge challenges brought by the WTO membership. 
The implications of WTO membership for Chinese tax law reform are extensive. 
It is not difficult to imagine various aspects of the Chinese tax law system 
conflicting with general WTO principles, such as principles ofnondiscrimination, 
transparency, uniform and impartial administration, and judicial review, among 
others. To address this problem, China's commitments include instrumental 
aspects of tax law reform such as lowering tariffs and removing non-tariffbarriers 
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to encourage foreign trade and investment, removing tax-related export subsidies, 
and designing tax policies following international standards, and substantive 
reform proposals to reform its legal system to be more compatible with a market 
economy and the rule of law. 
In contrast to the stepwise consolidation and rough development of tax law reform 
in the 1990s that characterized the legislation meant to establish a functional tax 
order for China's new market economy, developments in tax law after China's 
WTO accession comprised a steady and flexible approach in coordinating 
international trade and tax norms. There are three major prongs in the reform. The 
first is a continuation of the consolidation and completion process carried over 
from the pre-WTO accession tax law aiming to rewrite tax legislation and deepen 
the revenue sharing scheme. This can be understood as a continuation of the 
socialist legacy and political-compromise culture. Such continued efforts included 
releasing an update of accounting standards, adjusting the revenue sharing 
scheme, and consolidating the enterprise income tax. Second, in order to fulfill its 
Protocol commitments, China gradually removed its non-compliant tax laws and 
regulations, especially regulations that provided special treatment for export 
products. Third, the tax law reform, as part of the comprehensive legal reform in 
China,81 gradually began to accommodate the rule of law and WTO principles of 
transparency, uniformity, impartial administration and judicial review. At first 
81 For more discussion on the Chinese legal traditions, see irifra Chapter III; see generally Randall 
Peerenboom, China's Long March Toward Rule of Law. New York: Cambridge University Press 
(2002); Stanley B. Lubman, Bird in a Cage-Legal Reform in China After Mao. Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press (1999); Stanley B. Lubman, Looking for Law in China, Columbia J. of 
Asian Law 1 (2006); Hsu, C. Stephen, ed., Understanding China's Legal System: Essays in Honor 
of Jerome A. Cohen. New York: New York University Press (2003); Xin Ren, Tradition of the 
Law and Lm11 of the Tradition: Law, State, and Social. New York, Greenwood Press (1997) 
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glance, the WTO accession suggests a general framework to guide further tax law 
reform in China. However, compliance with the commitments made in the 
Accession Protocol and the desire to build a rule of law will complicate China's 
future tax reform as well. 
2.4.1. Accounting standards 
In February 2006, a new version of Accounting Standards for Business 
Enterprises was adopted by MOF aimed at listed companies and SOBs. The new 
ASBB, based on the 1992 set of financial and accounting rules for domestic 
enterprises, mostly referred to the international financial report standards which 
are widely accepted by developed countries, especially those with major capital 
markets. Two problems led to the promulgation of these new standards. The first 
was that the 1992 version of accounting standards was far out of line with and 
even conflicted with international accounting standards, reflecting the domestic 
enterprise focus of previous standards. Second, the jagged and unsystematic 
accounting routines adopted by various SOBs presented huge difficulties for 
auditors calculating profits and taxable income. Therefore, more stringent 
requirements on disclosure are included in the new version. It is said that over 
90% of SOBs, centrally or provincially-owned, for business expansion and 
development have kept their own "treasury" which encouraged corrupt and 
unprofessional retention and use of revenue resources. Moreover, with the boom 
of China's stock markets and loosened monitoring on "A" share listing by SOEs, 
scandals of false financial statements and performance reports caused headaches 
for the securities regulatory commission, and a set of uniform financial and 
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accounting standards was designed to remedy these problems. 
While the new version of ASBE was modeled on international standards, it 
contains quite a few rules reflecting the ideology of Chinese legislators regarding 
their fears of exploiting rules and socialist characteristics of market economy. In 
this sense, the new ASBE is a compromise between international standards and 
specifically Chinese concerns. For example, the restructuring and adjustment of 
enterprise debts is relaxed to encourage the use of financial planning and 
derivatives, related-party disclosure rules remain loose, and there are significant 
disparities between accounting and tax law treatments of recognition of profits 
and cost identification. Among the above differences, the relaxation of regulations 
governing the use of financial planning and derivatives was mostly targeted at 
improving the vitality and competency of the enterprise surplus, given that SOEs, 
after the painful restructuring after 1980s, have more financial capacity and 
knowledge of modem corporate governance practices to compete in the market. 
However, the loosened disclosure requirements allow SOEs to conduct more 
related party transactions leaving a huge loophole, which complicates auditing 
and the enforcement of tax compliance. Moreover, as far as tax practitioners are 
concerned, the new ASBE created a larger gap between the accounting and tax 
practice of profit recognition and cost identification, which would burden tax 
auditing authorities to undergo complicated compliance audit and expertise 
training. Moreover, the new ASBE also takes care of farming and small, private 
enterprises by adopting cost rather than market price to determine product values. 
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2.4.2. A silent transition to a consumption type VAT 
After applying a pseudo "trial" VAT to domestic enterprise in the 1980s and 
adopting a set of VAT laws and regulations of modem sense in the 1994 tax law 
reform, VAT as a turnover tax has been proclaimed by both Chinese academics 
and international commentators as an important step toward modernizing and 
completing the reform of China's tax system. Since 2007, there has been a heated 
debate on transforming the current production type VAT to a more neutral and 
administratively efficient VAT model based on consumption. The academic 
deliberation mostly centers on allowing a full input tax deductions as is 
exemplified in the traditional, and more efficient, VAT system as adopted in other 
market economies. Meanwhile, the opponents to a consumption based VAT, most 
notably several central SAT officials, believe that such consumption based VAT 
will hurt revenue in total and create administrative confusion. However, major 
changes in the VAT arena since 2001 seem to have muted the opposition over 
revenue concerns. 
In 2003 a limited deduction for VAT inputs on capital equipment was allowed by 
MOF and SAT to revitalize the northeastern rustbelt provinces for eight 
designated industries, such as oil-drilling, auto manufacturing, metallurgy and 
down-stream oil chemical production. However, the original initiative was not 
intended as a tax law reform, rather, it served as an incentive to promote 
investment in the northeastern region and to quell the unrest of laid-off workers 
from regional large SOEs. However, an optimistic view would take this change as 
a case for moving the VAT regime toward a neutral, modem system without 
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burdening intermediate enterprises with a final VAT. Following the socialist 
stereotype thinking, this change was phased in by an "incremental amount 
deduction" that limits the deduction only to the VAT payable in excess of that in 
previous years. Ironically, this change was delayed in implementation for three 
months until July I, 2003 due to the extremely high number of fixed asset 
purchases undertaken immediately after the policy was announced in early 2003. 
This program, however, was extended to other regions in 2007 and 2008 to 
rejuvenate twenty-six old industrial bases in the central region and five industry-
rust cities in the Inner Mongolia region. The third round of this program was 
adopted to promote reconstruction of the three provinces that suffered earthquake 
disasters in 2008 but carried more preferential input tax deductions on capital 
assets: enterprises of all industries (with slight exception on military related 
businesses) were approved to recognize the full amount of input tax on acquisition 
of fixed assets. However, the policies adopted in the regions affected by the earth 
quake were more deemed as a revitalizing approach to resurrect shattered public 
confidence and nurture local investments. Ultimately and more remarkably, the 
State Council in November 2008 announced that the deduction for VAT input tax 
on acquisitions of fixed assets would be extended to all industries in a few regions 
of China beginning in January 2009. 
It is too early to assess the fiscal impact that may be brought by such expansive 
VAT reform for the past eight years, and it is far too soon to guess the next move 
MOF and SAT will make concerning the input tax deduction, given the pressure 
from currency reevaluation of RMB, high foreign exchange reserve and the 
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sweeping financial crisis since 2008. At the very least we can observe that the 
shifting of the VAT base from production to consumption may direct more 
revenues from poorer to richer provinces. Such an imbalance can only be resolved 
through a well-channeled transfer payment regime designed by the government. 
However, this may necessitate a reformulation of the current 25:75 split of 
revenues from the VAT to a new ratio to be negotiated by central and provincial 
governments, or a multi-tier formulation for richer or poorer provinces. In 
essence, China's VAT reform demands a high learning curve, mature 
commitments by central and local governments, and caution in the 
implementation of experiments with shifting the VAT from a production to a 
consumption tax. 
2.4.3. Adjusting the revenue sharing formula 
Another significant move made by MOF to the tax system concerned the 
adjustment to the 1993 arrangement on the share of enterprise and individual 
income tax revenue between central and provincial governments. According to 
the revenue sharing formula adopted in 1993, the agreed division between central 
and provincial government would gradually move from 50:50 to 60:40 leading the 
central government to take a larger share of the designated revenue base. The 
change made in 2003 was therefore simply a delayed realization of previously 
reached formulae. This change has had a larger impact than the central 
government originally intended. Not only were relative finances of both tiers of 
government rebalanced, but the central government also sent a strong signal 
regarding its intention to further restrain the control of the provincial government 
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over its own revenue. Provincial governments, instead, had to pay more attention 
to the taxes (e.g. business tax) assigned exclusively to them. This change in part 
also distorted provincial governments' behavior, causing them to increase their 
revenue by various other means, including the recent real estate market boom and 
land transfer fever dominated by provincial and local government actors is an 
unsurprising result of the rebalancing of tax revenues and the systemic revenue 
shortage perceived by provincial governments. 
2.4.4. Nondiscrimination Principle 
The principle of nondiscrimination is central to the WTO umbrella agreements, 
comprising two important principles: the Most-favored-nation (MFN) and 
National Treatment (NT) obligations. Under the MFN principle, GATT 
contracting parties must grant each other treatment as favorable as they give any 
country in the treatment of their goods (import and export tariffs, duties, and 
charges). 82 The NT principle83 prohibits member countries from discriminating 
between imported and domestically produced products and services. Once import 
duty is paid, imported goods and services must be treated no less favorably than 
domestic products and services. This nondiscrimination obligation is applied 
broadly to cover all internal taxes and charges, and all laws, regulations, and 
requirements affecting the domestic sale, offering for sale, purchase, distribution 
or use of a product. 
The principle prohibiting tax subsidies is found in the Agreement on Subsidies 
82 See GATT, Art. I 
83 See GATT, Art. III 
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and Countervailing Measures.84 This provision sets out the general prohibition on 
two types of subsidies, including tax subsidies. The first type of prohibited 
subsidies covers those made contingent on export performance or, more common, 
export subsidies. The second type of prohibited subsidies includes import 
replacement subsidies, which are made contingent on the use of domestic, over 
imported, goods. Some aspects of the current Chinese tax system may violate the 
principles of nondiscrimination and prohibition of tax subsidies. 85 In addition, the 
WTO system also requires an expanded scope of taxpayer rights and deepened 
transparency in tax legislation and administration. 86 
Another important aspect of China's tax system that may conflict with WTO 
principles is the two-track tax system introduced since early 1980s, when China 
first started modernizing its tax system. The two track system refers to the 
existence of one set of rules for foreign investment and foreign individuals, and 
another set of rules for domestic enterprises and Chinese citizens. As previously 
discussed, 87 these two tracks were merged and simplified gradually during the 
reform process in the areas of individual income tax, VAT, and other indirect 
taxes, including the business tax and consumption tax. 
A remarkable merging ofthe two tracks was undertaken in 2007 when the unified 
Enterprise Income Tax was promulgated, but there are still some preferential 
policies offered to foreign enterprises. In particular, (1) tax holidays: a standard 
84 See SCM Art.III 
85 See infra Chapter V, Subchapters II and III 
86 See infra Chapter VII for details on taxpayers' rights protection 
87 See supra 3 and accompanying texts 
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five-year holidal8 for FIEs engaged in productive activities, which entails a tax 
exemption for two years and a 50% reduction in the tax rate for the next three 
years; (2) preferential policies in special economic zones and recently established 
new zones (e.g., Chongqing Liangjiang and Tianjin Binhai new zones), including 
extended tax holidays, and lower income tax rates for large foreign investment 
projects exceeding certain investment values such as USD I 0 million or 5 million; 
(3) reinvestment refunds, whereby FIEs receive 40% refund of tax ifthey reinvest 
their profits in China for at least five years, and a full refund is allowed if profits 
are reinvested for establishing or expanding an export-oriented or technologically 
advanced enterprise; and (4) reduced rates for export-oriented enterprises, 89 which 
are granted a 50% reduction in the applicable tax rate after their tax holidays 
expire and such reduced rate applies whenever it qualifies as an export-oriented 
enterprise. In contrast, domestic enterprises do not receive many tax incentives 
unless they choose investing in waste disposal projects, locating in remote, 
poverty-stricken or minority ethnic regions, or creating large numbers of new 
jobs, to name just a few. 
Admittedly, China's tax system was redesigned based on WTO principles and 
related economic policy changes. However, the extent to which it achieves and 
implements these goals is another question. The unification process evidenced 
that China catered various principles under WTO and honored the development 
schemes of Chinese government with flexible tax policies. However, due to 
88 See Arts. 8-11, FIE Income Tax Law, for certain infrastructure enterprises, the tax holiday is ten 
~ears 
9 An export-oriented enterprise is one for which, on an annual basis, at least 70% of total output 
value is derived from exportation 
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limitations in the WTO rules and dispute settlement mechanism, the impact of 
WTO rules will continue to be relatively modest. Another question is whether 
China's tax system suffers from problems resulting from a lack of consideration 
of principles of equity and neutrality. More time is needed under the WTO regime 
to determine whether WTO principles may cure such deficiency. 
III. Framework of the Chinese Tax System 
3.1. Sources of the Chinese Tax Laws 
An examination of the framework underlying China's tax law system is necessary 
at this stage. Not surprisingly, many problems arise pursuant to the sources and 
hierarchy of China's tax law system. In a descending manner, the laws enacted by 
the National People's Congress (NPC) have the highest authority. The provisional 
regulations or "regulations" enacted by the State Council, the executive center 
comprising various ministries, are next in the hierarchy. They are followed by 
provisional implementation rules issued by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and 
State Administration of Taxation (SAT).90 Each of these tax laws or provisional 
rules is usually supplemented by a set of detailed rules, regulations and various 
circulars, rulings and notices for implementation. The law sets out broad taxation 
principles whereas the provisional rules and regulations contain specific 
provisions for implementation of the respective tax issues. Major tax legislation, 
90 MOF and SAT are entrusted with the authority from the State Council to interpret tax Jaws and 
implement tax policies in China, some of which are coordinated with State Custom and State 
Administration oflndustry and Commerce (SAl C) 
113 
together with the detailed rules and regulations for implementation, provides the 
basic regime for the related taxes. 
Circulars, rulings and notices issued by various (central, provincial and local) 
authorities theoretically have the least authority and are a supplement for 
clarifying specific issues raised by the taxpayers and tax authorities. Although 
these circulars do not have the force oflaw, they are often so highly valued by tax 
authorities that they are deemed to possess the second highest level of authority. 
Hence these tax circulars are practically binding on taxpayers and authorities. One 
reason for this phenomenon is that the legislative process for basic tax laws and 
regulations is time consuming and laborious- the NPC typically assembles only 
once per year and only the State Council passes regulations on a regular basis. 
Moreover, the internal legislation process requires MOF and SAT to serve as the 
drafters and collectors of public opinion about tax laws passed by NPC. 
Therefore, investors have to resort to local tax offices for explanations of related 
tax regulations. Tight control on interpretation and enforcement of tax regulations 
does not exist and circulars may be carried emanate from local tax administrations 
and inconsistent with those of central government. There is no clear way to 
establish "unified" measures. 
3.2. Basic Factors Affecting China's Tax Law System in General 
Tax law in China is marked heavily by political interference. When China's tax 
system is discussed, scholars may initially go to the policy or guidelines enclosed 
in resolutions of CCP Congress annual plenary session and CCP Central 
Economic Working Conference. In this case, China's tax law and policies are a 
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designated system relying on the social, economic and international settings and 
norms. In the transition from a central, planned and socialist economy to an open, 
market-oriented system, mixed with various domestic political and social strife, 
China's tax law system presents a painful process of evolution mixed with back-
and-forth policy turbulence. This section aims to briefly describe the political 
factors and policy orientations that might have or will continue to impact the tax 
law system including legislation, administration and judicature in China. 
The Chinese government has long used economic and fiscal policies to promote 
the CCP's political and economic objectives.91 In addition to the revenue-raising 
function of taxation, 92 the government has used the tax regime to achieve 
objectives beyond revenue allocation. 93 In the early 1950s, the CCP class struggle 
policy and agrarian-land reform induced the imposition of arduous tax burdens on 
landlords,94 with the goal of transferring benefits extracted from land and property 
to the working class. Moreover, in urban areas, especially large cities, taxation 
was "a tool to protect and develop socialist and semi-socialist economies and 
gradually to use, constrain, and transform capitalist industry and commerce."95 To 
this end, an Industrial and Commercial Income Tax" (Gongshangye Suodeshui, or 
ICIT)96 was introduced against "capitalist, industrial and commercial businesses" 
to restrict their capital growth and divert their profits to strengthen the public 
91 See Xu, supra 3, at 25-29 and Jiang, supra 4, at 601-602 
92 See Jiang, supra 4, at 601 
93 !d. 
94 




Gongshangye Shui Zhanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Regulations on Industrial and Commercial 
Taxes], adopted by the State Council of Government Administration on January 27, 1950 and 
promulgated on January 31, 1950, see Li, supra 3 and Jiang supra 4 at 601 
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sector, while collective or state-owned enterprises did not have such ICIT 
liability. Instead, they remitted profits to the state treasury under separate 
regulations. 97 At the same time, favorable treatment was given and applied to 
industries or enterprises that met certain specified political and policy criteria.98 
Following the same logic, after China adopted the open door policy of economic 
reform to upgrade technology and attract foreign investment, the Chinese 
government granted tax holidays and exemption for enterprises engaged in the 
development and manufacturing of approved new products, 99 and for public and 
state-owned enterprises suffering financial hardships. 100 Preferential tax measures 
were also adopted to assign resources among industries, sectors and even 
geographical regions, 101 especially to state-chosen advantageous areas, although 
such treatment reduced nominal tax revenues. This policy orientation remains 
popular based on the economic development needs of different regions. 102 
As China had no modem corporate income tax of its own at the beginning of the 
openness policy and felt pressure to replicate successful tax practices, the Chinese 
government looked to other nations for both normative rules and special treatment 
97 For a detailed review of the history ofiCIT, and related tax reforms, see Jiang supra 4, at 602, 
noting that in particular, in 1958, the government raised taxes on the profit of private enterprises 
by ten to one hundred percent which brought the total income tax rate of private enterprises to as 
high as sixty-seven percent. Moreover, in the early 1970s, the ICIT adopted a special category 
named "temporary business" to catch any unregistered or unauthorized business activities, which 
was further imposed non-state and private businesses a penalty of up to one hundred percent in 
1977, despite the scope of the penalty provision broadly covered any individuals and units 
98 !d., at 603, for example, to implement Mao's industrial policy of favoring industries over 
commerce and heavy industries over light industries, a deduction of the ICIT rate ranging from ten 
to forty percent was offered to SOEs in machinery and military production. 
99 !d., for farm-related businesses including agricultural machine repair and leasing, small fertilizer 
and cement producers, newly established enterprises in people's communes 
100 /d. 
101 !d. 
102 See Xinmin Zhang, Tax Incentives for the Chong Qing Liang Jiang New Zones, presented at the 
PKU-Umich International Tax Conference in October 2010 
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to induce foreign capitai. 103 In order to maintain competitiveness in international 
markets and further its open door policy, the Chinese government also appealed to 
foreign business communities by comparing Chinese tax preferences and 
incentives against other developing countries. 104 In this way, the Chinese 
government was influenced by the concepts and practice of using fiscal and tax 
incentives to attract investments. 105 Chinese authorities also ratified separate tax 
regimes and incentives to codify differences between FIEs and DEs. 106 Moreover, 
state tax authorities had to supervise the spending oftax savings. 107 
WTO accession, through the application of international norms to the Chinese 
economy, has tremendously shaped China's tax policy orientation. The Chinese 
government is both a cautious adopter and a quick learner of international tax 
practices. One important drive behind China's fast assimilation into international 
103 See Jiang, supra 4, at 605 and accompanying footnotes, reviewing the legislative intents ofthe 
first set of tax incentives; 
104 ld. 
105 ld., at 606, Jiang summarizes that it is not surprising that foreign investment enterprises were 
initially limited to export-oriented and technologically advanced investments for the following 
reasons: ( 1) taxes are negatively related to net profits and therefore negatively related to the net 
rate of return, it follows that to increase [foreign direct investment] is to decrease the taxes on 
foreign investment income; (2) Beijing also prioritized profit maximization considerations in its 
decision-making to signal that China had become a friendly and willing host for business and 
investment; (3) Chinese officials were aware that access and opening to China's immense market 
would be immensely profitable to many overseas investors, but they were also concerned with the 
domestic problems arising from opening 
106 !d., at 607 and accompanying footnotes. Foreign investors were set apart from tax, finance, and 
accounting rules governing domestic enterprises, most of which, during the 1980s, still operated 
according to pkmned economy principles, for example, (1) different tax regimes also gave Chinese 
policy makers more room for manipulating the illusion of preferential treatment for foreign 
investors. As DEs were limited by stern rules and limitations in operation and business scope, any 
relaxation or flexibility approved for foreign investors from such "standard practice" could be 
called "preferences;" (2) such preferences hid the fact that DEs received state subsidies as well as 
market protection; (3) this "trade-off' enhanced the domestic competitiveness of Chinese firms 
and attracted foreign investments, but twisted the notions of fairness and efficiency in ways that 
would complicate future SOE reforms. Without favorable tax and fiscal treatment, SOEs might 
have lost support by competing for funds through costly and lengthy budgeting processes. SOEs 
were educated to retain a greater share of their revenue for business expansion and investment by 
depositing retained profit into designated accounts 
107 See supra 3, Moser & Zee, at 112-16, discussing that Chinese tax authorities may request an 
explanation of usage oftax savings and encourage re-investment in the same geographical area 
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tax practice is its strategic use of external forces to drive internal economic 
development. China has undertaken more extraordinary, or discriminatory, 
obligations than other WTO member countries could accept. This is not without 
its purpose however. China's leaders intended to take advantage of market access 
commitments and international disciplines imposed by WTO to further strengthen 
China's competence and competitiveness by transforming the state sector 
economy. In this sense, almost all major tax law reforms and revisions after WTO 
accession are directed at further liberalizing China's economy. This is evidenced 
by the unification of income tax treatment between FIEs and domestic enterprises 
in 2007, and China's prompt response to complaints filed by US on the export 
VAT refund through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. 
In summary, looking back at China's tax law reform for the past three decades, 
China's tax policies have been colored and dominated by the pursuit of economic 
growth and standard of living improvement. Designed as a planned socialist 
economy, the government had first to categorize particular areas or types of 
foreign investment to make the openness policy successful. Then tax and non-tax 
measures were targeted and adopted to promote such investments. National tax 
legislation has been augmented by a myriad of particularistic rules designed for 
targeted foreign investments, "regionally-oriented, industry-specific or ethnically-
based". 108 
108
See Jiang, supra 4, at 607, explaining SEZs and other priority areas were created in coastal 
regions because they were in the best position to attract foreign business. Overseas Chinese 
businesses received additional preferential treatment because they were more likely to invest in 
China 
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IV. Policy Considerations and the Reform of the Tax Law 
China's tax law system experienced extensive and dynamic changes over the past 
six decades, especially for the last thirty years. The speed of economic 
development achieved through foreign investment has been paralleled by the 
development of "preferential" tax policies and incentives. This describes the 
ultimate goal of China's tax law architecture since the early 1980s. The WTO 
accession drove China's tax law toward international and multidisciplinary 
compliance. As a result, advocates on any side of the tax reform debate in China 
are confronted with ambiguous and even contradictory results. However, there are 
a few policy orientations worth noting regarding China's efforts to establish a 
modem tax law system. 
4.1. A Capitalist Profit Motive? 
China's tax policy is marked by its socialist origins. On this foundation, the 
country initiated the policy of openness and domestic reform to build socialism 
with Chinese characteristics109 and sought foreign capital for the "development of 
socialist productive forces." 110 The development and application of law in China's 
transition to a market economy therefore bears markers of a strong socialist 
legacy and reflects the ideology of China's legislators. The Chinese authorities 
109 
ld, at 6IO and accompanying footnotes, quoting Deng Xiaoping, Building the Socialism With 
Chinese Characteristics [Jianshe You Zhongguo Tese De Shehui Zhuyi], June 30, 1984, in 
Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, at 62-64, explaining socialism in terms of developing 
productive forces); Deng Xiaoping, Yi Kao Lixiang Er Kao Jilu Caineng Tuanjie Qilai [Unite on 
the Basis of Idealism and Discipline], at II 0, explaining that socialism with Chinese 
characteristics depends on spiritual civilizations, idealism, ethics, morality, culture and discipline 
110 
See generally, Deng Xiaoping, Shehui Zhuyi He Shichang Jingji Bu Cunzai Genben Maodun 
[No Fundamental Contradiction Exists Between the Socialism and Market Economy], October 23, 
I985, in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, at 148-50 
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had to convince themselves and the Chinese people that the use of tax preferences 
would be beneficial to the country without sacrificing its socialist identity. 
However, the concept of profit maximization initially did not resonate well 
domestically when the CCP was dominated by left-wing military leaders. 111 
Under their leadership, the predominant view was that purely profit-motivated 
investment decisions would jeopardize the China's socialist legacy and long-term 
development goals by inducing chaotic competition with foreign seizures of 
domestic market shares and by threatening Chinese domestic industries. At the 
same time, the fast growing domestic private sector economy troubled the 
government on finding a mixed means to safeguard SOEs and public sector 
economy. Therefore, it was conceded that the pursuit of profit by foreign 
investors, while unavoidable, must therefore be controlled by the state. 112 Many 
even feared that because of preferential treatment, foreign investors might benefit 
more from the country's opening up than the Chinese themselves. 113 
As a result, Chinese government had to formulate a two-track system. It 
maintained a socialist system for domestic enterprises, i.e., SOEs, and Chinese 
citizens, and a western-style tax system for foreign-owned enterprises and foreign 
individuals. Therefore, a bifurcated tax, accounting and financial system was set 
111 According to Communist thinking, the capitalist idea of profit was offensive because it was 
related to exploitation and cheating, and profit motivation was synonymous with selfishness and 
greed 
112 See Guanyu Woguo De Duiwai Jingji Guanxi Wenti [Issues Concerning Our Country's 
Foreign Economic Relations], Hong Qi [Red Flag], April. 6, 1982, Hongqi Zazhi Bianjibu 
[Editorial Board, Red Flag Magazine]. The Chinese admitted that their lack of advanced 
equipment, technology, skilled personnel and management expertise, shortage of funds, and 
overpopulation were factors unfavorable to Chinese-foreign economic ties. at 2, 3-4, quoted by 
Jiang supra 4 at 611 
113 !d. 
120 
up to monitor foreign profit-seeking behavior. 114 Tax preferences also played a 
role in controlling foreign investment through information gathering and other 
monitoring. 115 Although the two tracks later merged in the areas of enterprise 
income tax, individual income tax, VAT, business tax, consumption tax and other 
indirect taxes, many tax incentives were kept to continue China's efforts in 
attracting foreign investment and promoting international trade. This two-track 
system served the goals of economic development and balancing foreign and 
domestic interests. In this case, the original worries of capitalist transformation 
seem overwrought. In addition, China's WTO accession bolstered the view that 
the profit seeking nature of foreign capital will actually contribute to the 
economic wellbeing of the Chinese economy. Tax policies, in this context, should 
therefore attempt to enlarge tax revenues and balance development among 
different regions. 
Another notorious example of the "socialist notion" in the turnover tax law area is 
the perverse dichotomy in which goods are subject to a VAT and services are 
subject to a business tax. Such artificial distinctions, requiring taxpayers to draw 
an artificial line in their business activities for different tax compliance purposes, 
is outdated in China's modern economy in which hybrid supplies are provided 
114 !d., Jiang supra 4 at 610-611, noting the 1979 EJV Law required EJVs to contribute to a 
reserve fund and a venture expansion fund from their after-tax profit, before distribution of any 
profit could be made to venture partners for reinvestment and joint venture expansion. Chinese 
joint venture partners had to hand over their distributed profits to their superior government 
department. Certain tax benefits were explicitly tied to reinvestment by foreign investors in China. 
The profit that foreign investors could actually repatriate represented only a small portion. 
115 See Pitman B. Potter, Foreign Investment Law in the People's Republic of China: Dilemmas of 
State Control, China Quarterly, Mar. 1995, at 155, 173 (noting that the Chinese state seeks to 
strengthen its capacity to obtain information on the financial condition, sales activities and 
technology base of foreign investment projects" through tax preferences, quoted by Jiang supra 4 
at 611) 
121 
without showing the division of tangible elements and associated services. For 
example, the sale of computerized hardware supplemented by database 
infrastructures, for which the value is largely in the intellectual property, may 
distort such a classification allowing firms to evade a high-rated VAT by 
characterizing the products as a service item, subject to a lower business tax 
obligation. A similar example is that in construction, taxpayers and tax authorities 
may have different views regarding which component of the constructions can be 
identified as immoveable and which as movable properties. The former are 
subject to business tax and the latter to VAT. Worse yet, for products mixed with 
goods and accompanying services it is hard find an enforceable formula due to the 
complexities oftransactions. Therefore, two separate methods of keeping records, 
one for goods and one for services, forces business taxpayers to drop optimal tax 
planning activities. All of this contributes either to the draining of collectible 
revenue and tax evasion, or to uncertainty in tax auditing and manipulative 
discretion in tax administration. 
4.2. Economic Efficiency and Tax Equity 
Efficiency and equity are basic elements in a well-functioning modern tax law 
system in a market economy, not to mention compliance with WTO principles. 116 
116 For a discussion of the tax equity in general, see, e.g., Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, 
Once More, 43 Nat'! Tax J. 113, 113 (1990); Deborah M. Weiss, Tax Incentives Without Inequity, 
41 UCLA L. Rev. 1949, 1955 (1994) (about tax incentives created horizontal inequity); For a 
discussion of the equity aspect of tax competition, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Bridging the 
North/South Divide: International Redistribution and Tax Competition, 26 Mich. J. Int'l L. 371 
(2004); Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax 
Competition, 89 Geo. L. J. 543 (2001 ). For a critique of the role of Miranda Stewart and Sunita 
Jogarajan, The International Monetary Fund and Tax Reform, British Tax Review (2004) 146-I 75 
(2004); and Miranda Stewart, Global Trajectories of Tax Reform: The Disclosure of Tax Reform 
122 
Not surprisingly, the Chinese government was aware of the efficiency argument 
against tax incentives throughout years of tax law reform. 117 Allocation of 
resources advocated in Western tax literature in perfectly competitive markets is 
presumably not achievable in China. 118 However, such market efficiency would 
imply significant government intervention in China. 119 On the other hand, in 
China, tax policy is meant to achieve higher goals of state and individual ordering 
that go beyond basic considerations of revenue maximization. In this case, 
bilateral tax treaties signed by China help the recognition of the concept of tax 
sparing and double taxation 120 to allow foreign investors to keep tax preferences 
they were entitled to under Chinese law. 121 The efficiency argument is particularly 
important in the current international tax regime as well. 122 
in Developing and Transition Countries, 44 Harv. Int'l L, J. 134, 140-190 (2003). 
117 See Jin Renqing (Minister of Finance ofthe P.R.C.), Explanation on Draft Enterprise Income 
Tax Law, The full text of the speech in English is http:// www.china-
embassy .org/eng/gyzg/t302221.htm 
118 See Jiang supra 4, at 611-637, Professor Jiang discussed the cultural factors are part of an 
important perspective on the reform oftax law in China in the past decades, and provided a policy 
consideration to understand how Chinese tax reform may evolve even a market economy system 
did not come into place 
119 Economists tend to argue that state intervention in the form of tax subsidies distorts the 
efficient allocation of resources through price and market mechanisms. For a survey of these 
views, see Celine Azemar, Rodolphe Desbordes and Jean-Louis Mucchielli, Do Tax Sparing 
Agreements Contribute to the Attraction of FDI in Developing Countries?, ftp://mse.univ-
parisl.fr/pub/mse/cahiers2004/Bla04047.pdf; James Hines, Jr., Tax Sparing and Direct Investment 
in Developing Countries, Nat'! Bureau Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6728 (1998), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6728. see also Jiang supra 4, at 638, noting that as tax incentives are 
intended to affect resource allocation and generate tax collection by deviating from market 
principles, they are objectionable per se according to the most basic tax policy framework. 
However, "in a world of uncertainty and imperfect information, a world in which most significant 
policy decisions rest on assumptions and conjectures," taxation is "one of the range of governing 
instruments at the disposal of government" and can be utilized "to maintain the acceptability and 
influence ofthe governing party with important segments of opinion" 
12° For further research, see Celine Azemar and Andrew Delios, Fiscal Incentives in Developing 
Countries and FDI: Tax Sparing Matters (Apr. 2005), 
http://www.afse.fr/docs/congres 2005/docs2005/ Azemar.pdf 
121 
A typical tax sparing credit clause makes specific references to the Chinese legislation that 
grants the tax reduction or exemption. The tax incentives granted under the FIE Tax (1991) have 
been considered to be of a substantially similar. Because the new Enterprise Income Tax Law 
(2007) retains the reductions and exemptions of withholding tax on dividends, interest and 
123 
Measuring the 1994 tax system overhaul on indirect taxes for efficiency, none of 
those three major indirect taxes (VAT, Business Tax and Consumption Tax) 
achieve the correct relationship between negative externalities and social costs, 
and tax burdens were mostly placed on firms in the intermediate part of the 
production chain. The VAT, for example has a general 17 percent VAT for sales 
of most goods and a 13 percent rate for a select few goods or products. Different 
from a modem final-consumption-based VAT regime such as a retail sales tax 
where tax is not collected in intermediate, business-to-business stages of the 
production chain, China's VAT is refunded or credited for exportation and 
business-to-business transactions. On the other hand, small businesses are subject 
to two tax rates - 4 and 6 percent, but they are not entitled to recover VAT on 
their acquisitions and businesses subject to higher tax rate can only recover the 
input VAT from inventory, and no input VAT from capital goods is usually 
refundable. As the most important tax, in terms of revenue contribution, the 
current production-based cascading VAT induces economic inefficiencies by 
associating externalities and social costs with longer production chains (with 
various intermediate stages of inventory and production). Intermediate 
transactions completed within a single, inefficient, but integrated firm may avoid 
more costs than those efficient intermediate businesses that need to deal with both 
royalties available under the 1991 tax law, it should be clear that the tax sparing credit applies to 
the new law. 
122 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to overview the literature on international tax neutralities. 
For further reference, see Hugh J. Ault & Brian J. Arnold, Comparative Income Taxation: A 
Structural Analysis (Kluwer Law International2d ed. 2004); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure 
of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1301 (1996); Michael 
Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts and 
Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 Tax L. Rev. 261 (2001); Michael Graetz & Itai Grinberg, Taxing 
International Portfolio Income, 56 Tax L. Rev. 537 (2003) 
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input and output VAT compliance. Therefore, the efficiency rational fails to 
justify the shortage of relief from input business tax for small businesses and 
prejudice against businesses relying heavily on services. 
Moreover, the VAT relief provided for exported goods creates another set of 
inefficiency concerns. China offers a VAT refund to exporters to remove their 
domestic externalities in terms of tax paid before exported goods leave China with 
a credit for all tax incurred on inputs during the production of exported goods or a 
refund of available input taxes. However, this general rule was fragmented into 
five discretional rates of refund formulas as enforced by tax authorities, ranging 
from the highest rate of 17 percent to the lowest - 3 percent. Tax authorities, 
based on their sole discretion, may apply or selectively distort the application of 
these various rates to penalize disfavored exports or subsidize industries desirable 
in the particular industrial reform climate. These adjustable rates and applicable 
industries may also serve to retool investments across different industries and 
sectors, which leave ample room for tax authorities to administer the laws 
inefficiently. 
As to the other two types of indirect taxes, the business tax is imposed on all 
services, whether provided to intermediate businesses or final consumption, and 
this tax collection practice breads inefficiency as it creates both externalities on 
intermediate business and burdens the final consumers. An example is the 
business tax based on interest payments of bank loans, the most popular, if not the 
only, way to obtain capital for business development. For enterprises with 
different types of debt financing needs, especially those privately-held or medium 
125 
and small sized businesses, such taxes on bank loan interest payment may lead 
them to borrow capital from non-bank sources by back-to-back or alternative 
means without incurring the business tax obligation through the high interest rate 
charged on loans. This rule will definitely cause external costs for capital and a 
social cost of unregulated and tainted financing practices. As to the consumption 
tax, which is imposed on a long list of selected "luxury" goods, it can hardly 
perform intended redistributive function. Rather it mostly serves as a punitive 
measure, actualizing political biases with a very weak link to sound tax policy. 
The consumption tax, with rates ranging from 3 to 45 percent, is at best a policy 
to balance socioeconomic disparity in China. However it really succeeds only in 
shifting the purchasing capacity of the growing population of wealthy Chinese to 
overseas markets for luxury goods. 
A focus on tax equity now turns more attention to the Chinese government, which 
seemed to pay it little or no attention when they first introduced the two-track 
system. While many other factors may have contributed to the dismal 
performance of China's SOEs, disparate tax treatment has been criticized based 
on irregular development of markets and the weakening of state planning. 123 To 
eliminate these criticisms, in 1985, the State Council revised the progressive 
income tax schedule for collectively-owned enterprises to reduce their tax 
burden. 124 While non-state sectors are thriving, the performance of many SOEs 
123 
See Wang, supra 11at 166-168, discussing the control of the states are private economy sector 
has been loosened since the 1980s 
124 
see Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiti Qiye Suodeshui Zhanxing Tiaoli [Provisional 
Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Income Tax of Collective Enterprises], issued by 
the State Council on April 11, 1985; See Li, supra 3 at 47-49; see Jiang supra 4, at 647, noting 
that after China's Constitution allowed for privately-owned businesses in 1988, the government 
126 
remains dismal. 125 Differences in tax treatment between the state and non-state 
sectors were eliminated by the 1994 tax law reform, which unified income tax 
regulations governing all firms, whether state-owned or not. However, since then 
the critics have shifted the thrust of their complaints to various tax and non-tax 
preferences benefiting PIEs, all of which led to the unification of enterprise 
income tax Jaw in 2007. 
Tax incentives create horizontal inequity. After the unification of enterprise 
income tax law, the debates that equity does not apply to tax preferences have 
been animated, particularly after China's accession to WTO. Advocates for 
uniform taxation of PIEs and SOEs usually assume that, although the rules should 
be changed, the preferential tax policies should be maintained. Although SOEs 
have eagerly sought tax benefits for themselves arguing with reference to policy 
concerns, 126 their equity argument does not require an abandonment of tax 
preferences per se; rather, it simply demands the same tax benefits given to 
foreign businesses. In reality, however, it is unlikely that existing tax preferences 
favoring foreign businesses can indiscriminately be applied to domestic 
enterprises. 
Another aspect of tax equity - vertical equity - requires "an appropriate 
differentiation among unequals." 127 Vertical equity is more controversial than 
horizontal equity to China because the differentiation is made based on "social 
applied a favorable thirty-five percent income tax rate to private enterprises, compared with the 
then fifty-five percent rate for large and medium state-owned enterprises 
125 See Jiang supra 4 at 648, noting critics blame disparate tax treatment for the plight of the state 
sector. By I99I, large-and medium-sized SOEs paid a higher percentage of their profits as income 
tax than did the non-state enterprises 
126 See Wang supra II at I27-132, discussing SOEs may take the advantage of governmental 
subsidies 
127 See Musgrave supra II6 at 1I3, quoted by Jiang supra 4 at 651 
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taste and political debate." 128 China once had a revenue-sharing system under 
which a portion of locally-collected revenues were withheld for the central 
government. The rest went into a pool to be shared between the central and local 
governments according to pre-determined formulas or contracts. 129 
The efficiency and equity debate perfectly showcases the inability of China's tax 
system to resolve challenges between foreign and domestic interests, coastal and 
hinterland development and income disparities among various classes. China is 
now far more open than thirty years ago. The debate is important because it serves 
to perfect the agenda of domestic economic development and liberalization set by 
Chinese leaders. The scope of this debate should focus on the future agenda of 
Chinese economic development, given China's tradition of treating tax policies as 
political and social adjustments. 
V. China's Tax Law Reform and Fiscal Decentralization 
5.1. Overview 
5.1.1. Decentralization in General 
A series of fiscal and tax law reforms undertaken in China in the past decades 
witnessed the enduring, sometimes painful, process of de facto fiscal 
decentralization. Inheriting an established feudal, authoritarian, bureaucratic 
128 
see Paul R. McDaniel and James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The 
Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1, Fla. Tax Rev. 607 (1993) 
129 
See Xu, supra 3, at 163-169, discussing the effect of revenue sharing between central and local 
governments; see Jiang supra 4, at 651, emphasizing rich or coastal provinces could yield tax 
revenues because they had a large revenue basis to be shared with the central government, whereas 
poor or interior provinces had scarce resources as all the revenues collected locally often fell short 
of local development targets. Governments in poor areas tended to treat tax preferences as abuses 
and distortions in favor of richer regions 
128 
system lasting over two thousand years, the People's Republic took up the 
imperial tradition of bureaucratic government by maintaining a centralized, 
planned economy system with Soviet overtones. Tax collection, was run locally 
but organized and manipulated by the central government. Insufficient financial 
resources caused by political and economic centralization, vestiges of feudal 
relationships, and the denial of democratic elections and government 
accountability collectively contributed to serious corruption, uneven tax burdens, 
and high prevalence of land annexation in both imperial China and the PRC. 
In retrospect, the strategy of prioritizing heavy industries and a state-owned sector 
was likely inconsistent with China's inherited governmental structure at the 
beginning of the socialist transformation in the 1950s. The mobilization of capital 
for resource-intensive industrialization and deficient material accumulation 
require a planned economy system, and corresponding fiscal system. China's 
history of distorted prices, highly centralized planned resource allocation, and a 
micro-management of firms left its financial sector dangerously under-developed 
and the fiscal system served as the key, if not the only channel, for centralized 
resource enlistment and allocation. 
Some scholars arguably theorized the institutional settings of China's "central-
local two track" system in the past three decades as a "market-preserving 
federalism." 130 In particular, it emphasized local fiscal incentives created for local 
economic development and growth by retaining a high degree of local revenue as 
providing powerful incentives to expand local tax bases through market-friendly 
130 
See generally, Qian Yingyi and Gerard Roland, Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint. 
Am. Econ. Rev., Vol. 88, No.5, (1998}, Qian Yingyi and Barry Weingast, China's Transition to 
Market: Market-Preserving Federalism Chinese Style, Journal of Policy Reform, 1:149-185 (1996) 
129 
and development-oriented policies. 131 During periods of socialist industrialization 
and market formation when capital was scarce, a profoundly centralized fiscal 
system, such as the "unified revenue and unified expenditure" (tongshou tongzhi) 
model, was sought where the accounting system and financial indexes of SOEs 
were directly incorporated into and formulated through the fiscal system and all 
important resources were heavily controlled by the central government. For 
instance, all budgets were devised and monitored by the central while local 
governments did not have discretionary power to determine independent 
budgets. 132 On the other hand, local governments were not silent in voicing out 
their "autonomy." They not only obtained significant autonomy over their own 
budgetary decision processes, investments, land requisitions and sales, local fees 
and the like, but they also took on the responsibilities of providing and monitoring 
public goods and services, such as healthcare, social insurance, education and 
infrastructure construction. Local governments also relaxed the control of SOEs 
and TVEs by promoting a market-based system honoring contractual business 
activities and independent firm operation in the hope to establish a coordinated 
local system of tax incentives. 
Not surprisingly, the intergovernmental game in China followed a cycle of 
"decentralization leads to disorder; disorder leads to centralization; centralization 
131 !d. 
132 Local governments (at province, prefecture, county level and commune level) did not have 
independent budgets. As to expenditure assignment, the central government was responsible for 
national defense, economic development (capital spending, R&D, universities and research 
institutes), industrial policy, and administration ofnational institutions such as the judicial system. 
Responsibilities for delivering day-to-day public administration and social services such as 
education (except universities), public safety, health care, social security, housing, and other 
local/urban services was delegated to local governments 
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leads to stagnation; stagnation leads to decentralization," 133 which was inevitable 
under the soft-budget constraints vested to local government and SOEs. However, 
the evolution of the Chinese fiscal and tax system hardly can be portrayed as a 
"federalism" 134 which is constitution-oriented, election-based and inter-regional 
mobility-driven 135• Consequently, a de facto informal and flexible tax framework 
administered by local government intertwined with central, formal and national 
tax regime controlled by the central government inevitably came into place 
contributing to a complex "central-local two track" system. 
5.1.2. The Dilemma of the Decentralization Cycle in China's Planned 
Economy 
The typical problem of State control and centralized scrutinizing caused by 
information asymmetry emerged shortly after the central planned system was 
formulated in the early 1950s. Deficiencies of the over-centralized economy 
inherited by the PRC received close attention from top Chinese leaders, 136 to 
whom China's "territory is so vast," 137 and Chinese "population is so large and 
the conditions are so complex that it is far between to have the initiatives come 
133 See Qian and Weingast, supra 130 at 152-53 
134 See generally, Brennan, G. and J.M. Buchanan, The Power to Tax, (Cambridge University 
Press, 1980). In Brennan and Buchanan's Model, the government is viewed as a monolithic 
Leviathan to maximize its tax revenue, which should be restrained by the institutional settings of 
fiscal federalism 
135 See Ch.M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, Journal of Political Economy 64 
( 1956), 41 ~24, discussing vote by hand vs. vote by feet 
136 See generally Mao, Zedong On Ten Important Relationships, a famous speech published by 
Mao in 1956 
137 !d. 
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from both the central and the local authorities than from once source alone." 138 
Therefore, China "must not follow the example of the Soviet Union in 
concentrating everything in the hands of the central authorities, shackling the 
local authorities and denying them the right to independent action." 139 In light of 
the substantial workload required to formulate, administrate, balance, coordinate, 
and monitor a planned fiscal system in China and establish corresponding 
intergovernmental arrangements, which only increased as the economy grew 
larger and more complicated, decentralization of the fiscal function was 
necessary. 140 As economic development coupled with more infrastructure projects 
initiated and enlarged the SOE sector, fiscal centralization became increasingly 
less efficient and competent. Moreover, a highly centralized planned system 
thwarted promoting SOE incentives as well as discouraged local governments to 
fully coordinate and foster local industrial projects. 
To resolve problems arising from centralized socialist transformation, China 
initiated the first round of decentralization efforts within the planned economy 
framework by delegating more powers to local governments immediately after the 
first five-year plan in 1957141, for example, revenue sharing schemes were fixed 




See Qian and Weingast, supra 130, at 160-161, the number of state owned enterprises(SOEs) 
subordinated to the central government increased from 2,800 in 1953 to 9,300 in 1957, and the 
number of items in material allocation under central planning increased from 55 in 1952 to 231 in 
1957 
141 
/d., reviewing the history of decentralization in China, in particular, the policies then covered: 
( 1) delegating nearly all SOEs to local governments such that the share of industrial output by the 
enterprises subordinated to the central government shrank from 40 percent to 14 percent of the 
national total; (2) central planning was to change from a national to a provincial basis, with 
decisions about fixed investment to be made by local governments rather than the central 
government 
132 
However, the decentralization, together with Great Leap Forward, led to the 
collapse of cross-industry coordination assembled under the planned 
centralization and inter-regional segmentation pushed local governments to 
establish an independent, but duplicative, set of industrial systems in the interest 
of self-sufficiency. As a result, central government revenue heavily shrank from 
7 5 percent to less than 50 percent of the treasury until the end of 1950s.142 
Expectedly, such radical decentralization efforts run to opposite extreme due to 
coordination failures. The soft budget constraint faced by local governments and 
SOEs soon led to excessive investment expansion and inefficient duplication of 
production among various regions. Recentralization had to begin in 1959 in which 
all large and medium-sized industrial enterprises were again subordinated back to 
the central government. However, the centralization again brought about incentive 
problems and economic stagnation in the 1960s, thus a second wave of 
decentralization followed in the early 1970s when local governments gained more 
authority over fixed investment and local revenue. Afterwards, a similar, but less 
serious investment boom led to yet another round of recentralization in the mid-
1970s, coupled with the political strife caused by the Cultural Revolution. 
To recap, the separation of administrative responsibilities and adjustment of 
power division between the central and local governments ultimately only 
changed the political statuses of regions and reshuffled industries in the resource 
allocation scheme. However, the heavy-industry-stressed development strategy, 
the distorted macro-policy environment, controlled resource allocation system and 
rigid enterprise management institutions were left largely intact. It is easy to see 
l42ld. 
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that the decentralization under a central, planned system was not able to alleviate 
the inefficiency problem since it could neither improve micro-efficiency through 
market discipline, nor could it change the heavy industry development strategy 
inconsistent with China's comparative advantage. Therefore, a cycle of 
"decentralization leads to disorder; disorder leads to centralization; centralization 
leads to stagnation; stagnation leads to decentralization" was inevitable under the 
soft-budget constraints vested to local government and SOBs. 
5.1.3. Administrative Decentralization 
Although the distorted infrastructures and low efficiency under the planned 
economy were considered problematic from the first round of decentralization in 
the 1950s, it was not until the 1978 market economy reforms that fundamental 
reforms were undertaken. There had been an inherent political logic for the 
distorted development strategy, centralized resource allocation system and rigid 
enterprise institutions, with production irregularities and twisted price control. 
When China's top leaders realized in the late 1970s the production inefficiency of 
SOBs and People's Communes and lack of stimulus for workers and farmers, the 
Household Responsibility System became a dominant form of microeconomic 
organizations in rural areas, and reforms of the Contract Responsibility System 
(chengbao zeren zhi) on SOBs centering on power delegation and profit sharing 
were initiated. Accordingly, those micro-reforms in rural areas and SOBs were 
accompanied by a process of administrative and fiscal decentralization, which 
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was deemed necessary in a large country like China to induce local coordination 
in market-oriented reforms. 
From the administrative perspective, fiscal and tax reform since the early 1980s 
stimulated a significant increase in local governments' autonomy in local 
administration and economic management. The autonomy was evidenced by a 
few decentralization efforts in improving efficiency and justifying fair 
competition, such as "local state corporatism" 143 , tax incentives for attracting 
(foreign) investment, removal of barriers on industry entry standards, pledging 
bank credit for the profitability of local firms, and flexibility in resource 
allocation, Moreover, rural economies, especially the town and village enterprises 
(TVEs), and some local SOEs were tentatively released outside the planned 
framework due to deregulation. For instance, a shift of revenue sources from top-
down stripping of profit or cash flow gradually moved to levying taxes on the 
non-state sector to secure protection of local property rights under an 
unpredictable centralized setting. Local governments behave as lawmakers when 
they impose taxes on TVEs and as possessors when they declare residual profits 
under local control. Another particularly remarkable development is the flexibility 
of coastal systems in designing local tax incentives in the initial years of the open 
door policy. 144 Starting from the early 1980s, many regions especially coastal 
provinces were designated and approved to establish their own foreign trade 
143 
See e.g., Jean Oi, Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in 
China, World Politics 45:99-126 (1992) [hereinafter Oi: Fiscal Reform]; Jean Oi, Rural China 
Takes Off: Incentives for Reform Berkeley: University of California Press (1994); Jean Oi, The 
Role of the Local States in China's Transitional Economy China Quarterly 144:1132-1149 (1995) 
(Professor Jean Oi from Stanford is one of the leading political scientists in studying the 
federalism and central-local government relationships of China.) 
144 
See generally Jean Oi, Fiscal Reform, World Politics 45:99-126 (1992) 
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corporations with regional opening-up experimentation. Experiments included the 
"one step ahead" policy, implemented in Guangdong and Fujian provinces, the 
establishment of four special economic zones ("SEZ") (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and 
Shantou, and Xiamen) in 1980, and the designation of 14 coastal cities as "coastal 
open cities" ("COC") in 1984. These areas were privileged to enjoy lower tax 
rates and a higher share of collected revenues, but perhaps more importantly, they 
benefited from special institutional and policy arrangements and gained more 
autonomy over local economic development. 
Granting more independent decision-making autonomy to an increased number of 
local, especially littoral SEZs and COCs, governments is far from describing the 
whole picture of administrative decentralization. The principle-agent relationship 
is another deliberation underpinning many scholars' characterizations 145 of 
China's intergovernmental balance. Local government agencies exploited 
different degrees of flexibilities in implementing central policies given their 
diversified social, geographical, historical and resource allocation. With balance 
shifted and separated between central-to-local ownership, local governments were 
provided with incentives in tax and profit sharing to step up their effort in revenue 
collection. Meanwhile, inter-regional rivalry compelled local governments to 
adopt aggressive tax incentives to subsidize their tax bases. 146 A penetrating factor 
in the administrative decentralization was the delegation, from the early 1980s 
145 
See generally Barbara Krug and Hans Hendrischke. (eds.) China's Economy in the 21st century: 
Enterprise and Business Behavior. London: Edward Elgar (2007); see also Barbara Krug, (ed.) 
China's Rational Entrepreneurs : The Development of the New Private Business Sector. London: 
Routledge Press.(2004) 
146 
See Barbara Krug, Introduction: New Opportunities, New Sector, New Firms in Barbara Krug 
( ed.) China's Rational Entrepreneurs: The Development of the New Private Business Sector. 
London: Routledge Press.(2004) 
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onward, of the operation and management of SOEs to local governments at the 
provincial, municipal and county levels. 147 Fixed asset investments for local-
government-owned-enterprises naturally fell on the shoulders of local government, 
which had to take primary and final responsibilities as the SOE owners for 
expenditures covering a wide range of social services like education, healthcare, 
pension and retirement services. These created a de facto coalition of SOEs and 
local government agencies incentivized to exploit central fiscal and tax policies to 
maximize local benefits. 
5.2. Overview of Fiscal Decentralization 
5.2.1. Fiscal Decentralization under Market Economy Development (1978-
1993) 
Chinese fiscal system also experienced substantial decentralizing process and 
efforts since adopting the reform and economic reform policies from the late 
1970s. The objective of decentralization was designed to substantiate local 
government responsibilities and autonomy for local economic development and 
fiscal functioning, while preserving an adequate degree of central fiscal control 
147 
See Yingyi Qian and Chenggang Xu, Why China's Economic Reform Differ: The M-form 
Hierarchy and Entry/Expansion of the Non-state Sector, Economics of Transition 1(2), pp.l35-
170 (1993), discussing the overall costs and benefits of U-forms and M-forms in terms of scale 
economies, incentives, and coordination, and also the implications of these costs and benefits for 
alternative approaches to reform and further noting that, by 1985, the state-owned industrial 
enterprises controlled by the center accounted for only 20 percent of the total industrial output at 
or above the township level, while provincial and municipality governments controlled 45 percent 
and county governments 35 percent 
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and appropriate nationwide resource allocation. Meanwhile, decentralization 
brought unexpected headaches to top Chinese leaders in executing contractual 
arrangements between the central and local agents, such as drains on revenue, 
increased central deficits, weakened macroeconomic management and augmented 
interregional disparities. China's fiscal decentralization efforts in the 1980s and 
early 1990s involved balancing and delineating intergovernmental contractual 
relationships in three areas: 1) division of expenditure responsibilities between 
central and local governments; 2) reformulating the allocation or sharing of 
revenue resources; and 3) vertical fiscal transfers among various levels of 
governments. 
China's division of expenditure responsibilities between the central 148 and the 
local 149 governments follows the hierarchy of budgetary agencies, which is 
roughly consistent with international practices. 150 Accordingly, expenditures of 
budgetary agencies owned or materially managed by local governments are taken 
care of by local budgets, whereas the central government only provides subsides 
to poor or underdeveloped regions to meet a set of uniform national minimum 
standards of basic public services and social security. Although the central 
148 Details on such arrangement and formula are the website of the Ministry of Finance of the 
P.R.C., http://www.mof.gov.cn, the center government's expenditure responsibilities include 
national defense; foreign aid and external relations; capital construction and technical upgrading of 
centrally owned enterprises and outlays on their new product development; agriculture, forestry, 
and water conservation at the central level; industrial transportation, and commercial operation of 
national importance; certain education, culture, health and social services; outlays on centrally 
obligated price subsidies; geological surveys; and repayment of public debt (last visited on March 
15, 2011) 
149 Local expenditure responsibilities include basic construction and technical improvement of 
locally owned enterprises and their new product development; rural production assistance, 
agricultural development and water conservation at the local level; urban maintenance and 
construction; education, health, culture, and social services; social welfare and pensions; 
administrative expenditures; and a range of price subsidies. 
150 See generally, Ze Zhu and Barbara Krug, Is China a Leviathan? ERIM Report Series Research 
in Management (2005), https://ep.eur.nl/handle/1765/7175 (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
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government no longer micromanaged with confusing stipulations for individual 
local cases, it continued to burden itself with formulating compulsory guidelines 
monitoring acceptable minimum levels of local expenditure, adjusted by factors 
such as policy priorities such as disasters relief, price readjustment and 
government procurement changes. 
The revenue-sharing and tax assignment dimension of decentralization was no 
less dramatic. Starting in the early 1980s, the central-provincial fiscal system 
shifted from a "unified revenue and unified expenditure" into the "dining in 
separate kitchens"(fenzao chifan) that divided revenue and expenditure 
responsibilities between the central and the provincial governments. 151 To 
experiment with the transfer of fiscal power from central to local governments, 
many programs were initiated such as the "fixed overall revenue sharing rate" in 
Jiangsu Province in 1977, "dividing central, local and central-local share" in 
Sichuan Province in 1979, and a "fixed lump sum upward remittance" in 
Guangdong and Fujian Provinces from 1979 to 1983. The central-provincial 
intergovernmental division experienced some further adjustments including the 
proportional sharing system in 1982. Moreover, the central government adopted 
the Contract Responsibility System followed by a "tax-for-profit" (li gai shui) in 
1983 and 1984. The share of after tax profit or the tax rate was subject to a case-
151 See Qian and Xu, supra 147 at 150-155, noting under such a system, (i) some fiscal sources 
were clearly specified as the central government's revenue, among these were custom duties and 
revenue remitted by central-government-owned-enterprises; (ii) other sources such as salt tax, 
agricultural taxes, and the revenue of local-government-owned-enterprises were defined as the 
local governments' revenues. (iii) for the profits of large-scale SOEs under dual leadership by 
central and local governments, the industrial and commercial taxes (turnover taxes), central 
government and local government shared them with some fixed proportion. It is obvious that the 
spirit of the rearrangements in 1980 is to preserve the incentives for the local governments, 
constraint to the guarantee of the central government's revenue 
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by-case annual or bi-annual negotiation with the central government in terms of 
enterprise size, industry sectors, and various development concerns. In this new 
arrangement, SOEs, after submitting their contracted quota of profits to the 
central government, behaved as independent market participants and kept residual 
profits for wages, investments, and capital investment purposes without State 
intervention. However, the underperformance of SOEs forced the central 
government to increase expenditures and bank loans to bail out bankrupt SOEs, 
while managers of profitable SOEs were suspected of manipulation and asset-
stripping through privatization of state assets or transfer of assets to non-state 
sectors. Therefore, the subsidies for SOEs were much higher than the revenue 
collected from SOEs. This led the central government to design more schemes to 
expand the tax base including TVEs, Sino-foreign joint ventures and foreign 
investments. 
As to the fiscal contracting system, or tax farming, the central government 
negotiated different contracts with each province on revenue remittances to the 
central treasury, and permitted most provincial governments to retain the bulk of 
h . 152 H h . I t e1r revenues. owever, t e contractual arrangements were not stnct y 
honored, enforced, adhered to and were revised repeatedly for some provinces. 
These breaches of central-local contractual arrangements can be explained. 
152 
See Oi: Fiscal Reform, supra 143, noting that there were six basic types of sharing schemes in 
1988 and they continued through 1993, such as a fixed subsidies from the center (in 14 provinces), 
fixed quota delivery to the center (in 3 provinces), fixed sharing with the center (in 3 provinces), 
quota delivery with a pre-specified growth (in 2 provinces), an incremental sharing, and sharing up 
to a limit with growth adjustment (10 provinces retained a share within a specific percentage of 
revenue from the previous year and then retain all revenues above that quota) 
140 
Although the 1988 fiscal contracting system was extended until the end of 1993 
with limited modifications to revenue-sharing ratios and quotas, the central 
government was unable to find its way to negotiate a satisfactory replacement 
scheme. First of all, the local budget planning as well as a comprehensive 
understanding of cross-regional budgets is unpredictable. Second, the information 
asymmetry based on the principal-agent relationship was dominated by various 
localities, which may switch part of revenue offline from the sharing arrangement. 
Under the fiscal contract systems, the local government controlled considerably 
the actual tax rates and tax bases adopted in practice, although they did not enjoy 
the legislative authority to design and adjust the statutory tax rates and bases. 
Local governments offered various types of tax concessions and incentives to 
enterprises especially foreign investments located and operated in local 
jurisdictions, and shifted budgetary funds for non-budgetary or extra-budgetary 
purposes, thus minimizing the tax revenue share to be remitted to the center. 
Hence, the central government had to take various ad hoc measures to demand 
and manage revenue remittances from local governments, which inevitably had 
perverse reactions to those measures. Therefore, it was not uncommon for local 
governments to submit fraudulent reports on, or even conceal, their true revenue 
capacities when the central government reacted to tighten or revise rules to 
squeeze or penalize local governments with rapidly growing revenues. 
Due to the declining local tax efforts and then on-going SOE reforms, the state 
financial bases were eroded heavily and the central government proposed to 
remedy such deficiency. China's budgetary revenue-to-GDP ratio decreased 
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sharply which caused more government deficits and constrained the central 
government's flexibility in redistribution as well as its stabilization control. The 
central government became increasingly concerned about the shrinking revenue-
to-GOP ratio, 153 which fell from an already low 26 percent in 1980 to 13 percent 
in 1993, and the ratio of central government revenue to total revenue 154 which fell 
from 41 percent in 1984 to 22 percent in 1993. 155 
Another unresolved issue is the vertical fiscal transfers between various layers of 
administrative hierarchy (central, provincial, prefecture, county and township) in 
addition to various levels of special economic zones. Although the central and 
provincial governments may negotiate the share of expenditures and revenue, the 
negotiation on sub-provincial levels of fiscal transfers was left unlegislated, and 
the tax rates were contracted without reflecting efficiencies or legislative intent. 
Diversity of the sub-provincial levels of governments even aggregated the 
discretionary implementation of national tax legislations and policies. Sub-
provincial governments had to negotiate their shares of expenditure and revenue 
with upper level of governments. Therefore, negotiations between different layers 
of governments on transfers and reallocation were constant and added 
considerable burden to tax administration and collection. Moreover, lower levels 
of government made tentative attempts to maximize discretionary revenue and 
their tax base but shift expenditure responsibilities upward in order to minimize 
transfers. 
153 h T e government revenue refers to the budgetary revenue 
154 
Domestic and foreign debts held by the central government are excluded 
155 
See China Statistical Yearbook, National Bureau of Statistics, China (2004) 
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5.2.2. Recentralization efforts- the 1994 fiscal reform 
Echoing the endangered two ratios 156 as well as to strengthen expansion on tax 
revenue and expenditure policies implementation, in 1994 the central government 
initiated a fundamental fiscal reform to replace the already disabling fiscal 
contracting system thus to increase the regulatory share and authority of central 
revenue and to establish a reformulated fiscal transfer system. The centerpiece of 
the comprehensive package of fiscal reform in 1994, still in effect today, was the 
revenue sharing scheme (fen shui zhi), under which the sources of revenue were 
regrouped to include those shared revenues that central and local governments can 
only collect revenue from designated taxes only. In total 29 taxes have been 
imposed on income, turnover, property, resources and services, and indirect taxes 
since then have composed the major revenue source. The revenue sharing scheme 
(Table 4.1) authorizes the central government to collect the bulk of the tax 
revenue, and importantly a 75% share of the newly created Value Added Tax 
(VAT) and other indirect taxes. 157 Local taxes mainly consist of business taxes, 
personal and enterprises income taxes, and other taxes such as urban construction 
tax, land use and real estate taxes, and agricultural taxes (abolished in 2004). In 
addition to VAT, shared revenue sources include securities trading tax and natural 
resource taxes. The expenditure responsibilities were nominally unchanged with 
the sub-provincial levels (prefecture, county, and township) bearing the same 
!56 !d. 
157 
Customs duty, consumption tax collected by customs, income tax on centrally-owned SOE, 
turnover taxes on railway, banks, and insurance companies, and income tax from financial 
institutions set up by the headquarters of People's Bank of China, etc. 
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expenditure responsibilities that were delegated to them through the 
decentralization in the 1980s. (Table 1) 
Table 1. Central-local Taxes Sharing Formula 
Shared Taxes 
VAT 
Enterprise Income Tax 

















Along with the reformed tax assignment system, the central government set up 
strong infrastructural revenue collection agencies called State Tax Bureaus under 
the supervision of State Administration of Taxation in all provincial, prefecture 
and city level governments to collect central and shared taxes. The outcome of the 
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(Figure 14) 
Local Revenue/ Total Government Revenue (2005-2009) 
Tabl.2 Local Revenue 
Percentage 
Total ( Local/Tota 
Governme Local 
nt Revenue Revenue 
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2005 31649.29 14884.22 47.0% 
2006 38760.2 12297.31 31.7% 
2007 51321.78 19168.93 37.4% 
2008 61330.35 17008.04 27.7% 










The percentage of total budgetary revenue collected by the central government 
jumped from 22 percent by the end of 1993 to 61 percent in the share of central 
government revenue in 2009, more importantly, the central government regained 




about 42 percent of total government revenue. 
Although the reformulated revenue sharing scheme was carried out with more 
transparency and stability, many rudiments of old fiscal system remained along 
with emerging new problems. First, the central government compromised with 
many provinces especially the affluent, coastal regions that were initially averse 
to the revenue sharing formula. It was forced to agree that the tax-sharing system 
would be implemented gradually over a few years and part of the shared revenues 
would be returned to locals. Second, the central government allowed tax 
exemptions associated with foreign investment and approved by local 
governments to remain valid for the first two years after the fiscal reform. SOEs 
that were previously co-managed by central and provincial governments could 
continue to receive subsidies for launching large-scale investments and for 
supporting laid-off workers. In addition, many new issues arose regarding the 
expenditure burden borne by county and township governments, which together 
provided the bulk of vital public services such as social security, social welfare, 
education and health services, particularly after the large-scale SOE restructuring 
in the mid-1990s. Many of the public services and social security responsibilities 
that were provided by SOEs fell upon local governments, which were not 
allocated corresponding capital and human resources to perform those 
responsibilities. Accordingly, many local governments at county or township 
levels became nearly insolvent or were in urgent need of redistribution or 
additional transfers from the center. 
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Further, a notorious old problem remained unresolved under the revenue sharing 
scheme - a serious lack of a clear assignment of responsibilities among sub-
provincial levels of government, which produced a high degree of concurrent and 
overlapping expenditures and made it more difficult to identify what levels of 
sub-provincial government were accountable to deliver particular public services 
social security. Perpetuating the disadvantaged bureaucratic position lower level 
county and township governments have always held in China, upper level 
governments concentrate revenue near the center and delegating expenditure 
responsibilities to lower level governments. Provincial governments on one hand 
tend to squeeze larger shares of revenues from sub-provincial levels of 
governments, and on the other hand, exploit means to request and negotiate more 
transfers from the center. 158 This two-sided tendency became increasingly 
apparent after the 1994 fiscal reform. 
At the same time, the revenue sharing scheme fiscal reform also promised to 
achieve a healthy intergovernmental fiscal transfer. Among those transfers or 
grants, the sharing formula based on the old fiscal contracting system prevailing 
during 1979-93 159 was still allowed in some regions. In some specific industry 
lines, such contracting formulas remained unbothered to ensure silky completion 
of those then on-going construction projects such as water conservancy, 
electricity power plant and animal husbandry, etc. The second type of transfer is 
the calculated share returned from the central government to ensure various 
locality to keep the same revenue capacity that was no less than what it was prior 
158 
See Justin Y., Lin, Decentralization, Deregulation and Economic Transition in China 
(Working Paper, CCER, Peking University, 2003) (on file with the author) at page 41 
159 Jd. 
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to 1994. Regretfully, the newly designed transfer formulas did not attain the 
considerations of regional disparity, and worse is that many transfers were made 
on ad hoc basis based on political needs and equalitarian concerns without a 
scientific or statistic measurement of fiscal capacities and needs. Thirdly, 
intergovernmental transfers comprised grants for various purposes, such as price 
subsidies for bulk products, educational organization subsidies, environmental 
protection missions, natural disaster relief and outlaying poverty-stricken regional 
development. However, a "transitional fiscal transfer plans" for channeling more 
transfers from richer coastal areas to poorer hinterland ones by the center was 
never fully realized. 160 
5.3. Impact of Fiscal Decentralization 
Fiscal decentralization, characterized by local tax incentives, has played a 
significant role in upholding state revenue growth and local economic 
160 !d., Lin, at 49. See also, Hu Shudong The Logic of China's Fiscal System Change in the Past 
50 years. Ph.D. dissertation (2001) (CCER, Peking University), noting that in order to satisfy the 
needs of coastal provinces that generate much of the revenues, a lump-sum tax rebates to 
guarantee their pre-1994 income was agreed. In addition, to permit each province to share in the 
growth of its lost tax base over time, the central government committed to giving back 30 percent 
of its increased revenue from the newly created value added tax as well as consumption tax each 
year. The tax rebates, the largest item in overall transfers, are highly correlated with incomes and 
dis-equalizing in nature. The earmarked grants, the second largest item of transfer, have been 
found to be mildly dis-equalizing because they were dominated by food and other consumer 
subsidies that favored urban areas. To offset this regressive effect, the government introduced an 
equalizing (general purpose) transfer to aid poor regions in 1996. They are rule based and rely on 
variables such as provincial GDP, student-teacher ratios, number of civil servants, and population 
density. However, these transfers have been under-funded since their inception, accounting for just 
2% of total transfers. For example, in 1998 the central government allocated RMB 2.2 billion to 
equalization transfers, compared to the estimated fiscal gap of RMB 63 billion produced by the 
formula. 
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development 161 in the past three decades, especially for the development of an 
impressive and distinctive expansion of non-state sector enterprises, including 
TVEs and foreign investment. The autonomy of local governments ensured their 
flexibility in designing local tax incentives to attract foreign investment and 
structure comprehensive local economic infrastructure. Meanwhile, the troubled 
intergovernmental fiscal transfer system also stimulated non-state-owned sectors 
to compete successfully in the market economy. Fiscal decentralization in China, 
after rounds of ups and downs, deserves credit for promoting rapid economic 
development. 
5 .3.1. Private Enterprises 
The rise and expansion of TVEs, 162 some of which later developed into 
successful private enterprises (minying qiye or siying qiye), were attributed to the 
administrative and fiscal decentralization since the late 1970s. Local governments 
actively supported market-oriented, needs-driven, non-state enterprises to expand 
161See generally, Linda Chelan Li, Centre and Provinces--China 1978-1993: Power as Non-Zero-
Sum (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2002), noting that, from 1978 to 1993, China's per capita GNP 
increased in real terms by around 280 percent. National absolute poverty was reduced by more 
than 50 percent in the first half of the 1980s, dropping from 17.9 percent of the population in 1982 
to 6.1 percent in 1984. This downward trend corresponds to the growth of real income and real 
GNP. China also witnessed an across-board growth both in coastal and inland regions. Indeed, if 
each China's province were taken as an economy, about 20 out of top 30 growth regions in the 
world in the period would be provinces in China 
162 See Jiahua Che & Yingyi Qian, Institutional Environment, Community Government, and 
Corporate Governance: Understanding China's Township-Village Enterprises, William Davidson 
Institute Working Papers Series 59, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan 
(1998), noting the output ofTVEs grew more than six-fold in real terms between 1985 and 1997, 
leading China's rapid industrial and overall growth. By 1993, TVEs already accounted for 36% of 
the national industrial output, up from 9% in 1978. Within the rural sector, the TVEs accounted 
for three-quarters of rural industrial output 
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their revenue bases, enlarge local markets, and increase their labor forces in 
response to interregional competition, especially after the establishment of 
Household Responsibility System in rural areas and discharge of agricultural 
collectivization. Fiscal decentralization gave higher shares of revenue (TVE tax or 
profits) to local governments as well as discretional authority to design locally 
customized incentives for TVEs. The decentralization policies called for local 
governments to enjoy great autonomy, including independently standardizing 
pricing strategy, investing self-raised funds, and designing local labor-incentive 
industries to margin cover capital shortage. More importantly, the autonomy to 
restructure local enterprises structure and simplified procedures to issue licenses 
to newly established enterprises, 163 which led to the golden period of TVE and 
private enterprises growth. In addition, fiscal decentralization supported a better 
delimitation of intra-governmental property rights, which provided provincial 
governments as resident claimant and de facto controller of those previously 
central-provincial jointly owned SOEs within their jurisdiction. Local 
governments then stepped in and assumed the entrepreneurial role, which is 
beneficial to the legislation and implementation of tax incentives and efficient 
administration. 
163 See generally Linda Li, supra 161, noting that in the planning period, the state planning 
seriously limited the autonomy of local governments to generate and retain revenues. Localities 
were required to turn over all or most of their revenues to upper level governments. The surplus 
retained was also subject to higher-level approval before any use. It is also interesting to mention 
that the upsurge of TVEs in post-reform period is also closely related to the two waves of 
decentralization before the reform, which led to the rise of some collective enterprises (such as 
Commune and Brigade Enterprises in rural areas to emerge outside the state plan before the advent 
of reform) 
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5.3.2. Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
The fiscal decentralization process also intertwined with China's development 
strategy by facilitating a gradual, region-by-region, and industry-specific tempo of 
attracting of foreign capital and technology. Under a centralized authoritarian 
state based on extensive expenditure decentralization but little revenue 
decentralization or fiscal transfer, local government officials no doubt focused on 
local development needs. With vast expanse, large population, huge regional 
contrasts, outdated industrial infrastructure, and a ridiculous scarcity of trained 
workers and business professionals, China has, since the late 1970s, needed an 
enormous infusion of foreign capital and massive amounts imports of modern 
equipment and technology in order to make an immediate, visible difference in its 
productivity and standard of living. China's business and fiscal environment, 
nationally and locally, were not so appealing to foreign investment. However, 
China's top leaders understood clearly the importance of decentralization as 
drastic changes had to be achieved by delegating more authority to localities to 
improve efficiency and productivity nationally or attract foreign capital. Fiscal 
decentralization was prioritized as a way of giving that authority by allowing 
locally designed, region-specific tax incentives and flexible tax collection policies. 
On July 15, 1979, experimental Special Export Zone (chukou tequ) proposed by 
Fujian and Guangdong provinces were approved by the CCP Central Standing 
Committee to compete for oversea investment, and such zones were later renamed 
as Special Economic Zones (jingji tequ or SEZ) in part to attract funds from 
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overseas Chinese 164 who were geographically proximate or had a cultural 
closeness and kinship with the SEZs. Because SEZs served as a breakthrough of 
opening-up policy, the government secured unprecedented undertakings to make 
them successful. SEZs and their governments were given exceptional autonomy 
and extensive powers in areas such as foreign exchange, financial management, 
and labor and price controls. As a matter of decentralization, SEZs received 
preferential policies on tax reductions, exemptions and other flexible fiscal 
privileges to make them more attractive. Early preferential tax treatment of 
foreign investors in SEZs was governed by the Regulations on Special Economic 
Zones in Guangdong Province, which, in fact, preceded the 1980 JVITL and later 
was fine-tuned and improved by the 1984 Tax Reduction and Exemption 
Regulations by unifying tax treatment for foreign investment projects in all four 
SEZs and in Hainan Island. 
With a plethora of preferential schemes and overlapping promises, foreign 
investors in a designated area may claim not only benefits that are available 
nationwide, but also special treatment offered by regional schemes. On top of 
nationwide preferential income tax treatments, several SEZ-specific privileges 
stood out, evidencing the seriousness of China's decentralization efforts. 165 
164 See Jiang, supra 4, at 633 and accompanying footnotes, presenting the 1985 Regulations on 
Preferences to Overseas Chinese Investment created confusion as overseas Chinese investors, no 
matter where they invested, received more tax benefits than foreign investors even in SEZs, and it 
was also difficult to distinguish overseas Chinese investment from other foreign investment as 
many investors were companies, rather than individuals 
165 !d., at 571 and accompanying footnotes, and see generally Li, supra 1, explaining that all FDI 
projects in SEZs enjoyed a reduced enterprise income tax rate without distinction between forms 
of investment and continued using this privilege even after the 1991 unified tax law was 
promulgated. Moreover, the local governments in SEZs could waive or reduce local income tax. 
Most significantly, SEZs established precedents for the authorities to create preferences, which 
helped channel foreign capital and technology into other designated priority areas 
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China's fiscal decentralization efforts were strengthened after the establishment of 
SEZs when Chinese leaders decided to encourage almost all coastal areas to 
accommodate foreign investment and attract foreign capital and technology. Tax 
incentives ranked high on regional barometers of openness and hospitality to 
foreign investment. Therefore, efforts to improve investment conditions needed to 
incorporate preferential tax measures. In May 1984, the central government 
designated fourteen coastal cities as Coastal Open Cities (yanhai kaifang chengshi 
or COC) and released broader autonomy on local development and foreign 
investment affairs. In particular, government assigned certain areas within COCs 
as Economic and Technology Development Zones (jingjijishu kaifaqu or ETDZs), 
which duplicated most of the characteristics of the SEZs together with other 
preferential policies to target technology-oriented and capital-intensive projects. 
ETDZs, however, in part evidenced the recentralization efforts of the central 
government since it retained the final say on matters such as the feasibility of 
establishing an ETDZ and the exact location and scale of ETDZs 166 Meanwhile, 
as a regionally based initiative, Old Urban Districts (lao cheng qu or OUDs) 
within COCs were created with limited incentives for foreign investment 167 to 
166 /d., at 573 
167 !d., at 575, and accompanying footnotes, OUD's tax preferential policies were closely applied 
to another initiative of decentralization - the Coastal Economic Open Regions (yanhai jingji 
kaifangqu or CEORs) that were established to strengthen export sectors as well as reinforce 
receipts of foreign capital, technology, management skills. The 1984 Tax Reduction and 
Exemption Regulations has allowed a reduced fifteen percent rate to certain productive EJVs, 
CJVs and WFOEs in OUDs. In particular, the enterprises must be technology or know-how 
intensive, with an investment exceeding U.S. $30 million and a long investment recovery period, 
or they must be projects related to energy, transport or port construction. EJVs, WFOEs and CJVs 
based in OUDs which are not eligible for the fifteen percent rate receive a twenty percent 
reduction in their applicable income tax if they fall within one of the following sectors: (1) 
machinery, manufacturing and electronics; (2) metallurgy, chemical, and building material; (3) 
light industry, textile, and packaging; (4) medical equipment and pharmaceutical; (5) agriculture, 
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refuel regional economy. China's leaders also championed the development of 
those privileged regions and committed their limited available resources to the 
improvement of related infrastructure. 168 Regional tax incentives made SEZs, 
ETDZs, OUDs and CEORs outshine the rest of the country but hierarchies were 
created even among those prioritized regions themselves. SEZs received special 
attention with the most generous tax benefits to foreign investors due to their 
pioneering positions and top priority status - a situation, which has remained 
largely unchanged - since the establishment of the SEZs. The heightened tension 
had already aroused certain unrest within the CCP leadership itself, so it is no 
surprise that decentralized efforts and tax benefits available to foreign investment 
in ETDZs, OUDs and CEORs were capped. 169 
The cycle of decentralization and recentralization in terms of tax incentives and 
fiscal transfers repeated and carried over in the 1990s. Although interrupted by 
the 1989 democracy movement, the CCP's top leaders realized that any continued 
unreasonable clench on centralized power would hamper their ability to deliver on 
promises of material improvements of standards of living. As a result, in addition 
to those prioritized initiatives, the central government approved further opening 
and development of the Pudong New District in the City of Shanghai as a 
showcase for Chinese leaders' commitment to embrace foreign investments by 
designating a new priority district, and preferential schemes comparable to those 
forestry, husbandry, aquatic breeding and processing related to any one of these sectors; or (6) 
construction 
168 Id., at 575-76 
169 !d., discussing that in fact, China's leaders suspected that to allow the same preferential 
treatment in non-SEZ prioritized areas would lead to damaging rivalries and distract attention 
from SEZs 
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in SEZs were adopted for foreign investment in Pudong 170 followed by the Tianjin 
Binhai171 and Chongqing Liangjiang172 new zones. Chinese leaders also adopted a 
development plan to stimulate economy within unparalleled geographical width. 
In early 1992, recognizing that urban popular discontent was responsible for the 
unrest in the spring of 1989, the central authorities placed an increased emphasis 
on economic development in cities and municipalities to maintain political and 
social stability. Concerns for stability in border areas called for fast economic 
growth and both domestic and foreign investments were encouraged through 
preferential measures. 173 Decentralization efforts, as evidenced by the 
establishment and prosperous development of those privileged regions, were 
largely implemented through tax incentives including tax holidays, exemptions, 
concessions, and preferential tax rates for reinvestment, among others. Such 
incentives were also in line with international practices of attracting foreign 
170 See Xinmin Zhang, supra 102, the program applies a fifteen percent enterprise income tax rate 
to FIEs engaged in productive sectors, large infrastructure development projects, construction of 
airport, port, railway, road, power station, or other energy and communication projects, as well as 
certain foreign banks, branches, and Chinese-foreign joint banking corporations or finance 
companies established in Pudong. All FIEs in Pudong are exempt from local enterprise income 
surcharge until the year 2000 
171 /d. 
172 !d. 
173 See generally, Moser & Zee, supra 3, China Tax Guide 105-06 (2d ed. 1993). Jiang, supra 4 at 
577-580, Curley & Fortunato, Tax Considerations for Investors in China, 20 N.C. J. Int'l L. & 
Com. Reg. 531 (1995); noting that there are other a few types of special economic zones 
established: in some cities bordering Russia, Mongolia and Vietnam were created as Border 
Economic Cooperation Zones (bianjing jingji hezuoqu or BECZs), which were adjusted shortly 
after the political chaos of former Soviet Union and Eastern European block. The plan offered a 
preferential income tax rate of twenty-four percent to FIEs incorporated in BECZs. More border 
cities and towns were later designated as open border cities and permitted to set up their own 
BECZs. These efforts to stimulate economic growth in urban areas spread to non-coastal cities. 
Large cities alongside the Yangtze River and in interior provinces were accorded a status similar 
to that of COCs, with permission to set up their own ETDZs. Various newly designated priority 
zones and areas mushroomed in coastal regions and urban areas which were given of special status 
and subsequent preferential measures to accommodate foreign investment in those new designated 
regions, such as Free Trade Zone (baa shui qu), High and New Technology Industrial 
Development Zones (gaoxinjishu chanye kaifaqu), Taiwan Investment Zones (taishang touziqu), 
and State Tourist and Resort Areas (guojia lvyou dujiaqu). 
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capital and keeping profits in the host country. Many Chinese local governments 
performed even better by setting up assorted auxiliary services such as supply 
chain management, export control, quality supervision, and other services, all of 
which were incidental to the successful implementation of tax incentives and 
fiscal transfers. 
5.3.3. Development strategy for the Western Region 
China's administrative and fiscal decentralization in the past decades also created 
increased regional disparity and worsened the poverty situation in certain outlying 
regions, in spite of the fact that originally tax preferential policies were designed 
for nationwide economic development. In reality, over eighty percent of foreign 
but high quality investment for the past three decades was pooled in coastal areas, 
which account for less than twenty percent of China's territory. 174 The uneven and 
imbalanced economic development across China was the product of an 
unsustainable model based on lopsided preferential policies which would 
eventually cause political instability and social upheaval. In China's Eleventh 
Five-Year Plan, the CCP proclaimed the Grand Western Region Development 
(xibu da kaifa) that in the first two decades of the twenty-first century, more 
resources and favors will be transplanted and adopted to the hinterland and 
174 
See Sheila Rae, Time to Go West, China Brief, (September 2000), 
http://www.amchamchina.org/article/3057 (last visited March 15, 2011) 
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western regions of China. 175 Hinterland provincial governments will enjoy larger 
degrees of autonomy for attracting investment and substantiating local economies, 
such as loosened land use approval processes, expanded access to national 
markets, the ability to nurture agricultural and forestry business, and building up 
selective industrial infrastructure profiles. 176 Of course, tax preferential policies 
and incentives, as proven tooling for advancing local development, account for 
major approaches in development strategy reforms. 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to catalog the pros and cons of reform 
strategies on western development, however, several serious concerns have arisen 
in terms of decentralization and poverty alleviation in western regions. First of all, 
are hinterland provinces capable of handling special tax preferential policies? To 
date, there has been a serious shortage of practical and meaningful approaches to 
carry out nationwide reform measures. Moreover, is there any supervision on 
quality of investment to which tax preferential policy will be applied? As capital 
investment of various sources flooded into coastal areas, which have experienced 
hardships in setting up standardized processes of hand lings, hinterland provinces 
emerged as regions where unqualified or unhealthy funds go. More importantly, 
because the agricultural, forestry and mineral industries dominate hinterland 
economy, enormous environmental protection and natural deterioration challenge 
the sustainability of development and land requisition. To this extent, hinterland 
provinces are alarmed about the prospect of tightening the tax incentive and 
investment quality supervision of the central government, which in turn may 
175 See Mehmet Ogilt9U, FD! and Importance of the "Go West" Strategy in China's Energy Sector 
(2002) http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/l/35/2085596.pdf (last visited March 15, 2011) 
176 See generally in Rae, supra 174 
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jeopardize the decentralization efforts designated for west regions. This dilemma 
may require decades to work out. Finally and more controversially, coastal areas, 
facing further centralizing efforts and enlarged fiscal transfers to western regions, 
are reluctant to transfer capital investment to hinterland provinces. 
5.3.4. Harmful Impacts on Economic Growth 
The cycle of decentralization is endogenous to China during the process of 
economic development. Local governments face ruthless political pressure from 
tight hierarchical personnel arrangements and polytropical fiscal transfer schemes. 
Worse is that almost all levels of governments in China are economic-growth-
driven and over-receptive in nature. Moreover, the promotion and performance 
evaluation of individual local officials at every level are calculated by a series of 
economic and social indicators manipulated by the central government, such as 
annual growth achieved in local GDP, the growth of collected revenue, the 
revenue contributions made to upper levels of government, output of SOEs and 
the quantities of foreign investment attracted, etc. as unbreakable economic 
factors; as well as various but sometime embarrassed societal measures, such as 
birth control quota, public security maintenance judged by death sentences 
approved, reducing elementary drop-out rate, elderly care system, and healthcare 
reform and so on. Successfully completing or exceeding anticipated targets 
prescribed by central and provincial governments is the sine qua non for local 
officials seeking political promotion or retirement benefits. Meanwhile, to fulfill 
158 
economic and social targets, local officials have a tendency to fabricate statistics on 
economic growth, exaggerate SOEs' growth, and underreport collected revenues. 
Either image projects, such as more visible highway, outstretched educational 
institutionalization, and expensive health care facilities, showcase in the local 
government agenda, or arisen excessive fee charged on farmers or private enterprises, 
are lavishly, repeatedly increased to meet revenue contribution needs requested by 
upper level governments. 
As discussed above, instead of decentralizing or loosening controls, the central 
government is eager to centralize fiscal and administrative power. When local 
governments are deprived of most oftheir fiscal and administrative autonomy, the 
best option for the central government is to heavily manipulate local government 
behavior, directly dictating local management and providing fiscal large transfers. 
Unfortunately, such fiscal transfers fail to embody central policy intentions. Local 
governments easily recourse to the further expansion of local bureaucracy and to 
rent-seeking under the soft budget constraints created by such a transfer 
mechanism. The fiscal transfers simply create imbalanced initiatives to mobilize 
resources and failed to meet local development needs. 
China's fiscal transfer schemes also include a fairly top-down approach to poverty 
relief policy implementation, in which tax measures, tax exemption, and 
intergovernmental transfers play a key role. Fiscal transfers were allocated to 
various poverty-stricken and underdeveloped areas to nurture economy and 
maintain lowest tolerable standard of living. A most prevalent complaint 
submitted by government officials from underdeveloped areas is that they were 
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not allowed the choice of what activities to do with poverty alleviation investment 
funds allocated. Rather, they often are forced to participate in duplicative or less-
urgent activities even when time, resources, and know-how for undertaking the 
project is limited. The lack of fieldwork and survey, rule-based formula and 
transparency in transfer tends to systematically distort local incentives and draw 
local governments in poor regions into unhealthy competition for more transfers 
and frame political performance that caters to upper-level officials. Moreover, 
urbanization and industrialization in developed regions continually contributed to 
escalation of land values, and forcibly seizure of country land from farmers 
became pervasive and even up to neck of robbery. Revenue-hungry governments 
have every incentive to expropriate more agricultural land for urban expansion 
and commercial leases and make a profit since such land revenues fall into the 
locally controlled extra-budgets. With faster urbanization and stronger regional 
competition for outside investments, local governments initiated waves of land 
requisition leading to roaring high housing price, and distorted promotional hype 
of establishing unnecessary and duplicative lower-level industrial parks and 
development zones. 
5.4. Challenges raised by fiscal decentralization 
5.4.1. Dual Tax Administration Structure 
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Tax administration in China has a two-track institutionalized structure. The 
national system governs major tax legislation that prescribes tax bases, (nominal) 
tax rates, enforceable administrative procedures, the intergovernmental revenue 
sharing formula, and budgetary planning above the provincial level. On the other 
hand, the provincial and sub-provincial system mostly deals with local revenue 
collection, implementation of national tax legislations, designing local (foreign) 
investment-friendly tax incentives, stipulating local administrative procedures, 
and detailing local budgetary planning. This dual-track tax administration system 
creates several challenges for implementation. First, the transparency issue -
revenue collection and allocation remain mysterious and undisclosed. Many ad 
hoc taxation and stipends are offered without scientific and statistical 
substantiation. Procedural conflicts on tax administration are not uncommon. 
Second, the uniformity issue - the actual tax rate for economic activities varies 
across localities when local governments hold ultimate authority in calculating 
and enforcing actual local rates and fees. One cause is that local tax preferential 
policies and incentives may distort the legislative purpose of national tax rate 
stipulation in implementation. In addition, the already worsened regional 
development disparity aggregates jurisdictional competition for irrational tax 
administration as to hunting for investment. Third, the principal-agent issue -
local governments experience constantly-changing financial needs and political 
agendas in their negotiations with the central government. Finally, the 
coordination issue - can the central government, national auditing and treasury 
authorities essentially control and coordinate the vastly fragmented two-track 
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system? How can the Chinese government remedy the ambiguity in local 
collection of off-budget fees and tax-for-fee at sub-provincial levels? How to 
streamline sub-provincial budgetary control ex ante for a more effective sharing 
formula? Is it achievable for the central government to supervise and coordinate 
sub-provincial sharing formula? Regretfully, answers to these questions are 
thorny to identify, but these unaddressed concerns lighten the direction for further 
policy orientations. 
5.4.2. Extra-budgetary and off-budgetary revenues 
Extra-budgetary and off-budgetary revenues are two quasi-taxes collected by 
local governments to compensate for revenue shortages under the existing tax 
system. Usually collected in the name of service fees or charges for local 
administrative activities, these non-tax levies de facto contribute inflows to local 
treasury without being compromised by sharing commands of the central 
government, and therefore, foster local autonomy. Without legitimate 
substantiation, extra-budgetary and off-budgetary revenues usually are presented 
without uniformity and transparency in terms of calculation, base, rate, 
procedures and statutes of limitation. 
Extra-budgetary revenue is the legacy of the socialist planned economy to finance 
locally nurtured expenditures, and it generally includes 1) locally collected funds 
and administrative fees, such as road tolls, road maintenance fees, utilities charges, 
and education fees (partially abolished for the 9-year basic education); 2) local 
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funds and surtaxes, such as agricultural surtax and education surtax, imposed on 
income, consumption, turnover or resources bases; 3) a special reserve for SOEs 
such as depreciation, infrastructure innovation and repair funds (abolished in 1993 
and 1997). 177 On the other hand, off-budgetary items are more locally-controlled, 
self-raised and independent revenues with contributions from local land sales, 
private enterprises, and charges from various administrative authorities 178• 
The outbreak of extra-budgetary and off-budgetary issues has come up with 
regularity since 2003 when the central government adjusted the revenue sharing 
formula leaving even lesser shares to local governments. Meanwhile, prompted by 
self-interested maximization of revenue and expenditures, local governments are 
forced to hunt for leeway to bolster their financial independence over and above 
that provided by the small portion of taxes they are allowed to collect. Various 
proposals have been explored to reinforce local disposable revenues, such as land 
sales or long-term leases to investors, overcharged service fees, sales of 
previously state-owned assets, SOE employee benefits buy-outs, investments in 
local businesses, and mandatory apportioned collection to support local 
infrastructure construction - all proceeds collected through these means are 
legitimized as local extra-budgetary and off-budgetary items. In particular, 
collections from land sales, real estate management, and overcharged 
177 See generally, Richard Eckaus, Some Consequences of Fiscal Reliance on Extra-budgetary 
Revenues in China, China Economic Review 14:72-88 (2003); C.P.W. Wong, Financing Local 
Government in the People's Republic of China. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press (1997); 
Gang Fan, Market-oriented Economic Reform and the Growth of Off-budget Local Public Finance. 
in Brean, D. J. S. (ed.) Taxation in Modern China. New York: Routledge Press (1998); Z. Zhu and 
B. Krug, China's Emerging Tax Regime: Local Tax Farming and Central Tax Bureaucracy. in B. 
Krug and H. Hendrischke. (eds.) China's Economy in the 21st century: Enterprise and Business 
Behavior (London: Edward Elgar, 2007) 
178 
See, Richard Eckaus, Some Consequences of Fiscal Reliance on Extra-budgetary Revenues in 
China, China Economic Review 14:72-88 (2003) at 76 
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administrative fees are pillars of local revenues to buttress financial independence 
and local autonomy. The roaring housing price increase has spread from coastal 
regions and metropolitan areas to central provinces and second-tier cities since 
2004, and local GDP growth has become more rapid as well. This has given local 
governments the incentive to seek greater control over local assets without 
interference from the center. 
Extra-budgetary and off-budgetary revenues create the same transparency and 
uniformity controversies as described above with regard to the decentralization 
and redistribution process. The lack of administrative procedure, basis calculation, 
rate stipulation and the ambiguous fiscal status of extra-budgetary and off-
budgetary revenues, all challenge the capacity of central and provincial 
governments in fiscal transfer and uniform coordination of sub-provincial fiscal 
activities. Local governments find these off-budget levies an advantageous 
alternative to simple political leverage in their quest to maintain social stability 
and foster local development. However, considerations of efficiency and fairness 
are not depicted given short spectrum of local political agenda and deteriorated 
bureaucracy. Fiscal administration of extra-budgetary and off-budgetary revenues 
is far from procedural substantiation such as public hearing and ex post audit. On 
the one hand, such proceeds are ideal in terms of local governments' capacity to 
provide local public goods, social services, 179 nimble reaction to local 
emergencies, and management of local affairs. On the other hand, over-extraction 
from local enterprises and taxpayers in the form of extra-budgetary and off-
179 !d. 
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budgetary revenues may arouse opposition and cause social instability such as 
rural unrest or protests. 180 
5.4.3. Intergovernmental transfer system 
As discussed earlier, management of vertical fiscal transfers between a mixture of 
levels in the administrative hierarchy (central, provincial, prefecture, county and 
township) in addition to various administrative levels of special economic zones 
presents another challenge to the central-local two track tax system. Since central 
and provincial governments may bargain over the share of expenditure and 
revenue, the total amount and nature of sub-provincial fiscal transfers is left 
unlegislated and mismanaged. Calculation of basis, rates, and procedural 
requirements are usually contracted in inefficient ways, contrary to legislative 
intent and without regard for diverse sub-provincial social and economic needs. 
Multiplicity of the sub-provincial governments even aggregates the discretionary 
practice of national tax legislations and fiscal policies. 
As long as the upper levels of government farm out lower levels to collect 
revenue, negotiations between different layers of governments on transfers and 
reallocation have to be constant. Tax farming imposes considerable logistical 
burdens on the already complicated two-track tax administration and 
redistribution procedures. As negotiated formulas are in place, three issues 
180 See generally, Thomas Bernstein and Xiaobo Lv, Taxation without Representation in 
Contemporary Rural China (Cambridge Press 2003); Tsui, K. andY. Wang, Between Separate 
Stoves and a Single Menu: Fiscal Decentralization in China, China Quarterly 177: 71-91 (2004) 
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prompted in such principal-agent relationship. First, if contractual arrangements 
in revenue sharing are breached, would upper level of government remedy the 
revenue deficiency of those farmed lower levels of governments? Usually, As 
long as a reallocation is invested and operated by the lower level, local 
governments may request more allocation without any punishment for more 
subsidies above the fixed agreed amount or based on the ad hoc appropriation of 
local budget surpluses at the end of a fiscal year. Second, lower levels of 
administrations have the drive to maximize their discretionary revenue and tax 
base, and therefore, shift expenditure upward to minimize transfers. Third, the 
fiscal administration of local extra-budgetary and off-budgetary proceeds is 
opposed by lower level of governments in many aspects. In addition to the lack of 
systematic way to measure an uncalculated bases and rates, lower levels of 
governments investigate many ways to evade control from upper levels on 
genuine local financings, if not discoverable, such as investments in local 
business and profitable operation of local public services. Given the complicated 
tax structure and administrative hierarchies, it is safe to highlight the self-
conflicting yet evolving feature of China's two-track tax system. 
5.5. Summary 
China has experienced rounds of fiscal and administrative decentralization 
dominated by a socialist legacy and alignment of political compromises with a 
significant consideration for transactional costs and budgetary constraints. First, 
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the decentralization efforts have been endogenous from the centralized, planned 
economic system featured by heavy industrialization development strategy to a 
market economy-oriented revenue sharing scheme with international inputs. 
Although fiscal decentralization for market-oriented reforms helped strengthen 
provincial and local autonomy and fostered economic growth, they are plagued by 
impotent central redistributive power and enlarged interregional inequality. With 
only a rough system of intergovernmental expenditure responsibility division and 
egalitarian fiscal transfer scheme, the recentralization since 1994 has significantly 
impaired local capacity to provide decent public goods and services, and 
witnessed serious local governance issues such as land-requisition-based local 
GDP growth and scattered social unrest. 
Second, tax farming by the central government on one hand fortifies central 
revenue and authority by squeezing local revenues with budget constraints and 
national enforcement agencies; decentralization also harnesses the increased 
autonomy of local governments in designing local-friendly tax incentives and 
flexibly carrying on centrally-authorized tax policies on the other hand. The 
intergovernmental bargaining influences the official tax system. Jurisdictional 
competition for (foreign) investment and local development creates less efficient 
and irrational local tax concessions such as over-extended contractual land leases 
for plant constructions, and introduces a detrimental fiscal culture to boost local 
GDP by concentrating tax levying on only a few tax bases such as real estate 
development and land sale. It worth noting that the local autonomy and 
intergovernmental balance is not a federalism model based on a separation of 
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powers. Rather, decentralization is a regulatory compromise to align different 
political and administrative authorities. Since the rural tax was officially repealed 
in 2004, some local governments in agricultural regions have become increasingly 
reliant on governmental transfers or certain off-budgetary revenue collections. 
The drop of part of local tax bases implies not only how the central government 
can provide sufficient transfers, but also on how to make those transfers without 
discouraging local resource mobilization and removing the soft budget constraint 
for local governments. A centralized party-sate bureaucratic system inevitably 
leads to a shortage of local government accountability due to widespread 
corruption and distorted local tax practices, such as excessive fees or taxes in rural 
areas and abusive land requisition. In the long run, good governance will be the 
outcome of a more decentralized administrative and fiscal system that includes a 
sound inter-governmental transfer arrangement, of wider local political 
participation and competition under free elections and, ultimately, of stronger 
capital mobility across regions. 
Third, the institutionalization of the central-local two-track tax administration is 
not uniform across the nation. Diversity or irregularity in local tax administration 
especially on sub-provincial levels evidences the cooperation between local 
business and governments over time to architect a framework to evade central 
control or switch upward more expenditure to serve local economic interests. 
Moreover, if the central government has to collect localities into its fiscal 
umbrella, local administrations may lose incentives to provide locally adequate 
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public goods and services as long as more shares of transfers are assigned from 
the central rather than for specific local needs. 
Fourth, the inflated extra-budgetary and off-budgetary revenues represent local 
efforts to seize resources outside of the central government's control and to keep 
larger shares of local revenue for local development. However, the lack of legally 
established institutions to streamline extra-budgetary and off-budgetary revenues 
may simply exacerbate interregional economic disparities and rampant corruption. 
This practice erodes the tax base and there is no institution to enforce 
administrative efficiency in this area. However, further administrative and fiscal 
centralization may bring more distortions in local government behavior. 
VI. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the past six decades of tax law reform in China have developed 
within the context of enormous economic development, legal reform, a socialist 
political system, efficiency concerns, tax equity, cultural factors, assimilation to 
internationally accepted accounting standards, and the fulfillment of WTO 
principles and international tax norms. This varied context has contributed to the 
evolution of a modern and internationalized tax system, albeit one with Chinese 
characteristics. 
First, each of the three major phases of tax law reform in China has improved the 
structure of the Chinese tax law system. Meanwhile, the tax authorities reshuffle 
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and an ever-growing need for transparent, unifonn and impartial tax 
administration poses vital challenges and opportunities for tax refonn. 
Second, tax laws in China are designated to promote revenue collection with the 
hope to enlarge the tax base and improve the standard of living of Chinese 
citizens within sound enforcement and compliance regimes. At the same time, the 
concerns of balancing the tax treatment of domestic and foreign enterprises and 
minimizing interregional disparities imply fundamental dilemmas of tax law 
administration, enforcement and fiscal transfers. 
Third, the fiscal and administrative decentralization prompted a market economy-
oriented revenue sharing scheme with international inputs. Tax fanning by the 
central government consolidated central fiscal authority and revenue collection, 
even as it increased local autonomy by allowing provincial governments to 
bargain toward an intergovernmental compromise. The central-local two-track tax 
administration system, however, does not prescribe an institutionalized 
framework for managing the enlarged extra-budgetary and off-budgetary revenues. 
The abolishment of rural tax and twisted local GDP development culture add 
) 
another layer of complexity to fiscal decentralization and transfers. In addition, 
the large scale of China's economy makes the adoption of fiscal policies which 




The Rule of Law and Legal Reform in China 
I. Introduction 
Stepping into the 21st Century, the legal system, in which China's tax law and its 
reform are embedded, has experienced its most dynamic period of evolution and 
reform. 1 No other major modem society has endeavored to reconstruct its legal 
system in such an expansive, novel, and globalized fashion for the past three 
decades as China. 2 However, China's unprecedented, ongoing legal 3 reform is 
intertwined with its enormous economic development, and more importantly, 
burdened by a deep introspective ambivalence on the part of its reformers. 
This analysis of the evolution of the Chinese legal system development shall not 
be ahistorical. In truth, China's contemporary legal system is neither 
1 See generally Benjamin L. Liebman, The 6dh Anniversary of the PRC: A Retrospective on the 
Chinese Legal System, 23 Colum. J. Asian L. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Liebman: Retrospective]. 
2 !d. 
3 See generally Zhongguo Fazhi Gaige Sanshinian [Thirty Years a/China's Legal Reform] ( ((r:j:l 
00 i'M~ i:&.!'fi:~ +if)) ), edited by CPC Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, ( lf1 00 r:j:l ~~ 
tl ND ) http://www.cctb.net/zjxz/expertarticle/200912/t20091230 _19604.htm (last visited on 
March 15, 2011) 
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fundamentally inherited from its imperial tradition nor entirely a western 
transplant.4 Historical eventful turning-points in the 20th Century are critical to 
evaluating the progress and troubles arising from China's legal reform, and China 
was not without such critical turning points in the last century. 5 It endured 
massive foreign invasion and semi-colonization from the late nineteen century by 
western forces, republican democratic revolution, various civil wars and wars 
against Japanese fascists, Communist revolution 6 (civil war with the KMT 
Regime), socialist construction and transformation 7 in the 1950s, Cultural 
Revolution, opening to the outside world and consequent globalization, the 
development of market economy, and accession to the WTO, among other major 
transformations. Even so, several important elements of China's traditional legal 
system survived this century-and-a-half of uncommon upheaval and 
transformation. 8 
China's adoption of a "Socialist Market Economy" in 1992 and "protection of 
property rights" in 2004 Amendments to the Chinese Constitution signaled a 
4 see Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law: Towards an Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and 
Development (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) at 83-85; see also Li Xiuqing, 
Yuwaifa de Yinjie ji Falvren de Dandang [Transplantation of Extraterritorial Laws and Mission of 
Chinese Jurists], presenting that the seventh stage of Chinese legal system development ( 1970-
present) is featured by enormous introduction and transplantation of foreign legal conceptions and 
international norms, http://www.sinoss.net/2011/0215/30729 .html (last visited on March 15, 201 1) 
5 See Id., Li, at 8-19; for a discussion of taxation system evolution in the Tsing Dynasty, See 
generally in Shao-Kwan Chen, The System of Taxation in China in the Tsing Dynasty, 1644-1911 
[1914), Cornell University Press (2009) 
6 See Kathlyn Gay, Mao Zedong's China (21st Century Books, 2008), stating that the last three 
years of the Chinese Civil War (1947-1949) is more commonly known as the War of Liberation 
7 
See generally in Peter J. Boettke, Why Perestroika Failed: The Politics and Economics of 
Socialist Transformation (Routledge, 1993), discussing the impacts and rationales of socialist 
transformation movements aiming to achieve communism in China and East European countries 
in the 1940s and 1950s. 
8 
See Randal Peerenboom, The X-Files: Past and Present Portrayals of China's Alien "Legal 
System "(2003) 2 Wash. U. Global Studies L. Rev.37 at 38-39 (hereinafter Peerenboom: X-Files] 
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breakthrough in China's self-conscious westemization.9 The CCP also officially 
endorsed such notions in its Party Charter. 10 Meanwhile, political slogans such as 
"performing in accordance with international standards" and "assimilation or 
harmonization with international practice" materialized in the official propaganda 
agenda and daily political and legal settings. China's WTO commitments have 
driven China's immense, if disorganized, legal infrastructure increasingly into 
compliance with a decidedly non-Marxist international legal order. Celebrating 
ten years of WTO membership, China has rigorously overhauled its legal system 
to a postural stability by incorporating both international and domestic norms. 
Another important turning point in Chinese legal evolution is the triumph of"rule 
of law "11 (''fa zhi" ~)ft) over "rule of men" ("ren zhi'' A)ft). 12 The importance of 
9 The evolution of China's Constitution has four stages. The first Constitution of the People's 
Republic of China was promulgated in 1954. After two intervening versions enacted in 1975 and 
1978, the current Constitution was promulgated in 1982. There were significant differences 
between each of these versions, and the 1982 Constitution has subsequently been amended four 
times since its promulgation 
10 See generally, Mei Ying Gechlik (Veron Hung), The Chinese Communist Party's Leadership 
and Judicial Independence (2003), discussing revision of the CCP Charter and its impact to 
China's legal system, 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=650 (last visited on 
March 15, 2011) 
11 See Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U.L. Rev. 781 {1989), at 783-91, 
presenting the "instrumental" and "substantive" concepts of the rule of law; See also, Robert S. 
Summers, A Formal Theory of the Rule of Law, 6 Ratio Juris 127, 135 (1993), presenting the 
"formal" and "substantive" concepts of the rule oflaw; Other theorists have also made distinctions 
between rule by law and the rule oflaw, particularly in the context of China. See also generally in 
Chen, supra 4, at 135; Paha L. Heieh, China's Development of International Economic Law and 
WTO Legal Capacity Building, 13 J. Int'l Econ. L. 997 (2010); Eric W. Orts, The Rule of Law in 
China, 34 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 43 (2001) at 93-98, discussing the difference of rule by law and 
rule of law. In particular, two conceptions between law and the state should be distinguished to 
expedite discussion on the rule of law in China: 1) the rule by law, referring to a descriptive, 
positive, and instrumental view of the relationship, in which law is used to govern by state; 2) the 
rule of law, a prescriptive, normative, and political view, which refers limited government, 
procedural justices and equality before law; Cao Jianming, Speech: WTO and the Rule of Law in 
China, 16 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 379 (2002) 
12 See XIAN FA art 5, (1982) (P.R.C.) (Constitution of the P.R.C.), stipulating that "all state 
organs, the armed forces, all political parties and public organizations and all enterprises and 
undertakings must abide by the Constitution and law". See also Aristotle (384-322 BC): General 
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this development in China cannot be overstated. The CCP's commitment to 
subject itself to law finally offers domestic reformers and foreign observers the 
arena, in an authoritarian society, to advocate liberal ideals of limiting the 
arbitrary use of power, establishment of the rule of law, and possibly dynamic 
polity reform. The results of the CCP's commitment are not unequivocally 
celebrated by international or domestic commentators. However, that China's 
economic development has driven important rule of law reforms is undeniable. 
Indeed, market economy development has been a crucial stimulus for creating the 
rule of law in the contemporary Chinese legal system. From Deng's "reform and 
open door" orientation to its WTO accession in 2001, China has arguably 
implemented a setting in which "acting according to law" is conceived as the 
"objective demand of a socialist market economy." 13 "The economic reform, 
based on autonomy, equality, credit and honesty, and fair competition, needs to be 
maintained primarily by legal tools." 14 Primarily, the market economy requires 
"the establishment of legal rules governing the rights and duties of those carrying 
out transactions." 15 
Introduction Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. There are two kinds of rule of person. The first 
kind is rule of the few persons, examples of which include tyranny and oligarchy. The second kind 
of rule of person is rule of the many persons, an example of which is the ancient Greek 
democracies. The common feature of rule of person is the ethos that what pleases the ruler(s) is 
law. That is, under rule of person, there is no limit to what the rulers (the government) can do and 
how they do things, http://www.iep.utm.edu/aristotl/ (last visited on March 15, 2011); Many 
scholars have chosen to define the rule of law by what it is not, namely, the "rule of men," see, e.g., 
Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orienta/ism, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 179, 222-23 (2002); Teemu Ruskola, Law 
Without Law, or Is "Chinese Law" an Oxymoron?, 11 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 655,655 (2003) 
13 See Liberman, supra 1, at 32, stating that China's legal reforms aim to create a fair system that 
serves both to further economic development and to address the rights and grievances of those left 
behind by such development 
14 Id.,at31 
15 See Pitman B. Potter, The Legal Implications of China's Accession to the WTO, The China 
Quarterly, at 593 and 602-603. 
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It is clear that, for the past three decades, Chinese legal system development has 
focused on absorbing westernized legal norms, modernizing practice, and 
conforming to the demands of a globalized market-based order. An objective 
assessment of China's legal reform, at this stage, must acknowledge the successes 
of China's law reforms in laying the foundation for constructing the rule of law, 
albeit "with Chinese characteristics." 16 Noticeably, China agreed to initiate 
sweeping reform measures "designed to implement the WTO market access, 
national treatment and transparency standards, to protect intellectual property 
rights, to limit the use of trade-distorting domestic subsidies and to make other 
changes to bring its legal and regulatory system in line with those of other WTO 
members." 17 China has put tremendous effort into honoring such commitments. 
Its efforts have been the subject of debates regarding how China will fulfill its 
WTO obligations as well as establish "the rule of law" to promote the country's 
economic growth and liberal democracy. 18 
This chapter and the next will attempt to evaluate how the rule of law rhetoric and 
WTO accession has impacted Chinese legal reform in the past three decades, 
looking particularly at the post-WTO accession framework, and the major 
implications of this impact. The Second subchapter begins with a critical but brief 
16 See U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) Annual Report 2002, at 1, 
stating that "China has made important strides toward building the structure of a modern legal 
system", albeit [a] wide gap remains between the law on paper and the law in practice, 
http://ww.cecc.gov (last visited March 15, 2011); the same conclusion was also drawn by a few 
other scholars, see also Jiangyu Wang, The Rule of Law in China: A Realistic View of the 
Jurisprudence, the Impact of the WTO, and the Prospects for Future Development, Sing. J. Legal 
Stud. 347, at 348, 359. 
17 See United States Trade Representative, 2003 Report to Congress on China's WTO Compliance, 
at 3. Available at http://www.ustr.gov (words searched: Report 2003) (last visited March 15, 2011) 
18 See generally in Potter supra 15. See also Wang, supra 16, summarizing a debate between 
Professors Porter and Don Clarke, at 363-367 
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overview of rule of law rhetoric developed by western jurists and philosophers, to 
develop an understanding of the rule of law as a contested concept. 19 Then the 
third subchapter provides an overview of China's legal reform for the past thirty 
years is provided focusing on the evolution of the socialist rule of law construct, 
and how the rule of law concept fits in the socialist legal system with Chinese 
characteristics. The fourth subchapter concludes and introduces the impacts of 
WTO accession which will be explored in more detail in chapter IV in terms of 
China's WTO commitments, WTO principles of transparency, judicial review, 
and impartial administration. 
II. The Western Rule of Law Rhetoric 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to rehash the voluminous debates regarding 
the evolution and conception of the rule of law.20 Bearing a western origin, the 
19 See Radin supra 11, at 783-794 
20 !d. Western conceptions ofthe rule oflaw trace their origins to the writings of Aristotle, 
Montesquieu, Locke, who emphasized the importance of law in protecting society from the 
potentially arbitrary and abusive authority of government. See also, Alvaro Santos, The World 
Bank's Uses of the "Rule of Law ·• Promise in Economic Development, in The New Law and 
Development: A Critical Appraisal, (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006), at 257. The rule 
of law is viewed as necessary to the market economy and has been promoted in developing and 
transition economies. The connection between the rule oflaw, markets, and economic 
development is based in large part on the work of Friedrich Hayek, Max Weber, and, more 
broadly, by the work of modernization theorists. Under this theory, efficient markets require the 
protection of private property and freedom of contract. The rule of law was necessary to ensure the 
integrity ofthese rights. Markets, in turn, fuel economic growth which leads gradually, according 
to modernization theory, to the growth of the middle class and a demand for democracy; see also, 
William P. Alford, Exporting "The Pursuit of Happiness," 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1677, 1683 (2000) 
(book review); John K.M. Ohnesorge, Asia's Legal Systems in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: 
Can the Rule of Law Carry Any of the Weight?, in Neoliberalism and Institutional Reform in East 
Asia 64-68 (Meredith Jung-En Wooed.) [hereinafter Ohnesorge: Asia's Legal Systems], 
http:/ /www.law. wisc.edu/mlhfwd3/risd _rule_ of_ law _northeast_ asia _proofs. pdf; (last visited on 
March 15, 2011); see also Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (1944), formulating the rule of 
law is largely limited to its instrumental aspect, and focuses on the power of law to limit the 
actions of government. Rules, "fixed and announced beforehand," allow individuals to foresee 
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rule of law concept is contested, 21 at times loosely interpreted, 22 and variously 
described. The definition of the term "rule of law" has long been the object of 
heated debate. All of the various interpretations include in the term the protection 
of a correct balance ofrights and powers between individuals and the state.23 In a 
state embracing the rule of law, the society is governed by a complete and 
functioning legal infrastructure which governs relations between private actors 
and public authorities and among private sectors with the independent judge as 
enforcer of rules and of privately bargained contracts?4 Further, and perhaps more 
importantly, the rule of law presumes democracy, liberty and freedom. Like many 
other philosophical ideals in the West, the concept of rule of law originated in 
ancient Greece. 25 From Plato and Aristotle through the Roman jurists, the 
medieval natural law thinkers, the neo-Stoics and modern natural law theorists, 
Montesquieu and the American Founders, the nineteenth-century advocates ofthe 
Rechtsstaat, and up to contemporary enthusiasts such as Friedrich Hayek and 
John Rawls, Lon Fuller and Theodore Lowi, champions of the rule of law have 
potential coercive intrusions of government authority, which in turn allows individuals to plan 
their activities and regulate their behaviors accordingly 
21 See Radin supra 11, at 784; see also Randall Reerenboom, Let One Humdred Flowers Bloom, 
One Hundred Schools Contend: Debating Rule of Law in China (2002) 23 Mich. J. Int'l L. 471 at 
472-3 [hereinafter Peerenboom: Debating Rule of Law in China] 
22 See generally, Lawrence Solum, Equity and The Rule of Law, in Ian Shapiro (Ed.) The Rule of 
Law: NOMOS XXXVI. (New York: New York University Press, 1994), noting that the rule of 
law ... may be more accurate to understand as the ideal of the rule of law as a set of ideals 
connected more by family resemblance than by a unifying conceptual structure 
23 See generally in Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtues, in This thesisity of Law: Essays 
on Law and Morality 210-29 (1979) 
24 
See John K.M. Ohnesorge "The Rule of Law, Economic Development, and The Developmental 
States of Northeast Asia" in Law and Economic Development in East and Southeast Asia 91 
(Christoph Antons, ed., 2003) at 93-94 [hereinafter The Rule of Law and Economic Development], 
http://www.Iaw.wisc.edu/m/m2mgg/leiden_rol.pdf(last visited on March 15, 2011) 
25 
See Radin supra 11, stating that Plato and Aristotle instituted the tradition of thinking about rule 
oflaw 
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assumed the desirability or at least the ineliminable reality of extensive legal 
orders and political rule ofhuman conduct.26 
The underlying complexity to define the rule oflaw is not completely canonical27• 
The nineteenth-century British jurist, Albert Venn Dicey, to whom the 
formulation of the term "the rule of law" may to some extent be credited, 
elaborated three characteristics of the "the rule or supremacy of law": absence of 
arbitrary power on the part of government; ordinary law administered by ordinary 
tribunals; and general rules of constitutional law resulting from the ordinary law 
of the land.Z8 Similarly, in Germany a state of legality is Rechtsstaat (literally, a 
law-based state or a constitutional state), it advocates rule of law, limited 
government, substantive due process, reasonableness, equal protection, and a full 
and fair hearing, which is similar to the Anglo-American rule of law and French 
Etat De Droit, where the rule of law restrains the exercise of state power or 
government power9• 
For developing thesis of this chapter, different categories of dichotomies of the 
Rule of Law conceptions will be briefed in this subchapter, mostly, the 
instrumental and substantive discussion, the "thin" and ''thick" model, and the 
26 See generally, Richard Flathman, Liberalism and the Suspect Enterprise of Political 
Institutionalization: The Case of the Rule of Law, in The Rule of Law 297, 302 (Ian Shapiro ed., 
1994) (discussing Plato's philosophy of law); see also Ernest J. Weinrib, The Intelligibility of the 
Rule of Law, in The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology, at 59, 62-63 (arguing that for Plato law was "a 
matter of convention" and "the rationality of law" depended entirely on the philosophical wisdom 
and knowledge of the rulers), quoted by Orts, supra 20, at 78 
27 See Radin, supra 11 
28 See A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 179-92 (1908) 
29 See generally in L. Heuschling, Etat de droit, Rechstaat, Rule of law, (Paris: Dalloz, 2002), 
Michael Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy, 74 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 1307-09 (2001), Susan Newman, Comparing Courts, Wash. U. Sch. of L. Magazine 8-9 
(Spring 2002) 
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Rule of Law and development rhetoric. The purpose of this discussion is to 
introduce the discussion of how Rule of Law, which may serve as a model, may 
impact the legal reform in China. More importantly, the goal is to develop a Rule 
of Law- Tax Rhetoric, particularly for the reform of China's Tax Law system. 
2.1 The Contested Definition-Instrumental vs. Substantive 
Legal theorists have proffered various definitions for the rule of law, among 
which Lon Fuller 30 and John Rawls 31 represent two of the most important 
conceptualizations. Fuller articulates an instrumental conception of the rule of 
law, 32 which advocates that the Rule of Law is a prerequisite for any efficacious 
legal order.33 Rawls's conception alternatively is substantive and holds that the 
Rule of Law embodies tenets of a particular political morality. This distinction, 
although it is overly simplistic and risky, is the core of our notion of a contested 
Rule of Law. 
2.1.1 The Instrumental Conception 
Lon Fuller's instrumental conception advocates the "inner morality of law:" a 
relative certainty and uniformity in the application, regular and impartial 
administration of legal rules, 34 whereby a legal system is regarded as "the product 
of a sustained purposive effort" fulfilling certain moral qualities. To this extent, 
30 See generally, Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law. 33-94 (rev.ed.1969) 
31 See generally, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 235-43 (1971) 
32 See Radin supra 11 at 792, admitting that her reading of this characterization is oversimplified 
because Fuller apparently include his formulation other values besides instrumental efficacy 
33 !d. 
34 See Rawls, supra 31, at 235 (1971). 
179 
the state may use the institutions of law and the method adopting the enforcement 
of legal rules as an instrument of policy where any separation or differentiation 
between the legal system and state is not required. In this regard, Lon Fuller 
outlined eight elements whereby to measure the Rule of Law, which represent 
"the morality" that makes law possible: generality; 35 notice or publicity; 36 
prospectivity;37 clarity;38 consistency or non-contradictoriness;39 conformability;40 
stability;41 and congruence.42 
Fuller's notion of generality requires that the rules encompass a broader sphere 
than specific cases, and must be comprehended, subsumed, or covered43 • The rest 
of Fuller's list, however, can be boiled down to two categories "know-ability" and 
"perform-ability."44 Western scholars have added ninth and tenth elements, found 
to be implicit in Fuller's formulation, that the affected parties must be rational 
35 See Radin supra ll at 785, stating that "there must be rules, cognizable separately from (and 
broader than) specific cases, such that the rules can applied to specific cases, or specific cases that 
can be seen to fall under or lie within them". There is, of course, a major debate between Fuller 
and Hart, among others, concerning whether Hitler's Nazi regime and other modern tyrannies may 
properly be described as having "law." see Orts, supra 20, at 255-56, 270-72, discussing differing 
views of the legality of the Nazi regime. Similarly, one may argue about whether the Cultural 
Revolution resulted in a complete or only partial breakdown of rule by law. This thesis shares that 
this debate should be more empirical and historical than conceptual. A regime may rule by law in 
some areas of life and yet still employ other irregular methods for decisions in a wide array of 
other important fields. The essential empirical and historical question is to ask about the extent to 
which rule by law institutions had broken down or were overturned in the most important 
~overnment decisions, such as the criminal law and the use of lethal force by government officials. 
6 See Radin supra 11 at 785, stating publicity means that those affected party who are supposed to 
observe the rules, at least to the extent necessary, are made available to the rules to conform 
37 !d., stating that the rules must exist prior in time to guide future actions which may be judged by 
them 
38 !d., stating that the rules at least are sufficiently understandable to affected parties to follow 
39 !d., stating that at least to some extent, completely contradictory rules are equivalent to no rule 
or at least an arbitrary decision between two rules 
40 !d., stating that The affected parties must be capable of following particular rules 
41 !d., stating that, in some degrees, the rules must not change constantly so that affected parties 
can follow or orient their actions toward rules 
42 !d., stating that the explicitly promulgated rules must correspond with the rules enforced in 
actual practice. 
43 !d., at 786-787 
44/d. 
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choosers45 and suitably motivated by either penal sanctions or by compensation.46 
Given the gravity of Fuller's formulation, all (eight) elements should be "internal" 
to law,47 meaning that failure to comply with any one of those eight attributes 
would jeopardize the state's ability to be called a legal system at all.48 
Fuller's explanation, however complex, does not explicitly raise substantive 
ideals such as fairness or democracy, autonomy or dignity of persons, nor did he 
exemplify democratic procedural traditions, like separation of powers or the 
access to courts and jury trials, all of which are essential to the substantive 
conception of the Rule ofLaw.49 
2.2.2. The Substantive Conception 
John Rawls claims that the Rule of Law is formal justice which promotes liberty 
and fairness. Derived from his seminal definition of a legal system, Rawls 
believes that Rule of law is necessary for predictability, determinateness, and 
certainty oflegal consequences. More importantly, as exemplified in his Hobbes's 
Thesis and social cooperation, Rawls states that liberty is required for achieving 
social justice, which underlies the Rule of Law. However, Rawls's conception is 
not complete in that it misses, especially with regard to American jurisprudence, 




47 See generally, Fuller, supra 30 
48 !d. 
49 See Radin supra 11 at 787 
50 Id, at 788-792 
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A similar version of distinction is developed by Paul Craig, 51 who accents 
Rawls's "substantive" conception with his own "formal" notion. Craig's formal 
conception defines the rule of law as "the manner in which the law was 
promulgated"52 by responsible authorities under a properly authorized guideline. 
The substantive version conceptualizes that certain substantive rights should be 
derived from or based on the rule of law, "which are used to distinguish between 
'good' laws, which comply with such rights, and 'bad' laws which do not."53 
The above discussion, albeit crude and oversimplified, suggests at least broadly 
that the Rule of Law is a Janus-faced, deeply ambiguous and contested 
conception54. The instrumental version emphasizes the role of a legal system in 
structuring behaviors, whereas the substantive version necessitates fairness, 
human dignity, freedom and democracy. 55 Putting this distinction into a broader 
social-political context, the instrumental conception is a model of a general and 
ahistorical nature where government achieves its ends by way of rules. The 
substantive conception, on the other hand, bears a particular modem ideological 
heritage which demands the government's ends be the goals of social contract: 
liberty and justice. 56 
51 
See generally, Paul Craig, Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An 
Analytical Framework (1997) P.L.467, cited by Wang supra 16 at 350 
52 See Wang supra 16, 351 
53 ld. 
54Jd. 
55 See Radin supra 11, at 791-792 
56 /d. 
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2.2. Rule of Law in Positivism and Natural Law 
Denying the inherent or necessary connection between the requirements of law, 
on the one hand, and ethics or morality on the other, modern legal positivism 
centers on the "Separation Thesis. "57 It suggests that laws are rules made, whether 
deliberately or unintentionally, by human beings, without questioning what is 
good, right, or just. 58 Furthering the views of H.L.A. Hart59 -- and influenced by 
Max Weber -- Joseph Raz supports the distinction between the internal and 
external points of view of law and rules. Rule of Law, as interpreted by Raz, is a 
political ideal which a legal system may lack or may possess to a greater or lesser 
degree. 6° For instance, although Raz in the end turns towards the substantive 
conception of the Rule of Law, he proffers a slightly different version of the 
instrumental conception of the rule of law and Fuller's eight principles61 • Thus, as 
57 See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, (2nd ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press, I994) at 97-IOI and 
250, which emerged from a set oflectures that Hart began to deliver in I952, and it is presaged by 
his Holmes lecture, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, putting it simple, the 
Separation thesis holds that having a legal right to do doesn't entail having a moral right to do it, 
and vice versa; having a legal obligation to do something doesn't entail having a moral right to do 
it, and vice versa; having a legal justification to do something doesn't entail having a moral 
justification, and vice versa; etc. Largely, this thesis understands and draws this notion from 
Professor Radin's analysis 
58 !d. See also, Raz, supra 23, at 47-50 
59 See Radin supra II, at 800-80I, stating that a distinction between the internal and external 
points of view of law and rules, close to (and influenced by) Max Weber's distinction between the 
sociological and the legal perspectives of law. Professor Radin further states that a distinction 
between primary and secondary legal rules, where a primary rule governs conduct, such as 
criminal law and a secondary rule govern the procedural methods by which primary rules are 
enforced, prosecuted and so on; See generally, Hart, supra 57, Hart specifically enumerates three 
secondary rules including the Rule of Recognition, the rule by which any member of society may 
check to find out what the primary rules of the society are. In a simple society, Hart states, the 
recognition rule might only be what is written in a sacred book or what is said by a ruler. Hart 
viewed the concept of rule of recognition as an evolution from Hans Kelsen's "Grundnorm", or 
"basic norm." 
60 See Raz, supra 23, at 2II 
61 !d., at 2I4-224 for original discussion by Raz; See also in Ronald Dworkin, The Practice of 
Principle: In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory (book review), I15 Harv. L. Rev. 
I655 (2002); see, Wang, supra 16, at 35I-352, summarizing legal positivism that law should be 
prospective, open and clear, stable, that law-making process should be guided by open, stable, 
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positivism views the law ultimately as a matter of human custom or convention, 
i.e., the nature of law as a human institution, without touching the substantive 
value of liberty, justice and fairness, the rule of law in legal positivism is mostly 
featured as an instrumental conception. 
Natural law contests the rivalry legal positivism's notion of law and its relation to 
morality. It has evolved thousands of years featured great jurists and 
philosophers62 and been cited as a component in landmark legal documents such 
as the United States Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the 
United States. Natural law holds that just laws are immanent in nature and emerge 
by the natural process of resolving conflicts. More importantly, the content of law 
cannot be determined except by reference to various moral principles. Influential 
contemporary natural law jurist Ronald Dworkin, in attacking the legal positivists' 
model of rules, i.e. the "rule-book conception"63, bifurcated the general category 
of "standards" into "rules", on the one hand, and "principles, policies and other 
sorts of standards" that "do not function as rules" on the other. 64 Dworkin argues 
that there is a "logical difference" between rules and principles, 65 and "a rule can 
clear and general rules, that judicial independence must be guaranteed, that judicial judgments 
shall have the final binding force, that the principles of natural justice must be observed, that the 
power of judicial review on legislation and administrative action is secure, that courts are 
accessible to citizens, and that the discretion possessed by crime-preventing agencies should not 
pervert the law 
62 jurists and philosophers include Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Francisco Suarez, Richard Hooker, 
Thomas Hobbes, Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf, John Locke, Francis Hutcheson, Jean 
Jacques Burlamaqui, and Emmerich de Vattel 
63 See Dworkin supra 61 at 1660; see generally, Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 209-15 (1986), 
presenting the relationship between law and rules 
64 See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 14-80 (1977) at 22, referring to the "rulebook 
model of community". See generally also Radin supra 11 at 803-06 
65 !d., Dworkin, at 26-27 
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be completely stated with all exceptions, but a principle cannot."66 Moreover, the 
use of principles determines one right answer to legal questions even though 
principles lack formal actualization, because in using principles the judge should 
apply the best interpretation of the entire body of past legal authoritative acts, 
where that interpretation rests on the best political theory available to explain and 
justify law as an expertise.67 Therefore, the natural law conception of rule of law 
is essentially the rule of certain rights or values that are inherent in or universally 
cognizable by virtue of human reason or human nature, and for this instance, 
conforms more to the substantive conception of the rule oflaw. 
2.3. "Thin vs. Thick" categorization - an over-asserted dichotomy 
The "thin" and "thick" categorization of the rule of law is principally championed 
and explored for the case of China by Professor Randall Peerenboom, 68 and a 
school of supportive scholars. The thesis obligates to mention that the thin-thick 
rule of law model also appeared in Michael Neumann's treatise almost at the 
same time as Professor Peerenboom raised the model.69 This thesis respectfully 
submits that, the thin and thick definition of the rule of law is not major but a 
reinterpretation of Lon Fuller's theory. Although proponents of thin and thick 
interpretations of rule of law rhetoric endeavor to label their construct in slightly 
66 !d., at 25-26, Dworkin presents that legal positivists' model of rules does not describe what the 
law is, because law also consists of principles; and that application of rules does not fully 
document what judges do, because judges also use principles. 
67 See Radin supra 11, at 806 
68 See Randall Peerenboom: Debating Rule of Law in China, supra 21, and Wang, supra 11 for 
detailed description of the thin-thick rule of law model. This thesis notes that wordsmithing does 
not change the instrumental-substantive bifurcation of the rule oflaw interpretations 
69 See generally in Michael Neumann, The Rule of Law: Politicizing Ethics (Burlington, T, 
Ashgate Publishing, 2002) at 3 
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different or heuristic ways, there is considerable common ground with Lon 
Fuller's influential account that laws, in particular, a thin rule of law requires laws 
be general, public, prospective, clear, consistent, capable of being followed, stable, 
and enforceable/0 which are based on Lon Fuller's instrumentalist view. 
Analogically, the thin version of the rule of law formulates the rule of law as "a 
vision of judging that celebrates the systemic virtues of regularity, predictability 
and certainty over the concern with substantive justice in particular instances: 
formal rules are the most efficacious and legitimate way to protect substantive 
values."71 Therefore, "it is possible for a legal system to comply with the rule of 
law and still be undemocratic and/or unjust in general ... and in particular 
instances."72 On the other hand, the thick conception is more substantive built up 
on those basic elements of a thin conception. The "thick" version of the rule of 
law holds that law is inseparable from moral, (universal) values and politics such 
as particular economic arrangements, forms of government or conception of 
human rights, and that "the existence of pre-announced, objectively-knowable and 
impartially-applied rules must be supplemented by tying such formal virtues to a 
substantive account of democratic justice." 73 Arguably, comparing with the 
antagonistic opposition between positivism and natural law, the acrimony 
between "thin" and "formal" is less notable, and, to some extent, such 
70 See Peerenboom: Debating Rule of Law in China supra 21 at 497 
71 See Allan Hutchinson, The Rule of Law revisited: Democracy and Courts, in David Dyzenhaus, 
ed., Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order 196 (Hart Publishing, 1999) at 199, 




resemblance pictures a parallel intergrowth for the establishment of the rule of 
law.74 
A primary merit of the thin and thick categorization is that such definition rests on 
the model of the rule of law explicated by Fuller and Dicey. The definition, 
debatably, can be substantiated on two grounds and is encouraged to sustain. 
First, 75 the "thin" version focuses on the "instrumental function" or "process 
nature" of a legal system. Second, 76 in addition to meaningful restraints on State 
actors, the inner morality of law pictures that a legal system meeting the 
requirement of generality, 77 regularity, 78 transparency, 79 consistency, 80 clarity, 81 
acceptability,82 and good enforcement,83 among others, are not likely to lead to a 
moral legal system. 84 However, there are still barriers in fully addressing the thin 
and thick conceptions. 
The first setback with the thin and thick model is the insurmountable barrier 
between the thin and thick models which features individual rights and liberty, 
although the supporters of model argue that the thin model could develop into the 
74 See Radin supra 11, at 792-793, stating that the conception of the rule of law has not changed 
over generations but scholars usually employ different re-interpretations for their own needs 
75 See Wang supra 16, at 354-358, analyzing the jurisprudence of "thin" and "thick" theories in 
detail 
76 !d. 
77 !d., Wang does not create any new conceptions of the rule of law but interpretatively states his 
explanations of Fuller's rule of law elements, in particular, laws must not be aimed at a particular 
~erson and must treat similarly situated people equally 
8 !d., stating that laws must be relatively stable 
79 !d., stating that laws must be made public and readily accessible 
80 !d., stating that laws must be consistent on the whole 
81 !d., stating that laws must be relatively clear 
82 
!d., stating that laws must be reasonably acceptable to a majority of the populace or people 
affected (or at least the key groups affected) by the laws 
83 
!d., stating that laws must be fairly applied and enforced -- the gap between the law on the 
books and law in practice should be narrow 
84 !d. 
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thick version. This barrier parallels the wide bifurcation of positivism and natural 
law in structuring a legal system. Further, too much leeway has been granted the 
supporters of the thin/thick model in their suggestion that the thin model might 
develop into the thick. 85 Even Fuller's work suggests that the rule of law is a 
"matter of degree." 86 The thick model, however obscure, was structured to 
incorporate all elements of the thin model. However, it was also presented as an 
opposite ideal to which thin model is incapable of being evolved to. If the thin 
model is defined as similar to Fuller's instrumental conception or Raz's purposive 
enterprise, the thick model would be difficult to resolve with Rawl's substantive 
connection between the rule of law and the core value of liberty, justice and 
fairness, let alone his sense of the American jurisprudence innovation. 87 Therefore 
the thin/thick dichotomy is too aggressive theoretically unsustainable and not as 
sophisticated as Rawls's and Fuller's theories. 
Empiricaily, another obstacle for the thin and thick model overlooks the rule of 
law as a political theory of limited government. As Hobbes argues, a sovereign 
state or "Leviathan"88 requires, first and foremost, that the rule of law necessitate 
"a known and authentic legislator" who is "endowed with authority to create 
obligations." Under the theory of the state, the rule of law "stands as a moral (not 
85 Professor deLisie in his presentation at the University of Michigan in Fall 2010 stated that the 
thin and thick model is only a pragmatic manner in structuring a discussion and this model is far 
from representing a hallmark model, even for the purpose of analyzing China's legal reform (notes 
on file with the author) 
86 See Robert P. George, Reason, Freedom and the Rule of Law: their Significance in the Natural 
Law Tradition (2001) 46 Am. J. Juris. 249, at 250 
87 See generally, Radin supra 11 
88 See generally Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 100 (Michael Oakeshott ed., 1973) (1651) 
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a prudential) relationship89, and needs a legal authority that is morally binding on 
its citizens.90 With such an omission in applying its model empirically, the thin 
and thick model supporters evade the challenge of articulating the rule of law as a 
political theory, especially on government, the judiciary and legal 
institutionalization. 
Another challenge to the thin and thick model is that, in transition economies, 
China for example, it does not address the ramifications of the shifting social, 
political, economic and international setting for its implementation and 
application. As detailed later as to the rule of law - development rhetoric, a 
comprehensive evaluation and outside force to the development of the rule of law 
are indispensible and of pith and moment. 
In spite of these theoretical and empirical obstacles and challenges to applying the 
thin and thick model in defining the rule of law, and its tendency to be too 
forcefully applied, it still can be accepted as a practical and modem means to 
describe and analyze a legal system, especially for developing countries. Given 
the lack of empirical value represented by the thin and thick model, it is far too 
early to abandon the instrumental and substantive conceptions of the rule of law 
prescribed by leading theorists. While analyses and reform propositions based on 
the thick/thin model are still among the most important and realistic proposals for 
restructuring a legal system, however, assertions propelled by this model 
89 See Michael Oakeshott, On History? And Other Essays, Imprint Academic (January 2004) at 
163 
90 !d. at 170-171, cited by Ortz supra 20 at 84-86 and accompanying notes 
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inevitably involves the connection between instrumental and substantive 
conceptions. 
2.4. The Rule of Law- Development Rhetoric 
Over the past few decades, especially after the end of Cold war, the rule of law 
rhetoric has experienced an impressive revival, not only in western academic 
discourses, but also in a parallel reinforcement in the international sphere.91 The 
prevalence of western civilization, technology, capitalism, and globalization 
inspired tremendous indigenous demand for law in the non-western world92 and 
developing countries. Among the newly spread disciplines reached by the rule of 
law, the area of law and development has dramatically escalated and reshaped the 
traditional rule of law discourse, normatively and practically. For international 
financial institutions (IFis) - major drivers of this law and development rule of 
law rhetoric 93 - the rule of law is associated with economic development, 
modernization and settings of market economy, rather than any rigid legal or 
political ideal. 
This new trend of expanding the conception of rule of law is driven by the 
development assistance offered by IFis in a suddenly unipolar world with tactical 
demands of reforming IFI borrower countries' legal systems.94 In particular, IFI 
client countries should adopt sets of rules that would enshrine the policy 
91 See generally, Ohnesorge: Asia's Legal Systems, supra 20; see also, Ohnesorge, The Rule of 
Law and Economic Development, supra 24 
92 See generally, Li Xiuqing, supra 4 
94 See generally Ohnesorge, supra 24, discussing the political movement such as the crash down 
of Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union fall-down 
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prescriptions of the Washington Consensus in their legal systems.95 The rule of 
law - development rhetoric envisions both positivist96 and formalist suggestions 
that economic development at times may be prioritized over civil, social, and 
political development which will predictably follow the sustainable economic 
development, in particular, deregulation, privatization of state-owned sectors, 
tight restrictions on bureaucratic discretion, stringent property rights protections, 
enhanced protections for minority shareholders, a well-functioning tax system, 
and independent judicature, amongst others. 97 
The interpretation of the rule of law rhetoric has changed over time, experiencing 
an ongoing expansion of its substance. Adopting an instrumental conception of 
the rule of law as a start, IFI initially demands primarily a functioning legal 
infrastructure that is capable of enforcing substantive rules. 98 In 1999, the 
Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) proposed by the World Bank 
envisioned a highly contentious 99 "all in" notion 100 of legal reform in a client 
country, requiring that a client country protect "human and property rights,"101 
and set up "a comprehensive framework oflaws," 102 reasoning that otherwise, "no 
95 See generally, Alvaro Santos, supra 20 
96 See Ohnesorge, supra 24 at 94 
97 For detailed analysis, review and critics about the Washington Consensus, See generally, Narcis 
Serra and Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global 
Governance (Initiative for Policy Dialogue) Oxford University Press, USA (2008) 
98 See Ohnesorge: Asia's Legal Systems, supra 20, at 65 
99 See Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (2002) challenging the neoliberal 
orthodoxy based W ashtington Censensus and its applicability. See also Kenneth Rogoff presents 
an extraordinary open letter to respond Stiglitz's criticism, 
http://www. imf.org/ external/np/vc/200 1/070202. htm 
100 See John Ohnesorge, The Rule of Law, Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 3:99-114 ( 2007) at 106, 
quoting the new Comprehensive Development Framework proposed by World Bank President 




equitable development is possible." 103 The CDF further demanded that a 
government ensure "an effective system of property, contract, labor, bankruptcy, 
commercial codes, personal rights laws and other elements of a comprehensive 
legal system" 104 (emphasis added by the author), which are effectively, 
impartially and cleanly administered by "a well-functioning, impartial and honest 
judicial and legal system."105 Apparently, this description of the rule of law was 
too broad in its embrace of liberal values of democracy and justice. Values of 
democracy, justice, human rights and limited government go over and above an 
instrumental conception of rule of law, 106 which requires only elements such as 
know-ability and perform-ability. 107 
Echoing criticism and resistance from client countries, the World Bank in 2002 
defined conditions of the Rule of Law in its Initiatives in Legal and Judicial 
Reform: "(I) the government itself is bound by the law; (2) all in society are 
treated equally under the law; (3) the government authorities, including the 
judiciary, protect the human dignity of its citizens; and ( 4) justice is accessible for 
all its citizens. 108 The rule of law requires transparent legislation, fair laws, 
predictable enforcement, and accountable governments to maintain order, 





107 See Radin supra 11, at 786 
108See generally, World Bank Initiatives in Legal and Judicial Reform (2002), 
http://siteresources. worldbank.org/BRAZILINPOREXTN/Resources/3 817166-
1185895645304/4044168-1186409169154/18initiativesFinal.pdf (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
109 !d., at 2 
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judicial reform is a means to promote the rule of law."110 We can perceive that, in 
this definition, the World Bank aims its definition at the approval ofhuman rights 
activists and dyed-in-the-wool internationalists. Without a doubt, this definition 
raises the bar for the market economy development model as well as 
infrastructure reconstruction for borrower countries, which are plagued by its 
vague, generally articulated standards. 
The rule of law rhetoric in the economic development context brings together 
literatures 111 theorizing, in various ways, the relationship between legal reform 
and economic development. 112The scholarship in this area mostly explicates two 
essentials for a proper rule of law: limiting bureaucratic discretion on economic 
governance, and promoting freedom of contracts and private property rights 
protection. Limitation of bureaucratic discretion connotes transparency, 
predictable administration, and anti-corruption. The second essential element, 
ensuring freedom of contract and protection of property rights (including 
intellectual property rights), is the foundation of market economy. In this sense, 
rule of law rhetoric in the economic development context accords with Raz's 
110 !d., at 3 
111 Professor John Ohnesorge in the past years has summarized and been a major contributor on 
the rule of law - economic development rhetoric. For discussion about the rule of law reform 
dominated by western jurisdictions and IF Is, see also generally in Thomas Carothers, The Rule of 
Law Revival, Foreign Affairs 77-95 (2006), Thomas Carothers, Promoting the Rule of Law 
Abroad: In search of Knowledge, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endow. Int. Peace, 2006); for 
discussion of rule oflaw reform and development in other developing countries, see John Stanley 
Gillespie, Transplanting Commercial Law Reform: Developing a "Rule of Law'' in Vietnam, 
(Ashgate, Burlington VT, 2006), http://www.ejcl.orgl122/review122-l.PDF, See Paul Gewirtz, 
The U.S.-China Rule of Law Initiative, William Mary Bill Rights J. 11 603-22 (2003); Kathryn 
Hendley, Assessing the Rule of Law in Russia, Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L 14 347-91 (2006), 
http:/ /www.law. wisc.edu/rnlzgyzz/russian _style _rol.pdf; Professor Ohnesorge 's works are 
http://www.law.wisc.edu/profiles/pubs.php?iEmployeeiD=184 (last visited March 15, 2011) 
112 !d., Carothers, stating that the law and economic development also suffered from a fall from 
grace in the 1970s and 1980s, at 22-25 
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"Rule of Good Law," but also heeds the Hayekian definition requiring 
predictability and private economic protections. 
The rule of law rhetoric in the economic development is more favored by 
politicians, who see rule of law reforms as part of a broader strategy to 
micromanage the social and economic structures of IFI client countries, and 
thereby to steer reform down a path of development, which caters to IFI policy 
preferences. According to the ideal formula of IFI rule of law models, economic 
development "spills over" into areas of sensitive political and legal issues, and 
uses economic incentives to bring transition countries in line with IFI - especially 
American- ideals of liberal democracy. The mark of American political and legal 
ideology in this rhetoric is undeniable. IFis and international organizations such 
as the WTO largely concentrate on the competency and autonomy of the judicial 
and legislative sectors and on promoting administrative proficiency in member 
states.113 That these efforts conform to the United State's understanding of its own 
political ideals and economic best interests is not a coincidence. 
The rule of law rhetoric in the economic development phenomenon exhibits the 
influence, enforceable upon developing states by developed states through 
international organizations like IFis, used to conform developing states' legal 
infrastructures to the requirements of the global market economy. Although 
empirically the development of Northeastern Asian countries has not proven the 
inevitability of the development of the rule of law, especially in the case of liberal 
113 See generally, Jacques deLisle, Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance, American 
Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. Pa. J. Int'l 
Econ. L. 179,217-18 (1999). 
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legal values, 114 there is still an urgency in these countries to adopt the conceptions 
of rule of law, in a pragmatic and realistic manner, which cater to their own 
economic, social and legal needs. As will be discussed below, China's invitation 
of the rule of law as impacted by its WTO membership, both charms and 
frustrates domestic and outside commentators, albeit for widely varying reasons. 
2.5 Summary 
Having discussed major conceptions and arguments of the rule of law rhetoric, 
bifurcations such as instrumental and substantive, positivism and natural law, the 
thin and thick model, and the economic development rhetoric, this thesis aims to 
prepare a reasonable, practical and realistic foundation to evaluate the progress of 
the China's legal reform in the past three decades. Pushing this goal further, this 
thesis tentatively submits- on the basis of the foregoing contemporary debates of 
Rule of Law - a tailored, pragmatic and practical proposal for the tax reform 
rhetoric under China's current legal infrastructure. This proposed rhetoric is 
underpinned by instrumental notions of, inter alia, generality, clarity, consistency, 
enforceability, stability and congruence, as well as substantive notions of judicial 
independence, human rights and the limitation of bureaucratic government. 
III. The Establishment of the Socialist Rule of Law with Chinese 
Characteristics 
Chronicling Chinese officials' discussion of China's rule of law conception is 
essential, given its contested content within a complicated transitory "elite legal 
114 
See Ohnesorge, The Rule ofLaw and Economic Development, supra 20, at 95 
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culture," 115and because the Chinese party-state devises and implements the legal 
reform process. Below, therefore we examine the policies orientations taken by 
senior politicians and cheered by scholars. In the past thirty years, three stages of 
legal reform and development have taken place based on Deng's theory of 
"socialism with Chinese characteristics" for economic reform. 
3.1 Deng's Legal Theorems 
Deng Xiaoping, facing a fragmented polity after the Cultural Revolution, first 
focused on "institutionalization" (zhiduhua i!iU J.:t {t ) and "legitimatization" 
(fazhihua ¥*i11Ht). In particular, Deng said, "to safeguard people's democracy" 
and "to ensure the stability, continuity and full authority of.. .[the] democratic 
system and laws", there must be "laws for people to follow, laws [must] be 
observed, enforcement must be strict and lawbreakers must be punished." 116 
These 16 words 117 are still enshrined in the minds of Chinese politicians and 
academics as pillars ofthe socialist legal canon as to features of"to modernize the 
law, to observe the law and act in accordance with law, equity before the law, and 
to fortify laws as the utmost authority. 118" 
115 See Pitman Potter, The Chinese Legal System: Globalization and Local Legal Culture 
(Routledge Studies on China in Transition, 2001) at Preface and 115 
116 See People's Daily, The Communique of the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Congress of the 
Central Committee ofCCP (December 22, 1978) 
117 Deng's legal thoughts center on "there must be laws to go by, the laws must be observed and 
strictly enforced, and lawbreakers must be prosecuted."("1f$PJ11X ' j:f$£;,{~ • tJL$!16'F ' ;(2 
$!J6,JE") 
118 
See generally, Research on Deng Xiao Ping's Ideologies on Rule of Law, 
http://www.yfzs.gov.cn/gb/info/xsll/2006-03/19/1950232785.html (last visited on March 15, 
2011); Chuanguang Jiang Goujian Zhongguo Fazhi Shehui de Zhinan - Deng Xiao Ping Fazhi 
Sixiang Yanjiu [Guidelines on Structuring the Rule of Law in China -Research on Deng Xiao 
Ping's Ideologies on Rule of Law], (Anhui University Press, 2000) 
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Likely reflecting wisdom gained in his personal political tribulations, Deng's goal 
of "institutionalization" of law focused primarily on circumventing individual 
arbitrariness, and the "rule of men." His goal of "legitimization" aimed at 
improving legal awareness (/alii yishi ¥:!1*~i9-) and equity before law (/alii mian 
qian renren pingdeng ¥:!1-lfi.m!W AA 3f-~). Pursuing these goals however, Deng 
was adamant that in establishing a stable political order, resistant to outside 
influence, China should also achieve economic development. 119 
We have to admit that Deng's institutionalization and legitimization ideals come 
from an ideological standpoint that is radically different from that of traditional 
rule of law conceptions. His political agenda demands that law, as an institution, 
simply normalize a set of rules to buttress economic development and eradicate 
political turmoil of the kind seen during the Cultural Revolution. On the other 
hand, his legal theorems are constructed to solidify the ruling position of the 
communists and not to vivify law in a role over and above the party-state. Deng's 
alternative political interpretation of the rule of law is well evidenced by the One 
Party rule and his refusal to adopt Americanized separation of powers in the mid-
1980s.120 
119 See generally, Deng Xiao Ping Wen Xuan Di San Juan [Selected Works of Deng Xiao Ping], 
Volume III (2000) In Deng's famous notion that constructing economic development on one hand, 
and law and socialist value on the other, with equal priority and commitments (liangshouzhua, 
liangshou dou yaoying f!'l§-'f-tJK • fl'l§-'f-j!f/3~~), Deng again reiterated his concomitant goals to 
achieve economic development and thwart westernized liberal invasion 
120 !d. at 256, stating that Deng rejected a western mutually constrained system, stating "if 
excessive emphasis is placed on a mutually limited system, it maybe still cannot solve the problem" 
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3.2 Jiang's Development of Socialist rule of law 
Although initially seen as a "puppet" 121 of Deng, Jiang Zemin made bold strides 
to develop the socialist rule of law in the 1990s. The term "rule of law," in fact, 
did not officially surface until 1997 at the 15th CCP Congress, where it was 
presented as a part of the new phase of socialist market economy development. 122 
In a 2005 editorial in Qiu Shi (Seeking Truth), an official publication of CCP 
Standing Committee, Jiang proposed the rule of law to "renovate legal and 
administrative system, improve 'for the people' ideology and modernize sqciety 
to strengthen order and keep away unhealthy influences." 123 In essence, the 
socialist market economy precipitated the shift away from Deng's rule by law to 
Jiang's new rule of law conception. However, cautioning romanticized 
expectations of the "socialist rule of law", Jiang further clarified in an Op-Ed 
piece for the People's Daily that his regal goal in developing the rule of law was 
"upholding and improving political system without copying any westernized 
models." Indeed the rule of law was to be "decisive in sustaining the leadership of 
the party" and the people's democracy." 124 Jiang further bulleted that 
"administration in accordance with law unifies the Party's leadership ... and 
121 See Edward Friedman, Jiang Zemin 's Successors and China's Growing, in China Under Hu 
Jintao, Opportunities, Dangers and Dilemma, 97-134 (Cheng, deLisle and Brown, ed., World 
Scientific, 2006) 
122 See Cai Dingjian & Wang Chenguang, China's Journal Toward the Rule of Law (Koninklijk 
Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands, and Social Sciences Academic Pres, Beijing, 2010) 
[hereinafter "Cai and Wang"] at 15-16 
123 See generally, Jiang Zemin, Hold High the Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping Theor for all All-
Round Advancement of the Cause of Building Socilist with Chinese characterises into the 21'1 
Century - Report Delivered at the 151h National Congress of the Communist Party of China 
(Gaoju Deng Xiao Ping Lilun Weida Qizhi, Ba Jianshe You Zhongguo Tese Shehui Zhuyi Shiye 
Quanmian tuixiang Ershiyi Shiji) Uir~§;:rB'J'*:X~!j\S]Zf!i:{?;ft*1m*R ' t~lti§!::fi"t:pOO~@.H~ 
3:. 5C$ ill!.~ iiD ffi loJ = +- t!H2- 1£ t:p 00 ~ f' R: ~ + 1i ::jz ~ 00 ft :tz * ~ J: 8'g tfH~f), 
http:l/news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/20/content 697189.htm (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
124Jd. -
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ensures the enforcement and implementation of the Party's basic policies ... to 
ensure that the Party at all times play the crucial leading role in controlling the 
full situation and coordinating all constituents."125 
Jiang's rule of law therefore may be read as a cogent recapitulation of Deng's 
institutionalization and legitimization, for a more modem and globalized Chinese 
economic and political situation. Jiang's formulation still prioritizes the political 
agenda of the party-state and un-challengeable position of the One Party 
sovereign. Westernized or Americanized ideals of separation of powers, judicial 
independence, the supremacy of law, human rights and multiparty polity are 
deemed "incompatible" with China's "overall situation" of socialism ("quanguo 
daju" t±~±5C~OO:*:fi0). 126 The CCP and China's One Party system of rule, 
during Jiang's era, faced severe challenges and pressures from domestic 
dissidents and foreign governments and international institutions. Jiang's rule of 
law was a response to domestic challenges to the party's legitimacy 127 and foreign 
condemnations of China's sluggish reform process. 128 After abandoned the notion 
of socialist rule by law (shehui zhuyi fazhi ;f±~.±xl!$0) in political reform 
settings, Jiang further honors the rule of virtue (yide zhiguo ~ 1~ ¥§1 00) to 
125 !d. (omissions added by this thesis) 
126 See People's Daily (overseas version), February I, 2001 
127 See Jiang Zemin, "Resolutions in the CCP Central Committee Regarding Important Questions 
on Promoting Socialist Ethical and Cultural Program," adopted at the Sixth Session of the 141h 
CCP Central Committee Congress, October 10, 1996. Jiang warned about the deterioration of 
moral standards, the practice of worshipping money, seeking pleasure and selfish individualism, 
the revival of feudal superstitions, pornography, gambling and drug abuse, the production of 
shoddy and fake goods and fraud in the market place, and rampant corruption, all of which are 
seriously damaging the work of both Party and government. Furthermore, there is a vacuum in 
people's faith in socialism and the ideal of honoring the state is weak. He claimed that all these 
problems must be resolved through the promotion of ethical and cultural moralism. See generally, 
Cai and Wang, supra 122 
128 See generally CECC 2002 Report, supra 16 
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supplement the rule of law to divert attention pushing on political refonn to legal 
and administrative system refonn. 
The "Three Represents" (sange daibiao .:=:.1- 1~ *-.) 129 arguably is the most 
remarkable theorized contribution made by Jiang to the socialism movement. 
Although Jiang fought hard to insert the "Three Represents" as an amendment to 
the Preface of Constitution and the Party Charter, together with the "rule of 
virtue", it still fails to weld the political legacy and ideological vacuum 
opinionated by the general constituents. Is the upholding of the "rule of virtue" 
another resort to justify the inwardly sensitiveness of adopting the westernized 
conception of rule of law, or to find Chinese ancient root for the rule of law 
rhetoric to substantiate the legitimacy ofthe party-state? There is no clear answer 
to this. However, the academia in China admits that rule of virtue marginalize the 
debate and introduction of the traditional or western rule of law conception, even 
the "rule of virtue" proclaims fair competition, creditability, self-respect and 
cooperation with government. 
Although Jiang boldly introduced the "rule of law" discourse into the social, 
political and legal settings of China, the conception he articulated was to secure 
the ruling of party-state and maintain the authoritarian status of the CCP, rather 
than to implement checks on governmental powers. Jiang's rule of law is 
therefore, in essence, a reformulation of Deng's legal theorems that aims to 
129 See generally Larry Cata Backer, Chinese Constitutionalism, Sange Daibiao (the "Three 
Represents''), and the Rule of Law, 16 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 29, 33-34 (2006) for a 
detailed analysis of the rule of law reform and the "Three Represents" 
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stimulate economic development and evade potential challenges to the part-state 
legitimacy. 
3.3 The Hu-Wen Harmonious Society Undertaking 
Chinese President, Hu Jintao, and Premier, Wen Jiabao, are survivors ofthe first 
arguably peaceful power transition in modem Chinese history, and its legacy 
represents the ascension of China's fourth generation of leadership after the 
Sixteenth CCP Congress held in November 2002. Unlike their predecessors, Hu 
and Wen have been confronted with myriad domestic political challenges from 
economic readjustments domestically and constant international calls for 
economic and political liberalization, to managing the SARS epidemic and an 
Olympic Games. The leaders, as a result of their WTO obligations in particular, 
face difficult choices in carrying out their political agenda. 
Hu and Wen advocate a "harmonious society" for promoting people's welfare 
(minsheng, ~ :1:.) and balancing economic growth with social justice. In this 
instance, Hu and Wen have plainly inherited the discourse of"socialist rule of law" 
from Jiang, while concern for social welfare and reducing socioeconomic 
disparity that have clearly affected their notion of the object of law. Hu and Wen 
have mostly been "trouble-removers" and have faced complex a domestic 
political setting after China's over two decades of economic growth and 
participation in international orders. Cultivating their gross-roots allures, Hu and 
Wen have concerned themselves and the party more with the plight of low-
income citizenry and countryside or agricultural welfares. Extensive corruption, 
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undisciplined local grandees, enlarged social disparity, a further deteriorated 
environment, growing breakouts of worker unrest, and social imbalance all 
contribute to Hu and Wen's policy deviations from their predecessors' focus on 
economic development, SOE destruction and reform, and international outreaches. 
As evidenced by the amendment to China's constitution in 2004, which includes 
safeguarding human rights and private property rights as a primary focus of the 
party-state, Hu and Wen have added more "substantive" or "thick" elements to 
the official undertaking of the rule of law reform in China. It further accents the 
economic development, WTO obligation fulfillment and the sense that the ruling 
party-state cannot be preserved without promoting justice and fairness. 
Substantial as the Constitution's rule of law development looks in its invocation 
of employing laws as weapons to protect individuals' rights and liberties, citizens' 
fair share of social wealth and corresponding social status, Hu and Wen mostly 
purport seeking to achieve a harmonious relationship between GDP growth and 
social welfare, with the ultimate goals of maintaining social stability and cooling 
down hatreds towards the highest echelon of wealthy classes (7t 'I Mi' m ). Hu and 
Wen's political vocabulary does not speak to political harmony or further 
institutionalized legal structure, nor does its agenda ever manifestly proclaim the 
rule of law. Thus, it is well recognized that Hu and Wen's focus, albeit using a 
rule of law discourse, continues to try to secure CCP's rule status and maintain 
social stability. 
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It is too early to analyze ideologies on socialist rule of law of Xi Jinping and Li 
Keqiang, who are supposed to take over the mantle ofthe Hu-Wen legacy in three 
years. However, given the perceptions of CCP's steady goal of securing party-
state sovereign and traditional focus on GOP growth, a reasonable observation 
would conclude that in the near future an overhauled upgrade of rule of law 
reform is not attainable, especially under the decentralized and cliquey 
factionalism of the inner-party system, which is now under heated debate. 
3.4. Summary 
In summary, the development of socialist rule of law rhetoric is a paradoxical 
labor, being receptive to market economy principles and modernizing state and 
private enterprises on the one hand, while remorselessly preserving an autocratic 
form of socialism on the other. Such a paradox can only be described as "the 
socialist rule of law with Chinese Characteristics", with vague description of 
"characteristics" and re-interpretative conception of "socialism". Throughout the 
three decades of economic reform and social evolution, and three generations of 
CCP leaderships, China has consistently made overtures toward the goal of setting 
up the rule of law order. However, ideological barriers still preclude adoption of 
traditional rule of law conceptions, allowing only for strategic reinterpretations. 
Minimum thresholds of traditional rule of law: protection of individual rights and 
building up a "government under rule of law" (fazhi zhengfu 1t:.¥~ II;& m) or 
"limited government" (youxian zhengfu :fr~~~}ff), still appear unachievable. The 
development of socialist rule of law is heavily constrained by serving its political 
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initiatives of maintaining social stability and securing the one party state. Even 
bearing a "Chinese characteristic" or "socialism" stamp, which might lay 
differences at the doorstep of legitimate sovereignty concerns, the legal institution 
itself can hardly say as being embraced or centered as a modern means to 
harmonize the society. 
Any serious discussion of a viable rule of law rhetoric for use in China must 
consider its domestic political and social needs to maintain social stability and its 
demonstrated desire to maintain one party rule, in conjunction with new and 
complex roles played by China in the international arena. The CCP's adoption of 
new political slogans such as "doing things in accordance with international 
standard" and "assimilation or harmonization with international practice," 
compels serious commentators to include in-depth examination of the impact of 
international organizations, such as the WTO, in their reviews of China's socialist 
rule of law rhetoric. 
IV. The Implication of Rule of Law Conception to Contemporary China 
4.1. Legal Reform in the Past Three Decades 
Beginning in the late 1970s with an over-manipulated and shattered Constitution 
that was essentially a complex assurance of the CCP's ruling status, established 
institutions of socialist governance, and a limited number of vaguely worded 
statutes typically derived from CCP's class struggle policy pronouncements (yi 
jieji touzheng weigang l-;Uf1!&1J..!ft-~~), China has developed an extensive body 
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of laws, regulations, and other legal enactments. 130This accomplishment has only 
been possible with the parallel development of administrative infrastructure, as 
well as the establishment of over 400 post-secondary law departments which have 
graduated over 250,000 students. Professor William Alford's excellent summary 
ten years ago on the achievements of China's legal system reform might shad 
some lights on such promising and phenomenal progress 131 : 
Over the past quarter century, China has been engaged in the most 
concerted program of legal construction is world history. At the end of the 
Cultural Revolution, China's modest legal infrastructure lay in near ruin-
with but a skeletal body of legislation, a thinly staffed judicial system, and 
a populace having scant awareness of law ... China now has an extensive 
body of national and sub-national legislation and other legal enactment, 
130 The literature on China's legal reform in the past three decades in voluminous. See generally, 
The 601h Anniversary of the PRC: A Retrospective on the Chinese Legal System, 23 Colum. J. 
Asian L. (2009); China's Legal System: New Developments, New Challenges, The China 
Quarterly (Special issue, September 2007) (Cambridge University Press) on China's legal reform; 
For projects related to China's rule of law reform, See generally, Gewirtz, supra 111; Randall 
Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of Law: Administrative Law Reform 
and Rule of Law in the People's Republic ofChina, 19 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 161, 198-99 (2001); 
Fred Bergsten, N. Lardy, B. Gill & D. Mitchell, The Balance Sheet in 2007 and Beyond, 
(Conference held jointly by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, Apr. 2007) (suggesting that "China is slowly establishing 
elements of a 'rule of law' system"), 
http:// www.chinabalancesheet.org/Documents/05RuleofLaw.pdf; (last visited on March 15, 
2011); Randall Peerenboom, What Have we Learned about Law and Development? Describing, 
Predicting, and Assessing Legal Reforms in China, 27 Mich. J. Int'l L. 823, 842 (2006); Randall 
Peerenboom, Law and Development of Constitutional Democracy in China: Problem or 
Paradigm?, 19 Colum. J. Asian L. 185, 187 (2005); Li Buyun, Ideal and Reality of the Rule of 
Law in China, 3 J. Chinese & Comp. L. 40-59 (1997); Xianchu Zhang, Commentary on 
"Legislating for a Market Economy in China," 191 China Q. 586, 588 (2007) (citing the Report on 
Governance and Social Policy of the World Bank Institute, http:// 
www. worldbank.org/wbi/ governance/pubs/ govmatters4 .htm. (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
131 See generally, Alford, supra 20, noting that Chinese officials proudly report the promulgation 
in the past quarter century of more than 300 laws by NPC and its Standing Committee, more than 
700 regulations by the State Council, more than 4,000regulations by sub-national people's 
congresses and their standing committees, and more than 24,000 other legal enactments by the 
ministries arrayed under the State Council and their sub-national counterparts 
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concentrated on, but not limited to, economic matters, and has joined 
major international agreements covering trade, the environment, human 
rights, intellectual property and a host of other issues... The Chinese 
judicial system now has a nation-wide presence, with specialized 
chambers to address criminal, civil, economic, administrative and in some 
instances, intellectual property law questions. Whereas a generation ago, 
China had fewer than 3,000 lawyers and approximately a dozen law 
schools, now there are over 125,000 lawyers and hundreds oflaw schools, 
with law a very popular subject for university study and well over 150,000 
candidates yearly taking the bar exam. Chinese citizens now avail 
themselves of the formal legal system in an unprecedented manner ... 132 
As noted above, the achievements of the past three decades of formal legal 
development have been phenomenal. After a few controversial amendments, 
China has developed an intricate Constitution that sets forth an institutional 
regime for the protection of, inter alia, general economic social and cultural as 
well as civil and political rights of individuals. The Constitution further 
establishes the legal functions and statuses of central and local Congresses, courts, 
and the Procuracy and other key administrative institutions. Basic laws (ji ben fa 
£7-js:l:E) promulgated by the NPC Standing Committee implement and fill in the 
rights and governance system outlined in the Constitution, detailing principles and 
rules on commercial routines, contracts, civil, criminal and administrative 
principle and procedure, enterprise, tax, finance, securities, labor, and 
132Jd 
206 
environmental protection, among other areas, many of which are in their fourth or 
later revisions; and various laws and regulations in areas of investment, 
corporations, health and safety, construction, intellectual property, and legal 
profession. 133 The Constitution and laws therefore cover almost all major aspects 
of social, economic and legal life in China. Moreover, China has extended its 
international presence tremendously, as exemplified by its WTO membership and 
improved discourse power in IFis, all of which contributes to and encourages 
China's legal reform. 
Notwithstanding the above accomplishments and ongoing legal reform, there are 
still debates on how to reform China's legal system, and even suspicions on 
whether China owns a separate and institutionalized legal system or ifthere exists 
a "Chinese legal system" at all. A notably opinionated view along these lines 
holds that Chinese historical, social, and political settings are so fractured and 
inhomogeneous from modern western legal system, that meaningful 
transplantation or adoption of western legal ideals, e.g. a western polity, to China 
is fantasy. 134 This view, although analytically it bears the merits of an in-depth 
understanding of Chinese legal settings, showcases a certain deficiency in 
historical materialism on which it theorized western legal tradition, and 
133 See generally, China's Efforts and Achievements in Promoting the Rule of Law, Information 
Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China (February 2008), stating that 
China's promulgation efforts have also been coupled with unprecedented undertakings in training, 
nominating and placing required personnel for the legal project. Moreover, China citizens are 
increasingly engaging themselves in safeguarding rights and receiving basic legal assistance. The 
awareness of Chinese citizen to understand, accept, and employ law has been improved and more 
rooted in the population including farmers of more than 1 billion 
134 See Donald Clark, Puzzling Observation in Chinese Law: When is a Riddle Just a Mistake? in 
C. Stephen Hsu, Ed., Understanding China's Legal System: Essays in Honor of Jerome A. Cohen 
(New York: New York University Press, 2003) at 93 
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exaggerates the difference between the legal systems. First, the danger of this 
view is to isolate western legal ideals in a self-congratulatory manner as a system 
without referential needs from other legal systems. Second, legal reform in China 
has, since its imperial era, been shaped by western legal norms. Republican era 
China's laws were an almost direct translation of western norms. 135 Moreover, 
China's contemporary legal reform also presents a strong absorption of westernize 
legal ideas. Third, the impact of participation in the international legal sphere 
cannot be understated. Finally, it causes illusion that supporters of this view 
neglect international and domestic efforts to build a more accepted and 
functioning Chinese legal system. 
4.2. Rule of Law vs. Rule by law 
It is essential now to revisit and appraise two conceptions of the possible 
relationship between law and the state: rule by law and rule of law. These two 
notions, although they are somewhat unsophisticated for the purposes of complete 
normative comparison, outline basic sets of prerequisites for modern economic 
development and legal infrastructures, especially in transitory and emerging 
economies: an independent judiciary; and limited bureaucratic discretion and 
administration. Both of these constructs assume away a third possibility of rule by 
135 See generally, Tay-sheng Wang, Legal Reform in Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895-
1945: The Reception ofWestern Law (University of Washington Press, 2000) 
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definition - the rule of men 136 and both are particularly appropriate to the 
discussion ofvarious aspects ofChina's legal reform 137• 
Rule by law as a term in this thesis primarily refers to the instrumental aspect of 
law: descriptive, positive, and thin. Rule of law as a term, given various 
interpretations and for the purpose of comparing with the rule by law, represents a 
prescriptive, normative, thick and political view that includes, but is not limited to, 
separation of powers, fairness and justice, judicial review and embracing liberty 
and freedom. 138 Given the substantial impacts that these two conceptions have had 
on Chinese legal reform, it is necessary to briefly describe the difference between 
these two terms. 
Rule by law does not require separation of between the legal infrastructure and 
the state. In this sense, rule by law aims at implementation of generally prescribed, 
known, consistent, and enforceable rules by the state government over human 
conduct. 139 Value in this system is placed on uniformity, impartiality and 
predictability140 in application, which invites the regularity and consistency in a 
legal system independent of spontaneous political and social interference. Of 
136 See Yufan Hao, From Rule of Men to Rule of Law: An Unintended Consequences of 
Corruption in China in the 1990s, 8 J. Contemp. China.(I999); See also Cai and Wang, supra 122 
at 1-50 
137 See Albert Chen, Toward a Legal Enlightenment: Discussion in Contemporary China on the 
Rule of Law, 17 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. at 135 
138 See Radin, infra 11, at 783-91, discussing the "instrumental" and "substantive" concepts of law; 
see also, Robert Summers, supra 11, at 127, 135, briefing the "formal" and "substantive" concepts 
of the rule of law. For discussions in Chinese, see generally, Zhu Haigen, From Rule by Law to 
Rule of Law ( Cong Fazhi Dao Fazhi, 2008), 
http://www.chinacourt.org/html!article/200812/19/336712.shtml (last visited on March 15, 2011); 
Cheng Liaoyuan, From Rule by Law to Rule of Law (Cong Fazhi Dao Fazhi) (China Law Press, 
1999) 
139 See Radin, supra11, at 785-786 and accompanying text. 
140 See generally, Maimon Schwarzschild, Keeping it Private (2007), stating that legal stability 
and predictability are a fundamental part of"what people mean by the Rule of Law" 
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course, the minimum requirement is that there is a set up codified rules available 
for administration and application. So, enforcement of rules can be merely 
realized by legal staffs of a state's administrative and judicial apparatuses. Rule 
by law is often criticized, because even an authoritarian legal system or a legal 
system depraving human rights may qualify such relatively strict instrumental and 
. . . h h ld 141 positivist t res o s. 
Rule by law is most similar to Fuller's eight fundamental characteristics 
instrumental conception. 142 Meanwhile, formalist theorists also hearken back to 
Fuller, 143 who also claims that formalism lies in the concept of decision making 
according to law. 144 In this sense, a formalist view of rule by law centers on using 
the promulgation and enforcement of law as a method of ruling. 145 Rule by law, in 
terms of enforcement, envisions a method whereby legal rules are enforced as a 
part of governance. However, rule by law as instrumental, descriptive and positive, 
does not embrace fully the "inner morality" or values as preferred by Fuller. 146 
Rule of law, on the contrary, incorporates a normative and political theory of the 
relationship between the state and law. In this sense, rule of law primarily refers 
to a set of substantive and prescriptive values and political theories of limited 
government, independent judiciary, how laws are used and how governmental 
discretion is constrained by law. Rule of law, as discussed in the economic 
development literature, has expanded to include almost all characteristics of 
141 !d. 
142 See generally, Fuller supra 30 
143 See Summers, supra 11,at 135 (1993) 
144 See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97, Yale L.J. 509-510 (1988) 
145 !d. see also Radin supra 11 at 796 
146 See Fuller supra 30 at 42-44, 96-97; see also Radin Supra11 at 795-96 
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"good law" or "good governance." In this sense, the rule of law embraces a 
constitutional structure in which government behavior is subject to review by 
independent legal process, and possibly, limitations and punishment, i.e., 
government officials are monitored by judicial review. Therefore, a well-
functioning judicial system including court, police, judges, qualified legal 
professionals, and a set of normative procedures is required for the rule of law in 
the economic development literature. Although Fuller's eight characteristics of 
rule of law may also be broadly reinterpreted in a substantive and prescriptive 
way, 147 other interpretations of rule of law cannot be missed. Among others, Raz 
argues that ''judicial judgments shall have the final binding force", "the power of 
judicial review on legislation and administrative action is secure", and "courts are 
accessible to citizens, and that the discretion possessed by crime-preventing 
agencies should not pervert the law." 148 Therefore, rule of law in Raz's 
conception, requires at least a judicial and legal infrastructure independent, at 
least to some extent, of administrative interference. 
In summary, in the context of Chinese legal reform, the development of rule of 
law conception has been inextricably intertwined with polity evolution in China. 
Following the Republic of China in adopting a westernized model, China's legal 
reform in the past three decades gradually developed into a mixed yet promising 
socialist rule of law catering to the needs of a globalized market economy. From 
the beginning of China's contemporary legal reform, there has been consensus to 
147 See William P. Alford, A Second Great Wall?: China's Post-Cultural Revolution Project of 
Legal Construction, 11 Cultural Dynamics, 203-205, describing the forces encouraging an attitude 
of"instrumental approaches to legality" in China,[hereinafter Alford: A Second Great Wall] 
148 See Radin 11 at 788-789 
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pursue the rule of law or rule by law rather than rule of men to circumvent 
individual arbitrariness and personality cult. Moreover, given the heated debates 
on which model of rule of law that China should undertake, the instrumental 
characteristics of rule of law and a realistic understanding of China's political, 
economic, social and international settings are commensurably essential. 
Furthermore, rule by law and rule of law bifurcation on one hand shows the 
China's promise to developing a law based market economy, and present arduous 
commitments to China in developing a rule oflaw order on the other. Situating an 
instrumental, descriptive and positive conception of rule of law as bottom line, 
reasonable efforts to promote a normative and substantive conception of rule of 
law would for sure escalate China's legal reform conforming to universally 
accepted values and ideals of human rights protection, limited government, 
functioning independent judiciary and impartial administration by bureaucratic 
discretions. The analysis of this chapter shows that, putting aside the prioritization 
on which rule oflaw model that China should embrace and adopt (assuming there 
is one), the formal aspects of Chinese legal reform including its deficiencies and 
problem need be identified and appraised. Needless to say, China's greatly 
increased international commitments have made its need for domestic legal 
reform more urgent. 
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4.3. Incompetency of China's legal system 
Chinese legal reform accomplishments deserve quality deliberations 149 but so do 
various undertakings in which China's legal system continues to fall short of 
expectations - either romanticized or widely accepted - of a modem, rule of law 
state. In a substantive sense, China has substantially failed to protect legitimate 
rights of all citizens, leaving groups such as rural seniors, unattended children, 
migrant laborers, laid-off SOE workers, natural disaster victims, minority 
nationals, and notoriously trafficked women, just name a few, without effective 
legal recourse. The judiciary branch woefully is not privileged to be sufficiently 
independent from the CCP and political authority, nor are its judges uniformly 
competent or autonomous in their embrace of the rule of law and impartial 
political ideals. Corruption, on both national and local levels and involving almost 
all comers of economic and social fields, plagues the legal system abrasively. 
Environmental protection protocols and low carbon guidelines are distorted in 
application and encumber meaningful calculations in fighting pollution and 
deterioration of ecological balance; administrative branch of government, though 
improved under the new Information Disclosure Law in 2009, is still 
characterized by its low efficiency, overstaffing, overlapping hierarchies of 
command, and opacity. Although the legislative process has expanded to include 
public hearings and opinion collection from a broader spectrum of interests, it 
remains largely a top-down routine, typically falling short of implementing 
149 See generally, Liebman: Retrospective, supra 1 
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formally provided opportunities for quality input from academics and popularized 
comments by citizens, especially low-income constituencies. 
Law enforcement, still manifests violence, dissonance, staffing shortages, 
procedural confusion, 150 case nature misidentification, local protectionism and 
retarded response mechanisms. The emergence of countless prison management 
scandals has increased doubts about the competence of the penal system to uphold 
the rights of accused and convicted individuals. 151 While China has accomplished 
the formal articulation of a reformed socialist legal system, even the theoretical 
and instrumental foundation articulated is not without problems. Indeed, one need 
not hunt far to find limitations and vulnerability inherent even in the formal laws. 
Even China's Constitution 152 has been the target of academic and public criticism. 
Although China's Constitution has put forward panoply of basic rights of citizens, 
some of which are not even explicitly stated in those of developed countries, the 
difference between a constitution on the book and an enforceable document in 
practice is so massive that western scholars and politicians have lost their faith in 
a "qualified constitutionalism."153 China's Constitution is not subject to litigation 
15° For example, see Cross-Provincial Detainment by Hubei Tongcheng Police Bureau [Hubei 
Tongcheng Jingfang Kuasheng Zhuaren] May 30, 2009, Southern Weekend, 
http:/ /news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2009-05-30/160517915790.shtml (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
151 For example, the development of a popular lexicon deriving from these incidents, including 
terms such as "peekaboo" (duomaomao), "soy sauce shopping" (dajiangyou), "pushing-up" 
(fuwocheng), etc., which showcase the hazy and helpless mindsets of citizens 
152 See generally, Marc Rosenberg, The Chinese Legal System Made Easy: A Survey of the 
Structure of Government, Creation of Legislation, and the Judicial System under the Constitution 
and Major Statutes of the People's Republic of China, 9 U, Miami Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. (200 1 ). 
The precise role of the Constitution in Chinese law is subject to debate; Michael William Dowdle, 
Of Parliaments, Pragmatism, and the Dynamics of Constitutional Development: The Curious Case 
of China, 35 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. (2002). 
153 !d., See also generally, Louis Henkin, Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Foreign Affairs 
(Columbia University Press, 1990), interpreting constitutionalism as comprising the following 
elements: (1) government according to the constitution; (2) separation of power; (3) sovereignty of 
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nor is it designed to serve as reference in judging cases - it is a nonjusticiable 
document. Constitutionalism, in western traditional interpretations, means an 
institution that denies the preeminence of the legislature but recognizes liberalism 
and the realization of human rights and human nature. China's Constitution, 154 by 
comparison, is relatively incapable of constraining the government's or authorities' 
power or determining cases. Another defect ascribed to China's Constitution is its 
amendments lack solid legal grounding; rather, those amendments are enshrined 
as signifying the political supremacy of individual leaders. China's new 1982 
Constitution has been amended four times over the past thirty years. Except a few 
canonical amendments such as introducing the notion of a private sector economy, 
market economy and the conception of rule of law, amendments are frequently 
just juggling with terms in ways that suggest political manipulation rather than 
legal reform is their impetus. For example, the forceful insertion of the "Three 
Represents" into the 2004 Amendment did not even receive the supportive votes 
in the NPC Parliament that seemed a foregone conclusion. It is well noted that 
such unscrupulous political interference has heavily trampled on the stability and 
authority of China's Constitution, which are minimum requirements of modern 
Constitutionalism. 
Considerable doubts about legislative upgrade of the Chinese legal system exist as 
well. This old charge points to vagueness and obfuscation with regard to which 
the people and democratic government; (4) constitutional review; (5) independent judiciary; (6) 
limited government subject to a bill of individual rights; (7) controlling the police; (8) civilian 
control of the military; and (9) no state power, or very limited and strictly circumscribed state 
fower, to suspend the operation of some parts of, or the entire, constitution 
54 See Marc Rosenberg, supra 152 at 225-226, arguing that China's Constitution is an aspirational 
document lacking any binding legal force 
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units of government, administrative organs or local authorities are appropriately 
entitled to interpret and enforce any given cluster of laws and on what basis. 155 
Ambiguity chronically consists in implementing standards and guidelines to 
categorize various sources of laws, such as basic and other laws passed by the 
NPC, regulations promulgated by state agencies by delegation or authorization, 
and the enormous volume of interpretive notices and circulars enacted by non-
judicial administrative organs, to speak nothing of provincial and local decrees 
and regulations. 
Putting it simply, abstractions in legal language and inherent confusion within 
Chinese legal system exacerbate the concerns aroused by of the inability to define 
legal obligations and authoritative boundaries of administrations. Various 
administrative agencies have failed to architect, annotate, and execute laws and 
regulations promulgated by themselves, which are free of "riddle quizzing," 
deliberations and external reviews, particularly at times when unqualified, 
obtrusive administrators intrude to chum out rules designed in part to super-
ordinate their political symbol rather than serving underlying legislative 
initiatives. 156 Moreover, Chinese legislative process is filled with stochastic inputs 
that represent political motives and crisis interventions. It proceeds without a 
formulated agenda to fill in legislation gaps, nor does it have an early-warning or 
prefiguring process to identify fields of promulgation - many unplanned 
regulations and laws are made on ad hoc basis - that lead to delayed remedies. 
The Chinese legal system clearly needs an "ombudsperson," system or 
155 
See Alford: A Second Great Wall, supra 147 at 196 
156 !d. 
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coordination of networks that might help eradicate inadequacy or local protective 
· d I' d I . 1 . 157 regulatiOns of ecentra tze egts attve process. 
Finally, the case or precedent record system has not been officially substantiated 
throughout even the top judiciary reforms. As a so-called "civil law" system 
bearing a former Soviet Union heritage, 158 Chinese courts are unpredictable in 
creating or referring to precedents for adjudication or dispute settlement. This 
attribute is no longer attributable to China's civil law origins, but rather, the 
judiciary's lack of autonomy and confidence has prevented its embrace of the 
precedents approach. Another censorable criticism of the Chinese judiciary is the 
inconsistent qualification of judges and legal staff, which are crucial in realizing 
the "predictabilities" of applying the "promulgated" regulations, an indispensable 
characteristic for the rule of law conception. Such irregularity is inevitably more 
evident when China's local courts hear cases featuring international norms and 
foreign litigants, especially where, for example, the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism adopts a jurisdictional system in which case law and precedents 
matter. 
157 See He Weifang, Three Supremes, Who is the Most Supreme? [Sange Zhishang Shui 
Zhishang?], http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_ 488663200100atga.html (last visited on March 15, 
2011) 
158 This understanding is strengthened by Professor Whitmore Gray from the University of 
Michigan Law School. Professor Gray noted that China in many aspects followed Soviet Union's 
model for codification of important laws and such heritage still plays a huge part in jurisprudent 
research settings (discussion notes on file with the author) See also Walter Gellhom, China's 
Quest for Legal Modernity, 1 J. Chinese L. 1, 6 (1987), observing that China has relied heavily 
upon Soviet Union for content of law, and training of judges, lawyers and legal staffs; for 
discussions in Chinese, See generally, He Qinhua, Reexaminations of China's Transplantation of 
Soviet Union Legal System (Guanyu Xinzhongguo Yizhi Sulian Sifa Zhidu de Fansi,2008), 
http://www.china-review.com/sao.asp?id=2836 (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
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4.4. Summary 
The above plaudits and criticisms convincingly expose true facets of Chinese 
legal reform, although the academic coverage has been much broader than it is 
necessary for this thesis to examine. A balanced observer must admit the 
significant strides China has taken, by reaping and absorbing advantages of 
western liberal legality, in terms of its perceived capacity to buttress economic 
growth, engage in the international legal order, upgrade existing legislation, and 
reform its judiciary. On the other hand, given China's current authoritarian ruling 
regime, too many social, political, historical troubles have thwarted and will 
continue disturb China's legal reform process, making it fall short of meeting 
certain instrumental requirements of the "rule of law" or creating a paradoxically 
variant socialist rule of law system that heavily deviates from the original 
initiatives of legal reform. 
V. Prospects and Implications for China's Socialist Rule of Law 
5.1. Is There a Necessity to Locate a Rule of Law Model for China? 
One inescapable attribute squeezed into debates on China's legal reform is to 
fantasize and mold a rule of law conception. This thought deserves further 
consideration. Such approach is quite common in literature authored by western 
jurists and theorists in the hope of creating and insinuating such a rule of law 
model into the Chinese legal system. This methodological setting is not without 
merits, but it risks ossifying a biased standard in mind in advance before making 
quality evaluation. Drawing from the discussion and sources above, there are a 
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number of categorizations of the rule of law model in general and formulations 
for China's legal system in specific. For example, the instrumental and 
substantive definitions, positivism and natural law ideals, the bifurcated thin and 
thick models, views of futility in application or radical proponents of overhaul 
reconstruction, all advocate different approaches to developing the rule of law. 
This thesis submits that the priority of conceptualizing a perfect model of rule of 
law for the whole legal system is not practical for China's current stage of 
development or the current state of its legal system. Rather, a few 
recommendations shall be made against retooling the Chinese legal system. 
Democracy is still sensitive, but not untouchable, in China. Mostly, it depends on 
how Chinese top politicians and reformers conceive of it. In the context of 
contemporary Chinese political system and social orders, China does not enjoy 
the luxury of the historical, religious, and philosophical traditions from whence 
western or American models of democracy organically arose. In this sense, we 
need a probing discussion of the relationship between democracy and the rule of 
law, especially in the Chinese context. A normative conception of Chinese rule of 
law should therefore be confined to an independent judicial and legal system, 
while democracy has to be viewed from a historical and developmental 
perspective. On the other hand, we should note that no single contemporary 
western polity or society perfectly meets all criteria of their liberal rule of law 
conception. 159 The rule of law as a political and democratic theory should not be 
subject to exaggeration and abuse, and requires careful deliberation. After all, 
159 See Radin supra 11 at 787 
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empirically and conceptually, a full-scale Chinese conversion to a western style of 
polity and democracy may not translate into a stable political and economic 
order, 160 on which the establishment and development of rule of law is 
conditioned. It is difficult to substantiate that a democratic government might 
rather invite social turmoil and political chaos than fail to implement certain 
political ideals or romanticized legal conceptions, so this thesis will limit its focus 
on legal and judicial reform independent of democracy. 
An often neglected or misunderstood feature about China's rule of law reform is 
that such reform has strong inner political, economic and social drives and 
support from top glitterati, growing middle class and broader constituencies 
(farmers and low-income groups). The modem post-information society, 
characterized by information advancement over6 the internet renders many old 
tropes about China outdated and unwelcome to its citizens. Establishing the rule 
of law means real business to China. Developmental goals such as limited 
government, regularity of laws, transparency in procedures and administration, 
and perform-ability of laws, are what generations of Chinese elites pursue and 
fight for. Drawing from the above, this thesis proposes the following submissions, 
some of which are shared by domestic policy makers and foreign commentators, 
for upgrading the rule of law reform in China in general. 
160 See John Stanley Gillespie, supra 111, discussing the impact of rule of law reform in Vietnam; 
See generally, Ohnersorge, Asian Legal System, supra 24, noting that IFI-dominated legal reforms 
in Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Japan, Latin American nations have various 
problems such as social stability 
220 
5.2. Prospects for Chinese Legal Reform 
First and foremost, securing the independence of legal system as an institution, 
even in a relatively self-sufficient manner, is the foundation for transformation to 
the rule of law. Political barriers in China are evidently against reaching the 
autonomy of the legal system. "Political science" and "law" conceptions (zhengfa 
li&i'!) have never been officially separated in governmental reform agenda. One 
notorious example of this lack of separation is that the "politics and law 
committee" (zhengfawei ll&¥!~) controlled by the CCP is the highest authority in 
the legal and judicial system administration. Professor Stanley Luhman observes 
that Chinese legal system alone hardly has never enjoyed the same autonomy as 
its western counterparts, 161 thus he expresses mixed pessimism towards the future 
of China's rule of law reform. However, Chinese scholars find greater hope 162 in 
their observation of the CCP's loosened control as over legal functions like 
legislation, adjudication, and the procuracy while it pursues priorities of 
deepening economic development. This thesis shares such optimism regarding the 
development of autonomy and independence of an institutionalized legal system 
for two reasons. First, reform over the past three decades has promoted a legal 
161 See generally, Stanley Luhman, Introduction: The Future of Chinese Law, 141 China Q. 1, 14 
( 1995), noting that "a number of factors clouding the future of Chinese law reform, in particular 
the continual intervention by political interests, growing weakness of the Chinese apparatus of 
state' and declining power of the central government over the rest of the country"; quoted in 
Professor Donald C. Clarke, Introduction: The Chinese Legal System Since 1995: Steady 
Development and Striking Continuities, 191 China Q. 555, 556 (2007) 
162 See Pei Minxin, Creeping Democratization in China, 6 J. Democracy 65, at 66 (1995); A 
prominent Chinese law scholar, Professor Ma Huaide (the Vice-President of the China University 
of Political Science and Law) notes that CCP has made receptive efforts in promoting legal reform 
even the extent is subject to debate, see Ma Huaide, Kaohe Fazhi GDP, Tuijin Yifa Xingzheng 
[Revaluation ofthe Rule of Law GDP, Promoting Administration in Accordance with Law (2011)], 
http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/14323193.html (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
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culture of seeking remedies through legal process rather than personal favor or 
connections, and such legal culture in turn sets political inference in the spotlight 
and fosters judicial independence. Second, disputes arising from foreign 
investment and international trade arena have lined up judicial procedural settings 
which are not easily subject to political manipulations. In this sense, the Chinese 
legal system as an independent infrastructure promises considerable reform 
opportunities. 
Second, transparency and public accountability are the catalysts for promoting the 
publicity of laws, judicial decisions and administrative process. As Fuller notes, 
the "publicity" characteristic of the rule of law characterizes that "those who are 
expected to obey the rules must be able to find out what the rules are." 163 Chinese 
laws and administrative regulations are at times not available to interested parties 
or are subject to unclear processes of interpretation. Citizens sometimes are short 
of access to information about legislative updates or trial hearings. For many 
years the Chinese government launched rounds of "law dissemination campaigns" 
(pufa yundong lliF~:iEZ9J) and received sound responses in the initial reform years, 
but most of such campaigns ended up being mere formalities. The failure of these 
law dissemination campaigns may have resulted from the somewhat 
propagandistic method of dissemination itself, but another important account is 
that the surfeit of laws, regulations, notices, and circulars promulgated by various 
authorities create confusion thus leading to a public aversion to new laws. Public 
accountability, on the other hand, requires public disclosure of legal information 
163 See generally, Radin supra 11 and Fuller supra 30 
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and procedures. Non-enforcement of bargained over contracts among individuals, 
private and state enterprises often traps and hurts good will market participants. 
Another annoying trap for foreign businesses is the government procurement 
process associated with confusing administrative procedures. "Black box" 
practice, backstage operation, affiliated trading and secret deals are popular and 
have plagued the legal system in China for a long time. Transparency, in this 
sense, as a normative requirement for transforming to the rule of law, demands 
public disclosure and accessibility of important legal information. 
The third prerequisite goes to the independence of the judicature system and the 
autonomy of legal professionals in particular. Judges in China, especially those 
presiding in lower courts face various unjustified influences from many sources. 
Local courts usually are underpaid, understaffed, and undervalued. In this sense, 
the natural justice requirement of the rule of law values that "judges must be 
impartial and independent" and "trials must be fair, open, and not prejudiced by 
public clamor." However, local judges at times have to yield to local interests and 
reach imperfect legal reasoning and decisions. Given China lacks a historical 
litigation culture, such surrender by local courts and judges may deteriorate what 
remaining trust that litigants credit to them. Lawyers, on the other hand, suffer 
similar hardships in performing professional roles in practice. They have to rely 
on judges to benefit their clients and concede to the order ofbar association which 
is controlled by the "politics and law" committee, let alone the top authority in 
law firms is the CCP branch but not the partner board. As normative elements of 
the rule of law in addition to know-ability and perform-ability, lawyers (on behalf 
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their clients) must "be rational choosers", and "be suitably motivated, perhaps by 
penal sanctions or opportunities for reward." 164 Therefore, rationality, legal 
sophistication and impartiality must be established in China to confonn the rule of 
law basics. 
Finally, a brief submission about the more sensitive role of human rights in 
China's rule of law development: As discussed earlier, the human rights package 
embraces a long, if not exhaustive, list of to-dos for structuring a socialist rule of 
law rhetoric. The Chinese government claims that it acknowledges and respects 
meaningful, universally accepted human rights and values, but caveats that 
cultural, economic, historical and social settings must be considered together to 
honor basic human rights. Probably due to both political withering and ideological 
rigidity, the expansion of civil rights and liberties is often said to endanger and 
impede China's economic development. However, this thought fails to identify a 
balanced and healthy relationship among economic development, human rights, 
and related substantive nonns of the rule of law. Human rights can be interpreted 
in various ways, but at a minimum level - for example, a citizen's ability to 
contribute to and benefit from the economic behaviors she chooses - a citizen has 
the right to know into which area her taxes go and how they are distributed. 
Flexible and strategic interpretations of human rights can therefore be a boon to 
efficient administration and contract enforcement protection. Therefore, for the 
purpose of this thesis, a list of pragmatic and proactive taxpayers' rights walks a 
middle ground on the issue of human rights, which might be both morally 
164 See Radin supra 11 at 787-88 
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defensible and politically viable. Criticisms of China's protections of human 
rights without consideration of both morality and the political viability of such 
protections may not help promote the rule of law in China; rather, they might 
worsen or endanger its nascent system of basic human rights. 
VI. Summary 
This chapter summarizes the theoretical debates on conceptions of the rule of law, 
the evolution of the Chinese socialist rule of law rhetoric, and progress that 
Chinese legal reform has made to date. One goal has been examination of the, 
often paradoxical, forces exerted on China's rule of law development by its 
historical roots, ideological interferences, economic development, and dynamic 
reformers in the past thirty years. True, this young system suffers infrastructural 
deficiency, domestic political intrusion, understaffing, and difficult demands from 
the outside world. On the other hand, it has already embraced many traditional 
rule of law characteristics, albeit in a somewhat unique socialist rearticulation, 
respectfully acknowledging universal basic human rights, improving room for 
scholastic submissions and debates, and more importantly, inviting foreign 
observation and attempting compliance with international norms. 
This chapter has further sought to show that an institutionalized Chinese legal 
system does exist in both a normative and an instrumental sense, despite valid 
critiques, which must be respected and accommodated. Solutions and upgrades 
are essential to tackle technical misidentification, and implementation (zhixing jj;1. 
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1r)165 and enforcement have priorities in nursing difficulties arising at all times. 
' 
For policymakers and entrepreneurial leaders in the West, perhaps especially in 
the United States, an objective assessment of China's historical, political and 
social traditions is necessary for targeted, objective and meaningful promotion of 
China's rule of law reform. 
"' 
165 
Professor Jacques deLisle, in his speech at the University of Michigan, specifically mentioned 
the difficulty in law enforcement, i.e. zhixingnan (fAIT$). For similar and detailed discussions, 
see generally, Cai and Wang, supra 122, Huang Yanzhong, Is the Chinese State Apparatus Being 
Revamped?; in China Under Hu Jintao (in Cheng, deLisle and Brown), supra 2 at 49-52, 
discussing the divergence between the law promulgation and enforcement 
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Chapter IV 
WTO Accession and its Implications for the Rule of Law Reform in China 
I. Introduction 
A close examination of China's legal reform for the past ten years reveals that it 
has been heavily shaped by China's accession to the World Trade Organization 
(WT0). 1 Although China has implemented Deng's "Reform and Open Door" 
paradigm since the late 1970s, China's WTO membership has wrought equally 
influential dynamic changes in social, economic and regulatory areas in a much 
shorter time. While China's commitments in its accession agreement (the 
"Protocol") 2primarily involve in liberalizing its trade, foreign investment, tax and 
dispute resolution laws, the impacts exerted by WTO go well beyond the 
economic and trade regimes by requiring transparency, uniformity and 
impartiality of its domestic governance and legal system. 
1 See generally, Nicholas R. Lardy, Integrating China into the Global Economy (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002) [hereinafter Lardy: Integrating China] 
2 Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, WT /L/432 (1 0 November 2001) 
(the Protocol), which incorporates by reference selected paragraphs of Report of the Working 
Party on the Accession of China, WT/MIN(01)/3 (10 November 2001) (WPR). The texts of the 
Protocol and WPR are 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/ChinaAccessionProtocol.pdf (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
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The Protocol is China's first treaty adopted containing explicit provisions against 
discrimination, and the WTO is the first international economic organization to 
which China has acceded to supervisory and adjudicative oversight. As evidenced 
by commitments enclosed in Protocol, China gave extraordinary concessions in 
its accession to WTO in terms of intensifying economic reform, improving 
administrative efficiency, training qualified agents, localizing international norms, 
and removing trade barriers. In this sense, WTO accession is considered a 
milestone for its domestic reform agenda wherein China, for the first time, openly 
incorporated foreign minimum requirements and international norms into its legal 
reform project. China accepted much higher accession standards than any other 
member country to date. The underlying rational is that Chinese top leaders take 
advantage of external forces and international norms to further develop its 
economy and upgrade institutionalization of its system to keep China as a whole 
competitive and sustainable in fostering development. This is particularly true 
given China's endeavor to overhaul its legal system in preparation for and 
compliance with the accession. During the three years prior to formal accession, 
the Chinese government abolished and revised thousands of laws and regulations 
that were in conflict with WTO principles, meanwhile, investing tremendous 
resources and tireless efforts to promulgate new WTO-compliant laws and ensure 
local synchronization of WTO practices. More importantly, WTO principles such 
as transparency, consistency and trade promotion were introduced to and 
employed by the Chinese public in their daily lives. "Gearing to WTO norms and 
integration into international markets" (yu shimao he guojia shichang jiegui .!=3t!t 
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m ~o 00 ~ff- rtf :!0 ~$A) was among the most popular phrases in the common 
vocabulary at the end of the twentieth century in China. All these social, cultural, 
regulatory and institutional overhauls stimulated by the general public's 
receptivity and WTO membership have contributed astoundingly to further 
development of China's economic and legal reform. 
China has been a beneficiary, albeit not without some bitterness, of its accession 
to WTO. In the last 30 years the rate of Chinese economic growth has been 
miraculous, averaging 9.3% growth in GDP per annum, while the GDP growth 
since accession to the WTO has averaged 9.7% with GDP reaching approximately 
$5.08 trillion by 2010. From 2001 to 2010, China's foreign trade increased nearly 
six times.3 At the same time, China's post-accession development has witnessed 
serious issues arising like increased disparities in rural and urban livelihoods, 
fluctuating trade scale, 4 increasing domestic needs, stock market bubbles and 
shock, an increasingly dissatisfied migrant labor force, overexpansion of 
infrastructure construction, environmental degradation and shortages of natural 
resources. Although the Chinese government has downplayed its role gradually as 
both market economy regulator and participant, vigilant observation shows that it 
has tightened monitoring measures to ensure a steady and stable development. 
3 The total value of China's imports and exports was approximately $509.5 billion in 2001 and 
$2,900 billion in 2010, respectively. For a detailed data analysis, see infra Chapter I 
4 China's exportation volume was severely hacked by the SARS in 2003 and the financial crisis in 
2008. See generally, Wayne M. Morrison, China and the Global Financial Crisis: Implications for 
the United States, Congressional Research Service, June 3, 2009, discussing the impact of 
financial crisis on Sino-US trade balances, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22984.pdf; (last 
visited on March 15, 2011); Tung Chen-yuan, SARS Impact on China's Economy, Taipei Times, 
July 05, 2003, p. 8, presenting that the heaviest impact SARS had on the Chinese economy was on 
demand, or, to be more specific, on consumption 
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Chinese government realistically has prepared for the political, economic and 
social costs of its international obligations. It even has outlined a tentative reform 
agenda before putting signatories on the Protocol. The abolition of the notorious 
agricultural tax, the overhaul of pension and social security system, better 
promotion of regional equality in economic development, a nationwide 
educational program to familiarize talented actors with WTO rules, and pre-
designed anti-monopoly and anti-money-laundering legislations, all evidence 
China's preparatory works and political precautions. China's institutionalized 
reform has a longer list of international pursuits and domestic ambitions which 
increased its participation in the international legal order and created new 
domestic legal reform targets as a result of its WTO commitments. While it is 
certain that full compliance with WTO norms will improve China's legal system; 
evasion of its WTO responsibilities, intentionally or recklessly, is not entirely 
unlikely given the significant extra obligations China agreed to and the 
experiences of other member states after their accession. In this sense, the chapter 
aims to brief China's WTO commitments on market access and domestic 
adoption of WTO rule of conduct. 
China's integration into the globalized trade system arouses heightened 
complaints on national treatment and fair competition from both foreign and 
domestic enterprises. One charge against the Chinese government is that it 
engages in protectionism, economic nationalism and constrained profits transfer 
in favor of domestic state and private enterprises in order to compete with foreign 
capitalist rivals. On the other hand, perceptions of foreign capital invasion and hot 
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money manipulation have required the Chinese government to cool down 
indigenous anger. For the context of Chinese legal reform, certain areas of legal 
reform may be accelerated and concentrated, but disciplines of the international 
business norms should be prioritized essentially for a healthy economic setting. In 
a political instance, the accession to WTO helps Chinese government remove 
stubborn obstacles on its domestic reform agenda, while it induces other sets of 
unforeseen impediments to deepen a deliberate development regime. 
Focusing on China's fulfillment of and uncertainness associated with WTO 
commitments, this chapter firstly briefs obligations conditioned in the Protocol, 
then summarizes their ramifications on Chinese legal system, in particular, 
foreign trade and investment, constitutional order 5 , domestic governance, 
judicature, WTO dispute practices, and more importantly, the final subchapter 
summarizes impacts that WTO possibly injects into the rule of law reform and 
related profound domestic policy orientations. 
II. Overview of China's WTO Commitments 
The WTO represents a self-regulatory global trading system for promoting 
international trade and breaking down barriers to the trade of goods and services, 
cross-border investments, and controversial intellectual property protection. In 
this sense, two major areas under WTO jurisdiction are market access and 
5 The constitutional function of the world trading system is commonly understood. See generally 
Frider Roessler, The Constitutional function of the multilateral trade order, in Essays on the Legal 
Structure, Functions & Limits of the World Trade Order (London: Cameron May, 2000), at 109-
53. See generally, Ten Benefits of the WTO trading system, http:// www.wto.org (last visited on 
March 15, 2011) 
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international principles of conduct for member countries. Market access is subject 
to negotiation while WTO principles of conduct bear consistency and uniformity 
applicable to all member countries. By periodically reviewing trade policies, the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism is essential to implementing WTO 
jurisdictional guidelines, such as notification requirements, and enforcement of 
binding rulings and trade sanctions to avoid trade wars or retaliations. China as a 
WTO member Country will have to comply with both the market access and 
WTO principles requirements.6 
As discussed earlier, China's commitments in terms of market access are 
unprecedented. In certain sectors the commitments are much more extensive than 
those highly developed countries, 7 and China agreed not to adopt many special 
treatment provisions granted to other developing countries. The depth and scope 
of those commitments enclosed in Protocol are tremendous for China as a 
developing country. In particular, the Protocol subjects all tariffs to unusually low 
statutory rates, and sets up an aggressive agenda for foreign access to sensitive 
service sectors such as telecommunication, banking, natural resources, and 
distribution, etc. This remarkable level oftrade liberalization is further intensified 
by China's accession to special rule obligations - its so called "WTO-plus" and 
"WTO-minus" obligations. 8 In this sense, "WTO-plus" obligations in particular 
6 See generally, Cass, Williams and Barker, China and the World Trading System: Entering the 
New Millennium, Cambridge Press (2003) 
7 See Aadiya Mattoo, China's Accession to the WTO: the Service Dimension, J. of Int'l Econ. L, 
Vol. 6, No.2, (2003), at 299 and 302-04 
8 See generally, Julia Ya Qin, WTO-plus Obligations and Their Implementations for the WTO 
Legal System- An Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol," Journal of World Trade, Vol. 37, 
No. 3 (2003), at 483-533 [hereinafter Qin: WTO-plus Obligations] (Professor Julia Qin from the 
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raise issues about the condition of China's market economy, foreign investment 
and domestic governance, while the "WTO-minus" provisions order 
discriminatory measures against Chinese exports. These "WTO-minus" 
obligations allow an importing member to lower WTO standards in applying trade 
remedies (antidumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard measures) against Chinese 
exported products. Although some "WTO-minus" rules are restrained with phase-
out dates, all "WTO-plus" obligations are permanent.9 
A special transition review mechanism ("TRM") was specially designed to 
monitor China's compliance with its extensive WTO commitments. Under this 
review mechanism, for the first eight years of accession, annual review of China's 
performance is conducted to evaluate China's policy changes and economic 
settings. In addition, at the end of the tenth year of accession, a final review is due 
to summarize China's over-all performance and compliance. No other WTO 
member Country has acceded to such a strict watch by the WTO and international 
community. Furthermore, all the market access and rule obligations are subject to 
compulsory jurisdiction and possibly binding sanction of the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism. 
To summarize, China's undertakings of WTO obligations and principles are 
tremendous and unprecedented. Undoubtedly, these market access and WTO 
principles obligations have powered China's market economy development to 
achieve greater compliance with international standards, yet they have done so at 
Wayne State University Law School is one of the topmost contributors in reviewing the China's 
accession to the WTO and commitments enclosed in the Protocol) 
9 !d. at 496 
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the cost of explicitly discriminatory tenns and unequal treatments. 10 This swift 
liberalization by way of international legal commitments has brought dynamic yet 
astringent changes and reform to China's legal system on the whole, and in a few 
areas of law in particular. 
III. Impact of WTO Accession on the China's Legal System 
WTO's jurisdictional outreach presents many unique challenges to the Chinese 
legal system. An underlying question is whether the WTO agreements are self-
executing, since the Chinese Constitution does not define the legal status and 
applicability of international treaties, nor does it prescribe meaningful procedures 
as to directly adopting compulsory jurisdiction of treaty obligations. 11 Such a 
"muddled account" is not unintentional. One reason is that the accession 
negotiation timeline was too tight for China to calculate a comprehensive system 
of domestic execution of such a large number of obligations enclosed in Protocol. 
Another reason is that top Chinese political leaders, using external forces to 
transfonn the state economy, simply wanted to foster and impinge a consensus 
10 Leftists in CCP specifically characterized the accession to the WTO as the New Eight Power 
Allied Force, which was one of the stigmas in the latest Chinese history; see China Should be a 
Utility Infielder upon Accession to the WTO (Zhongguo Jiaru Shimao Ying Nenggong Shanshou) 
( { Jtl ~ :J.m .A tit~ .fi)z ~I~ ff ~} ), http://www.gdyjzx.gov.cn/xxhw/99.files/wto05/05.htm (last 
visited on March 15, 2011) 
11 See Bing Ling, Is China's Accession to the WTO Legally Valid? (2002), http://bingling.page.tl/. 
Professor Ling of the Chinese University of Hong Kong argues persuasively that the ratification 
procedure was defective - the validity of China's accession, in spite of any procedural defects, 
seems unquestionable as a matter of international law under Articles 45 and 46 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties; although the National People's Congress Standing Committee 
granted a before-the-fact authorization (on August 25, 2000, long before the accession protocol 
had taken its final form and been signed by the Chinese government's representative), not an after-
the-fact ratification; Professor Donald Clarke shares the same concerns, see Donald Clarke, 
China's Legal System and the WTO: Prospects for Compliance 
http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/dclarke/pubs/wto_china.pdf (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
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that all international agreements obligations must be endorsed and implemented 
through domestic legislation. 
3.1. Market Economy 
On a basic level, the "market economy" commitment requires aU parties including 
the Chinese government, state and private sectors, and foreign investors to 
participate market activities equally. For instance, the prices of goods and services 
are result of fair competition and calculated choices. "WTO-plus" obligations to 
China also demand that prior state-controlled import-export business ~ectors must 
open to foreign investors within three years of accession 12, and that SOEs have to 
carry out its own commercial decisions without any administrative and political 
interference. 
These "market economy" related obligations are also of constitutional importance. 
A milestone development in this connection is the fourth amendment to the 1982 
Chinese Constitution which embraces two major symbolic additions: "the State 
respects and preserves human rights" and "citizen's lawful private property is 
inviolable." With strong suspicions, legal scholars and political theorists still 
believe that these constitutional amendments evidence an ideological inclination 
to deepen China's legal reform. One example is the enactment of the Property 
Law in 2007 which details operational guidelines and rules for protecting various 
ownership forms. In this sense, the Property law stipulates the equal status of state 
12 Such overwhelming market access has a few exceptions, especially in those "prohibited 
industries" contained in the Catalog 
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and private property in terms of decision making, corporate governance and 
minority shareholder protection. 13 
Moreover, securing the acknowledgement of the "market economy" designation 
challenges and discomfits the Chinese government and state economy sector. The 
government has to transform from a state regulator and property owner to a 
market participant and an authority constrained by law. This undertaking commits 
the Chinese government itself into a globalized system. The liberation of trading 
rights and state interference of commercial activities are among top complaints 
from other WTO member countries. Therefore, the Chinese government has to 
behave in a "market economy" manner to serve China's membership in the WTO, 
and as a result, to subscribe itself to a multilateral and balanced setting of 
uniformity and fairness. 
3.2. Dispute Settlement and China's WTO capacity building 
The jurisdictional significance of binding decisions and sanction against 
noncompliance of WTO commitments has place the Chinese government under 
an unprecedented external judicial enforcement system. The dispute settlement 
mechanism at the same time calls for China to develop its capacity to participate 
in modem legal order and litigate before international tribunals. The accession has 
immediately prompted governmental and scholarly interest in studying the WTO 
13 See generally, Andrew L. Stoler, Treatment ofChina as a Non-Market Economy: Implications 
for Anti-dumping and Countervailing Measures and Impact on Chinese Company Operations in 
the WTO Framework, presented at the Shanghai WTO Affairs Consultation Center (December 
2003), discussing how the market economy system may influence investment decisions, 
http://www.iit.adelaide.edu.au/docs/Shanghai%20Speech.pdf (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
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system and the domestic ramifications its dispute settlement mechanism. During 
the first few years after the accession, the international community seemed to be 
flexible and patient waiting for China to honor its commitments, however, due to 
rapidly growing trade deficits with China, partners like the U.S. and EU have 
more aggressively used the WTO judicial framework to influence China. 
Since the US filed the first WTO case in 2004 against China regarding the 
exemption of VAT rebates for domestically produced semiconductor products, as 
of June 2010, five countries- US, EU, Canada, Guatemala and Mexico- have 
initiated 18 complaints against China, 11 of which were filed by joint 
complainants. The growing number of complaints filed against China has mostly 
resulted from the trade deficits western countries have with China and the 
beginning of China's commitments in the services sector at the end 2006. 
Moreover, internal politics and financial crises in 2008 intensified the pressure 
faced by US and EU to initiate actions against China. 
China has not, by any means, been exclusively a respondent before the WTO 
dispute settlement board. Since China filed its first WTO complaint in 2007, 
China has initiated seven complaints, all of which were against the US and EU. 
These complaints brought to the WTO mostly concerned the designation of non-
market economy treatment of anti-dumping and safeguard regulations that China 
resented. In addition, China, as a co-complainant, has joined other member 
countries in filing 67 cases as a third party. All these litigation efforts evidence 
that China is gradually withdrawing its passive mindset by participating 
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international disputes and inserting its own role with singular voice. However, 
China has been very diplomatic in resolving trade crises with its trading 
partners, 14 and has taken meaningful steps in cooperation with domestic 
enterprises in resolving disputes before cases are brought up against China in 
formal procedure since the settlement process is resource intensive and time 
consuming. 15 
Overall, the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO has helped China in 
honoring its commitments by privileging its trading partners with opportunities to 
challenge the incomplete implementation of commitments. It also arms China to 
safeguard its exports to sustain economic development and to avoid harmful 
invasion of foreign trade routines over Chinese domestic enterprises. China has 
implemented WTO education campaigns to promote anticipation of possible 
WTO related disputes on the local and regional level. Given China's growing 
experience as a complainant, third-party complainant and respondent in WTO 
disputes, it is meaningful to theorize about the more assertive roles China may 
play in defending its economic and political interests before the WTO. 16 
14 See Julia Ya Qin, The Impact of WTO Accession on the Chinese Legal System: Trade, 
Investment and Beyond 189 The China Quarterly (Special Issue, September 2007) (Cambridge 
University Press) at 739, http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/cf_ dev/ AbsBy Auth.cfm?per _id=625173 (last 
visited on March 15, 2011) 
15 See Pasha L. Hsieh, China's Development on International Economic Law and WTO Legal 
Capacity Building, l3 J. lnt'l Econ. L. 997, [hereinafter Hsieh, China's WTO Capacity Building] 
at 1010 
16 Id., at 1017, discussing that China's passive mindset has been slightly changed to take a more 
assertive role in defending its interests 
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3.3. Foreign Investment Law 
WTO accession has brought tremendous expansion of FDI of all sources and 
contributed unprecedented increase of foreign trade surplus to China. 17 Since 
WTO accession, China's foreign trade has increased about three times which 
nearly two thirds were derived from imports and exports by foreign invested 
enterprises (PIEs). 18 China's market access commitments in service sectors, 
preferential treatment of foreign capital and administrative efficiency 
improvement all foster foreign investment flows into China. However, ten years 
after China's accession, there has been a trend of tightened government 
interference and control, beginning after the "accession honeymoon," as discussed 
below. 
3.3.1. National Treatment 
WTO accession gives China a quite different set of requirements for national 
treatment, some of which are "WTO-plus" obligations beyond the scope of WTO 
national treatment provisions. In particular, the national treatment rules in the 
Protocol demand that China give foreign investors market access in the services 
sector, the right to engage in the import-export business, and favorable conditions 
concerning foreign investors' operations and production. These favorable 
17 See generally in Qin: Impact ofWTO Accession, supra 14 at 735-738, from which this sentence 
is mostly drawn 
18 See infra Chapter I for data analysis 
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conditions have powered a huge influx of foreign investment entering into various 
fi ld 
. . . 19 1e s of the Chmese economy smce accessiOn. 
Ironically, compliance with the national treatment provisions has created an 
interesting battle initiated by Chinese domestic enterprises claiming their rights 
and market status are too disadvantaged and engulfed thus losing their reasonable 
share in the market. According to national treatment and most favored nation 
provisions, China is directed only to provide foreign interests "no less favorable" 
treatment than those offered to domestic interests. This requirement, however, 
does not substantiate Chinese public misunderstanding of national treatment that 
foreign interests must be taken care with preferential treatment. 
The complaint from Chinese domestic interests is not surprising, especially given 
that China, during the twenty years prior to accession, adopted remarkably 
different policies towards foreign and domestic, and state-owned and private 
enterprises.2° Foreign and state-owned enterprises are too privileged in terms of 
income tax rate, resource allocation, and operational assistance, and there have 
been public calls to remove foreign preferential policies and to create a fair 
competition environment for all enterprises, especially private enterprises. 21 The 
promulgation of the new Enterprise Income Tax Law passed in 2007 presents an 
19 See Qin supra 8 at 492-96, discussing the details ofWTO-plus obligations that China has agreed 
to take. This thesis benefits from Professor Qin's analysis on understanding of WTO's impact on 
China's legal reform, especially as to SOEs subsidies and detailed documentations of China's 
WTO accession 
20 !d., at 490 
21 See Qin supra 14 at 740-741 
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example of such efforts at unifying different policies toward foreign and domestic 
enterprises. 
3.3.2. Tightened Control Associated with Protectionism 
WTO accession commitments on market access to a broader scope of industries, 
removal of trade barriers and reduction of tariffs to a low level have created other 
issues commonly associated with fair competition between foreign and domestic 
enterprises in China. Following the WTO accession, foreign investors 
increasingly steered their investment towards acquiring local Chinese companies. 
An increasing number of mergers and acquisitions conducted by foreign 
companies heightened China's government's and general public's concerns that 
its industries might be dominated, or even controlled, by foreign companies. At 
the same time, there has been an intensified aversion grown among China's 
domestic enterprises that foreign investors have benefitted from too many 
preferential policies for the past three decades, and that now they are cornered 
into very disadvantaged positions in the market. All those worries arose when 
many local name-brands were acquired by foreign interests, and some of those 
acquisitions were completed at considerably discounted prices. Domestic 
enterprises complain that such foreign investment inappropriately seized valuable 
state owned assets and transferred profits overseas without providing promised 
technology transfers and human capital development. These domestic interests 
blame the shortsightedness of government policy in allowing these foreign 
acquisitions. 
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Cautiously, Chinese government adopted a few regulations and guidelines to 
circumvent mergers and acquisitions by foreign investments in sensitive sectors. 
For this instance, MOFCOM may investigate and deny22 the foreign acquisition of 
domestic enterprises after national security review. Furthermore, responding to 
concerns on protecting domestic enterprises from "foreign capital invasion," the 
Chinese government has accelerated the promulgation of China's first Anti-
Monopoly Law passed in March 2007 (together with the Unified Enterprise 
Income Tax Law), which induces arrears from foreign investors of being targeted 
as monopoly practice. Moreover, with China's attraction on foreign investment, 
Chinese government has upgraded its national strategy focusing on the quality 
rather than quantity of foreign investment23, and diverting more attention to high-
end, technology-based, research-orientated and environmentally friendly foreign 
investments. 24 
It might be over assertive to claim Chinese government's tightened supervision on 
mergers and acquisitions evidence nationalism against foreign investment. There 
are still overwhelming needs for foreign capital in the hinterlands of China25 • 
China's economic scale, pressure on appreciation of Chinese currency, shortage 
of measure to watch capital mobility, and so forth, are legitimate arrows in 
China's quiver of responses to charges of nationalism or protectionism. Given the 
pressure on China's government to push back against market access, WTO 
22 
See Guanyu Waiguo Touzizhe Binggou Jingnei Qiye de Guiding [Provisions on Mergers and 
Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprise by Foreign Investors], jointly issued by MOFCOM and five 
other state ministries, effective as of September 6, 2006 
23 See Liyong Waizi "Shiyiwu" Guihua [The 1 th Five- Year Plan for Utilizing Foreign Investment], 
issued by the National Development and Reform Commission of the P.R.C, November 2006 
24 !d. 
25 As evidenced by Chong Qing Liangjiang and Tian Jin TEDA SEZs 
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commitments of market access to various industries remain an important source 
of monitoring, and incentive to China's compliance and reform progress. 
3.3.3. Eliminating Performance Requirements 
China has adopted unprecedented commitments on eliminating performance 
requirements. Under the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures 
(TRIMs), China must eliminate certain performance requirements or supervisory 
measures against foreign investments. Those performance requirements usually 
include foreign exchange controls, export performance controls, and import 
substitution, all of which restrict free trade and limit capital mobility. Further, 
China agreed in the Protocol not to condition foreign investment on "performance 
requirements of any kind," including "the transfer of technology" and "the 
conduct of research and development in China," going significantly over and 
above the TRIMs requirements?6 
To honor these remarkable commitments, the Chinese government has abolished, 
revised and promulgated various foreign investment related laws and 
regulations. 27 One vivid example is that previous compulsory requirement on 
technology transfer is removed from approval of foreign investment planning and 
operation except with regard to certain prohibited and restricted technologies 
prescribed. However, the Chinese government maintains a cautious strategy by 
gradually eliminating certain performance requirements for specific industries. 
For example, all tax benefits and other incentives offered to foreign enterprises 
26 See Qin supra 14 at 732-33 
27 See Potter, supra 1 at 597-598 
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were upheld until 2010, and in 2007 the Environmental Protection Administration 
required foreign investments in chemical products and petroleum drilling to be 
environmentally friendly and supported by sound research and development 
controls. 
3.3.4. Entry Restriction 
It is worth emphasizing that China made extensive market access commitments in 
services. According to the national treatment principle and the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), once a member country pledges 
commitments in a particular service sector, it will have to guarantee national 
treatment to all foreign investments, subject only to negotiated service schedules 
based on GATS. After WTO accession, the Chinese government has substantially 
revised the Industry Guidance Catalogue for Foreign Investment (the Catalogue), 
which outlines specific requirements and the scope of industries in which foreign 
enterprises may invest. According to the latest 2007 Catalogue effective as of 
December I, 2007, the number of encouraged industries increases to 351 from 
257 in the 2004 Catalogue, aiming to control resources exploitation, lower energy 
consumption and upgrade industries and monitor real estate investment. For the 
other three industry categories, i.e. permitted, restricted and prohibited categories, 
the adjustments were designed to convert more permitted category industries to 
encouraged category industries, and ease the barrier between restricted and 
permitted categories. For example, in September 201 0, Chinese government 
solicited revision proposals from foreign investors to further its endeavors to open 
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as many industries as possible while balancing its hinterland development 
policies?8 
As per the Protocol, China has agreed to open nine out of twelve service sectors 
according to GATS provisions. The market access commitments cover crucial 
areas such as distribution, construction, transportation, banking and 
telecommunications. One important aspect of China's implementation of its 
commitments is the opening of the banking service sector - foreign banks can 
now operate fully in Chinese territory without any geographical, client base and 
ownership strings. This is remarkable given the tight controls imposed on the 
banking sector by Chinese government since 1979?9 However, the future of this 
bold policy is unclear especially when all four major state-owned commercial 
banks have completed their public offerings in overseas stock markets. 
3.4. Trade Law Regime 
China's foreign trade law regime has been overhauled and liberalized after WTO 
accession. Important legislation concerning foreign trade such as the Foreign 
Trade Law (2004), the Custom Law (2001), trade remedy regulations, 30 
intellectual property protection, administrative procedures and rules, has been 
reviewed, evaluated and revised to make the foreign trade sector WTO-
28 See generally, Waishang Touzi Chanye Zhidao Mulu [Industry Guidance Catalogue for Foreign 
Investment (2007)] GH{ijt9:1JfF.illL:J=§~ § ~(2007 if-{~iT)} , released by MOFCOM effective 
as of October 31, 2007, http://www.hb.xinhuanet.com/zhuanti/2008-04/1 O/content_12931826.htm 
(last visited on March 15, 2011) 
29 See generally, Peng Yuanyuan, The Challenges of WTO Entry to China's Banking Industry, 
http://faculty. washington.edulkaryiulconferlbeijing06/papers/peng.pdf (last visited on March 15, 
2011) 
30 See Qin supra 14 at 727 
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compliant. 31 In addition, the Chinese government has liberalized control over 
importation by substantially reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers and opening 
broader service sectors. As discussed above, although protectionism may arise in 
the course of trade regime liberalization, China's foreign trade regime, as a 
system, is institutionally capable of ensuring compliance with accession 
commitments and WTO principles. 
China has been rigorously compliant with its commitments to lower its tariffs to 
statutory binding rates and remove non-tariff barriers such as quotas and licenses 
to attainably minimum level. State trading especially state procurement through 
commercial means should be transparent and the scope of state trading is subject 
to review by MOFCOM. Notification requirements by WTO also demands timely 
updates of any adjustments or changes made to the list of state trading in the 
Protocol. 
China has been aggressive in responding to charges on trade remedies initiated by 
other member countries. 32 For example, China has implemented revised anti-
dumping and anti-subsidy measures and a new safeguard regulation, promulgated 
in 200 1, all of which follow the WTO standards but lack certain operational 
details. The key reason is that the U.S., EU, and certain other countries designate 
China as a non-market economy, and such designation allows those countries to 
abuse anti-dumping measures against Chinese producers or imported products 
31 See generally, TPR Report, Appendix, Table A.Il.2. For updates and changes of China's trade 
regulations, visit MOFCOM official website http://www.mofcom.gov.cn. (last visited on March 
15, 2011) 
32 See Hsieh supra 15 at 1030-31 and Table A1, summarizing that China became the third largest 
antidumping user after India and the United States according to the WTO Anti-dumping Statistics 
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from China. It is likely true that some anti-dumping measures imposed on China 
were purely a product of internal political interests rather than in the spirit of 
promoting free trade. Moreover, the Protocol stipulates that designation of China 
as a non-market economy may persist until December 2016 for anti-dumping 
purposes, and permanently for anti-subsidy purposes. The Protocol further 
permits an importing member Country to categorize China separately for 
safeguard measures. All these discriminatory measures have aroused China's 
export practices especially after China has realized lowering tariffs and removal 
of non-tariff barriers. 
Another branch of laws affected by WTO accession is foreign trade laws and 
regulations. For example, China, in 2004, replaced a ten-year old foreign trade 
law with a WTO compliant one. The new Foreign Trade Law switches the pre-
WTO approval system to a registration system removing tedious procedures for 
most forms of foreign investment by agreeing to issue registration within five 
days if stipulated procedures are followed. As to technical standards applicable to 
specific areas of economic sectors, such as those in healthcare, chemical and 
technology fields, China has revised most relevant laws to assure a legitimate 
objective and impartial and non-discriminatory implementation. However, since 
many industries fall into restrict or prohibited categories of the Catalogue, China 
has gradually taken more cautious procedures and tightened import and export 
controls in safeguarding technical interests of domestic enterprises. One example 
is that in 2007, China promulgated new rules regarding importation of certain 
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metalwork scrape such as copper and lead, for which traders from the US and EU 
submitted their complaints to local import authorities and customs.33 
Last but not least, the foreign trade regime gives great attention to the protection 
of intellectual property according to requirements of Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Inadequate protections for intellectual 
property has been a complaint in China for many years due to the rampant 
violation of IP rights and China's weak enforcement against infringers. TRIPS 
designs a wide-ranging set of detailed regulations for its member countries to take 
action, including a comprehensive list of minimum requirements for civil, 
criminal and administrative procedures and undertaking to be inserted into the 
domestic legal system. Without a doubt, China has made great efforts and 
achieved quite remarkable circumvention against IP rights violations. However, 
China's IP rights protection remains one of the most troubling factors for foreign 
investors in carrying out commercial activities and in refraining Chinese domestic 
competitors from reverse engineering or "fortifying" (shanzhai W *) their 
innovations and products. 
The Chinese government, in this regard, has made amendments to almost all laws 
and regulations concerning IP, including but not limited to, crimes of IP violation 
in the Criminal Code (1997), the Trademark Law (2001), the Copyright Law 
(200 1 ), computer software protection measures (200 1 ), lay-out designs of 
33 See generally Qin supra 14, providing a summary of major foreign trade related laws and 
regulations since China's WTO accession 
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integrated circuits protection regulations (200 1 ), and the Patent Law (2000). 34 
Overall, China has been fundamentally WTO-compliant in IP rights protection 
although its efforts are still a cause for grumbles by trade partners who find them 
incomplete and ineffective. The US's opinion to this extent resulted in an official 
complaint filed with the WTO in April2007. 35 
3.5. WTO's Normative Impacts 
WTO accession not only brings specific legislative revisions in an "instrumental" 
sense in almost all major areas of economic arena, but it also sets out significant 
normative challenges to the Chinese legislative and institutional systems. China 
has gradually accepted the basic values and obligations of WTO membership, 
such as transparency, uniformity and impartiality and judicial review and 
incorporated them into the legal system, in which the tax law reform is embedded. 
There has been remarkable progress made in terms of introducing WTO related 
commitments to academic debates and public awareness. WTO principles have 
stepped into the daily lives of Chinese people in commercial and political settings. 
Chinese scholars have also given support to WTO principles of promoting and 
enforcing constitutionally significant ideas such as property rights, as the 
34 See generally, Omario Kanji, Paper Dragon: Inadequate Protection of Intellectual Property 
Rights in China, 27 Mich. J. lnt'l L. 1261, 1270 {2006); Aaron Schwabach, Intellectual Property 
Piracy: Perception and Reality in China, the United States, and Elsewhere, 2 J. Int'l Media & Ent. 
L. 65 (2008); Joseph A. Massey, The Emperor is Far Away: China's Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights Protection 1986-2006, 7 Chi. J. lnt'l L. 231, 235 (2006); Donald Harris, The 
Honeymoon is Over: The US-China WTO Intellectual Property Compliant, 32 Fordham lnt'l L.J. 
96 
35 See generally, WTO: China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights, DS 362 (April 16, 2007), charging that China's criminal law does not provide 
appropriate criminal punishments for IP violtions, and the denial of copyright protection under the 
censorship review is not compliant with TRIPS 
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foundations of a market economy. 36 Such discussion was largely inconceivable 
before accession. The normative implications of WTO accession for the Chinese 
legal system are thus political, philosophical and institutional. 
3.5.1.Transparency 
The transparency commitment in China's Protocol is a quite comprehensive rule 
of law requirement. The concept of transparency is central to the WTO 
agreements as well as to the construction of the rule of law. According to GATT 
Article X, GATS Article III37 and TRIPS Article 63, laws, regulations, judicial 
decisions and administrative decisions in connection with trade of a member 
country should be made public before their implementation and enforcement, and 
any change in such laws should be notified to the WTO. In the Protocol, China 
has agreed to undertake extra transparency obligations that are stricter than 
regular transparency requirements. Admittedly, public disclosure and the 
availability of legal decisions promote the rationality as well as the legitimacy of 
the rule of law.38 It is also important in order for citizens and foreign investors to 
36 See generally, Frieder Roessler, Diverging Domestic Policies and Multilateral Trade 
Integration, in Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade? Vol. 2: Legal 
Analysis 22-27 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996), Roessler is an ex-GATT Legal 
Advisor (United States--Measures on Alcoholic and Malt Beverages and United States--Taxes on 
Automobiles cases) 
37 !d. Roessler wrote that the central issue considered by dispute settlement panels in determining 
whether two products are "like products" for purposes of Article lli "is whether the product 
categories under which they fall have been distinguished with the intent and effect of affording 
protection." see also, Frieder Roessler, Should Principles of Competition Policy be Incorporated 
into WTO Law Through Non-Violation Complaints?, 2 J. lnt'l Econ. L. 413,421 (1999). 
38 See Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law 33-94 (rev.ed.1969) at 49-51 and 79-81, discussing the 
need for "promulgation" and "constancy of law through time" 
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be informed of the "rules of the game" and to enable investors to get reliable 
advice.39 
Although the definition and scope of "transparency" is subject to debate, the 
Protocol provides clear and operational guidelines on the "transparency" 
• J:'. Ch' 4o reqmrement 10r ma : 
1) China shall make public all relevant laws, regulations and other measures 
before they are implemented or enforced; China will only enforce those 
laws that are published and made readily available to other WTO members, 
individuals and enterprises; 
2) China shall establish or designate an official journal dedicated to the 
publication of all relevant laws which should be made readily available to 
the public; 
3) After publication of laws in such a journal, China shall provide a 
reasonable period for comments to be made to the appropriate authorities 
before such measures are implemented; 
4) China shall establish or designate an entry point where the published laws 
can be obtained and requests from the public can be replied to in an 
authoritative way. 
39 See generally, James Zimmerman, China Law Deskbook: A Llegal Guide for Foreign-Invested 
Enterprises (2004); see also Donald Clarke, Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: The 
Enforcement of Civil Judgment, 10 Col urn. J. Asia L. 1 (1996) at 82, discussing various factors 
that drive judicial decisions without robust basis of statute, regulation, or even policy. 
40 See Protocol, supra 2 Part I. para. 2. (c) on details of transparency requirements 
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Features of "transparency" include fair notice and hearing provisions, public 
promulgation of legislation, and the availability of the legal information necessary 
to meet reasonable expectations for a person to find out what the law is and to 
behave in accordance with it. 41 Foreign investors continually complain of the 
unfairness of being plagued by inaccessible internal or unpublished regulations 
(neibu guizang P3 $;};J\l~), which discourage investment and trouble business 
operations. Moreover, many ministerial rulings and regulations, internal or public, 
are hard to track and record when issued given their ad hoc nature. Following 
China's commitment to transparency, most trade-related legislation is classified 
and edited by a central publishing authority, i.e., the MOFCOM. However, some 
local regulations are still hard for investors and courts to locate and rely upon, in 
spite of the fact that the issuing authorities give those regulations binding force. In 
addition to certain encouraging progress on transparency made since accession, 
such as the publication of "Gazette of the MOFTEC of the PRC," annual 
publication of collections of new law, and electronic databases of administrative 
laws and regulations available to the public, the Chinese government has 
promulgated a series of laws and regulations to facilitate implementation of the 
transparency requirement, such as the Legislation Law's (2000) requirement of 
appropriate forms of public hearing and comments collection, and the Law on 
Administrative Permission's (2003) prohibition of using unpublished documents 
as a basis for denying or granting administrative licenses. 
41 See Fuller, supra 38 at 63-65 and 81-91, discussing the clarity of laws and congruence between 
official action and declared rules 
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In summary, China's implementation of the transparency requirement is 
remarkable but incomplete given the large number of laws and regulations 
promulgated every year and complex details of local procedural filing. 
Transparency concerns still trouble foreign investors in making commercial and 
operational decisions. However, observers should have an optimistic perspective 
regarding the prospect of further improvements to transparency in legislation, 
administration and procedural compliance. 
3.5.2. Uniform and Impartial Administration of Laws 
China agreed in the Protocol to apply and administer all WTO-related laws, 
regulations, and other measures in a "uniform, impartial and reasonable 
manner." 42 Actually, the major legal challenges confronting China's WTO 
accession lie in its application and enforcement of the law (#1.1-J jJ Jl'), 43 which 
presumes the existence of enforcement institutions with clear lines of authority 
and the capacity to render neutral decisions according to the law.44 The Protocol 
seeks to apply WTO agreements to the entire territory of the PRC, including all 
the areas in the complex political map such as border trade regions, minority 
autonomous areas and various special economic and development zones, among 
others. The Protocol further demands the administration "in a uniform, impartial 
and reasonable manner" at both central and sub-national levels with a reporting 
42 
See Protocol, supra 2, Part I, para. 2. (a); 
43 Id., Part I, para.2(a)-2 
44 Id. 
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system where noncompliance of this requirement in trade regime is brought to 
attention.45 
In reality, compliance with the uniform administration commitment mostly 
depends on the political determination of central and local governments to 
implement it. Therefore, it is premature to evaluate and examine to which extent 
the uniform administration is carried out on the local level, in that China today is 
plagued by distorted local protectionism and the failures of its decentralization 
strategy. The Chinese central government should stress the importance ofuniform 
administration to local governments, since WTO agreements permit a petitioner 
country to submit complaints on breaches of uniformity and impartiality 
requirements at a local level. 
3.6. Judicial Review46 
An independent, effective and true judicial authority is essential to compliance 
with China's WTO commitments. The Protocol mandates the establishment of 
tribunal, contact points and procedures for the prompt review of all administrative 
actions relating to the implementation of the laws, regulations, judicial decisions, 
and administrative rulings of general application referred to in the WTO rules. 
Meanwhile, the tribunals must be independent of administrative organs and thus 
are required to be "impartial and independent of the agency entrusted with 
administrative enforcement and shall not have any substantial interest in the 
45 Jd. 
46 
See Article X, 3(b) of GATT, stipulating that member countries should establish a judicial 
review infrastructure 
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outcome of the matter." 47 The tribunals may be administrative or judicial, 
however, right to appeal must be granted if the case is originally submitted for an 
administrative review following due process. 
Effective judicial review is comprised of four essential pillars: a capable court 
system, a group of judges with reliability and proficiency, judicial review 
empowered by law, and full judicial independence48• Although China's judicial 
system has been subjected to significant criticism with regard to its independence 
and competency, positive trends suggest that the situation is gradually improving. 
In addition to the Legislation Law (2000), and the Law on Administrative 
Permissions (2003), the Supreme People's Court of China issued three judicial 
interpretations to detail the scope and standards for judicial review of WTO-
related cases, for example, the SPC authorizes courts at the intennediate or higher 
level to take the initial review of international cases to ensure impartial and 
uniform judgment and avoid unexpected external influence on judgments. 
Overall, it is not realistic to expect China to set up a judicial review system 
similar to the western or American routines, however, the judicial review 
requirements under WTO agreements give a strong push to modernize China's 
judicial system to ensure impartiality and unifonnity in administration, and to 
foster judicial independence and the quality of its judges. It also subjects the 
government to a limited scope of judicial review if possible to avoid 
administrative discretion. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect the judicial-review-
47 
See Protocol, supra 2 Part I, para. 2(d) 
48 !d. 
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related reforms will be embraced, especially in areas such as tax law, as a means 
to perfect the functioning of the legal system. 
IV. The Impact of WTO Accession on Rule of Law Development in China 
WTO accession has brought comprehensive changes to the political, economic, 
legal and international settings for the ongoing development of the rule of law in 
China. As summarized above in this chapter, WTO accession politically is viewed 
as a forceful external incentive to implement and promote domestic institutional 
reform and shut down opposition to reform. Substantive characteristics of rule of 
law, such as transparency, uniformity, impartiality, judicial review and procedural 
justice, which once were hard to implement due to ideological barriers, have been 
forcibly incorporated into Chinese legal reform through the adoption and strict 
implementation of similar WTO principles. Moreover, China has made 
remarkable progress in institutional reforms to comply with its WTO 
commitments- it has abolished, revised and promulgated almost 3,000 national 
and local laws and regulations. Normatively, WTO accession has promoted the 
rule of law awareness and fostered education on WTO principles and rules. Any 
conscious commentator would acknowledge the influential impacts on the rule of 
law development in China encouraged by the WTO and its dispute settlement 
mechanism. 
Moreover, WTO accession has strengthened China's efforts in promoting judicial 
independence, even over and above its Protocol commitments, advancing judicial 
review of administrative discretion on both national and local levels. Promising 
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signs such as using case as precedent and rigorous pursuit to safeguard national 
interests through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism also boost China's 
favorable implementation of national treatment and most favored national 
principles. Another significant lesson learnt from China's role and participation in 
WTO capacity building is China's gradual adoption of traditional rule of law 
requirements such as due process, predictability, and the supremacy of law in 
governance. 
The impacts of WTO accession on the rule of law development in China, however 
debated, have been profound. The force of WTO principles and rules is sharp and 
straightforward in conforming China to both instrumental and substantive 
conceptions of the rule of law: legal institutions, transparency, uniformity, 
impartiality, judicial independence, limited government, and a culture seasoned 
with "common law" routines of case precedent and judicial review. Although 
such impacts should not be exaggerated or over-romanticized, it is meaningful to 
incorporate these positive implications into studies of specific sectors of Chinese 
legal reform. This thesis will do so in developing a practical and suggestive rule 




WTO and China's Tax Law Reform-Tax Legislation Reform 
I. Introduction 
As one of the newest members of the WTO, China is unique in a number of 
aspects as the largest developing economy and communist regime. The 
accession to the WTO marks China's commitment to further opening up to the 
globalized regime and its priority of embracing a market economy as a more 
dynamic economic growth engine. This aspiration was evident in the global 
financial crisis of 2008. The trajectory of China's economic development in 
the past three decades has shown its WTO accession as to be profound 
influencing its rule of law development and judicial reform with remarkable 
progresses. 1 
Literature regarding the implications of WTO accession for China's economic 
and legal reform is voluminous, 2 but opinions vary widely across the 
1 See generally , MOFTEC China International Trade White Paper, released on August 31, 
2000 
2 See Cass, Williams and Barker, China and the World Trading System: Entering the New 
Millennium, Cambridge Press (2003); Aadiya Mattoo, China's Accession to the WTO: the 
Service Dimension, J. oflnt'I Econ. L, Vol. 6, No. 2, (2003), at 299-339 and 302-04; Julia Ya 
Qin, WTO-plus Obligations and Their Implementations for the WTO Legal System - An 
Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol," Journal of World Trade, Vol. 37, No. 3 (2003), at 
483-533; China Under Hu Jintao, Opportunities, Dangers and Dilemma, 97-134 (Cheng, 
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literature. Some discussions fantasize that the WTO's influence will result in a 
complete overhaul of the Chinese legal system to conform to a rule of law 
construct or western ideals of multi-party democracy. Some are more 
instrumentally oriented, focusing on changes of finely textured details m 
specific areas of law such as transplanting banking regulations or 
environmental protection measures. The same mixed discourse applies to 
China's tax laws. Moreover, the traditional distinction between trade law and 
tax law is vague under multilateral trading agreements such as the WTO or 
NAFT A. Meanwhile, China's tax legislation is administrative in nature -the 
line between tax administration or tax legislation is somewhat blurred in 
China. This chapter submits that the Chinese tax law reform embodies the 
WTO principles in a visible but constrained manner, however the normative 
value of those WTO is applicable to China's tax reforms as well - it richly 
applies to China's tax legislation, which is embedded in its tax administration. 
Two points should be made about the Chinese tax legislation framework. First, 
starting from the pre-WTO massive regulatory clean-up, tax legislation reform 
was focused in trade related areas, such as lowering tariffs or non-tariff 
barriers, turnover tax reformulation, income tax compliance updates, and 
transplantation of international tax practices. Without doubt, this aspect of tax 
legislation is popular for scholars concentrating on WTO or trade related 
areas. Although certain tax legislation updates have proven not to be ideal and 
have been subject to frequent change, tax laws generally remain stable and 
enforceable. Second, modem tax policies should be adopted in a more vibrant 
deLisle and Brown, ed., World Scientific, 2006); Cai Dingjian & Wang Chenguang, China's 
Journal Toward the Rule of Law (Koninklijk Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands, and Social 
Sciences Academic Pres, Beijing, 2010) [hereinafter "Cai and Wang"] at 439-495 
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way. For example, advanced pricing agreements for curbing tax evasion 
should be employed or actual enterprise tax payment should be lowered. It is 
without merit or political substantiation to take cautious steps in transplanting 
modem tax conceptions. However, experimental trials in appropriate localities 
or industry lines are a more reasonable means of honing these transplants. 
Given China's marvelous expansion in revenue collection over the past three 
decades, the time is ripe to introduce reform measures on certain types of 
taxes. 3 Another dissonance in tax legislation is the irregular orientation of tax 
administrative documents. Some scholars argue that tax administrative rulings, 
notices or directives are true "legislation,"4 however, the administrative nature 
of China's tax system and centralization efforts somewhat validate the 
enforcement of tax legislation given China's nascent tax judicature system. 
This chapter discusses the tax legislation sector, which is intertwined with tax 
administration. Subchapter II reviews the impacts of the accession to WTO on 
the tax system in general, its principles and the dispute settlement procedures 
associated with tax law areas. Subchapter III discusses the tax legislation 
updates since China's accession to the WTO, including enterprise income tax, 
individual income tax and turnover tax. Subchapter IV summarizes tax 
legislation from the perspectives of administration and compliance. 
China's dual status as the largest developing country with an inheritance of 
centralized economy and communist sovereign underlies commentators' 
worries about China's market economy orientation. This dualism partially 
explains China's acceptance of supervisory and adjudicative oversight from 
3 See Warrick Smith, World Development Report 2005: A Better Investment Climate for 
Everyone, World Bank at 95-171, discussing potential new tax legislations in China 
4 See generally, Perry Keller, Sources of Order in Chinese Law, Am. J. ofComp. L. 42:4,711-
759 (1994) 
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the WTO by acceding to WTO-plus obligations. Taking WTO's demands into 
account, in many aspects, the tax laws system manifests extraordinary 
concessions in terms of intensifying legislative updates, improving 
administrative efficiency, reforming compliance practice, localizing 
international norms, and removing trade barriers. 
II. Overview of WTO Principles Affecting the Tax Laws 
System 
The WTO institutionalizes a unified structure for international trade, and the 
significance thereof is renowned and profound. 5 The WTO agreements is an 
umbrella agreement with four annexes and a series of agreements6 including 
the GAIT and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 7 and 
covenants which contain the substantive obligations of member countries. 
Two important principles are dominant in the WTO agreements: the non-
discrimination principle and the principle against trading subsidies, in 
particular, the following rules are usually considered as primarily affecting the 
domestic tax policies ofWTO member countries. 
5 See John Jackson, Preface, in Cass supra 2, at 16-18 
6 For an introduction and overview of the WTO framework and international trade regime, see 
generally, Michael Trebilcock, Robert Howse, and Antonia Eliason, The Regulation of 
International Trade, (Routledge; 2"d Ed., 1999) 
7 See GATT, Article I, para. I, the Most-Favored-Nation Treatment reads as "with respect to 
customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or 
exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and 
with respect to the method oflevying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and 
formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters 
referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity 
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other 
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in 
or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties" 
http://www. wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt4 7 _ 0 I_ e.htm (last visited on March 15, 20 II) 
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The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Annex IA) 
incorporated the rules of the GATT 194 7. Mostly, these rules cover 
customs duties and procedures, and, to a narrower extent, to indirect 
taxes. The objective of the GATT is to liberalize trade within WTO 
member countries by non-discrimination principle and the reduction of 
barriers. 
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM 
Agreement) is one of the 12 agreements that further detail or clarify the 
GATT 1994. In particular, the SCM Agreement elaborates the 
obligations of member countries associated with subsidies and designs 
a comprehensive code regarding the application of countervailing 
duties. 
The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes, which is also known as the "Dispute Settlement 
Understanding" (DSU), sets forth the procedural requirements for 
dispute resolution under the WTO and establishes the Dispute 
Settlement Body to administer the procedures. 
2.1.The non-discrimination Principle 
The non-discrimination principle consists of two specific rules: the most-
favored-national (MFN) and national treatment principles. Under the MFN 
principle, in particular, products and services provided by member countries 
must be treated alike. 8 Under the national treatment principle, once import 
8 /d., GATT, Article III, National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation 
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duties have been paid, imported goods and services must be treated no less 
favorably than domestic products and services.9 
The national treatment principle demands that member countries not impose 
internal taxes or adopt other measures to protect domestic production. IO 
Obviously, this principle principally affects indirect taxes including excise 
taxes, VAT, and sales taxes imposed on imported goods. These types of taxes 
may not exceed those imposed on similar domestic products or be applied in a 
protective manner to domestic production. 
2.2.Principle against Export Subsidies 
Subsidies have been debated for a long time as a trade issue where they enable 
domestic producers to compete unfairly in international (foreign) markets. For 
example, export subsidies have been distorted in many ways especially for 
agricultural products. Article XVI of the GATT 1994 forbids export subsidies 
other than those for primary products and provides for consultations if such 
subsidies are applied by seriously damaging the interests of other member 
countries. II 
The SCM Agreement, on the other hand, stipulates explicit rules and 
guidelines on subsidies. The SCM Article 1 defines "subsidy" as a "financial 
contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a 
member ... whereby ... government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or 
9 !d., GATT, Arts. Il.l and III.2 
10 !d., GATT Article XVI, Subsidies 
11 See SCM Article 1, Definition of A Subsidy 
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not collected ... and a benefit is thereby conferred."12 Therefore, tax reductions, 
exemptions and refunds are clearly "subsides" according to the SCM 
Agreement. 13 Furthermore, the SCM Agreement classifies subsidies as 
prohibited subsidies, actionable subsidies, and non-actionable subsidies. 
Specifically: 
- Article3.1 of the SCM Agreement provides that, with the exception of 
agricultural products, prohibited subsidies are "(a) subsidies contingent, in 
law or in fact, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon 
export performance; (b) subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of 
several other conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported goods." 
A prohibited subsidy must be specific. Article 2 of the SCM Agreement 
defines that a subsidy is specific to an enterprise or a group of enterprises 
or industries if access to it is limited to certain enterprises or to certain 
enterprises within a designated geographical region; 
- Actionable subsidies are those that cause injury to the domestic industry 
of another member country, nullify or impair the benefits of the GATT 
1994, or cause serious prejudice to the interests of another member country; 
and 
- Subsidies are non-actionable if they are given for certain purposes that 
are recognized as legitimate, such as regional aid, environmental 
protection, or (within certain limits) the promotion of research and 
development. 14 
12 See Illustrative (e), SCM Annex I, Illustrative List of Export Subsidies "The full or partial 
exemption remission, or deferral specifically related to exports, of direct taxes or social 
welfare charges paid or payable by industrial or commercial enterprises" 
13 See generally, Yariv Brauner, USA Report, in The WTO and Direct Taxation (Michael Lang, 
ed.), Kluwer Law International (2005) 
14 !d. 
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Obviously, the meaning of"Contingent" is subject to meticulous interpretation. 
The Appellate Body expatiated on this word in the recent US FSC case, 
explaining it to mean "conditional" or "dependent for its existence on 
something else": 
In other words, the grant to the subsidy must be conditional or 
dependent upon export performance. Footnote 4 of the SCM 
Agreement, attached to Article 3.l(a), describes the relationship of 
contingency by stating that the grant of a subsidy must be "tied to" 
export performance. Article 3.l(a) further provides that such export 
contingency may be the "sole" condition governing the grant of a 
prohibited subsidy or it may be "one of several other conditions". 
The contingency upon export performance may be in law or in fact. The 
Appellate Body interpreted "contingency in law" in Para. 112 as follows: 
A subsidy is contingent "in law' upon export performance when the 
existence of that condition can be demonstrated on the basis of the very 
words of the relevant legislation, regulation or other legal instrument 
constituting the measure... For a subsidy to be de jure export 
contingent, the underlying legal instrument does not always have to 
provide expressis verbis that the subsidy is available only upon 
fulfillment of the condition of export performance. Such conditionality 
can also be derived by necessary implication from the words actually 
used in the measure. 15 
15 !d., summarizing that the most important segment of trio was ruled upon by the AB in 
February 2000 that the FSC (foreign subsidiary of U.S. corporations) regime constituted a 
prohibited subsidy under Art.3(l)(a) of the SCM Agreement. The FSC regime, enacted in 
1984, replaced the Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) regime which provided 
indefinite deferral to a portion of such corporations' export earnings. The DISC provisions 
were immediately attached by the European Commission, and in 1976 ruled as contradictory 
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Furthermore, the SCM Agreement incorporates a specific "illustrative list" of 
measures into the definition of prohibited subsides, including some tax related 
measures: "the full or partial exemption, remission, or deferral specifically 
related to exports, of direct taxes ... " 16 This item is explained in footnote 59, 
which provides that: ( 1) if appropriate interest is collected on deferred revenue, 
the deferral does not constitute an exports subsidy; (2) the arms' length 
standard applies to this analysis, and it implies that deviation from this 
standard may indicate a subsidy; (3) measures to avoid double-taxation of 
foreign sourced income are exempted from scrutiny as a subsidy. 
According to footnote 4 of the SCM Agreement, the standard for determining 
whether subsidies are in fact contingent upon export performance is met when 
the facts demonstrate that the granting of a subsidy, without being made 
legally contingent upon export performance, is in fact tied to actual or 
to the U.S. obligations under Article XVI (4) of the GATT 1947. At the same time, the U.S. 
challenged some of the European territorial income tax system. The panel disapproved of 
these too, but in 1981 the GATT council cleared these in a decision that served as a de facto 
roadmap for the FSC legislation as part ofthe U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1984. The FSC regime 
followed the same purposes of the DISC regime, attempting to adjust it to the council 
decision's language that permitted non-taxation of extraterritorial income. However, it still 
exempted a portion of export related corporation's foreign source income from U.S. tax that 
would have otherwise applied in contrast to the normal U.S. policy of worldwide income 
taxation. In November 1997, European Commission initiated the challenge against this second 
regime, followed by an official request filed on July I, 1998 to the dispute settlement panel, 
based on violations under Arts., 1.1, 3.l(a) and the SCM illustrative list. The Panel issued a 
final report against the U.S. in October 8, 1999, finding that the FSC constituted an export 
subsidy inconsistent with the SCM Agreement. The U.S. appeal was rejected on February 24, 
2000. In response, the U.S. designed a third regime- the ETI regime, which as designed to be 
in compliance with decision, but achieve similar consequences to the FSC regime. It purported 
to incorporate to the U.S. worldwide income system, territorial aspects, which had been ruled 
compliant with the GATT. The EU promptly responded, arguing that ETI did not comply with 
FSC ruling and panel was established and reported against the U.S. on August 20, 2001. The 
U.S. appealed and was rejected on all grounds by the Appellate Body on January, 14, 2002. 
The U.S. conceded then this battle, but Congress has not yet succeeded in repealing the ETI 
regime, which prompted EU retaliation as of March I, 2004. Probably the most important 
aspect of this final ruling is its firm support of the logic that each country has a baseline 
normative tax system that could be established as a benchmark for an inquiry into a specific 
measure that is suspected as tax subside, and a deviation from such benchmark would indicate, 
technically, that a tax would be "otherwise due." 
16 See SCM Annex I, Illustrative List of Export Subsidies 
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anticipated exportation or export earnings. 17 In this regard, a number of 
China's tax incentives may constitute discriminatory measures or prohibited 
export subsidies. There is little doubt, such tax incentives are subject to 
discretionary review under the WTO agreements or may be challenged by 
other member countries, which will lead to actions before the dispute 
resolution body. 
2.3. The dispute settlement process under the WTO 
While the GATT 1994 and other multilateral trade agreements are important 
for their substantive provisions on international trade, the agreements 
ultimately rely on the dispute settlement process to regulate compliance. 18 
Member countries are entitled to safeguard their interests by following the 
dispute settling mechanism to ensure compliance with WTO agreements. 
According to the DSU, only the legitimate government of member countries 
has standings under the procedure, and no individuals or organizations are able 
to file related requests even when their interests are affected by the resolution 
of the dispute. The DSU disallows member countries from unilaterally 
17 See SCM Art. 15, Determination oflnjury; for export performance related details, see SCM 
Art. 15.5, stipulating that it must be demonstrated that the subsidized imports are, through the 
effects of subsidies, causing injury within the meaning ofthis Agreement. The demonstration 
of a causal relationship between the subsidized imports and the injury to the domestic industry 
shall be based on an examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities. The 
authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the subsidized imports which at 
the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors 
must not be attributed to the subsidized imports. Factors which may be relevant in this respect 
include, inter alia, the volumes and prices of non-subsidized imports of the product in 
question, contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, trade restrictive 
practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers, developments in 
technology and the export performance and productivity of the domestic industry 
18 See John Jackson, supra I at 15 
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determining the liability, designing corrective measures, or judging whether 
their benefits are impaired or nullified under the WTO agreements. 
According to the DSU, the settlement of a dispute begins with a request for 
consultations, which takes, at most, 60 days. If a dispute is not resolved 
through consultations, the complaining party may request a three-person panel 
to adjudicate the case. The panel's decision may be appealed by the parties to 
the WTO Appellate Body, a permanent institution established by the Dispute 
Settlement Body. The appeal is limited to the issues of law in the panel's 
report and the legal interpretations issued by the panel. If a panel or the 
Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with WTO 
agreements, it will recommend that the country that lost the case bring the 
measure into conformity with the agreement, and it may suggest ways for 
doing so. If the recommendations are not implemented within a reasonable 
period of time, the Dispute Settlement Body can authorize the suspension of 
concessions or other obligations to implement its rulings. 19 In cases of 
prolonged non-compliance, Dispute Settlement Body may also authorize the 
winning party or the plaintiff member to impose trade sanctions against the 
defendant member country. For instance, the DSU procedures and operations 
may be understood by a primary and most developed dispute - the 
development of DISC/FSC/ETI saga, which comprises three consecutive and 
closely related cases brought by the European Union against U.S.20 The saga 
of U.S. and European fights over U.S. domestic income tax policies help us 
draw two conclusions: firstly, WTO agreements, as multilateral trading 
agreements, influence legislation and enforcement of domestic policies as 
19 See generally, Michael Trebilcock & Robert Howse, supra 6 
20 See generally, Brauner, supra 13 
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enforced by the dispute settlement process; secondly, the terms of WTO 
agreements are not incorporated automatically. For instance, it was not well-
equipped to deal with income taxes based on the widespread use of elections 
of deductions in income tax system at member countries.21 
III. Overview of the impacts ofWTO Principles on China's tax 
laws system 
China's tax law system is not isolated. Rather, it functions as part of a legal 
system intertwining with other sectors of law. The objective of this subchapter 
is to brief the impact of WTO agreements on China's tax governance order, 
which can be viewed from two angles: a public law perspective and a private 
sector perspective, focused on due process and judicial protections. This thesis 
tentatively addresses the first set of fundamental but key questions, such as: 
"is WTO law binding on China?"; "does it form a legitimate component of the 
Chinese legal system, and if so, to what extent?" and "is it supreme over other 
parts of Chinese law, including China's tax law system?". Answering these 
questions in the affirmative, this thesis later turns to a more practical 
question:22 "Will the Chinese judicature system resolve inconsistencies in the 
administration of tax laws?" It further considers how the Chinese tax 
judicature system might meaningfully resolve tax related disputes". This 
chapter attempts to connect these two perspectives by discussing how the tax 
legislation system may fulfill the requirements of WTO membership. 
21 !d. 
22 See infra Chapter VI 
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3.1. The binding effects of WTO agreements on the tax law system 
When elaborating the influence of WTO agreements on China's tax 
governance, the first question concerns the binding effect ofWTO agreements. 
The answer rests mainly in a well known principle of, "pacta sunt servanda" 
("treaties must be abided by"), and China is bound by the international treaties 
it concludes, including WTO agreements. As a result, the binding nature of 
WTO agreements requires that any inconsistent acts against the WTO 
agreements may expose China to the WTO dispute settlement process. Such 
process usually includes consultations, requests for the establishment of a 
panel, panel decision within established deadlines, possibility of appeal, and a 
final Appellate Body decision within established deadlines. Such dispute settle 
processes may bring in binding recommendations from the Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB) for readjusting domestic policies to ensure WTO compliance. 
The second question is to which extent the WTO agreements bind China with 
regard to its tax order. In practice, there are two main ways to apply 
international treaties. One is the transformational -- to revise domestic law in 
order to comply with the treaty. The other is direct application, requiring no 
change to domestic law. Some countries adopt the mixed approach depending 
on the nature of the treaty. However, the Constitution of China is not clear as 
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to how to apply international treaties in China.23 It seems it is neither against 
direct nor transformational application. 24 
Taking one step further, the third question deals with the possible direct effect 
of WTO provisions regardless of the approaches of adopting WTO principles 
-this is particularly evident in the Chinese tax context. This question shifts the 
challenges entirely to the tax legislation and related tax judicature system by 
which the private sector may seek to relief. Therefore, tax legislation has to 
identify and incorporate the possible direct effect of treaty articles to assure 
provisions at issue are sufficiently clear and precise for administrative 
interpretation or judiciary application. 
Being mindful of three questions above, impacts of the WTO agreements on 
China's tax law system necessitate two lines of inquiry: firstly, under the 
WTO general principles which affect China's legal reform in general, such as 
transparency, impartial and uniform administration, and judicial review, what 
are the direct implications of WTO accession? Second, what does China need 
to do to accommodate those implications? Apparently, these two queries 
should be addressed by the tax legislation reform at the first place. 
23 See Bing Ling, Is China's Accession to the WTO Legally Valid? (2002) 
http://bingling.page.tll(last visited on March IS, 2011), arguing that the ratification procedure 
was defective - the validity of China's accession, in spite of any procedural defects, seems 
unquestionable as a matter of international law under Articles 45 and 46 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties; although the National People's Congress Standing 
Committee granted a before-the-fact authorization but not an after-the-fact ratification; 
24 ld. 
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3.2.Implication of the WTO agreements to China's tax laws 
reform in General 
The essential function of the WTO has been described as providing a means to 
"resolve conflicts of interest within, not between, nations."25 "[A] more vivid 
analogy, along these same lines, characterizes the WTO as a "mast to which 
governments can tie themselves to escape the siren-like calls of various 
pressure groups. "26 Equally illustrative is the impetus derived from the WTO 
on China's rule of law construct. Undertakings of WTO accession, in addition 
to trade liberalization commitments, impose a special commitment that aims to 
promote transparency, predictability and faimess. 27 This includes, in particular, 
obligations on the public availability of trade-related laws, including tax 
legislation, uniform administration of the laws where tax administration and 
related procedural consistency are concerned, and the establishment of an 
independent and impartial system for reviewing administrative decisions -the 
tax judicature reform. 
3 .2.1. Transparency 
Transparency is a crucial, basic WTO principle, which requires that all WTO 
members publish and administer, in a uniform, impartial and reasonable 
25 See Friender Roessler, The Constitutional Funtion of the Multilateral Trade Order, in 
Essays on the Legal Structure, Function and Limits of the WTO, 109 (Meinhard Hilf & Emst-
Ulrich eds., 2000) (emphasis added) 
26 See Frieder Roessler, The Scope, Limits and Function of the GATT Legal System, 8 World 
Econ. 289-98 (1985). 
27 See generally, Jianming Cao, WTO and the Rule of Law in China 16 Temp. Int'l & Comp. 
L.J. at 379 
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manner, all of its laws, administrative regulations and foreign trade policies. 
Its main function is to prevent and eliminate any discriminatory treatment by 
members through unpublished laws, regulations and other measures or barriers, 
and to monitor the implementation of WTO agreements by all the members. 
The transparency requirement applies to the tax laws context in a singular way. 
In the Protocol, 28 China agreed that not only would WTO-related law, 
regulations and other measures that are published and readily available to 
other WTO members be made public, but also that drafts of all such 
documents should be provided beforehand for comments prior to official 
release and implementation 29 • China must also establish or designate an 
official journal for the publication of WTO-related rules, regulations, and 
other measures and to make copies of the journal readily available. 30 Moreover, 
China agreed to designate an enquiry point where all WTO-related 
information may be obtained. 
As to tax laws reform, since 1990, China has gradually published all of its 
laws, regulations, and policies related to tax administration and public finance 
management. 31 Still, its efforts fall short of transparency requirements during 
the process of policy and law development and opinion collection before final 
promulgation. Usually, the SAT or the MOP does not disclose "internal" or 
28 China's accession terms are contained in the WTO Report of the Working Party on the 
Accession of China, supra 2, and in World Trade Organization, Accession of the People's 
Republic of China, WT/L/432 (Nov. 10, 2001) 
29 Currently, according to the Law of Legislation, all legislations at basic law level or above 
are found beforehand or soon after official release, typically in the gazette of Ministry of 
Commerce that issue the legislation and sometimes in the national daily newspaper. 
30 See Karen Halverson Cross, China's WTO Accession: Economic, Legal, and Political 
Implications, B. C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. Vol. 27, No. 2 (2004), at 349, SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1082546(last visited on March 15, 2011) 
31 The publication usually is reterred to as the "Blue Book" for tax professionals. Originally 
being edited into a one-volume collection, nowadays it is mostly edited as two-volume or 
three-volume collection of selective tax ruling, notices, directives or regulations, part of which 
is accompanied with an official translation in English 
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"sensitive" documents. Ironically, sometimes foreign scholars even receive 
legislative documents earlier than local critics. 32 A robust example of the 
importance of transparency in cases where China does submit draft laws for 
public commentary is the intense debates cross-fired to determine the exact 
threshold for the new individual income tax deduction33 before it was signed 
into enactment on January 1, 2006.34 Despite the efforts China has made in the 
past decade, many new problems have arisen from its blurred hierarchy of 
legislative power. The clearest example is that, in the case of certain tax 
policies, no disclosure was made beforehand to enterprises and no information 
on implementation details was exchanged afterwards. Foreign investors may 
not become aware of the new policy or amendments to laws until they are 
faced with a particular problem in actual management and daily operation. 
Furthermore, there is an amorphous category of tax administrative documents 
referred to as rulings (guizhang or banfa) notices (tongzhi) and directives 
(zhishi or wenjian) that are released jointly or separately by the SAT, the MOF, 
and provincial tax authorities. Although the use of those administrative 
directives has decreased gradually due to various complaints it never 
disappears. As a result, there exists reckless or manipulative inconsistency or 
irregularities in the implementation of tax laws and policies in different 
localities. To preemptively restrict legislative actions in this regard, the SAT 
imposed stricter rulemaking procedures on the issuance of generally 
32 See infra Chapter VIII, noting that Professor Karla Simon even published a Jaw review 
article commenting China's Charity Code before most of scholars knew about the draft which 
was never published in any media in China 
33 See China to Raise Deductible Income Rate for liT to RMB3,000, China Briefing, March 7, 
20 II, noting that the threshold has been a good example of manipulating liT but also showing 
progress in legislative opinion collection and public hearing, http://www.china-
briefing.com/news/20 II /03/07 /china-to-allow-more-income-deduction-for-iit.htm I (last 
visited on March IS, 20II) 
34 /d. 
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applicable rules by tax agencies or those tax-related regulations by releasing 
the Administrative Measures for Formulating Normative Documents in 
Taxation. 35 However, the implementation of the "New Measures for 
Normative Documents" remains unclear. 
An additional obstacle in honoring the transparency requirement is that, other 
than tax authorities, various administrative apparatuses at different 
hierarchical levels issue overlapping and less formal notices, supplemental 
circulars, and interpretative opinions affecting taxpayers' behavior and 
creating nuances.36 Following the guideline that administration in accordance 
with the rule of law, China's Legislation Law demands the publication of all 
legislation including the NPC-level basic laws and amendments, 
administrative regulations, local and regional regulations, ministerial rules and 
local level rules. 37 Only a few normative documents or circulars are exempted 
from the requirement. Of course, to fulfill requirements of WTO as a 
multilateral trading system, China may "undertake only those laws, 
regulations, and other measures pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, 
services, TRIPs, or the control of foreign exchange that are published and 
readily available to other members, individuals, and enterprises, shall be 
enforced.38" In addition, China is obliged to make available to WTO members, 
upon request, all laws, regulations, and other measures pertaining to or 
35 SAT Decree No. 20, published Feb. 10, 2010, effective Jul. I, 2010, [hereinafter "New 
Measures for Normative Documents"] «f:it45r!sW.m·t1)CftflliUJ:Ei'II1J-rt» , rnl*f:it*.~.fiij 
4-~ 20 %(2010) 
36 An example is a notice issued by the State Administration of Industry and Commerce on 
redefining the status of Permanent Establishment, which arouses disputes on its tax treatment 
and international tax implications. 
37 See e.g., Regulations for Registration and Management of Representative Offices of Foreign 
Enterprises, effective as of March I, 2011, issued by the State Administration oflndustry and 
Commerce ( UrOO::&.illt;lt~:±f~7&m~!liC.i'II~i7u» ) 
38 See Halverson, supra 30, at 351 
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affecting trade in goods, services, TRIPs, or the control of foreign exchange 
before such measure are implemented or enforced. In emergency situations, 
laws, regulations, and other measures shall be made available at the latest 
when they are implemented or enforced. 39 However, given the meticulous 
reach of tax legislations, it is always hard and impractical to pick out specific 
tax terms stipulated in widely scattered administrative regulations. 
Another practical obstacle to compliance with China's tax laws is that they are 
not easily accessible. Although the protocol specifically requires China to 
publish an official journal and establish a single enquiry point for WTO-
related materials under paragraph 2(C) of the Protocol, 40 accurate and reliable 
information on tax legislation is often not provided to individuals and 
enterprises. Even the official website of the SAT or the MOF, which is 
supposed to be most authoritative hub on China's tax laws, does not provide 
all major tax related laws and regulations, let alone various administrative 
rulings, notices and directives.41 
An additional note is that secrecy and lack of transparency in the tax 
legislation system are not merely accidental. Rather, they stem from China's 
39 !d., at 352 
40 Article X of the GATT 1994 stipulates that laws, regulations, policies, and decisions, 
including judicial decisions, pertaining to foreign trade "shall be published promptly in such 
manner as to enable governments and traders to become acquainted with them. See China to 
Open Official WTO Website, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Sept. 12, 2002, LEXIS, News 
Library, Xinhua File. TRIPs also prescribes that laws and regulations, and final judicial 
decisions and administrative rulings of general applications, made effective by a member 
pertaining to the availability, scope, acquisition, enforcement, and protection shall be 
published by each member; see Halverson, supra 30 at 350-352, establishing an official WTO 
website could greatly facilitate the ability of outsiders to gather legal information. The website 
at least purports to make current information regarding the WTO accessible to the public, 
provides links to China's WTO-related laws and regulations, and allows visitors to ask 
question 
41 For instance, for the first 6 months of 2010, around 310 "SAT Correspondences" were 
issued, of which only 53 are currently publicly available; 64 "SAT Issuances" were adopted 
but only 36 are currently publicly available from the SAT official website 
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
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basic hierarchical organization structure. China's tax governance is essentially 
administrative. Most tax laws and regulations, national or local, would be 
better characterized as commands running down a bureaucratic hierarchy from 
superiors to subordinates. If laws and regulations are alien to the 
administrative hierarchy, it is not surprising that those laws are subject to 
ineffective implementation. The result is that tax laws and regulations passed 
by legislative bodies are rarely very meaningful without administrative 
articulation and implementation. 
3.2.2. Uniform and impartial administration of tax laws and 
regulations 
As required by Article X ofthe GATT 1994, China agreed, in the Protocol, to 
apply and administer all WTO-related laws, regulations, and other measures in 
a "uniform, impartial and reasonable manner." 42 Scholars of Chinese law 
express a mix of skepticism 43 and optimism 44 regarding the possibility of 
China's fulfillment to this obligation, which demands enforcement institution 
with clear lines of authority and the capacity to render neutral decisions. 45 
However, as this requirement applies to the tax context, there are several 
problems that might jeopardize the neutrality and predictability of their 
administration. 46 
42 See the Protocol, Part. I, Para 2(A)(2). 
43 See generally Halverson, supra 30 
44 See generally Cao, supra 27 
45 See Halverson supra 30 at 352 
46 /d., at 353 
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First, Chinese tax legislation usually tends to fall into one of two extremes. 
Those drafted in vague terms or in direction by "political guidelines or spirit," 
and those drafted with too many details applicable only to specific issues. 
Both extremes are lacking in jurisprudential value.47 Those undefined, policy-
orientated, broadly worded tax laws and regulations create a mixed authority 
and provoke discretionary decision-making on the part of local tax authorities 
interpreting their specific meaning. 48 This is particularly problematic, because 
many local tax authorities are incompetent to exercise this discretionary 
capacity. Second, tax authorities as lawmaking institutions usually are short of 
modern legislation techniques. 49 This results in a proliferation of overlapping, 
repetitive, ambiguous or contradictory laws at various hierarchical levels. 
Finally, various extra-legal factors impede the neutral and just implementation 
of tax laws. Those factors include political intervention, corruption of local tax 
officials, social stability concerns, imbalanced development strategies, 
minority unity, and the traditional Chinese notion of guanxi or influence 
peddling. 
Moreover, China has been criticized for local protectionism that manifests 
in certain localities through legislation and enforcement of tax regulations 
and rules associated with unfair implementation and treatment. For 
example, China's tax system suffers from discriminatory measures such as 
actual higher tax rates, refusal to issue tax registration licenses, overly 
strict administration against non-local products or services. It is clear that 
47 
See Luhman, supra 1 at 147, describing the techniques that characterize Chinese legislative 
drafting, including "the use of general principles, vagueness and ambiguity, undefined terms, 
broadly worded discretion, omissions and general catch-all phrases" 
48 See Halverson supra 30 at 352 
49 !d., at 3 54 
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unless local protectionism is destroyed, the national market as a whole will 
be impeded and trade disputes will arise. Meanwhile, it should be noted 
that the NPC, its Standing Committee and State Council have power to 
annul the administrative regulations that contradict the Constitution, laws 
and major regulations promulgated by legislative bodies in a higher 
hierarchy. This is in line with China's agreement to improve the uniform 
administration echoing the requirement under the Article X of GATT 
1994.50 
A few other aspects of China's tax law system militate against its impartial 
and predictable administration. First, except a few nationwide basic laws or 
regulations issued by the NPC, the MOF and the SAT on tax, many areas of 
the tax law or administrative regulations are not covered or promulgated, 
although some are available in vague or tentative terms. For example, the 
discussion centered on gift and estate tax has been kept for over a decade, 
however, there are no rules in this area. Courts or tax authorities have to resort 
to general provisions in the Civil Law Code or Contract Law to resolve 
disputes arising in this connection. Second, the tax authorities are comprised 
of officials of varying qualifications. Ironically, jobs in tax administration are 
viewed as safe, career positions. Job security is not premised on increasing 
sophistication of one's capacity to implement new tax provisions. So, there is 
no guarantee that the implementation and interpretation of tax laws will be 
consistent across localities. Third, China's economic structure and policies 
favoring coastal areas further undermine uniformity and predictability. When 
local officials' promotions and political sponsorship are staked on local 
50 See Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law: Towards an Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and 
Development, at 107-109 (1999). 
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economic performance, it is without doubt that ill-defined, ambiguous and 
contradictory tax laws and regulations are implemented for local benefit, 
which causes inconsistency and unpredictability. Notably, the administration 
of tax laws and regulations in special economic zones are in general 
illustrative of the above summary. Through the end of 2008, over 7,000 
special economic zones have been set up in China since 1979, of which nearly 
300 zones are of national level and the rest is of provincial or local level. The 
rapid increase of special economic zones caused irregularity and insufficiency 
to tax legislation and administration. Moreover, a considerable portion of local 
rulings, notices and directives (either published or non-published), are in 
conflict with laws and regulations from the central government. Meanwhile, 
the task force for tax administration is in short supply and a significant portion 
of available tax professionals do not possess adequate training and 
qualification to secure impartiality and independence. An additional note is 
that not all special economic zones have an independent judicature for 
determining administrative cases, which in tum exacerbates irregularity and 
the manipulation of tax related disputes. 
3.2.3. Review of Administrative Decisions 
One difficulty that plagues the Chinese legal system is the inability to provide, 
on a consistent basis, truly independent judicial review of administrative 
actions. 51 Tax administration is not an exception to this dilemma. According to 
51 See infra Chapter VI on details about tax judicature reform discussions. This section briefly 
reviews the overall picture of the administrative system that may concern tax legislation and 
judicature. 
280 
Article X of GATT 1994, Article VI of GATS and other related WTO 
agreements, China has committed itself to establishing and maintaining 
"impartial and independent tribunals, contact points and procedures" for the 
prompt review of all administrative actions relating to the implementation of 
the laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general 
application referred to in the WTO transparency rules. 52 Article II (d) of the 
GATT 1994 requires that review procedures be included with the opportunity 
for appeal, without penalty, by individuals or enterprises affected by any 
administrative action subject to review. If the initial right of appeal is to an 
administrative body, there shall in all cases be the opportunity to choose to 
appeal the decision to a judicial body. Notice of the decision on appeal shall 
be given to the appellant and the reasons for such decision shall be provided in 
writing. The appellant shall also be informed of any right to further appeal. 53 · 
This thesis notes that China has made remarkable progress in creating a 
national jurisprudence examination and reforming its judiciary institutions. 
The Supreme People's Court ("SPC"), during the process of constructing the 
rule of law as incorporated in Chinese Constitution, has served as a dominant 
52 China's official press is replete with examples of officials announcing the importance of 
transparency and rule of law in light of the country's WTO obligations. See, e.g., Timetable 
Set for China's Entry to WTO, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Nov. 3, 2001 (trade minister 
quoted as saying that the "most important" change resulting from China's WTO entry will be 
improving transparency of laws); Meng Yan, Legislative Efforts Benefit WTO Accession, 
CHINA DAILY, Jan. 7, 2002 (NPC representative observes that "transparency and public 
participation" have recently been emphasized during the NPC's legislative process after 
China's WTO entry); Shao Zongwei, Judicial Rules to Comply with WTO, CHINA DAILY, 
Feb. 26, 2002 (senior prosecutor pledges that China's procuracy will incorporate WTO 
principles of"openness, integrity and transparency"). 
53 See Protocol, supra 2 pt. I, para. 2(D)(2). The Protocol also requires that the relevant 
tribunal provide written notice of the decision on appeal, including the reasons for such 
decision; see also Working Party Report, supra 2 para.78, requiring that the tribunals 
responsible for judicial review be "impartial and independent of the agency entrusted with 
administrative enforcement" and have no "substantial" interest in the outcome 
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intervening force in judicial review reform. 54 In view of the powerful 
bureaucracy and political interference in China, however, a key issue is what 
degree of independence China's judges exert with regard to their delegated 
authority to review and correct administrative decisions, let alone the 
incomplete or absent tribunals in several important economic areas such as tax, 
international trade and bankruptcy. 
Although in some aspects China's judiciary system may fall short of 
expectations or the commitment listed in its Protocol, the efforts and progress 
demonstrate a capable framework in place that comports with the Protocol's 
obligation for reviewing administrative decisions with tribunals for appeal. In 
addition to judicial review of WTO-related laws and administrative 
54 See Halverson, supra 30 at 360-363, summarizing that SPC's authority to promote judicial 
independence is circumscribed both by the supremacy of the CPC and by specific statutory 
limitations on its authority to interpret law. Constraints undermining the judiciary 
independence include political influence and the continued involvement of CPC, lower status 
of judges vis-a-vis administrators, financial interests in court decisions at the local level (i.e., 
the interconnectedness of local government and the private sector), dependence on local 
government to enforce judgments, the hold-backs of guanxi, and outright corruption. Crucially, 
funding of courts at the local level is supported by local revenues. More generally, the 
weakening authority of the CCP, along with the growing importance of wealth as a measure of 
success, has left a moral vacuum, which exacerbates corruption and complicates efforts to 
promote neutral and objective decision-making. These factors will operate impeding effective 
implementation of China's WTO obligations, in particular, the commitment on judicial review 
of administrative decisions. Significantly, the SPC has emphasized China's WTO 
transparency-related obligations as a means to promote judicial independence in cases 
affecting international trade. However, The SPC's authority to promote judicial independence 
is circumscribed both by the supremacy of CPC and by specific statutory limitations on its 
authority to interpret law. The requirement of the rule of law encompasses not only 
transparency but also judicial independence and the notion that no person, including a 
government official, is above the law. Even Beijing has expressed a commitment to promoting 
judicial independence in a narrow sense of the phrase -WTO-related cases (including review 
of administrative acts) should be determined on the basis of international obligations - as 
opposed to being influenced by guanxi, corruption, incompetence of professionalism or 
political inference at the local level, it is unrealistic that such change will expand courts' 
power or authority vis-a-vis the CPC or certain administrative apparatus; for more discussion 
on the SPC, See generally, China's Legal Reforms (Stanley Luhman ed., 1996) (containing 
papers by various authors); The Limits of the Rule of Law in China (Karen G. Turner et al. eds., 
2000) (containing papers by various authors addressing rule of law related issues in China); 
Stanley B. Luhman, Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China After Mao (1999); Pitman Potter, 
The Chinese Legal System: Globalization and Local Legal Culture (2001); Randall 
Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of the Law: Administrative Law 
Reform and Rule of Law in the People's Republic of China, 19 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 1 (2001) 
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decisions, 55 there are a number of other channels that are worth highlighting 
for the review of administrative actions, including tax administrative decisions. 
First, Chinese law provides an internal but extra-judicial supervisory authority 
for reconsideration system of administrative decision-making, which is 
conducted from within the administration. 56 An evident limitation to this 
review, is its lack of independence. Usually, such a supervisory or 
reconsideration system serves political concerns of keeping potential conflicts 
of interests within the administrative system. Second, incomplete though it 
may be, the 1996 Administrative Punishment Law ("APL") outlines basic 
elements of a comprehensive law or an administrative punishment code, which 
imposes procedural requirements on administrative agencies. 57 The APL was 
developed to remove arbitrariness and overlapping exertions of jurisdiction in 
the imposition of an administrative "penalty" per se. The APL is distinctive in 
its incorporating procedural safeguards, including replacing inappropriate 
administrative clerks, establishing a right to know and the right to a hearing a 
certain cases.58 Third, as it applies to tax litigation, limited judicial review of 
"concrete" tax administrative cases is available. However, influences imposed 
on judges by tax authorities may distort its judgment by favoring tax 
authorities. China's tax judicature does not embody the "common law" 
principles of stare decisis to handle judicial review. Although the 1989 
55 See Protocol, supra note 2, pt. I para 2. 
56 Id. 
57 See generally The Administrative Reconsideration Law of the P.R.C.; Administrative 
Supervision Law of the P.R.C. ( 1997); Administrative Penalties Law of the P.R.C. ( 1996) 
[hereinafter APL]; State Compensation Law of the P.R.C. (1994); Administrative Litigation 
Law of the P.R.C. (1989) [hereinafter ALL]. 
58 See Chen supra 50 at 139-151. Noting that the right to hearing applies when "serious" 
penalties are at stake. In addition, the APL provides that (i) penalties may only be imposed 
and enforced by authorities that are specifically authorized to do so (Articlel5), (ii) a penalty 
may not be based on rules contained in internal, or unpublished, documents (Article4), and (iv) 
no administrative body may impose fines for the same offense twice (Article24), quoted by 
Halverson supra 30 at 365 
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Administrative Litigation Law (ALL) enriched China's judicial review system 
by allowing suits against administrations, 59 some drawbacks are associated 
with the narrowly designated ALL - namely, judicial review is limited to 
specific or concrete acts of the government such as imposing a fine or 
invoking a license. However, courts are not permitted to review abstract 
administrative actions, including for example the appropriateness or 
reasonableness of local tax administrative rulings or guidelines. 60 
Generally, judicial review of tax administrative cases involves similar efforts 
and difficulties as discussed above, but also has a few specific problems. First, 
tax administrative cases suffer from a high withdrawal rate. Foreign investors 
or individuals are typically not privileged to updates on consistent-changing 
local tax laws, regulations, and court procedures. Even though they are 
afforded representation by lawyers, a calculated cost-effective analysis may 
prevent them to do so and taxpayers are disincentivized from using it. Second, 
in contrast with civil or criminal law areas, judges in China are short of 
competency and expertise in handling administrative tax cases. More tax 
specialists are employed by tax authorities but fewer serve as judges for tax 
cases. It is not surprising that courts may seek suggestions from tax 
administration to determine tax cases, which in tum causes conflict of interests. 
Third, local courts lack financial independence and usually they are entirely 
funded by local revenue. As a result, judges are more cautious and unwilling 
to rule against the local tax administration or large local SOEs which may 
threaten their financial needs. This concern has been described as a "growing 
59 
See Wang Hanbin, Explanation of the (Draft) Administrative Litigation Law of the PRC, 
Delivered at the 2nd Session of the Seventh NPC (Mar. 28, 1989), translated in 3 CHINESE 
LAW AND GOVERNMENT 35, 35-36 (1991), quoted by Chen, supra 50 at 147 
60 See Chen supra 50, at 155 
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tumor" for China's tax judicature reform. While other areas of the law are 
affected, the lack of judicial independence affects tax cases specifically. 
Finally, overlapping and contradictory local tax laws and incentives put judges 
in the position of relying on uncertain legal sources - sometimes a vacancy of 
related laws or regulations. 
To this end, the active role of SPC for fulfilling WTO obligations and 
promoting tax judiciary competence may be extended to the proposal of 
establishing a Chinese tax court system. SPC, as the most important and active 
interpretation authority in China, functions both as a tribunal and as supervisor 
of an imaginary tax court system.61 The desirable tax court system structure is 
to adopt a circuit tax courts framework exercising both original (conditioned 
first instance) and appellate jurisdiction, sitting permanently in six to eight 
regions covering the entire Chinese territory, and reporting to the SPC Tax 
Tribunal based in Beijing. The designated High Tax Tribunal is an SPC 
subsidiary and should have ultimate appellate jurisdiction over tax cases 
appealed from circuit tax courts and provincial high courts, and perform tax 
court system administration or management. The transitory, costly and 
overhauling midlist "spin-off' structure should be denounced based on tax 
policy routines. 
3.2.4. Summary 
China's tax governance is essentially administrative. The binding effect of the 
WTO agreements on the tax governance can be summarized by three WTO 
principles: transparency, impartial and uniform administration, and judicial 
review. 
61 See infra Chapter VI 
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The transparency principle implies three separate issues. The process of tax 
legislation as to policy orientation and opinion collection before the final 
promulgation mostly is not open to public. Inconsistency and irregularity in 
the implementation of tax laws and policies in different localities create 
further ambiguity. Although the SAT imposed stricter rulemaking procedures 
on the issuance of generally applicable rules by tax agencies or those tax-
related regulations by releasing the ''New Measures for Normative 
Documents," the implementation of which remains unclear. Moreover, other 
than tax authorities, various administrative apparatus at different hierarchical 
levels issue overlapping and less formal notices, supplemental circulars. 
Secrecy and the lack of transparency in the tax legislation system partially 
stem from its basic hierarchical organizational structure. 
Uniform and impartial administration requirements raise the bar high for 
China's tax system especially for its tax legislation. China is required to apply 
and administer all WTO-related laws, regulations, and other measures in a 
"uniform, impartial and reasonable manner" to accord with neutrality and 
predictability requirements. However, tax authorities are usually vested with 
incompetent capacity to administer ill-designed tax laws: those drafted in 
vague terms or in direction by "political guidelines or spirit," and those drafted 
with too many details applicable only to specific issues. Tax authorities as 
lawmaking institutions usually are short of modem legislation techniques, and 
this leads to a proliferation of overlapping, repetitive, ambiguous or 
contradictory tax laws at various hierarchical levels. Various extra-legal 
factors also impede the neutral and righteous implementation of tax laws, such 
as political intervention, corruption of local tax officials, and local 
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protectionism. In addition to the marginal qualification of tax officials, 
China's favorable economic policies towards coastal areas undermine 
uniformity and predictability. When local economic performance is combined 
with economic pressure, ill-defined, ambiguous and contradictory tax laws and 
regulations are implemented for local benefit which induces disparity and 
unpredictability. 
The judicial review requirement creates specific issues in the Chinese tax 
context. A key issue is to what extent China's judges can independently 
execute their delegated authority to review and correct administrative 
decisions. Although certain extra-judicial means, such as administrative 
supervision or reconsideration, may be used to resolve adverse tax decisions 
made against taxpayers, tax administrative cases suffer from a high 
withdrawal rate due to unfamiliarity with tax laws and court procedure as well 
as a calculated cost-effective analysis. Judges hearing tax cases lack 
competency and expertise. Their financial dependence on local revenue drives 
courts to be more cautious and unwilling to rule against local tax 
administration or large local SOEs, which control their monetary allocations. 
Meanwhile, overlapping and contradictive local tax laws and incentives 
present judges with an unfavorable situation of facing vacancy or ambiguities 
of related laws or regulations. Although the debate regarding the tax court 
system is popular, the system, as imagined, is not in a position to replace the 
rest of the judicature reform.62 
62 !d. 
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3.3. WTO's impacts on the Chinese tax law system - a normative 
perspective 
China's tax reform is one of the most important components to bringing China 
into compliance with obligations enclosed in the Protocol and related WTO 
principles. China's tax law system is not isolated from macroeconomic and 
political constrains. Many of China's tax policies, laws, regulations and 
procedures have higher reform priority than other areas of law. The objectives 
of China's tax policies are to raise revenue and stimulate the economy by 
encouraging exports and foreign direct investment. However, less emphasis 
was put on tax equity and neutrality. In contrast with counterparts in Western 
tax jurisdictions, China's tax law system is plagued by the lack of impartial 
administration and judicial review. Although some outdated tax legislation 
was reformed before the accession to WTO, coupled with the unfinished 
business of establishing an institutional tax governance structure for liberating 
trade and capital mobility, a few areas in China's tax law remain necessary 
steps to accord with China's obligations the WTO accession. This section 
introduces necessary tax legislation updates based on two closely related WTO 
principles- the national treatment and most-favored-nation (MFN) principles. 
3.3 .1. The national treatment principle 
Article III (1) of the GATT stipulates the equalization of foreign with 
domestic products in the field of internal taxes and charges, as well as legal 
provisions. Although the definition of "product" is not found in GATT, it is 
reasonable to consider a product to be tangible and moveable. This general 
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rule is further explained by Article III (2) of the GATT, the first sentence of 
which states that "the products of territory of any contracting party imported 
into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or 
indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of 
those applied, directly or indirectly,63 to like domestics products" (emphasis 
added by the author). 64 Identical products are not required, but "likeness" is 
sufficient. Moreover, as the GAIT Analytical Index states, a situation falling 
under the scope of Article III (2) of the GATT has to fulfill two requirements: 
first, it must be a competition situation; second, there must be a directly 
competitive or substitutable product which has not been similarly taxed. 
Another crucial feature is that Article III of the GATT prohibits discrimination 
of not only a de jure, but also a de facto nature - in any case, the measure must 
be protective. Mere marginal differences are subject to the de minimis 
principle and, therefore, do not prove a violation.65 Although scholars debate 
whether or not Article III (2) of the GATT applies to direct taxation,66 one 
cannot deny the Appellate Body's decisions in the FSC/ETI case, which 
recognize the applicability of Article III ( 4) of the GATT to direct taxation.67 
In summary, tax measures of a WTO member country have to meet the 
requirement of national treatment under Article III ofthe GATT as long as the 
tax under consideration is levied on the profits arising from import 
transactions. Additionally, if tax measures protect domestic products 
exclusively, such measure may violate Article III of the GATT. 
63 See Article III (2) of the GATT 





Whereas the GATT regulates trade in goods, the GATS is applicable to the 
trade in services. Article XVII of the GATS sets forth the principle of national 
treatment for the trade in services:68 "[E]ach member shall accord to services 
and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting 
the supply of services, treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its 
own like services and service suppliers". Moreover, there are exceptions to 
this rule provided that the difference in treatment is aimed at ensuring the 
equitable or effective imposition or collection of direct taxes or the measure 
falls in scope of international agreements relating to the avoidance of double 
taxation. 69 
China's tax measures, especially those associated with foreign investments, 
have to comply with national treatment principle under Article III of the 
GATT and Article XVII ofthe GATS. To violate Article III ofthe GATT, the 
taxation of importing enterprises must be disadvantageous. This may include 
those sources which are not taxed in the comparable domestic situation, which 
are taxed at different or higher tax rates, which are denied or offered lower 
deductions and so on. After a painful process of negotiation and opinion 
collection, China has made quite good pointed tax legislation progress. For 
example, the following pre-WTO measures promulgated in various tax laws 
on the nation level were removed or adjusted based on recent updates 
including the 2008 new Enterprise Income Tax Law. 
68 See GATS Article XVIII(1) 
69 See Brauner, supra 13at 143-145 
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Income tax reduction for export-oriented enterprises: Article75 of the 
Rules of Foreign Enterprise Income tax Law (FEITL)70 provides that: 
after the application of a regular tax holiday, an enterprise exporting 
more than 70 percent of its sales is eligible for a 50 percent income tax 
reduction, but the reduced tax rate cannot be less than 1 0 percent. 
Although this measure is designated to benefit foreign investment, 
other WTO members may treat it as an export-subsidy measure; 
VAT and Income Tax Incentives for buying domestically made 
equipment: to encourage the use of locally made equipment specified 
in a qualifying list, VAT tax refund and income tax credits are granted 
to those who take advantage of this policy. For this instance, domestic 
enterprises (DEs) and foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) are allowed 
for an income tax credit equal to 40 percent of the purchase price of 
domestically made equipment. Such credit can be used to offset the 
incremental portion of the enterprises' current income tax liability over 
the preceding year. Unused income tax credits can be carried over for 
five years (seven years for FIEs eligible for a tax holiday). Purchasers 
may also depreciate the equipment based on the original purchase price 
and can receive a full VAT refund for tax paid on the equipment. This 
policy, obviously, could be viewed as discriminatory against 
manufacturers using imported equipment. Moreover, its application to 
DEs and FIEs could be considered inconsistent;71 
70 the FEITL was replaced by the new Enterprise Income Tax Law which became effective 
from January 1, 2008 
71 See generally, Alan Tsoi, China Goes for Equality, International Tax Review (July 2001) 
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Income tax exemptions for domestic enterprises: a two-track enterprise 
tax system72 was introduced in the early 1980s. It included a Western-
style tax system for FIES and another system for DEs. Several 
incentives, however, are available only to DEs to encourage the growth 
of specific industrial sectors. First, income derived from domestic 
research institutes for transfers of research results, technology training, 
consultation, and services are exempt from enterprise income tax. 
Second, DEs in agricultural production, fisheries, forestry, and 
husbandry will receive a general income tax exemption. However, 
FIEs engaged in the same industries will receive only a five-year tax 
holiday. Third, A two-year, tax free holiday, from the date of an 
entity's establishment, is provided for firms engaged in law, 
accountancy, auditing, technology, taxation, information consulting, 
transportation, shipping and communication. A one-year tax holiday is 
offered to enterprises engaged in the travel sector, restaurants, storage, 
education, and healthcare. However, only FIEs located in special 
economic zones that have registered capital of at least $ 5 million are 
entitled to a three-year tax holiday. Again, this income tax exemption 
arrangement puts DEs and FIEs in different position; 
VAT incentives for Domestic Enterprises: various VAT reductions and 
exemptions have been granted to DEs under special scenarios. First, 
DEs that utilize waste gas, waste water and solid waste as major 
production inputs. Second, newly established enterprises in remote 
regions, poverty-stricken regions or regions with ethnic groups. Third, 
72 The two-track enterprise income tax system was removed by the new Enterprise Income 
Tax Law in 2008 
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enterprise that receive income from transferring technologies or from 
related services such as technology consultancy or training. Fourth, 
enterprises that suffer from disasters and Acts of God. Fifth, newly 
established TVEs that create a significant number of new jobs. New 
jobs contribute over 60 percent of task force. Finally, enterprises that 
sell self-developed software effectively pay VAT at a 6 percent by 
refunding a portion of the tax paid already. All the above VAT 
incentives, among others, may induce national treatment issues when 
FIEs find themselves in a disadvantageous position due to higher VAT 
burden; 
Deductibility of Management Fees: China's tax authorities have not 
dealt favorably with inter-company charges and cost sharing 
arrangements, which are a common practice of multinationals. In fact, 
FIEs are not allowed to deduct management fees. However, DEs are 
allowed to deduct (by conditional approval) management fees paid to 
parent companies and affiliated companies. Obviously, FIEs may view 
such deduction measure as distorting operation process and putting 
them into a competitive disadvantageous position; 
Tax consolidation: FIEs with multiple entities m China are not 
encouraged to file consolidated returns, but DEs may act differently, 
especially domestic banks, insurance companies, airlines and power 
companies. This consolidation practice is under review following 
national treatment principle; 
Depreciation: DEs are granted a salvage value of up to 5 percent ofthe 
original fixed-asset costs, however, FIEs cannot set the salvage value 
293 
below 10 percent of cost, unless the tax authorities approve so. 
Therefore, when compared to domestic counterparts, PIEs must keep 5 
percent more of fixed asset cost in the balance sheet, as opposed to 
claiming that amount as a current tax deduction. 
Individual income tax: although WTO principles deal solely with the 
trading of goods and services, the current system of individual income 
tax has experienced a few rounds of review under the national 
treatment principle. The monthly deduction for individual taxpayers 
has been increased from RMB 800 to RMB 1,600, and is expected to 
be raised further. The RMB 4,800 monthly deduction for foreign 
individuals remains valid based on a RMB3,200 adjustment. There are 
a number of other scenarios that Chinese nationals and foreigners are 
treated differently, but it is beyond the scope of this. 
In summary, implications of the national treatment principle to China's tax 
law system probably are not as profound as observers may expect, however, 
certain inconsistencies with this principle exist even after a few major tax 
legislative pieces came into place in the past decade. However, certain 
irregular treatments for Chinese domestic enterprises exist with merits, mostly 
because foreign investments rarely get into certain industry lines such as the 
low-profit-margin but environmentally friendly waste recycling business 
dominated by domestic enterprises. With more emphasis put on the "green 
technology" industry by the Chinese government, this treatment may change 
as more foreign capitals are interested in entering into the environment 
protection business. Overall, although in many ways the Chinese tax system 
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has been reformulated and to certain extent has been successful after the 
accession to the WTO, the benchmark has to be upheld that the national 
treatment principle by large serves to restrict, not to enlarge the state's taxing 
power. 
3.3.2. The most-favored-nation (MFN) Principle 
The most-favored-nation (MFN) principle is embodied in Article I of the 
GATT that each country is obliged to accord immediately and unconditionally 
"any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party 
to any product originating in or destined for any other country... to the like 
product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting 
parties."73 Moreover, this applies "with respect to customs duties and charges 
of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation or 
imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and 
with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with 
respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and 
exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in Articles III (2) and III 
(4)."74 Although GATT provisions apply the MFN treatment to specific issues 
only/5 the terms "advantage, favor, privilege or immunity" are not defined 
precisely, but they are interpreted broadly. An additional requirement is that 
the benefit is granted immediately or unconditionally rather than gradually but 
73 See Article I, GATT 
74/d. 
75 See Brauner, supra 13 at 156 
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it may be partially granted. If this requirement is fulfilled, the same benefit 
should be offered to other member countries. 
Article II of the GATS, like Article I of the GATT, contains a MFN clause for 
trades of services. It states that "each Member shall accord immediately and 
unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other Member 
treatment no less favorable than that it accords to like services and services 
suppliers of any other country" (emphasis added by the author). 76 The term 
service includes any kind of services and the production, distribution, 
marketing, sale and delivery of services. 77 It has to be mentioned that services 
in the form of a "commercial presence" also include direct investment and, 
therefore, also include a freedom of establishment, either in form of a branch, 
or by purchase of shares in an existing enterprises. In reference to the 
determination of which treatment is more favorable it is forbidden to resort to 
the national treatment provisions of Article XVII of the GATS or Article III of 
the GATT. Because of the different wording, it cannot be concluded that the 
contracting parties had a common meaning in mind. However, the Appellate 
Body recognizes similarities between the MFN clauses of Article II of the 
GATS and Article I of the GATT. Both provisions prohibit a de jure as well as 
a de facto discrimination. 
Under the MFN principle, China is not prohibited from offering its trading 
partners more favorable tax treatment than that provided to domestic 
enterprises. For example, China could approve more tax incentives to FIEs 
with investment in specific geographical areas. As a matter of compliance, 
76 !d., at 159 
77 !d. 
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China needs to review not only rules violating WTO principles but also those 
provide preferential treatment based on capital resources of enterprises. On the 
other hand, when more and new business activities emerge after accession to 
the WTO, both FIEs and DEs must be aware of updated tax and financial 
implications caused by modifications of tax laws and regulations. To honor the 
commitments in the Protocol, the following pre-WTO measures in practice 
were removed or adjusted based on the mass pre-WTO legislation clean-up 
and recent tax legislative updates. 
Significant tariff reduction: According to U.S - China Market Access 
Agreement, the tariff rate is subject to significant reduction based on 
China's actual accession date. Although China has been reducing tariff 
rates since its accession to WTO the current average tariff rate for imports 
to China is around 12-15 percent which is substantially higher than the 
average of developed countries - 3.8 percent - and even developing 
countries, which is 10-11 percent. Some imported items are still running 
on a quota or import-permit system. In particular, i) for agricultural 
products, China already has a lowered its average tariff rate on U.S. 
agricultural products from 31 percent to roughly 14 percent by January 
2004; foreign producers have already begun using newly created tariff-rate 
quotas; ii) for industrial products, China has cut its tariff rate to around 1 0 
percent. Foreign companies are able to market, sell and distribute 
industrial goods freely and role of previous import and export agencies is 
fading harshly; iii) regarding automobiles, since mid-2006 China has 
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reduced its tariff from the original rate of 80-100 percent to 25 percent. 
Tariffs on auto parts reduced to 10 percent already. 
Foreign banks or financial institutions: according to the market-access 
commitment in the Protocol, China has acknowledged full market access 
(no geographic and customer restrictions) to foreign banks or financial 
institutions after end 2006, i.e., five years after the WTO accession. As 
foreign banks are granted substantially the same rights as Chinese banks, 
the reforms in tax law in this connection should be closely watched under 
the MFN principle; 
Reinvestment refund: a tax refund is available if an FIE reinvests the 
profits derived from China for at least five years. The standard refund rate 
is 40 percent. A full refund is allowed if the profits are reinvested for 
establishing or expanding an export-oriented or technologically advanced 
enterprise. Although debates had been made over whether this incentive 
should be refined, Chinese tax authorities believe in its control over it with 
a tightened approval processes for technologically advanced enterprise; 
Tax treatment on dividends: dividends paid by FIEs are not subject to 
withholding tax, and foreign nationals (corporate and individual) can 
receive dividends tax-free. Domestic enterprises are allowed to offset 
income tax based on attributable shares of the tax paid by the invested 
enterprise on the dividends. However, the tax credit may not be fully 
utilized if the applicable tax rate of the investors is lower than that of the 
invested enterprisers. Unlike foreign individual investors, dividends 
received from FIEs by Chinese individual investors are subject to income 
tax. This requirement is under review for amendment. 
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Bad debt: FIEs may claim a bad debt deduction for debts outstanding for 
more than two years and only financial institutions can establish bad debt 
reserves. Moreover, if an enterprise does not establish a reserve in books, 
it can deduct a bad debt only if the debt has been outstanding for more 
than three years. In contrast, domestic enterprises can claim a bad debt 
reserve and a bad debt deduction on an ad hoc basis. Although China has 
adopted an updated set of accounting rules, the bad debt extrudes the 
different treatment over books and details of accounting practice. 
Therefore, Chinese tax authorities will have to detail such differentiation 
under the MFN; 
Surtaxes and Surcharges: DEs usually are required to pay a city 
maintenance and construction surtax at rates varying based on enterprises' 
locations (e.g. 7 percent for urban area and 1 percent for town or other 
areas) and a 3 percent education surcharge is imposed on the same tax base 
additionally. However, FIEs are exempt from the above surtax and 
surcharges which means domestic enterprises effectively pay 10 percent 
more of turnover tax than their FIE counterparts. Certain surcharges 
nowadays are applicable to FIEs as well. 
Overall, China has made tremendous efforts through tax legislation to identify 
and reform inconsistencies with MFN principles in the tax context even the 
definitions of many key words or commonly accepted practice under the MFN 
principle are subject to broad interpretation. A mix of different tax treatments 
towards FIEs and DEs are caused by two main factors. First, the economic 
structure and development priorities invite flexible treatments towards specific 
industry lines or preferential tax treatments. To a substantial extent, foreign 
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interests are treated more favorably than domestic interests. Tax preferential 
measures are direct and enforceable in driving the free trade of products and 
services without discrimination. Second, arising complaints from foreign 
investors are about the non-transparent government procurement process 
associated with negotiation and protectionism. To foreign investors, a "Black 
box" practice may imply preferential tax treatments that are not available to 
them in negotiated procedures with competition bidding for government 
contracts. Although the government's practice to nurture domestic interests is 
common to many WTO member countries, the tax implications of the 
government procurement process are not given enough attention according to 
the MFN principle of eliminating barriers to facilitate the mobility of goods 
and services among member countries. 
3.4. Implications for the Tax Administration System 
The foremost effect of WTO accession for China's tax administration reform 
has been completed through an important piece of tax legislation. An amended 
The Law of Administration of the Levy and Collection Tax ofPRC (the "Tax 
Collection Law" or "TCL") was passed in April 2001, in response to the 
requirements of WTO accession. The Tax Collection Law marks a major step 
in China's tax legislation for conforming to WTO requirements. It articulates 
the rules for the administration of tax collection, stipulates various taxpayers' 
rights, identifies clear standards for tax collection at both the national and 
local levels, and establishes penalties for various violations of tax collection. 
More importantly, the Tax Collection Law sets forth clear rules for combating 
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inconsistency in tax collection that have long plagued the certainty and 
reliance of tax administration. It also improves transparency to assure 
investors of predictable tax consequences of specific transactions. 
Without doubt, establishing clear-cut standards for tax collection is prioritized 
by Chinese tax authorities to fight against local protectionism and corruption 
that drains revenue and distorts competition. The Tax Collection Law, along 
with its implementation regulations, largely prohibits cross-regional barriers 
and to certain extent combats tax evasion. It also helps consolidate domestic 
industries to improve competitiveness and operating efficiency. However, two 
major problems are unresolved. First, even the TCL stipulates various 
taxpayers' rights, the degree that tax administrations honor protection thereof 
remains uncertain. Rather, the TCL internalizes tax disputes within the tax 
administration system itself and to improve the internal management in the 
hope of monitoring the decentralization efforts of local tax bureaus. Second, 78 
the tax administration is not matched with a full-bodied tax judicature system 
in reaching impartial judgment on tax cases increase. Issues such as irregular 
judgment of similar tax controversies, shortage of tax expertise of judges 
hearing tax cases, and intervention from various authorities all impede the 
uniformity and impartiality of tax administration, let alone the vacancy of a 
tribunal designated exclusively for tax cases. Tax judicature reform, again, 
constitutes a break-through point against which Chinese tax authorities need to 
testify its commitment under WTO. 
78 See infra Chapter VI 
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3.5. Summary 
China's tax law system is not isolated; rather, it intertwines with other sectors 
of law. China's tax governance is essentially administrative. This subchapter 
has outlined the normative impacts of the WTO agreement on China's tax 
governance order from the tax legislation perspective in the hope to bridge the 
WTO principles and the tax administration system in terms of fulfilling the 
requirements raised thereof Tax legislation also contributes to improving tax 
administration and protection of taxpayers' rights through the Tax Collection 
Law, which sets forth clear rules for combating inconsistency in tax collection 
and promoting transparency to assure predictable tax consequences of 
transactional behaviors. In addition, it requires an improved tax judicature 
system to review tax administrative decisions and legislative actions. 
The binding effect of the WTO agreements on the tax governance could be 
addressed with attention paid to three WTO principles: transparency, impartial 
and uniform administration, and judicial review. 
The transparency principle implicates three ongoing issues in China's legal 
reform: (1) secrecy and lack of transparency in the tax legislation system 
partially stem from China's basic hierarchical organization structure. The 
process of tax legislation as to policy orientation and opinion collection should 
be open to pubic before final promulgation; (2) although the SAT released the 
"New Measures for Normative Documents", reckless or manipulative 
inconsistency or irregularities in local tax legislations in different localities 
still create ambiguity; (3) intervention from other administrative agents at 
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different hierarchical levels also complicates tax legislation reform by issuing 
overlapping and less formal notices and supplemental circulars. 
The uniform and impartial administration raises the bar high for China's tax 
system, and especially for the tax legislation. Tax authorities usually suffer 
from incompetent discretionary capacity to administer ill-designed tax laws. 
Modern legislation techniques somewhat are missing in local tax legislation 
which lead to a proliferation of overlapping, repetitive, ambiguous and 
contradictory tax laws at various hierarchical levels. Various extra-legal 
factors impede the neutral and just implementation of tax laws, including 
political intervention, corruption of local tax officials, and local protectionism. 
China's favorable economic policies toward coastal areas bring in unbalanced 
uniformity and predictability. Given the political stakes put on local economic 
performance, many ill-defined, ambiguous and contradictory tax laws and 
regulations are enforced for local benefit, which causes inconsistency and 
unpredictability. 
The judicial review requirement creates specific issues in the Chinese tax 
context. A key issue is the extent to which China's judges can exert 
independence in their delegated authority to review and correct tax 
administrative decisions. 
This subchapter further discusses implications of the national treatment and 
the most-favored-nation principles. First, certain inconsistency against the 
national treatment principle is diagnosed even after a few major tax legislative 
pieces came into place in the past decade. However, the inconsistent treatment 
of Chinese domestic enterprises may have its merits. The benchmark is that 
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the national treatment principle by and large serves to restrict, not enlarging to 
enlarge the state's tax power. Second, overall, China has made tremendous 
efforts through tax legislation in accordance with the MFN principle even the 
definitions of many key words or commonly accepted practices thereunder are 
subject to broad interpretation. Two inferences are made based on a mix of 
different tax treatments towards FIEs and DEs: (1) the economic structure and 
development priorities invite flexible treatment toward specific industry lines 
or preferential tax treatments. Ta.X preferential measures are direct and 
enforceable in driving free trade of products and services without 
discrimination; (2) arising complaints from foreign investors on the non-
transparent government procurement process may imply preferential tax 
treatments that are not available to foreign investors in negotiated procedures 
with competition bidding for government contracts. The tax implications of 
the government procurement process are not given enough attention according 
to the MFN principle of eliminating barrier to facilitate the mobility of goods 
and services among member countries. 
Based on the normative general binding impacts of WTO's principles on the 
tax governance order, the next subchapter provides an overview of progress 
made as to specific areas of tax laws after China's accession to the WTO. 
IV. Implications to the tax legislation reform - a formal 
perspective 
Contemporary tax governance discourses require a balance of formal and 
normative perspectives. In particular, a dynamic between focusing on specific 
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areas of tax legislation as unique entities in the tax mix firmament, and a 
substantiation to the values of WTO principles under the globalized context 
for liberating trade and capital mobility. As discussed in subchapters above, 
for the Chinese tax legislation reform, the normative implications of the WTO 
accession enjoy some salutary effects. Accession requires a more sophisticated 
understanding of WTO agreements, draws focus to the substance of China's 
current tax system, and accentuates the interrelationship of China's tax 
governance structure and taxpayers' rights. Paradoxically, an over-emphasis or 
vague transplant of WTO principles may make tax reform somewhat less 
relevant than the specific legislation that gives them meaning in the Chinese 
context. Many of the proposals offered based on WTO principles are not 
practical for China's taxpayers or its tax administration, but, rather, could be 
manipulated to reach political or local empowerment. Indeed, many of values 
embodied in WTO principles are the same as those that make up a rule of law 
order. However, when stepping into details of tax laws reform in China, much 
of the intellectual application for WTO principles converges with the 
promulgation and enforcement of tax laws. This subchapter, therefore, 
discusses a few formal implications of WTO principles to specific areas of tax 
laws to evidence the progress and problems associated with tax legislation 
reform. 
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4.l.lmplications for the turnover tax system 
4.1.1. Value-added Tax (VAT) 
Perhaps the most significant impact of China's accession to the WTO for 
foreign investors will be the opening of many industries previously closed to 
foreign investments, such as pharmaceuticals, high-end chemicals, banking 
and minerals. A key implication of WTO principles is the reform of turnover 
tax system, of which VAT is the most important turnover tax type. By 
definition, VAT is imposed on the importation and sales of goods, and 
provision of processing, repair, and replacement services. Currently, China has 
a production-type of VAT under which input VAT tax paid on the purchase of 
fixed assets cannot be used to offset output VAT on sales. As a feature of 
production-type of VAT, the non-creditable VAT on fixed asset investment 
played a role in reducing capital investment. Moreover, production-type of 
VAT regime favors low-tech, labor-intensive industries and penalize high-
tech, capital-intensive industries that employ a large amount of fixed assets. 
Inevitably, a production-type of VAT reverses the original objective of 
promoting capital-intensive, high-value-added industries. As a result, China's 
tax authorities should value the impact and merits of allowing the recovery of 
input VAT incurred on fixed assets, especially in those industries closed to 
foreigners, to yield more profound economic benefits under WTO principles. 
The second issue with VAT reform is the expansion of VAT basis. Chinese 
tax authorities have had discussed this topic even before the WTO accession. 
The idea is to include certain service industries that are currently subject to 
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business tax into the scope of VAT, such as finance, construction, 
communication, transportation, hotels, and restaurants. Proponents claim that 
those service industries, which attract most of the foreign investment after 
China's accession to WTO, thus expanding the scope of VAT to high-margin 
industries, will help generate more tax revenues. However, this thesis suggests 
two caveats to this basic notion. First, expanding VAT vase will further 
complicate the current multifaceted VAT regime - it currently lacks methods 
to incorporate business tax items into the VAT. Second, in practice, the VAT 
is a state tax while the business tax is a local tax. Pending on current VAT-
share formula, such expansion will reduce local revenues and require a 
readjustment of the share formula. The likely result is that this proposal will be 
rejected or manipulated by local authorities. 
Another implication of VAT reform is a change in the percentage of VAT 
refund to exported products. According to international practices, exported 
goods are entitled to full refund of VAT. However, export VAT refund in 
China is calculated at rates ranging from 5 percent to 17 percent. Only certain 
exports related to machinery and equipment, electrical items and electronics, 
transportation equipment, instruments, and clothing are currently enjoying the 
full refund rate, but VAT on most other exported goods is still not subject to 
full refund. Obviously, such practice of partial export VAT refund 
disadvantages and weakens the competitiveness in certain industry lines. To 
this end, this thesis shares the position that the VAT refund mechanism should 
consider incorporating an actual-payment system for three reasons. First, there 
is a consensus among many tax officials and scholars that a consumption-type 
VAT should be supplemented to the current production-type VAT regime. The 
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actual-payment system helps avoid the underlying difference between the two 
types of VAT. Second, the actual-payment system is unresponsive to the 
difference among industries, which saves the burden of differentiating 
industries and simplifying the collection system; third, for China to attract 
foreign investments, the actual-payment system, especially if it is associated 
with consumption-based VAT, is more acceptable and accommodating to 
general international practice on VAT refund of other WTO mem hers. 
In addition to the proposals of incorporating the production-based VAT with a 
consumption-based VAT and restructuring the export rebate mechanism, with 
respect to VAT taxpayers, the definition of "small scale" taxpayers should be 
reconsidered. "Small scale" taxpayers in China are posited awkwardly due to 
the conflict of credit and deduction during the transactions with their 
counterparts - "regular" taxpayers. 79 The services sector dominated by 
disadvantaged small-scale taxpayers represents a higher and growing 
proportion of China's fast GDP growth. Actually, small scale taxpayers 
account for much of local economy growth, increased employment 
opportunities and resourceful utilization of capital. Revenue from the services 
sector is essential to China's dynamic economic growth. As the small-scale 
taxpayer find hard to issue VAT invoices, output VAT cannot be offset against 
input VAT and the tax base for small-scale taxpayers is the VAT exclusive 
sales value. 80 
79 See Article 2, Provisional Regulation of VAT of the P.R.C., stipulating that small-scale 
taxpayers engaged in selling goods or taxable services shall use a simplified method for 
calculating the tax payable 
80 The VAT exemption and refund policy also applies to goods exported for contracted 
engineering projects and repair and maintenance services. However, as stipulated by a 
Circular issued by SAT on 24 March 2005 (Guoshuihan [2005] No. 248), export enterprises 
exporting products purchased from small-scale taxpayers must present a VAT invoice to 
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Due to China's labor-intensive advantage and enlarged market opened under 
WTO, refining the status and management of small-scale taxpayers has to be 
in line with similar rules of other WTO member countries. 81 For instance, 
small-scale taxpayers would benefit from tax simplification of VAT, and the 
importance of small-scale taxpayers must be valued by tax administration in 
revenue collection given the potential tax bases. 
Therefore, one issue here is to redefine the status of small-scale taxpayers to 
crystallize the tax bases. Then, considerable tax administrative resources for 
VAT collection should be assigned to design an appropriate framework to 
control the number of small-scale VAT taxpayers, and to transform them to 
regular or ordinary VAT taxpayers. That being said, the following questions 
should be considered in future VAT legislation, although approaches to 
resolve them are in debate: (1) which kind of a "single tax" might be designed 
for small-scale taxpayer; (2) if there is a need to eliminate the "small-scale" 
taxpayer category, what are the meaningful and practical standards to classify 
small-scale and ordinary or regular VAT taxpayers or any particular social and 
political ramifications; (3) does tax administration overestimate the tax 
evasion channeled through small scale taxpayers; and ( 4) is there any 
alternative to address the small scale taxpayers within the current VAT 
structure or an overhaul is necessary. All of these concerns complicate the 
post-WTO tax legislation reform as to VAT. 
obtain a VAT refund. In such cases, the small-scale taxpayer can request the tax authorities to 
issue a VAT invoice for products sold to export enterprises 
81 Public perception of small businesses has been changed radically over the last decades in 
China. During the first 15 years of China's opening economy, small businesses were 
perceived as marginal to the mainstream of economic activity, and were typically cast as 
habitual tax avoiders and evaders 
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4.1.2. Consumption Tax 
As an excise tax, the Chinese consumption tax is a means for the government 
to influence consumer spending behavior in terms of tax equity. Since the 
consumption tax was introduced in 1994, many commodities then categorized 
as "luxury" now are considered basics of daily urban life, including 
automobiles, cosmetic products, wine, and authentic Louis Vuitton handbags. 
Hence, an enlarged, open market under the WTO regime and increased 
citizens' purchasing power would drive Chinese tax authorities to redefine the 
subjects and tax rates of consumption tax - many then "luxury" now "basic 
needs" goods should be excluded from the consumption tax basis. On the 
other hand, the scope of consumption tax basis should include certain 
"luxurious" services such as high-yield personal banking services or recreation 
activities. Moreover, this thesis submits that to nurture domestic interests, tax 
authorities should also consider imposing a reasonable consumption tax rate 
on certain goods that are currently not produced locally or, even those 
products can be produced locally, but the standards of domestic products 
might not reach those imported ones. This may help enrich the market by 
saturation of both domestic and foreign products. 
4.1.3. Business Tax 
Business tax is imposed on provisions of services and transfers of immovable 
and intangible assets in China. As Business tax and VAT are mutually 
exclusive, a reform to VAT will inevitably lead to reduction of scope of 
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business tax. For those important domestic service industries that will be 
opened to foreign investors following China's accession to WTO, the tax 
authorities should consider imposing an even lower business tax rate on 
insurance and financial industries to drive the growth into a true "market" with 
healthy competition and easy entrance. However, the timing is not ripe to 
combine the business tax with the VAT. One important reason is that the VAT 
is a state tax under a central-local sharing formula, but the business tax is 
collected by local tax bureaus. Such combination may induce a readjustment 
of the sharing formula between central and local governments. Given the 
potential of reduced local revenues, very likely such combination will be 
rejected or manipulated by localities. 
4.2. Implications for Enterprise Income Tax 
The implications of China's accession to the WTO on the income tax regime 
centers on two major WTO non-discriminatory principles: the national 
treatment and most-favored-nation principles. The current Chinese income tax 
law framework derives from the tax system overhaul conducted in 1994. One 
of the foremost income tax legislation reforms is the enactment of the new 
Enterprise Income Tax Law effective as of January 1, 2008. The new 
Enterprise Income Tax Law (the "2008 EIT Law") actually is one of a series 
of updated legislative efforts catering to principles of the WTO and the rule of 
law order. Other major legislations include the new Corporation Law (2006), 
the Anti-Money-Laundering Law (2007), and the Anti-Monopoly Law (2008), 
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all of which were engineered and devised to follow an international practice in 
related areas. 
The 2008 EIT Law unified a bifurcated enterprise income tax treatment in 
force since 1994. Prior to 2008, China enterprise income tax law system 
consists of two parallel sections which regulate income tax on Chinese-
invested enterprises (DEs) and income tax on enterprises with foreign 
investment and foreign enterprises (FIEs), respectively. Undoubtedly, China's 
two-track structured income tax law system has provided an easy platform for 
enhancing China's economic stability, safeguarding national economic 
advantages, and coordinating between DEs and FIEs. However, with China's 
WTO accession and the need to expand revenue collection, drawbacks of a 
dual-track income tax become readily apparent. In addition to various 
compliant from foreign investors on confusing treatment of different types of 
corporate entities, intensified administration on tax collection, frequent tax 
evasion, and compliance with WTO's national treatment rule all contribute to 
the urgency of the China's need for the newly promulgated the 2008 EIT Law. 
4.2.1. The pre-2008 bifurcated enterprise income tax treatment 
The bifurcated enterprise income tax system for DEs and FIEs is historically 
rooted and well established in China. 82 Briefly, the track of DE income tax 
system evolved through the painful process of SOEs reform and a changed the 
balance between state-owned and private sectors in terms of economy scale 
and revenue contribution. The development of the FIE income tax law system 
82 See supra Chapter II. 
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mirrors China's tax preferential policies embracing foreign investment and 
international coordination. However, tax collection deficiency and global trade 
bring the drawbacks of China's dualism in its enterprise income tax law 
system to the fore in enforcement and administration. The following are major 
problems in the old "dual track" enterprise income tax system that led to the 
promulgation of the 2008 EIT Law. 
4.2.1.1. The costly dividing criteria of DE affecting tax efficiency 
Based on China's hierarchical tax administration structure, the 1994 enterprise 
income tax regime classified DEs into two groups with regard to income tax: 
those directly subordinate to the central government, and those to local 
governments. Accordingly, DE's income tax liabilities are controlled some by 
the central and some by local governments. Characterized by the discord and 
rigidity of a traditional command economy, such a tax-sharing structure lead 
to a distorted relationship between various tax authorities on partitioning 
revenue collection, and impeded an appropriate fiscal structure. A deep-rooted 
administrative loophole is that every level of tax authority aims to control the 
direct administration and collection of the income tax. Some SOEs are 
privileged to enjoy particular incentives conditioned on types of enterprises 
and this leads to designated preference and unfairness. Since the revenue 
partitioning and administrative hierarchy make the tax collection and tax law 
enforcement come under various levels of administration, the costs of tax 
collection are increased and uncertain. Worse is that the competent level of the 
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state treasury to collect a given tax is unclear and enterprises are bedeviled by 
cross collection and administration at will. 
4. 2.1. 2. Ill-designed tax collection and administration system 
The DEs enterprise income tax collection and administration are full of 
misapprehension and confusion. First, tax collection implementation has 
historically been subject to distortion. The old Provisional Regulations for 
Enterprise Income Tax provided that enterprises with independent books and 
accounting should pay taxes locally, yet it also provided that the sectors of 
railroad, civil aviation, postal service and banking should be collected on an 
industry basis. This mixed industry and hierarchical collection approaches 
added another double-layer to the dual track system, especially when many 
restricted markets were opened after the WTO accession. Second, irregular tax 
collection activities lead to inconsistency in administration and weaken the 
controlling role of tax authorities. 83 Third, although theoretically state and 
local tax authorities carry out uniform measures for the income tax collections, 
a parallel structure was set up to apply separate rules. 
4.2.1.3. Taxable income vs. accounting income 
Under the Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises (ASBE) 
promulgated by the MOF in 1992, a set of accounting rules specifies the 
83 for Chinese-invested enterprises, to which the authority of collection and administration of 
the income tax on the non-state-owned ones is allocated to the local tax authorities, whereas 
the income tax on the state-owned enterprises, nominally collected and administrated by tax 
authorities, is actually controlled by different levels of administrative organs. 
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categories and differences between taxable income and accounting income. 
However, the gap therein makes it more difficult for tax authorities and 
taxpayers, especially DEs, in practice. 84 A prime example of this is the lack of 
a uniform standard for the deduction of salary and donation, depreciation, tax 
auditing, bad-debt clearance and conflicts between provisional rules and local 
policies applied to the state-owned enterprises. 
4.2.1.4.Narrowly defined enterprises income tax incentives 
Despite the purpose of attracting foreign capitals with advanced technologies 
and developing infrastructure of bottleneck industries, the old FIE income tax 
incentives do not live up to national treatment and MFN standards. First, the 
industry lines of foreign investments are too narrow. The overall quality of 
foreign investment is relatively concentrated on labor-intensive nature instead 
of technology-focused or capital-intensive orientation. Second, the disparity 
and imbalance in economic development aggravate the loopholes in enforcing 
tax incentives. The preferential policy has evolved into an uneven FIE income 
tax policy. From special economic zones, to coastal economic development 
zones, and further to hinterland regions, the tax rates become progressively 
uneven. Such tax rate structure inevitably creates unfair competition and 
further worsens preferential policy shopping. 
84 The Provisional Regulations for Enterprise Income Tax and the Income Tax Law 
Concerning FIEs and Foreign Enterprises have both stipulated that when, applying to its own 
accounting method, the accounting income of a taxpayer is not agreeable to the applicable 
provisions of tax law, the income tax shall be determined by the applicable provisions. 
However, there are some practical concerns in implementing such general provisions 
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4.2.1.5./rregular tax rates applied 
The tax rate is the core of tax legislation in terms of simplicity, enforcement, 
transparency and fairness. The old two-track enterprise income tax system 
imposes the same tax rate for DEs and PIEs- a nominal rate of33%. However, 
due to various exemptions, stipulated tax holidays, and local tax incentives, 
the actual tax rate for FIE income is substantially lower than that of DEs. It is 
estimated that PIEs were actually charged at rates ranging from 17% to 27%. 
This difference aroused complaints from DEs about their disadvantaged 
position in market competition and reinvestment. Moreover, quite often 
domestic capital takes a "detour" overseas to be coated as foreign capital to 
enjoy tax preferential policies, which leads to draining of revenue and 
complicated tax administration. Considering the international trend of 
lowering corporate tax rate, a uniform tax rate applying to both DEs and PIEs 
was highly pledged by domestic interests. 
4.2.1.6. Summary 
As noted, the pre-2008 income tax law system complicated preferential tax 
treatments on enterprises of different ownership or capital sources, in different 
regions, and on different industries and productions lines. 85 As a result, 
enterprise income tax reform in large part centered on the unification of the 
bifurcation tax treatments for DEs and PIEs. First, the tax efficiency 
consideration drove the removal of irregular administrative activities 
85 See, Jinyan Li, The Rise and Fall of Chinese Tax Incentives and Implications for 
International Tax Debates, 8 Fla. Tax Rev. 669, at 675 
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associated therewith. Vertically, the structure of revenue partitioning between 
the central and local on DEs income tax was not well formulated. Horizontally, 
even at the same hierarchical level, two separate systems for DEs and FIEs 
created nuances in tax collection practice. Second, the difference between the 
actual income tax rates for DEs and FIEs was with highly disparate. A uniform 
tax rate, regardless of capital sources or ownership, is necessary. Third, the 
accounting standards imposed by ASBE and modernization of SOE reform 
require similar tax treatment for DEs and FIEs such as deduction, appreciation, 
and booking practices. Fourth, complaints from DEs were partially based on 
the national treatment principle, with which they sought to remedy their 
disadvantaged position in market share and competition. 86 
The promulgation of the 2008 EIT Law also conditioned on the WTO 
principles. The unification of enterprise income tax treatment would help 
create fair competition and investment conditions. In light of commitments 
made in the Protocol, tax preferential policies should be adjusted for assurance 
and supervision with transparency and uniform administration, especially for 
regions or industry lines that are badly in need of FDL The tax authorities 
should continue benefiting FIEs in an encouraging but careful way, for the 
purpose of complying with the national treatment and MFN principles. Certain 
innovation in enterprise tax laws should be incorporated following 
international practice - attention should be paid to balance exacerbation of 
disparity which might create political sensitivity in China. 
86 /d., at 676-682 
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4.2.2. The 2008 EIT Law 
Given the challenges raised by the bifurcated tax treatments and deficiencies 
in tax administration, the 2008 EIT Law incorporates both corrective measures 
and modern corporate tax conceptions. In terms of tax rate, taxpayer 
categorization, taxable income determination, tax credit, tax preference, tax 
evasion, and tax administration, the 2008 EIT Law provides a better income 
tax framework with an emphasis on international tax. 
4.2.2.1. An improved unified tax rate? 
The tax rate 87 is essential to revenue collection and central to the dynamic 
balancing taxpayers and the state in terms of private property rights. Enterprise 
income tax rate is even more evident or decisive in regulating taxpayers' 
transactional or planning behaviors. Therefore, the design of an enterprise tax 
structure reflects the status of overall economic development and rule of law 
considerations. According to the 2008 EIT Law, the statutory tax rate for 
regular enterprise taxpayers is stipulated as 25%, a tax rate of 20% for small-
scale enterprises and 15% for state-sponsored high-tech enterprises. 
It is well noted that the uniform 25% rate is a compromised number after 
evaluating various factors. First and foremost, the 25% rate reflects the 
effective or actual tax rate applicable to FIEs under pre-2008 tax treatment-
no extra burden is created considering the tax preferential treatments 
87 See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Corporate and International Tax Reform: Long-, Medium-, and 
Short Term Proposals, http://law.bepress.com/umichlwps/olin/artl 06, discussing the global 
trend on corporate tax rate reduction (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
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grandfathered under the old FIE tax treatment. Moreover, the tax burden of 
DEs is reduced to an acceptable level for carrying on business and generating 
reinvestments. Second, although the 25% rate is higher than that of Hong 
Kong (16.5%-17.5%), it is quite competitive comparing with statutory rates at 
peer neighboring tax jurisdictions such as Japan (20%), South Korea (27.5%), 
Vietnam (28%) and Malaysia (28%) as well as statutory rates adopted by 
developed tax jurisdictions in U.S. (35%), France (33.3%), Germany (25%), 
U.K. (30%), Italy (33%). This comparative advantage was highly valued in the 
legislative opinion collection process for two causes: (1) the rate should allow 
the Chinese market to remain competitive and attractive to FDI; and (2) it 
shall not substantially jeopardize the scale of national revenue collection. 
Third, from the perspective of tax collection and administration, the uniform 
25% rate facilitates compliance and cross-regional consolidation of tax 
liabilities. 
However, the benefit of a uniform tax rate should not be exaggerated. It is too 
early to claim such a uniform rate will improve tax equity and efficiency in a 
modem sense. Ultimately a uniform statutory rate only prevents tax inequality 
or cures deficiency. The inefficient partitioning formula between the central 
and local government still exists. The effective tax rates for DEs and FIEs in 
large extent are still different -the 2008 EIT somewhat only helps narrow the 
divergence. Moreover, although the nominal tax rate drops by 8 percent from 
33% to 25%, this decreased rate is only reflective of existing effective tax rate 
in practice. From a microeconomics point of view, the tax burden is not, in 
fact, lowered as much as the rate change shows. From the revenue collection 
perspective, given the limited fiscal contribution made by the enterprise 
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income tax sector, a lowered uniform tax rate with expanded taxpayer base 
does not substantiate tax authorities' position that extra-intensified compliance 
control should be implemented for revenue collection. 
4. 2. 2. 2. Clearer categorization of enterprise taxpayers 
The 2008 EIT Law classifies taxpayers as "resident" and "non-resident"88 
taxpayers in accordance with international standards of "place of incorporation" 
and "effective management." The outmoded categorization based on sources 
of capital, i.e., the two-track DE and FIE bifurcation, 89 was repudiated to 
expand the scope of taxpayers to include all units and organizations90 with 
business operation and income in China - but individual proprietorships and 
partnerships are excluded. Overall, this clearer categorization is wise for three 
reasons. 
First, the Marxist ideological delineation of "socialist ownership by all people" 
still plagues the tax system. The line between socialist collective or commune 
ownership and "private ownership" is blurred given the overall economic 
situation and establishment of modem corporate governance structures 
comprising publicly held corporations and shareholders. Sticking with 
stereotype classification would only perplex tax administration and impede tax 
collection. In this sense, the revised classification based on commercial 
88 See Art. II, The EIT Law of the P.R.C. 
89 Jd, Art. I, stipulating that the taxpayer for enterprise income tax is "any enterprise except 
for individual proprietorship and partnership, and other organizations which has income." 
90 See infra Chapter VIII, noting whether the organization should include non-profit 
organization is still in debate. Different from the U.S., which has the UBIT, the tax treatment 
of income generated by nonprofit organizations is not clear 
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profitability and business entity is a forced move rather than voluntary 
progress. Second, the exclusion of individual proprietorships and partnerships 
from the EIT application looks like a cautious makeshift. One probable reason 
is that China does not have a modem piece of comprehensive tax legislation 
for either individual proprietorships or partnerships. The other reason is that 
the EIT compliance system is not able to synchronize individual income tax to 
consolidate income generated by individual proprietorships and partnerships. 
Third, the classification of "resident" and "non-resident" enterprises is a 
perfect example of borrowing concepts from the individual income tax context. 
The advantage of this approach is that it simplifies tax administration based on 
standards of "place of incorporation" and "effective management". In this 
sense, this classification embodies an improvement in tax equity solely for tax 
collection purposes and in tax efficiency by identifying and administering 
presence of commercial benefits. 
4.2.2.3. Coordination of standards for taxable income and accounting 
income 
Progress made by the 2008 EIT Law includes a better coordinated taxable 
income calculation from the ASBE perspective. For the first time, the 2008 
EIT Law stipulates that taxable income in each taxable year is derived by 
deducting non-taxable income, exempted income, various deductions and 
remaining sum from covering losses in the previous year from the total income. 
The non-taxable income and exempted income actually are tax accounting 
concepts attaining more economic sense for tax auditing purposes. The 2008 
EIT Law also unifies standards for deduction calculation in determining 
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taxable income. 91 For instance, reasonable expenses actually incurred in 
production, management and other relevant business activities, such as costs, 
expenses, taxes, losses, and other miscellaneous expenses, can be deducted in 
calculating taxable income. In this sense, tax equity is better realized by 
honoring the principles of the ability to pay and accrual basis. 
4. 2. 2. 4. A more centralized framework of tax incentives for investment 
Tax preferential policies stipulated in the 2008 EIT Law reveal considerable 
controversy over whether those incentives are effective or desirable,92 i.e., for 
which incentives that the Chinese government would take the loss the revenue 
as a tradeoff. 93 In the 2008 EIT Law, different modes of amending previous 
. . . ld c. . 1 1' . k 94 d d 95 tax mcenttves co-extst - some o pre1erentta po tctes are ept, expan e , 
modified 96 or even voided. 97 A careful reading of tax incentives would 
91 See Article VIII, The EIT Law of the P.R. C. (2008) 
92 See generally in David Holland and Richard J. Vann, in Victor Thuronyi ed. Tax Law 
Design and Drafting, 986-1020 
93 See generally in Alex Easson, Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment, BIFD 266 
(July 2001) 
94 See Art. 27, the EIT Law of the P.R.C. (2008), stipulating that for tax preferences for 
investment on agriculture, forestry, husbandry and fishery industries, and public infrastructure, 
and Article 28(1) provides that tax preference is still reserved for small-sized enterprises with 
meager profit 
95 Articles 31 and 34, the EIT Law of the P.R.C. (2008), eliminating the regional tax 
preference limitation confining to high-tech industries the low tax preference of 15%, adds tax 
preference for venture investment, expands investment tax credit applicable from environment 
protection equipment and water conservation facilities to equipment of environmental 
protection, water and energy conservation and safe production etc. 
96 Articles 30(1) the EIT Law of the P.R.C. (2008), changes direct tax preferences into indirect 
tax preferences, such as wage paid for disabled people by labor service enterprise, welfare 
enterprise; Article 33 provides that income earned by products in conformity with industrial 
policy produced by resource comprehensive utilization enterprise, Article 30(1) allows 
research and development fees to be added up and deducted, and Article 30 permits 
accelerating depreciation, or shorten depreciation time of fixed asset in the enterprise 
97 Some old preferential tax policies were repudiated, such as the preferential policy providing 
periodic tax reduction or exemption to newly-established production-oriented foreign-invested 
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disclose that the central government is strongly favored with a controlling 
position in designing tax incentives. Incentive legislation policy power, once 
delegated to regional tax authorities, was centralized to integrate industry-
oriented or region-preferred schemes. The merits of this development are three 
fold. First, it strengthens a nationwide tax incentive scheme to ensure a 
balanced and improved development framework for various industries. For 
example, the 2008 EIT Law prioritizes environmentally friendly and high tech 
sectors. Second, centralized control helps circumvent local protectionism and 
cross-region tax incentive shopping by foreign investors, which may lead to 
interregional development disparity. Third, an integrated incentive framework 
is advantageous to simplifying the tax administration, and more importantly, 
to increasing efficiency in revenue collection. 
4.2.2.5. Development in international tax - tax credits and anti-
avoidance system 
The 2008 EIT Law incorporates the long-awaited international tax credit 
system. 98 Briefly, for income originated offshore which has already been 
charged tax in the source country, the tax paid should be deducted from tax 
liabilities in China, if the deductible amount is lower than that of tax 
calculated under Chinese tax laws. The tax credit system marks one of very 
few developments in the international aspects of Chinese tax legislation in 
enterprises or to enterprises after the transitional period ends, and preferential policy which 
levies only half the tax on export-oriented foreign- invested enterprises. For details, see 
Jianwen Liu, Eight Innovations of the New EfT Law, 
http://www.cftl.cnlshow.asp?c id=550&a id=6948 (last visited on March 15, 2011) . - -
See Articles 23 an 24, the EIT Law of the P.R.C. (2008) 
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recent years. Undoubtedly, it constructively avoids international double 
taxation and advances principles of tax equity. 
Another march that the 2008 EIT Law advances is the insertion of anti-
avoidance measures.99 Three prongs of consideration prompted the validation. 
First, after 30 years of accommodating FDI, thin capitalization and profits 
transfer after exploitation of tax incentives by foreign investors endanger the 
revenue collection at various fronts. In addition, increased capital mobility 
incentivizes exploiting tax havens for round-tripping which acerbates the 
draining of collectable tax payment. As a shared practice, tax avoidance 
measures are adopted to safeguard revenue sources. In this connection, the 
2008 EIT Law catches up with international routines. Second, the arm's length 
principle is established for transfer pricing and advanced pricing agreement 
practices. This is an encouraging move made in the 2008 EIT Law for 
modernizing tax administration. Since many multinationals treat the China 
market as indispensable for global profitability, the growing commercial 
expansion requires China's tax administration to master basic tax rationales to 
guarantee safe tax sovereign and revenue collection - the adoption of the 
arm's length principle provides a perfect example. Third, a few modern 
corporate law elements are embraced in the 2008 EIT Law. Tax treatments for 
closely-held corporations are detailed as to tax payments consolidation and 
compliance. One reason for this change is that irregular tax planning activities 
exploit the loopholes in cross-region tax administrative coordination. The 
other reason falls on the expertise and competence shortage suffered by local 
99 
See generally, Section IV "Special Tax Payment Adjustment", the EIT Law of the P.R.C. 
(2008) 
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tax officials. A nationwide EIT law would leverage more discretion in 
handling complicated corporate structure issues. 
4.2.2.6. Increased support for tax administrative discretion 
Under the 2008 EIT Law, administration is in line with the classification of 
taxpayers based on "place of incorporation" and "effective management" 
principles.100 The old enterprise income tax system evidenced a deficiency in 
this connection. Two lines of tax administrative discretion are evident. First, 
the consolidation of tax payment is administered more collectively. Taxpayers 
are not required to consolidate books of branches, representative offices, and 
subsidiaries to reach a final tax payment. Meanwhile, the headquarters may 
serve as the liaison point to fulfill tax liabilities. Second, the 2008 EIT Law 
honors the principle of non-retroactivity in administration, i.e., tax incentives 
would be grandfathered for taxpayers which have enjoyed tax incentives based 
on the old enterprise income tax system. Therefore, the solution of old 
enterprises old way, new enterprises new way should be enforced for FIEs 
concerning preferential tax treatments. According to Article 57 of the 2008 
EIT Law, an enterprise established before the promulgation of the new law, 
100 See Articles 3(2) and 3(3), the EIT Law of the P.RC. (2008), if a non-resident enterprise 
obtains income, the office or the site where the income occurs is considered as place of tax 
payment. If the non-resident enterprise has two or more than two offices or sites in China, the 
main office or site shall be chosen to pay enterprise income tax; if a non-resident enterprise 
acquires income, the place of the withholding agent is considered as the place of tax payment. 
As for headquarters and branches, if a resident enterprise set up business establishment of 
non-corporate status, enterprise income taxes of the headquarters and branch should be added 
up and calculated on a consolidated basis 
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which enjoyed a preferential tax rate according to the old tax law or tax 
1 . h . '11 . 5 . d 101 regu ations, t en 1t Wl enJOY a -year grace peno . 
4.2.2. 7. Summary 
Overall, the 2008 EIT Law is a hopeful piece upgrading the tax legislation and 
administration system in China. It not only is in line with the WTO principles 
and international tax practice on transparency, improved administration, and 
non-discrimination, but also helps establishing important elements of the rule 
of law order in terms of consistency, non-retroactivity and clear-cut obligation. 
Given the rich modern tax concepts embodied therein, it showcases improved 
legislative techniques in the tax context in terms of a unified tax rate, clearer 
categorization of taxpayers, synchronization with ASBE standards, tax credit 
and anti-avoidance measures. 
It is continually significant to mention that it still aims for revenue collection 
and internalizing administrative discrepancies. The 2008 EIT Law is not 
without limitations under the revenue-sharing formula between the central and 
local governments. The consolidation of tax payments and compliance still 
suffers from a shortage of detailed rules on approval and tax auditing 
101 See Article 57, the EIT Law of the P.R.C. (2008), enterprise which enjoys periodic 
reduction and exemption of income tax can continue to enjoy the preferential treatment after 
the implementation of the Law. But if the enterprise did not enjoy preferential treatment 
because of non-profitability, the preferential period will be calculated from the year of 
enforcement of the Law. High-tech enterprise which needs key support of the State in regions 
of economic cooperation and technology exchange with foreign countries, and in regions with 
special policy as prescribed by State Council, can enjoy transitional preferential treatment of 
the transitional nature. Other enterprises whose establishments are encouraged by the State, 
can enjoy tax reduction and exemption preferences according to regulations prescribed by 
State Council 
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procedures. The arm's-length principle adopted for transfer pricing and 
advance payment agreement is not often initiated or applied for domestic 
cross-region tax planning. Meanwhile, a centralized control on tax incentives 
promulgation may over-tailor a non-applicable nationwide administration 
practice. All these problems will emerge coupled with incompetency in tax 
administration. 
4.3.Individual income tax (liT) 
Over the past three decades of economic development and livelihood 
improvement, although the liT legislation has been amended five times, 102 the 
current liT Law103 remains nascent and incomplete. Generally, the Chinese liT 
adopts tax jurisdictions based on "residence" and "source" principles - a tax 
resident104 is liable to the liT on her worldwide income whereas a nonresident 
is liable for her Chinese-source income. Given the turnover tax dominant tax 
governance structure, liT either for revenue contribution or as the main tool of 
redistribution suffers from less attention. Introduced firstly in 1980 105 for 
imposing an income tax to foreign individuals employed in China, the liT is 
102 Five amendments were made in 1993, 1999, 2005, and 2007 (twice), see SAT official 
website; http://www.chinatax.gov.cn (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
103 Individual Income Tax Law ofthe People's Republic of China, adopted by the 4th Session 
of the Standing Committee ofthe 8th National People's Congress on October 31, 1993, and 
promulgated by the president on the same date. Implementing Regulations for the Individual 
Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China, issued by the State Council on January 29, 
1994 
104 This thesis uses the term "individual" referring to as a "physical person" or "natural person" 
105The Individual Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China was enacted by the 3rd 
Session of the 5th National People's Congress and promulgated September 10, 1980. Detailed 
Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of the Individual Income Tax Law of the 
People's Republic of China were approved December 10, 1980, by the State Council and 
promulgated December 14, 1980, by the Ministry of Finance 
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more symbolic than fiscal to the international community that the Chinese tax 
context is compatible with the market economy and conducive to international 
investment. Mostly, Revenue collection contributed by the liT w~ not 
significant enough and the liT bases were too narrow to actually influence 
redistribution. Although it increased eight-fold from 1980 to 2010 as a 
percentage of total tax revenue, 106 the liT does not perform as a meaningful 
tool of redistribution like its counterparts in western tax jurisdictions. On the 
other hand, although revenue contributed by liT is insignificant comparing 
with turnover taxes, 107 the amount of liT revenue increased rapidly. 
Since China's accession to the WTO, however, the fiscal and redistribution 
functions of liT have become more evident and recognized. There are three 
prongs of causes. First, for the past decade, the enlarged income disparities 
among taxpayers have greatly acerbated the tension between the wealthy and 
the low-income groups in both urban and rural regions. 108Second, with private 
property rights established in the Constitution and the stringent liT compliance 
requirements, the awareness of individual taxpayers' rights focuses more on 
the equity and efficiency of liT. The requirements of compulsory withholding 
and voluntary tax compliance for high-income taxpayers lead to questioning 
on redistribution function of liT when larger share of their income are 
106 In 1980, revenue contribution by liT is approximately CNY 0.1 million, accounting for less 
than 1 percent of total tax revenue; in 2010, approximately CNY653 billion, accounting for 
more than 8 percent of total tax revenue, State Administration of Taxation, Tax Statistics. 
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn (last visited on April. 10, 2011). 
107 For example, the combination of revenue from VAT, Business Tax and Consumption Tax 
accounts for approximately over 62% of total tax revenue in 2010. 
http://202.1 08.90.130/n8136506/n8136593/n8137633/n8138832/1 0637226.html (last visited 
on March 15, 2011) 
108 
See generally, People's Daily: Disparity oflncome Worsens the "Disadvantaged Mindset" 
of Citizens (November 11, 2010), (A~ !:H&:l&.A.iU§.:bU::k~l1~"~~~'l)J!"Jl~), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-ll/lllc_12760474.htm (last visited on March 15, 
2011) 
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taxed. 109 Third, tax administrative deficiencies in liT collection dishonor the 
tax credit and international coordination. Although various bi-lateral tax 
treaties have been contracted to avoid double taxation, given the increased 
cross-border mobility of labor and capital, liT collection actually complicates 
the tax administration in favor of tax authorities. Having noted the above, the 
liT legislation itself is left far behind from reform. 
The Chinese liT mostly is a scheduler and largely gross-basis taxation. Its 
collection usually is completed by direct source withholding from the source 
for easy calculation and administrative control. In this sense, tax authorities, in 
large measure, rely on employers to complete liT collection. However, the 
Chinese liT system suffers from the lack of tax equity and efficiency which 
arouse media attention and popular protest against current liT Law. 
First, based on the principle of "ability to pay," the liT fails to meet vertical 
equity with a progressive tax rate schedule, i.e., higher income is charged with 
higher tax. Taxable individual income is not measured on an annual, 
comprehensive basis; rather, liT calculation adopts a scheduler basis and is 
determined monthly or for each payment. Joint-filing is not allowed in China-
a taxpayer's household income is not valued and no relief is given familial 
obligations, such as child-care, education, and medical expenses. 
Second, in terms of horizontal equity, i.e., same tax liability for taxpayers with 
the same dollar, under the current Chinese liT Law, only employment income, 
such as salary, dividends and service charges, and certain business income are 
109 See generally, Chang'an Li, The Poor's Contribution Outshines the Wealthy? CHINA 
SOCIETYPERIODICAL2005(30)(**3l:: ~1;!!11'-m: ~A.:Vt~*T"Ji.A. ?~!;!!It±~ 
~TIJ) (2005) 
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subject to the high progressive liT tax rates schedule. Income from other 
sources is not taxable at the same rate or even not subject to tax. Because quite 
large portion of personal income is obtained from self-employment, capital 
investment or even "black-box" sources by those high-income earners, the liT 
sources are short of control. Moreover, liT for foreigners and Chinese citizens 
are calculated under different formulas and deduction arrangements which 
create nuances in tax administration. 
Third, tax efficiency is heavily impaired by the current liT Law. As to the 
collection system structure, China does not have an liT return filing system 
available. Although the SAT stipulates that individual taxpayers with annual 
income of RMB 120,000 must file an liT return, the administration of this 
filing regime is weak. The liT system lends itself to manipulation by well-
designed tax planning activities or specific arrangements to avoid tax. The 
administrative efficiency is distorted by the draining of liT revenue and leaves 
opportunities for corruption of bribing partial liT payment. 
Overall, China's liT system contains biased and oversimplified rules with 
insufficient tax administration. Surprisingly, other than playing a symbolic 
game of increasing the liT deduction threshold a few times, there are weak 
political pressures and reform proposals calling for a more neutral and 
efficient liT law system. Meanwhile, the deficiency in liT administration 
demands transparency and impartial administration with predictability. Almost 
no individual taxpayer would seek judicial review to challenge controversial 
liT collection. Returning to a jurisprudential analysis, the liT legislation 
should be reexamined to better realize the efficiency and redistributive 
functions of liT. For example, in terms of consistency, each of five 
330 
amendments would waste tremendous legislative resources. The liT Law 
should play a more proactive role in redistributing social wealth and resolve 
tensions caused by income disparity. 
4.3.1. Drawbacks 
China's liT Law has been quite passive in taking care of issues popping up 
from time to time. Therefore, it is plagued by many issues such as monitoring 
high income taxpayers, liT thresholds, measures to increase taxpayer 
awareness, and inconsistency with international practice. Drawbacks of the liT 
regime are summarized as below. 
4.3.1.1. Inadequate scheduler arrangement 
China adopts a scheduler system and a flat rate to facilitate liT withholding at 
source. Income from employment is subject to a progressive rate schedule 
ranging from 5 percent to 45 percent, while itemized income such as royalties, 
interest, dividends, bonuses, lease of property, transfer of property and like 
kind income that is not paid for the labor, is subject to a flat rate of 20 percent. 
However, individual taxpayers' income portfolios have become much more 
enriched than in the early 1980's when the scheduler system was designed. 
Flourishing capital investment and private wealth aggregation make people 
rely less on income from employment. In this sense, the current liT scheduler 
system does not honor the "ability to pay" and "tax equity" principles by 
leaving a great gap to locate legitimate bases for revenue collection - the 
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direct withholding at sources cannot remedy the loophole or create tax 
evasions through unethical accounting practice. On the other hand, taxpayers 
generally do not file a tax return to report tax liability unless they receive 
income from multiple sources or tax is not withheld by the payer. This leaves 
a large portion of income unreported and untaxed. Given the shortage of tax 
compliance culture in China, the scope of the liT system is no longer 
compatible with diversified and expanded income composition. 
4. 3.1.2. Ill-proportioned structure of tax rate 
A progressive liT tax rates schedule is widely recognized as an international 
practice. 110 Usually, income that cannot be itemized should be taxed at 
differentiated proportioned rates. In contrast with reforms adopted in western 
tax jurisdictions which support lower liT tax rates, reduction of the number of 
grade of tax rates and widening tax base, China's liT tax rate schedule remain 
highly progressive with the highest bracket as 45%. Three corrections should 
be made to the current liT tax rate schedule. First, the classification of 
progressive rates applied to income in excess of threshold amount is too 
complicated. In addition to liT imposed on sole proprietorship and 
partnerships, this classification complicates collection with a four-category 
rate structure, which is even further differentiated. Second, there are too many 
brackets of progressive rates on non-itemized income such as salary, and the 
marginal rate between grades is unreasonably high. Third, the standards of 
110 See generally, Victor Thuronyi, Tax Law Design and Drafting, IMF, Preface, noting the 
U.S. and other OECD countries adopting a progressive liT gradually since the late 1980s 
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establishing progressive rates are incoherent between different brackets of tax 
rates. For example, no statistical study substantiates a RMB20,000 difference 
for the tax rates from 25% to 35% within 3 brackets. This imposes an 
unnecessary tax burden and complicates the liT calculation, especially for 
income from remuneration for personal service and intellectual property (e.g. 
royalty); 
4.3.1.3.Illogical design of expense deductions 
Another common complaint against China's liT is the frustration as to unclear 
rules on expense deductions. Briefly, there are two measures of deduction 
under the Chinese liT Law: quota deduction and rate deduction. Income from 
wages and salaries shall be on quota deduction, while the concession for 
intellectual property, the remuneration for personal service and like kind 
services shall be taxed by combining quota deduction and rate deduction. In 
practice, the deduction measures complicate tax liability determination by 
overlooking actual burden on the taxpayers. The diversified portfolio of 
personal income through education, housing and social security makes it 
difficult to apply a reasonable expense deduction schedule to accommodate 
various aspects of economic well-being. On the other hand, the monthly 
deductible amount for income from wages and salaries remains symbolic 
although it has been amended quite a few times. Such revision is not without 
its merits considering the inflation and social wealth redistribution. However, 
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it manifests a shortage of legislative techniques on deciding deduction 
measures. 
4. 3.1. 4. !IT collection and administration: 
Source withholding (and remitting) and filing (reporting) tax returns are two 
major ways realizing tax collection. However, voluntary tax return filing only 
applies to high income earners. Due to the incompleteness in tax return filing 
computerization, deficiency in tax audit and inspection, and weak 
synchronization of enterprise income tax with liT, a modern collection and 
administration system is not available in China. This deficiency might be a 
good thing for many high income earners given the lack of tax compliance 
culture in China. However, in a long run, the weak administration of liT 
would jeopardize revenue collection and acerbate wealth disparity. First, the 
process of tax return filing is not standardized. No practical and integrated tax 
filing rules and compliance standards is available, nor individual income 
reporting, self-assessment tools and investigation system are established. 
Second, due to voluminous cash transactions in practice pushed by the loose 
banking transactional control, tax authorities are confronted with the dilemma 
of choosing between weak monitoring of high income groups and setting up a 
check system of all taxpayers. Third, the method of withholding and remitting 
tax is not comprehensive. Although it is stipulated that the enterprises (units) 
or persons must withhold and remit taxes and make special notes for the future 
audit, there are no systematic and feasible measures to assure or improve 
fulfillment of this obligation and, pertinent tax laws become a dead Jetter. 
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4.3.2. Refonn proposals 
The refonn of individual income tax laws should focus on tax equity and 
efficiency principles with efforts to improve neutrality and transparency. The 
legislation refonn of Chinese liT Law should be overwhelming. Priorities 
should be given to broadening tax base, adjusting preferential policies and 
fighting against tax evasion. In light of the WTO principles of transparency, 
unifonn and impartial administration, China's commitment in Protocol, as 
well as basic elements enclosed in a rule of law order, the following measures 
should be emphasized if a new liT Law is in expectation. 
4.3.2.l.Refining the scheduler system 
Transition to a comprehensively classified income tax system is necessary for 
Chinese liT system. Income tax is usually imposed by "definitional structure" 
(scheduler or global) based on the concept of income (accretion, source or 
thrust concept). 111 Among three major kinds of income taxation systems: item-
categorized income tax system, comprehensive income tax system and 
comprehensive item-categorized income tax system, 112 the third should be 
adopted in the Chinese liT system. 113 The rational is simple: the item-
111 See Victor Thuronyi Comparative Tax (Kluwer Press, 2003) at 233 
112 The standpoint of item-categorized income tax system is that income of different nature is 
taxed differently for the convenience of controlling tax administration and saving cost of 
collection. Yet it is suspected to discord the principle of levying tax on ability-to-pay. 
Although the comprehensive income tax system meets the principle of levying tax based on 
the actual paying ability of taxpayers, the collection process would be very complicated and 
may lead to unforeseeable tax evasion. 
113 Historically, the 1980 Individual Income Tax Law of China, first income tax law of 
China's opening economy, once took advantages of such comprehensive item-categorized 
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categorized tax system, though easy to implement, does not pay proper 
attention to the taxpayer's actual paying ability, and the comprehensive 
income tax system. The comprehensive item-categorized income tax system 
combines advantages of the above two systems, i.e. regrouping wages, salaries, 
income from contracted or subcontracted operation of enterprises or 
institutions, income from lease of property, and income from transfer of 
property into a comprehensive income, at progressive rates after a reasonable 
expense deduction. As to income from other sources, a proportional tax rate 
should remain applicable. 
4.3.2.2.Introducing the family-taxpayer practice 
The principles of transparency and tax equity demand the treatment of 
individuals and families as taxpayers. 114 In terms of equity and efficiency, 
treating the family as a taxpayer is a rather proper way to tax incomes from 
other sources than labor, including interest, dividend, bonuses, concession fees 
and so on. The source ofthe withholding would overlook various factors that 
might potentially impact the tax burden when only an individual is treated as a 
taxpayer. On the other hand, in terms of improving the deduction measures, 
many reasonable deductions will be grouped together to justify household 
income before paying tax. This practice has the U.S. system as precedent to 
follow. In terms of efficiency, treating an individual as the taxpayer may 
influence her investment choices, while treating a family, the basic unit of the 
income tax system. Yet the 1987 Provisional Regulations on Individual Regulatory Income 
Tax used item-categorized income tax system and later the amended Individual Income Tax 
Law kept item-categorized income tax system. 
114 Treating an individual or a family as a taxpayer mainly depends on the purpose of 
individual income tax at a particular time 
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society, as a taxpayer helps ensure that revenue collection will not be 
encumbered by considerations of expenses. In terms of social wealth 
redistribution, treating a family as a taxpayer somewhat increases mobility of 
capital and increase labor force. The thesis submits that the liT compliance 
system reform should prioritize expenses deduction for seniors and children. 
Moreover, under the current social intensity from unemployed college 
graduate and laid-off workers, treating a family as a taxpayer will comfort 
low-income families and mitigate disturbance arising from the unemployment. 
4.3.2.3.Broadening the liT bases 
Broadened tax bases lead to enlarged tax revenues. Given the large population 
in China, liT tax bases should be given a dominant role in running the liT 
system. Although the SAT provides various measures to solidify tax bases, 
consideration should be given to the following goals. (I) The scope of 
itemized income should be expanded to include personal gains from various 
forms of investments. For example, earnings of stock trading from overseas 
stock exchanges and private mineral production should be included; (2) 
Expense deductions against some categories of income, such as income from 
contracted services or real estate leasing operation should be voided or 
decreased; (3) Preferential deduction measures applicable to foreign individual 
taxpayers should be given to Chinese taxpayers for the same categories of 
income. Moreover, lowering tax rate and reducing the number of grade of tax 
rate must be taken into account. Current Chinese liT Law imposes a 9-scale 
tax rate schedule which is against its legislative intent of simplifying tax laws. 
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Income from personal services and employment income are taxed at different 
tax rates which is inconsistent with the tax equity principle. 
Another issue is about the synchronization of corporate and shareholder tax 
liabilities. However, this double taxation scenario is not fully attained by 
Chinese legislators. Similarly, individual proprietorships and partnerships are 
not separated from individual taxpayer liT treatment. For example, sole 
proprietorships' income derived from public sector infrastructures are only 
subject to a 5-scale tax rate comparing with the 9-scale liT rate structure. 
Therefore, the enlarged self-employed sector may exploit advantages of this 
discrepancy promulgated 25 years ago to evade tax liability. Meanwhile, the 
partnership tax law is not in place. 
4.3.2.4. Normalization of the expense deduction 
Deduction for the purposes of liT is covered by a comprehensive set of 
measures. Reasonable expenses, the livelihood standards, marital status, and 
social settings should be put together based on the "ability to pay" principle. In 
this sense, the deduction system is a symbol of tax mix quality for living and 
investments. Although the SAT and local tax authorities have released various 
provisional rules and circulars on deduction categorization and timing limits, 
the Chinese liT legislation is expected to formulate the following aspects: (1) 
the same income may mean different costs to different taxpayers. Therefore, 
the deduction method should be used uniformly in view of the imbalance of 
development; (2) a properly differentiated deduction index should be adapted 
to reduce income disparities; (3) China's one-child policy for the past thirty 
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years has forced the fourth and fifth generations of Chinese to face 
unprecedented pressure of supporting three families by a couple. Although 
China is in the process of establishing a pension system as well as social 
security mechanism to accommodate and prevent future restlessness, expense 
deduction should be awarded to families supporting seniors and children. In 
this sense, the expense deduction stipulated in the individual income tax 
should be flexible; ( 4) inflation, exchange rate variance, purchasing power, 
cost of living and labor mobility should also be considered in localizing 
deduction measures. (5) A unification of deduction measures for Chinese and 
foreign individuals should be considered following WTO principles of 
liberating trades and capital mobility. 
4.3.2.5.Improving liT compliance and administration 
The current liT administration of combining source withholding and an 
auxiliary tax declaration should be improved in the liT legislation. This thesis 
submits that current source withholding measures should be maintained in 
consideration of administrative efficiency. However, the scope of tax 
declaration should be prioritized to a simplified annual return filing and 
encouragements to synchronize annual tax credit and non-withheld taxable 
income. Given the lack of tax compliance culture and manipulated booking 
practice, tax credit should be considered on an annual basis. Therefore, 
individual taxpayers have incentives to consolidate expenses to lower tax 
liability or to get refund. This is in line with compliance practice in many tax 
jurisdictions. Gradually, the liT should consider transforming source 
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withholding to self declaration for specific categories of taxpayers, but the 
digitization of compliance system must enable this measure. 
A system of tax audits should be incorporated, and the U.S. provides a good 
precedent in handling related issues such as solidifying tax bases and avoiding 
tax evasion. This thesis submits that, if confidentiality or privacy is sensitive 
to individual taxpayers, a system of Individual Economic Identity Cards 
(IEID), even on an annual basis, would help tracking income tax for both 
Chinese and foreign individuals. Meanwhile, measures such as credit card 
monitoring, individual account checks, and a real-name banking deposit 
system will enhance the transparency and help administration. 
4.3.3. Summary 
The list above is far from complete. The reform of liT legislation under 
China's WTO accession cannot be simplified as a few unifications or adding 
corrective administration approaches. Rather, a comprehensive study should 
be involved for the restructuring and streamlining of liT legislation system in 
general. The liT functions for revenue contribution and social wealth 
redistribution must be valued based on considerations such as taxpayers' right 
awareness, acerbated income disparities, enterprise income tax 
synchronization, individual proprietorships and partnerships, personal gains 
from various forms of capital investments, and out-of-control underground 
gains. On the other hand, international investors are concerned with liT more 
because it is the most tangible and visible sign of robustness in a country's tax 
system. Equally important is the question of how to incorporate basic 
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requirements of the rule of law on legislation such as generality, regularity, 
transparency, consistency, clarity, acceptability and enforceability, among 
others, into the forthcoming liT legislation reform. Only after fulfilling these 
instrumental requirements can the liT legislation reform better embody WTO 
principles of transparency, uniform administration and judicial review for 
taxpayers' rights protection. Meanwhile, flexible approaches should be taken 
in building up a computerized liT compliance system and administration 
embracing both source withholding and self tax declaration. 
4.4. Case analysis WTO Constraints on China's Tax Law 
Reform 
4.4.1. The Semiconductor Case against China 
Export tax rebate (exemption) is a major concern for most foreign enterprises 
in China because the policies and declaration procedures affect the cash flows 
of enterprises in the country. On the other hand, policies on export tax rebates 
are practically complex in terms of resulting in different export methods and 
tax rebate declaration processes, leading to differing tax rebate amounts and 
affecting profitability. Foreign enterprises may legally use appropriate tactics 
to get more tax rebates over a short period oftime. 115 
115 Therefore, choosing an experienced tax consultant and get valuable advice at an early stage 
has become an important success factor for most foreign enterprises. In view of the fact that 
the relevant policies are changing frequently, and that officers from tax authorities may hold 
different opinions over regulations thus giving different interpretations, this is an area that 
needs careful analysis and attention 
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Export tax rebate refers to rebate of the taxes, including the VAT, business tax, 
and special consumption tax, that are incurred during the processes of 
domestic production and circulation for exported products - the purpose of 
export tax rebate is to encourage exportation which composes large portion of 
China's GDP growth and foreign currency reserve. For foreign-invested 
enterprises in China, such rebate usually refers to VAT rebates only, based on 
current stipulations of zero rate of consumption tax for FIEs. An 
understanding of relevant VAT policies and legislative background is a must 
to appropriately take the advantage of Chinese export tax rebate polices. 
4.4.2. Factual background 
Reform of China's VAT legislation has a major point of contention between 
the U.S. and China in the past years, especially involving the semiconductor 
industries. On March 18, 2004, U.S. (together with Semiconductor Industry 
Association) filed a complaint with the WTO claiming that China's VAT 
treatment of integrated circuits (semiconductors) was discriminatory against 
foreign semiconductor manufacturers and designers and, therefore, in breach 
of the national treatment principle. This was the first complaint against China 
since China's accession to the WTO and has been regarded as an experiment 
to test China's ability to respond as a WTO member. These complaints 
eventually escalated into a trade policy dispute between the U.S. and China 
governments, which reached a negotiation together in Geneva on July 14, 
2004. China agreed to stop certifying new semiconductor products and 
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manufacturers for the VAT refunds and to stop providing the refunds to the 
current beneficiaries by April 1, 2005. China also promised to terminate the 
tax refund for semiconductors that are designed locally, produced abroad and 
then imported into China. In turn, U.S. withdrew its complaint to the WTO. 
However, whether the same result would come out of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) itself is uncertain. 
An additional factual point is that the Chinese government provides a rebate of 
the VAT burden in excess of 3% for certain semiconductors manufactured 
within China, while it imposes the full 17% VAT on imported semiconductors. 
Although there is an argument that such VAT rebate constitutes a subsidy to 
domestic semiconductor industries, and was exempted from application of the 
national treatment requirement prescribed under GATT Article III, issues also 
come up for China's tax authorities as to what really constitute subsidies as 
interpreted under the WTO agreements. 
4.4.3. Analysis 
A subsidy under the SCM Agreement should fulfill two requirements. First, it 
must represent a cost to government and a benefit to the recipient. Second, it 
must be specific and applicable to a specific industry, a group of enterprises, 
or even an individual enterprise. There seems to be no issue that the VAT 
rebate program meets these two criteria. By definition, the VAT rebate is 
construed as a "direct transfer of funds" in accordance with Article I(l)(a)(i) 
of the SCM Agreement, and it is for a specific industry which will receive 
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benefits under this rebate program. However, being a subsidy is not 
necessarily illegal under the SCM Agreement, which categorizes subsidies 
into three categories: prohibited (Article III), actionable (Article V), and non-
actionable (Article VIII). As per Article VIII(2)(a) of the SCM Agreement, a 
non-actionable subsidy mostly refers to certain types of assistance for research 
activities conducted by firms or higher education entities on a contract basis. 
Apparently, the factual background of the export VAT rebate does not fall into 
the non-actionable subsidy category. Moreover, Article VIII ceased to be 
effective by December 31, 1999 due its conflicting provisions with other SCM 
Agreement articles such as Article XXXI. Therefore, prohibited subsidies and 
actionable subsidies are the only two categories left for analysis. 
According to SCM Agreement, a subsidy is prohibited if it is 1) either 
contingent (in law or in fact, solely or partially) upon export performance or 2) 
contingent (solely or partially) upon the use of domestic over imported goods. 
For the first factor, Article III(l)(a) of the SCM Agreement explicitly states 
that subsidies contingent on export can be either de facto or de jure. For VAT 
rebate, although one of its goals is to increase exportation, no tax regulation 
particularly requires that export performance is indispensable for obtaining 
such rebate. China authorities, therefore, can easily show such a VAT rebate is 
not contingent upon any export performance. Additionally, the plaintiff bears 
the burden of proof to establish such contingency, but the chance of 
substantiation is slim. Another contingency to support prohibited subsidy is 
under Article III( 1 )(b) of SCM Agreement which is about encouraging the use 
of domestic goods over imported ones. China's rebate program is 
advantageous to China's domestic importers that import semiconductor parts 
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designed in China. The issue then is left on whether the VAT rebate is 
contingent on the procurement of domestic design services over life services 
from foreign countries. China, therefore, can easily save the VAT rebate 
program from being deemed prohibited. 
As to the third and last category of subsidy, actionable subsidy under Articles 
V and VII of the SCM Agreement composes the last weapon for protesting 
China's VAT rebate program. The SCM Agreement tolerates an actionable 
subsidy unless it creates an "adverse effect" for the interests of other WTO 
member countries. In a meticulous way, Article V of SCM Agreement 
enumerates the types of adverse effects: (a) injury to the domestic industry of 
another Member; (b) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly 
or indirectly to other Members under the 1994 GATT in particular the benefits 
of concessions bound under Article II of GAIT 1994; or (c) serious prejudice 
to the interests of another Member. As to first type of adverse effect, in order 
for any complaining country to assure a domestic industry injury, an 
investigation following Article XI of the SCM Agreement should be 
conducted to access the level of injury. For the second type of adverse effect, 
it would be a "robust" nullification or impairment of benefits if more details 
and cases of WTO requirement were examined. 
Lastly, serious prejudice as the last type of adverse effect should be put 
together with Article VI of the SCM Agreement, which lists a number of 
scenarios where serious prejudice occurs and situations where serious 
prejudice does not apply. The challenging party must prove any of the four 
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effects according to Article VI(3) of the SCM Agreement. 116 Based on factual 
background of China's export VAT rebate program, without any robust 
substantiation, the WTO judiciary body will not approve the request of filing 
the VAT rebate as an actionable subsidy. 
4.4.4. Summary 
Based on analysis above on China's VAT rebate program, the 
substantiation of subsidy that emphasized by numerous WTO treaty 
provisions and precedents is not easy. However, the Complaint filed by the 
U.S. showed that, even if China may discharge itself from a dispute before 
the WTO tribunals on substantive and procedural grounds, the risk of 
improperly reforming VAT system and practice is that it would fail to 
comply with WTO rules. Under the big WTO "umbrella", the narrow 
consideration of domestic interests may bring tremendous challenges. This 
also raises the need for better legislative techniques in designing VAT or 
other tax legislations. The legislative intent has to embody or address 
standardized practices under WTO agreements. 
116 Article VI (3) of the SCM Agreement includes (a) the effect of displacing or impeding the 
imports of a like product of another Member into the market of the subsidizing Member; (b) 
the effect of displacing or impeding the exports of a like product of another Member into a 
third country market; (c) the effect of a significant price undercutting by the subsidized 
product as compared with the price of a like product of another Member in the same market or 
significant price suppression, price depression or lost sales in the same market; or (d) the 
effect of any increase in the world market share of the subsidizing Member in a particular 
subsidized primary product or commodity as compared to its average share during the 
previous three year period and where this increase follows a consistent trend over a period 
when subsidies have been granted 
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4.5. Limitations of the WTO's Constraints 
As a multilateral trading regime, the WTO's impacts on domestic tax policies 
is constrained in many aspects, which are found in the interpretation of WTO 
rules, rules affecting taxation, the dispute settlement process, and the 
enforcement mechanism. Returning to a jurisprudential analysis, WTO rules 
are designed to liberate trade and capital mobility, but not to influence the tax 
system specifically. Other than WTO rules affecting tax laws, China has 
sovereignty to determine its tax legislation and structural reforms on each 
type of tax. Even for tax subsidies, the WTO principles do not seem to 
prohibit China from using them. 
The first limitation of WTO 's constraints comes from the approach of treaty 
or WTO rules interpretation. According to Articles 31 and 3 2 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, three major approaches to treaty 
interpretation are pointed out: subjective or intentions, textual, and 
teleological methods. However, Vienna Convention rules essentially 
emphasize the objectively ascertained intention of the parties as manifested in 
the text of the agreement, i.e. the expressed intent rather than the subjective 
intent of the parties. 117 To this end, impacts of WTO rules are limited to the 
non-teleological interpretation in applying to the tax regime. 
Second, application means limitation. WTO rules affecting taxation 
traditionally focus on domestic tax obstacles to trade in goods and trade-
117 
See Michael Lennard, Navigating by the Stars: Interpreting the WTO Agreements, 5 J. of 
lnt'l Econ. L. (2002) at 17-19. 
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distorting subsidies. 118 As discussed earlier in this chapter, three prongs of 
WTO provisions are relevant in the tax area. The first is the non-
discrimination principles prescribed in Articles I and III GATT which 
includes the most-favored-nation principle 119 and the national treatment 
principle. 120 The second is the widely defined prohibited or actionable 
subsidies under Article XVI GATT and the SCM Agreement, including tax 
incentives. The third is based on GATS. All measures that may affect services 
or service suppliers may therefore apply to income taxes. 121 
Taxes that do not implicate the WTO rules above are imposable by Chinese 
tax legislations. For example, if a VAT export rebate is less than or equal to 
the VAT levied on business inputs, the rebate is not a prohibited export 
subsidy. Theoretically, as long as the export rebate rates are below the 
nominal VAT rates, China may elect to allow a full VAT rebate for exports 
without violating WTO rules while stimulating exports. 
Third, the enforcement of WTO appellate decisions has limitations due to the 
nature of the multilateral regime -specifically the problem of sovereignty.122 
Mostly, the execution of WTO principles depends on domestic policies and 
bilateral agreements. Usually, enforcement is more likely to happen or lead to 
settlement when the economic venture is tremendous, e.g., the US FSC/ETI 
118 
See generally Servaas van Thiel, General Report, in M. Lang, ed., WTO and Direct 
Taxation, Linde Publishing Inc. (2005) at page 13-48 
119 !d., noting the MFN principle prohibits higher internal taxes or more burdensome 
regulation on products imported than on similar imports from other members 
120 /d., the national treatment principle prohibits higher internal taxes or more burdensome 
regulation on products imported on similar domestic products 
121 Id, at 25-28, noting, in particular, it applies to services that are supplied by means of cross 
border establishment in the form of a branch or a subsidiary (mode 3) or by means of the 
cross-border movement of economically active professionals (mode 4) 
122 
See Reuven Avi-Yonah, The WTO, Export Subsidies, and Tax Competition, in Lang Ed., 
pl!5-l3l,supra 13,at 130 
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case (over USD 4 billion per annum) or the political stakes are high, e.g. the 
Sino-U.S. semiconductor case. Actually, the impact on domestic policy 
usually causes retaliation which is against the intent ofWTO Agreements. 
The fourth limitation goes to transparency for two reasons. First, the WTO 
arguably is "non-transparent" and lacks "democratic legitimacy". 123Second, 
the transparency requirement scattered in various provisions of the WTO 
Agreements may require the accessibility and publish of all tax legislations, 
but the extent of transparency is somewhat subject to negotiation. 
4.6. Summary 
This subchapter discusses the impacts of WTO accession to China's tax 
legislation system from a formal perspective. In particular, rules and principles 
of WTO Agreements call for China's turnover tax, enterprise income tax and 
individual income tax legislation and reform to incorporate non-discrimination 
principles and the transparency requirement. However, a careful review of tax 
legislations in China reveals that some basic elements of the instrumentalist 
concept of the rule of law are missed. This is specifically evident in the liT 
legislation reform. Meanwhile, even though the 2008 EIT Law in many 
aspects embodies modern tax concepts, it remains unclear how to realize both 
tax equity and efficiency by balancing central and local tax authorities. 
123 
See generally in Robert Green, Anti-legalistic Approaches to resolving Disputes Between 
Governments: A Comparison of International Tax and Trade Regime, 23 Yale J., Int'l L. 79 
(1998) 
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Another aspect of Chinese tax legislative reform is setting up a tax 
administration system with efficiency. 
Although WTO's principles and rules impose constraints such as the adoption 
of export subsidies and enforcement of AB decisions, as long as a member 
country may provide same economic benefit by manipulating domestic tax 
policies, WTO regime is weak in pushing tax legislative reforms. Lessons 
learnt from the US FSC/ETI and Sino-US semiconductor case exemplify the 
inherent weakness or distorted tax rule-making. 
V. Conclusion - Tax Incentive Policies under the WTO 
Regime 
Following the accession to the WTO and legal system reform, the tax 
legislation reform has endured a painful process. From the 1994 tax system 
overhaul in incorporating WTO principles, the tax legislation has experienced 
simplification, unification, and the revenue sharing scheme. Because tax 
legislations mostly attempt to encourage FDI with provisions such as tax 
holidays, rate reduction, export subsidy, reinvestment encouragement, 
exemption of the withholding tax, and accelerated depreciation, the structure 
of tax legislation is imbalanced from the very beginning in a way that harms 
tax equity and efficiency. For example, the dual-track enterprise income tax 
system frustrated both DEs and PIEs. The design of liT Law does not manifest 
revenue contribution and social wealth redistribution as it should be. Even 
though turnover tax dominates tax revenue in China, the structure of VAT and 
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Business Tax is still plagued by a few fundamental issues such as the 
transition to a consumption type VAT. 
China's tax legislation reform is further complicated by rules and principles 
under WTO Agreements and the rule of law order. In particular, rules and 
principles of WTO Agreements call for China's turnover tax, enterprise 
income tax and individual income tax legislation and reform to incorporate 
non-discrimination principles and the transparency requirement. However, a 
careful review of tax legislation in China reveals that some basic elements of 
the instrumentalist concept of the rule of law are missing. This is specifically 
evident in the IIT legislation reform. Review of tax incentives to ensure 
transparency and proper judicial review is also imperative. Even the 2008 EIT 
Law in many aspects embodies modem tax concepts, it remains unclear how 
to realize both tax equity and efficiency by balancing central and local tax 
authorities. Another aspect of Chinese tax legislative reform is setting up a tax 
administration system with efficiency. 
Although the WTO's principles and rules impose constraints such as on the 
adoption of export subsidies and enforcement of AB decisions, as long as all 
member countries are provided the same economic benefit by manipulating 
domestic tax policies, WTO regime is not without limitations in pushing 
forward tax legislative reforms. Lessons learnt from the US FSC/ETI and 
Sino-US semiconductor case exemplify the inherent weakness in tax rule-
making. 
As proposed by Avi-Yonah, answers to fine-tune China's tax legislation 
system might be found in an international tax arena through a multilateral 
solution. Essential is that the fundamental goals of taxation and WTO 
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principles should be achieved in terms of revenue collection, social wealth 
redistribution, transparency, uniform and impartial administration, and judicial 
review. Equally important is to incorporate elements of the rule of law order as 
well as to integrate China's tax legislation with an international perspective of 
facilitating development and institutionalization of the tax system. 
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Chapter VI 
Tax Judicature System Reform- An Identity Loss 
I. Introduction 
The reform of Chinese tax judicature system has been a complicated 
undertaking, which China's tax administration, its Chinese general judiciary, 
and its taxpayers have endured in equal measure. 124 "China's tax judicature 
must account for China's social and economic development situation before 
introducing pragmatic reform proposals," 125 and China should develop "a 
long-term goal of establishing a Chinese tax judicature system, in particular, a 
tax court system." 126 Moreover, given the current overhaul the Chinese 
administrative legal system, the tax judicature reform in China has garnered 
unprecedented attention from both tax authorities and Chinese taxpayers. In 
general, the tax judicature structure incorporates two layers: a dispute 
settlement mechanism for disputes between tax authorities and taxpayers as to 
124 See infra Chapter VII, for detailed discussion on China's taxpayers' right protection 
125 See Xu Shanda, Zhongguo Shuiquan Yanjiu [China Tax Jurisdiction Research], (China 
Taxation Press, 2004) Preface 
126 The establishment of the Chinese tax court is heatedly debated among Chinese tax scholars 
and tax administrators. See e.g .• Liu Jianwen, Chairman of China's Tax Law Society, in the 
evaluation conference of the World Bank project on China Tax Law Reform proposed the 
potential of setting up the Chinese tax court system (notes on file with the author) 
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an assessment of tax; and, if a settlement is not achieved, a cause of action in a 
Chinese court to appeal the administrative decision. Different from a common 
law system such as the United States, tax controversies in China are mostly 
litigated as administrative cases, supplemented by civil and criminal 
proceedings as necessary. 127 Given the small number of tax lawsuits in China, 
however, the tax judicature reform is usually one-sided. Chinese tax 
authorities dominate related reform proposals, while taxpayers are relatively 
innocuous in advocating for the protection of their rights. Meanwhile, there is 
a legitimate need to advance the reform in terms of fulfilling the WTO 
principles, to which China has committed itself, in a manner consistent with its 
socialist rule of law construct. 
China's tax judicature system, like China's judiciary in general, is permeated 
with controversies and deficiencies. Just as procedures for rights protections 
against administrative agencies mean less in light of China's problems with 
administrative impartiality, judicial review, and a system of elaborated rights, 
remedies, and procedures for taxpayers are of little use to China's taxpayers 
when there is no independent, impartial and competent judiciary. However, 
the reality is that the independence of the Chinese tax judiciary is inextricably 
linked to that of its formal courts. The independence of China's judiciary has 
been notoriously plagued by the judges' insecurity of tenure as well as the 
judiciary's own traditions of knowledge, integrity, and expertise and the law 
of contempt. Therefore, for China's tax judicature properly to exercise its 
jurisdiction requires that it have at least three interrelated features: technical 
127 Due to space limitations, this chapter focuses on administrative tax lawsuits. For 
discussions on criminal and civil aspects of tax lawsuits, see generally supra 2. This thesis 
also shares Professor Wei Xiong's concern that the reform for Chinese tax judicature is not 
highly prioritized by tax administrations 
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competence, commitment to the rule of law, and finally, institutionalized 
independence to embrace domestic causes and international demands such as 
WTO principles. Regretfully, none of these three features is unequivocally 
present or identifiable. 
As to China's tax judicature reform, this Chapter considers the following 
questions: ( 1) what is the procedure for administrative and judicial appeals and 
how likely is it to process a reasonable case? (2) Is all or a portion of the tax to 
be paid pending appeal, and if so, how secure is the taxpayer in obtaining 
relief from this requirement? (3) Is there any realistic need to establish a 
judicial tribunal for tax cases specifically, and if so, why and in which format? 
(4) Is the appeal process undermined by corruption? Subchapter II introduces 
general policy concerns and rationales for improving the tax judicature system, 
especially under the requirements of the rule of law. Subchapter III offers a 
brief description of the evolution of the tax court system in the United States. 
The goal is to summarize considerations for structuring a tax judicature system 
from tax authorities' and taxpayers' perspectives. Subchapter IV reviews the 
status quo of China's tax judicature system, and summarizes an interesting 
debate by Chinese tax scholars on tax judicature reforms, such as whether a 
tax court should be introduced and by which institution. Subchapter V further 
contributes several proposals for reform for China's tax judicature reform. 
Subchapter VI concludes. 
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II. Rationales for structuring the tax judicature system 
2.1. The application of basic principles of administrative law 
An established modem tax system in a socially just society embraces tax 
policies of efficiency, equity, transparency, simplicity and administrability128 
in terms of both substantive and procedural law. Revenue collection by a 
government and the extensive reach of the tax laws into taxpayers' actions 
necessitate a sound system of tax administration. In this sense, the tax 
judicature system presupposes dynamics between the tax administration and 
taxpayers. Tribunals thus must be available to taxpayers in the hope to resolve 
potential discrepancies in administrative assessment of taxes due or conflicting 
analyses of the tax laws. Therefore, many basic principles such as the principle 
of legality under China's administrative law more generally apply to the tax 
context. 
One example is the principle of fairness or public trust which underpins a 
functional tax administration. The tax authorities are restricted from exploiting 
unreasonable advantages in their interactions with taxpayers. This principle 
concerns the horizontal equity ofthe tax system. Taxpayers comparatively are 
a group of disadvantaged citizens, which do not anticipate direct conflict with 
the government. Entrusted with administering a fair and impartial system, tax 
authorities should perform in a logical and jurisprudential manner and be 
bound by judicial interpretations of the tax law. A taxpayer should receive 
128 See Government Accountability Office, Publ'n No. GA0-05-1009 SP, Understanding the 
Tax Reform Debate: Background, Criteria & Questions (2005), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d051009sp.pdf (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
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prompt notice of any action conducted by tax authorities concerning her and 
have guaranteed access to prescribed procedures in litigation. 
The principle of the ability to pay requires and expects tax legislators to 
account for taxpayers' means and relative ability to support government 
operation. In this sense, this principle is based on the vertical equity of a tax 
system, i.e., those with a greater ability to pay should pay a larger amount. The 
enforcement of the tax laws is not supposed to overtake or interfere with the 
exclusivity and ownership of individual property rights. The principle of the 
ability to pay also requires appreciation of taxpayers' compliance costs, 
because voluntary self-reporting is so often one-sidedly persuaded by tax 
authorities for the purpose of reducing tax collection costs. Similar to the 
principle of ability to pay is the principle of proportionality, which enshrines 
protections of taxpayers against excessive tax obligations. 
Another principle centers on taxpayers' reliance on tax authorities' 
administrative application and interpretation of the tax laws. If tax authorities 
erroneously interpret legislative intent or inaccurately administer related tax 
laws, and taxpayers rely on such rulings or decisions, it is without question 
that taxpayers should be free of charges for wrongful tax behaviors. Returning 
to a jurisprudential analysis, the principle of nonretroactivity shares the same 
reasoning of efficiency: tax consequences of taxpayers' behaviors should be 
predictable based on available knowledge. To this end, changes in the tax laws 
should be updated publicly and consistently in a timely manner. The principle 
of nonretroactivity also contributes to cost-efficient tax collection- when tax 
disputes arise, tax authorities are obligated to substantiate their administrative 
decisions and thus have to avoid abuses of discretion, which generate 
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compliance costs. This also helps reduce the likelihood of creating disputes 
thus minimizing tax litigation. 
An additional adaptive principle of administration law is that the 
reconsideration and appeal should be subject to fair hearing or due process. 
There are a number of rationales supporting the protection of due process. 
First, a fair hearing requires that the judge or a member of the administrative 
tribunal is neither personally or professionally prejudiced nor biased in 
conducting prescribed proceedings. In the tax law context, the independence 
of the tribunal from the larger tax authority in the reconsideration or review of 
administrative decisions is vital to protecting taxpayers' property rights and 
the efficiency of State revenue collection. Second, due process supports the 
right to legal representation by a qualified agent, usually, a lawyer. However, 
given the special nature of tax return filing and tax payment calculation, a 
CPA or a certified tax agent can replace a lawyer representing taxpayers 
before tribunals. Third, due process implies procedural equality, whereby both 
taxpayers and tax authorities have legitimate standing to represent and argue 
their cases. A palpable implication for taxpayers is the right to information, i.e., 
evidence and clear procedural rules, for understanding a tax administrative 
decision, because the dominant authority of tax administrative bureaus might 
otherwise unduly dominate the taxpayer in a grievance process. Tax 
authorities must comply with procedural requirements without interference 
with the independence of judicial review. 
Finally, an administrative system should safeguard the right to review and 
appeal, either by administrative or judicial recourse. A taxpayer needs this 
right as a last resort to receive a final decision to avoid circumvent any undue 
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interference in her property rights, especially outside of any intervention from 
the tax authorities. Administrative laws often involve the more banal 
operations of civil affairs, such as healthcare and education, and disputes 
therefrom are relatively straightforward and clear-cut. In the tax law context 
however, the right to review or appeal entails complexities - in particular, 
does the taxpayer need to prepay the tax due prior to commencing litigation? 
The answer varies in different jurisdictions, 129 but Chinese tax laws control 
this requirement as legal regimentations. 
Overall, tax judicature is intertwined with tax administration, which falls in 
the general administrative law framework. As a result, major drawbacks of an 
administrative law system manifest in the tax law contexts discussed above. 
For China's tax judicature, this feature is even more evident, because China's 
system inherits the imperial tradition of the over-reaching arm of 
administration. Taxpayers' inheritance in this context is a cultural history of 
obedience. This deeply-rooted cultural orientation dictates pragmatism over 
ideology in the judicature reform design. 
2.2.Judicial review and the rule of law 
China's tax judicature system is an indispensable component of the state's 
judicial review framework. Judicial review is doctrinal and imperative in 
modem legal systems and requires that legislative and executive proceedings 
or decisions be subject to review, and possible invalidation, by an independent 
judiciary. Tribunals with judicial review power should invalidate state actions 
129 
See Victor Thuronyi, Comparative Tax (Kluwer Law International, 2003) at 215-218 
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that violate a higher authority, such as a written constitution or prescribed 
procedures. Usually, judicial review exemplifies the separation of powers in a 
modern governmental system but is subject to various interpretations based on 
variations in the hierarchy of government structures. The procedure and scope 
of judicial review is also a case-by-case adaption based on different social, 
economic, political and legal settings. 
Regarding judicial review, A. V. Dicey emphasized three aspects in phrasing 
the rule of law: 130 (1) no one can be punished or made to suffer except for a 
breach of law proved in an ordinary court; (2) . . . [ e ]veryone (including 
government agencies) is equal before the law regardless of social, economic, 
or political status; and (3) the rule of law includes the results of judicial 
decisions determining the rights of private persons. 131 
Joseph Raz shares Dicey's last notion and further contends that the rule of law 
entails minimizing the danger of the exercise of discretionary power in an 
arbitrary manner. In particular, Raz details that, (1) laws should be prospective 
rather than retroactive; (2) laws (and interpretations thereof) should be stable 
and not changed so frequently as to prevent one from being guided by them 
(principle of consistency); (3) rules and procedures for making laws must be 
clear (right to know); ( 4) the independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed; 
(5) the right to fair hearing must also be guaranteed; (6) the judicial review 
power of an independent tribunal; (7) the courts should be accessible and (8) 
the law enforcement and crime prevention should not be discretionary. 132 Raz 
130 See generally, Albert Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 
(1885) 
131 
See S. A. Palekar, Comparative Politics and Government at 64-65 (PHI Learning 2009) 
132 See Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and It's Virtue, The Law Quarterly Review, volume 93, 
at 195 (1977), reprinted by Keith Culver, Readings in the Philosophy of Law, at 13 
(Broadview Press, 1999). 
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further presents that judicial review should not be "confused with democracy, 
justice, equality (before the law or otherwise), human rights of any kind or 
respect for persons or for the dignity of man". 133 
As China strives to build up a socialist rule of law order, its tax judicature 
system must be incorporated and upgraded. But there are should not be any 
over-romantized expectation that the tax judicature reform can proceed ahead 
or outside of the general judicial framework that is also full of flaws and 
discrepancies and in need of reform. The tax context has its singularities, so do 
other areas of law. The tax judicature reform, therefore, should proceed in a 
pragmatic fashion without dominating judicial reform in any sense. 
2.3.Development of a market economy 
China's ongoing efforts to structure a socialist market economy system and 
the rule of law order create an abiding need for an improved judicial system in 
general and an improved tax judicature system specifically. As remnants of the 
planned economy fade, transactional routines and corporate management 
structures become progressively complicated and tax is implicated from the 
planning to the wrapping-up. The market economy construct requires a 
functional tax judicature system embracing a set of standards and principles to 
regulate taxpayers' behavior as well as an independent, fair, and efficient 
tribunal system to enforce those standards. An underlying driver in this 
context is the shifting identify to the market participant in China. The roles of 
government agencies, enterprises, and individuals are not restricted by their 
133 !d., at 195-97 
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stereotypes as administers, SOEs, and low-income constituencies, respectively. 
Rather, a balanced dynamic is expected to operate for the revenue collection 
and redistribution of social wealth. Tax judicature system, in tum, provides 
standardized protection to enforce this undertaking with substantive and 
procedural components. 
2.4. Pressure from the tax legislation reform 
The development of the Chinese judicial system is colored by political 
demands, or as a tradeoff, by interference from the party-state. It seems naive 
to describe how democratization of Chinese politics develops over the past 
three decades, but at least comparing to the Cultural Revolution and the 
planned economy era, remarkable progress has been witnessed. Meanwhile, 
the dispute resolution system has lagged far behind the progress of legislation 
reform in terms of structuring an authoritative framework catering to 
diversified economic concerns and social needs. Echoing the overwhelming 
tax legislation reform in the past three decades, a tax dispute resolution system 
remains oversimplified and has therefore not caught up to tax legislation yet. 
New legislation in tax related areas poses unprecedented challenges to China's 
tax judicature system. Tax issues usually are intertwined with other economic 
matters, for example, banking, foreign trade and investment, which 
incorporate international elements as well as SOEs reform pressures. 134 Many 
localities at the same time promulgate local rulings, notices and directives 
based on local self-interests. Therefore, inappropriate handling of tax dispute 
134 See Chunlin Zhang, Revisiting China's SOE Reform Strategy (World Bank, 2009), 
http://www.hongfan.org.cn/file/upload/2009/ll/02/1257972368.pdf (last visited on March 15, 
2011) 
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resolution would spread unwelcoming implications to areas other than tax 
fields. The complexity of transactional behaviors rarely finds simplicity in the 
tax field, whereas it is on better footing in other areas of economic law. 
Therefore, tax legislation as to the growingly complicated economic 
transactions and diversified interests calls for ex post application of law by a 
robust tax judicature to compose an organized tax law framework as part of 
the whole legal system. 
2.5. Taxpayers' rights protection awareness135 
The awareness of taxpayers' rights has fashioned China's tax law reform in 
the past decade. Vocabularies such as the principle of legality and "no 
representation, no tax" were introduced to substantiate a latest wave of 
taxpayer consciousness movement to challenge the rights protection status quo 
in China. A fair and efficient tax judicature system is one of the most popular 
reform areas raised by taxpayers. China has been called the most miserable 
Asian country in terms of taxes, 136 and this issue is particularly important 
because the increase of Chinese tax revenue has been greater than its GDP 
growth in the past decade. Coupled with the inflation, rising housing prices, 
and high CPI experienced by Chinese taxpayers who are burdened by various 
forms of direct or indirect taxes, a reform of the tax system has naturally 
become a top priority for many Chinese citizens. Compliance requirements 
encourage taxpayers to examine the public benefits they receive compared 
135 See infra Chapter VII 
136 See China ranks the second in Forbes Ta:x Misery Index and accompanying discussions at 
http://forum.globaltimes.cn/forum/showthread.php?t=l0043 (September 2009) (last visited on 
March 15, 2011); see also e.g., The Forbes Ta:x Misery Index 2009, 
http://pdf.forbes.com/medialpdfs/Tax:Misery.pdf (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
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with the level of tax they pay, and inevitably seek rights protection against 
contribution without payback. Accordingly, the public's perception of the Tax 
Court may also affect its perception of the tax system as a whole, and thereby 
affect tax compliance. 137 For instance, a pragmatic and proactive approach to 
taxpayers' rights promotion is essential to construct a well-established, 
taxpayer-friendly tax judicature system which is politically viable and helpful 
to human rights protection. 
2.6. A catch-up to international routines 
The convergence of cross-border tax administration, enforcement, and 
cooperation has entailed two impacts on the tax judicature refonn push in 
China. First, foreign investors, which have experienced better-structured rights 
protection from their home tax jurisdictions, have legitimate expectation and 
needs to receive similar procedural justice from Chinese tribunals, especially 
its tax authorities. Second, there is a consensus that a robust tax judicature 
system creates a strong competitive advantage in the international market. The 
WTO exemplifies a robust multilateral regime embracing capital mobility and 
free trade, as well as prevention against discretionary interference from tax 
authorities. Rights exercised by taxpayers demand that an accommodation of 
international protection standards be incorporated into China's tax law system 
to safeguard revenue collection and to fuel economic development. 
137 See generally, Tom Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990), arguing that procedural 
fairness is critical in maintaining the legitimacy of authority, and that legitimacy affects self-
reported compliance with laws 
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2.7. Summary 
Chinese tax judicature reform is substantiated by various legitimate drives. 
The administrative law system reform expects tax authorities' discretion to be 
efficiently limited by a functional judicial review process. Taxpayers' 
awareness creates pressure to find a more taxpayer-friendly and just judiciary 
for rights protection. At the same time, legislation in the tax area is 
overwhelming, over-meticulous and more all-rounded, and thus adds to the 
need for an upgraded judicature system for the proper enforcement of new 
laws. More importantly, the market economy and the rule of law order urge 
the tax judicature to accommodate diversified economic interests and social 
needs in a fair, impartial, accessible, efficient and clear-cut manner. Pressures 
from international interests such as the WTO raise the bar for Chinese tax 
judicature reform. In addition, a tax judicature system contributes necessary 
competitive advantages to China's overall economy for seeking foreign 
investment and improving revenue collection. 
III. Takeaways from the U.S. experience 
A typical question for the Chinese tax judicature reform is which model it 
should follow, however, there are no right or wrong answers to this query, and 
there is no perfect model for all tax jurisdictions. The tax judicature system is 
so varied due to diversified economic, social and cultural of each state, and 
there are substantial differences in review or appeal procedures in terms of the 
administrative and judicial systems that take tax cases. This subchapter 
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tentatively draws on the U.S. experience, in particular, its tax court system. 
The goal is not to offer detailed structural proposals but to illustrate 
appropriate considerations or standards that should be reflected on in 
designing an upgrade of Chinese tax judicature reform. 
3.1.The evolution of the U.S. Tax Court system138 
3 .1.1. The current tax judicature system 
The current tax judicature system in the U.S. mainly has two prongs: the 
federal system and the tax court system. 139 As to the federal system, 140 
disputes between a taxpayer and the IRS regarding the amount of tax payment 
due or a decision on the tax consequences of a transaction can be tried in the 
138 Section 3.1. was written based on a careful reading and review of description of U.S. Tax 
Court history and procedures presented in voluminous writings and critics. See e.g., David 
Laro, The Evolution of the Tax Court as an Independent Tribunal, U. Ill. L. Rev. (1995); W. 
Patrick Cantrell, Federal Tax Procedure for Attorneys (2008) ABA General Practice, Solo & 
Small Firm Division; Christopher M. Peitruszkiewicz, Conjlating Standards of Review in the 
Tax Court: A Lesson in Ambiguity, 44 Hous. L. Rev. (2008); Danshera Cords, Administration 
law and Judicial Review of Tax Collection Decisions, 52 St. Louis U. L. J. 429 (2008); 
Leandra Lederman, Equity and the Article I Court: Is the Tax Court's Exercise of Equitable 
Powers Constitutional, 5 Fla. Tax Rev. 357 (2001); Leo P. Martinez, The Summons Power 
and tax Court Discovery: A Different Perspective, 13 Va. Tax Rev. 731 (1994); Leandra 
Lederman, Tax Appeal: A Proposal to Make the United States Tax Court More Judicial, 85 
Wash. U. L. Rev. 1195 (2008); Andre L. Smith, Differential Review of Tax Court Decisions of 
Law: Promoting Expertise, Uniformity, and Impartiality, 58 Tax Law. 361 (2005); Harold 
Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis, Part III: The Revenue Act of 
1926- Improving the Board of Tax Appeals, 40 Alb. L. Rev. (1976), reprinted in Harold A. 
Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis at 113 (1979), Camilla E. 
Watson, Tax Procedure And Tax Fraud in a Nutshell (Nutshell Series) (Thomson West, 
3'ct.Ed., 2006) 
139 See generally id., there are four different trial-level courts hear federal civil tax cases in the 
United States: the U.S. Tax Court, U.S. district courts, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, and 
U.S. bankruptcy courts. Professor Douglas Kahn also noted that the U.S. bankruptcy courts 
usually do not put too much focus on tax cases unless the bankruptcy cases are closely 
involved in tax factors. By a large margin, most tax cases are filed in the Tax Court, but the 
thoughtful advocate planning tax litigation carefully considers all available options 
140 See Leandra Lederman, Tax Appeal: A Proposal to Make the United States Tax Court 
More Judicial, 85 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1195 (2008), at 1198, presenting that management of 
federal courts is decentralized so that each court is largely self-governing, federal courts are 
served and overseen by centralized bodies, including the United States Judicial Conference 
and the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts (AOUSC) 
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federal system. Taxpayers may elect to pay their taxes and file a refund 
request in the United States District Court for the district in which they reside 
or in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. 141 Appeals of the district court decision 
then can be filed to the circuit court of appeals governing that district. If the 
Court of Federal Claims presides over a tax controversy, appeals are to the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. It is noted that tax payment usually 
should be paid in full in the first hand before filing a case in the federal system. 
Federal courts referred to here are all Article III (of the U.S. Constitution) 
courts. 142 
Alternatively, if the taxpayer chooses to litigate the controversy before paying 
in full, i.e., in a pre-assessment proceeding, she usually prefers a re-
determination by the Tax Court. 143 A Tax Court decision may be appealed 
either in the court of appeals in the circuit where the taxpayer resides or the 
principal place of the taxpayer's business, at the time she filed her petition to 
the United States Tax Court (Tax Court). All cases may, as a final matter after 
grant of certiorari, be heard by the Supreme Court. 144 The Tax Court resolves 
the overwhelming majority of all tax controversies, but after the financial 
crisis the U.S. Bankruptcy Court has become a more common forum for tax 
cases as well. 
3.1.2. The U.S. Tax Court system 
The United States Tax Court represents the type of court that only hears 
141 See generally Watson (Nutshell), supra 15 
142 See Lederman supra 17 at 1198-99 
143 l.R.C. §6213(a) 
144 I.R.C. §7482(a)(l) 
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disputes between taxpayers and the government agencies, i.e., the IRS. 
Although a choice of forum is available to a U.S. taxpayer as discussed above, 
it is more hypothetical than real because the Tax Court is the only tribunal that 
allows taxpayers not to first pay the amount in dispute, and approximately 
ninety-five percent oflitigated federal tax cases are filed in Tax Court. 145 
According to the holdings in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. 146 and the 
Sixteenth Amendment, 147 in 1924, the Congress created the Board of Tax 
Appeals, which was later renamed as the Tax Court of the United States, to 
provide a tribunal for challenging tax deficiencies decided by the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue, the predecessor of the IRS. The Board of Tax Appeals was 
designated as "an independent agency in the executive branch of the 
Government."148 Findings of fact by the Board of Tax Appeals were "prima 
facie evidence ofthe facts therein stated."149 Appeals of decisions ofthe Board 
of Tax Appeals were firstly limited to the federal district courts, but later 
145 Professor Douglas Kahn noted that there have been various reasons that created the current 
dispute resolution system for tax cases, and many historical accident Jed to the evolution of the 
U.S. tax judicature system. Morever, Prof. Kahn noted that in many occasions the filing 
requirement and strategies for tax cases may depend on specific cases or litigation skills. The 
author thanks Professor Doug Kahn's comments; see Laro, supra 15, at 17-18 
146 See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583 (1895), aff'd on reh'g, 158 
U.S. 601 (1895), the Supreme Court determined that taxes on income from property were 
unconstitutional as direct taxes that were not levied apportionately 
147 On February 25, 1913, the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified by the necessary three-
quarters of the states, reversing Pollock and making unapportioned federal income taxes 
constitutional. See Carlos E. Gonzales, The Logic of Legal Conflict: The Perplexing 
Combination of Formalism and Anti-Formalism in Acijudication of Conflicting Legal Norms, 
80 Or. L. Rev. 447, 449 n.105 (2001) ("The ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment was the 
direct consequence of the Supreme Court's 1895 decision in Pollock, holding Congress's 
attempt to tax incomes uniformly throughout the United States unconstitutional."), see also 
Peitruszkiewicz, supra 15, footnote 12 
148The author submits that this initial status of the U.S. Tax Court has plenary informative 
reference value to China's tax judicature reform. See id, Peitruszkiewicz at 1342-43 (quoting 
Leo P. Martinez, The Summons Power and Tax Court Discovery: A Different Perspective, 13 
Va. Tax Rev. 731, 7 4 3-44 (1994) (contending that the Board ofT ax Appeals was created for 
three reasons: "(1) to establish a pre-assessment forum for hearing tax controversies, (2) to 
create an adjudicating body which would be independent from the Internal Revenue Bureau's 
collection function, and (3) to initiate a forum which would increase efficiency and streamline_ 
judicial procedure for the growing number of tax cases") 
149 !d. 
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expanded to the various circuit courts of appeal. The circuit courts may 
modify or reverse a decision ofthe Board of Tax Appeals only "ifthe decision 
of the Board is not in accordance with the law." 150 
In 1969, the "United States Tax Court" took its current name and was 
reclassified as a legislative court under Article I of the U.S. Constitution. The 
Tax Court is granted jurisdiction to adjudicate specific income, excess profits, 
estate, and gift tax disputes prior to payment of taxes by a taxpayer. 151 The 
Tax Court is a "court of record" 152 or a "court of law"153 in that it engages in 
purely judicial functions. However, the Congress has left the Tax Court out of 
the administrative framework to which most federal courts belong. As a result, 
it is "neither fish nor fowl." 154 It is neither an agency nor a member of the 
judicial branch of government. Thus, the Tax Court is not served by the 
AOUSC or otherwise subject to the Judicial Code. Because it is not an agency, 
it is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) or the agency 
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 155 
The Tax Court is based in Washington, D.C., though it conducts trials in cities 
nationwide. All of the Tax Court's cases involve disputes between taxpayers 
and the IRS. 156 The Tax Court's core jurisdiction involves IRS assertions that 
the taxpayer understated the correct tax liability, resulting in a tax 
"deficiency."157 Generally, "pretrial procedure before the Tax Court is similar 
150 See generally Laro, supra 15 
ISI Id. 
152 I.R.C.§7441 
153 See Freytag v. Comm 'r, 501 U.S. 868, 889-91 (1991) 
154 See Lederman, supra 17, at 1199-1200 
155 !d. 
156 See generally Laro, supra 15 
157 For the definition of"deficiency", see I.R.C. §6211 
369 
to that applicable in most trial courts,"158 i.e., the taxpayer files a petition, and 
the IRS must file an answer. "Discovery is available in Tax Court, though its 
use is more limited than in the district courts, and the parties are required to 
stipulate to the facts of the case to the fullest extent possible."159 
By statute, Tax Court trials are bench trials. Nineteen judges serve in the Tax 
Court for a fifteen-year term. 160 The Tax Court judges are "appointed by the 
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,"161 and they come 
from an array of backgrounds. 162 Judges may be elected as senior status. 163 In 
addition, the Chief Judge has the power to appoint Special Trial Judges (STJs), 
who are somewhat analogous to magistrate judges, though they are employees 
at will. 164 STJs are permitted to hear any Tax Court case involving amount less 
than $50,000, i.e., mostly the "small tax cases," 165 which are cases with 
limited amounts in dispute, are decided under an informal procedure. 166 
For Chinese tax judicature reform, the U.S. Tax Court's evolution is quite 
informative from a legal historical perspective. Starting its tenure as an agency 
with doubts about its independence, the development of the U.S. Tax Court 
experienced a number of unsuccessful efforts to become an Article III court. 
With authorized expansion of its jurisdiction by the Congress, it ultimately 
158 See generally Joseph Cook & Harold Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical 
Analysis, Part V:Pretrial procedure, 40 Alb. L. Rev. 639-41(1976), reprinted in Harold A. 
Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis, 113 (1979). 
159 See Lederman, supra 17, at 1200; see also generally Watson, supra 15 
160 
See generally, Thomas Greenaway, Choice of Forum in Federal Civil Tax Litigation, 62 
Tax Law, at 313 
161 I.R.C.§7443(b) 
162 
for background of judges, senior judges and special trial judges, see U.S. Tax Court, Judges, 
http://www.ustaxcourt.gov (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
163 I.R.C.§7447 
164 For role played by STJ, see http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/rules/title_xviii.pdf. (last visited on 
March 15, 2011) 
165 I.R.C.§7443 
166 I.R.C.§7663. The author respectfully notes that description about STJ is quite similar in 
most literatures available, and is primary based on I.R.C.§§7443 and 7663, see generally 
supra 15 
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became an Article I court. Yet, the Tax Court retains vestigial attributes of an 
administrative tribunal, and it continues to face "allegations of bias in its 
decision making" 167 as challenged by legal critics. 
3.2.Considerations for structuring a tax court system 
The factors outlined below are selected in the hope of providing a reference to 
the Chinese tax judicature reform, in particular, the tax administrative 
reconsideration procedures and the tax court construct in the future. When 
considering how the U.S. Tax Court system emerges as the major tribunal for 
taxpayers' suits, there are a number of reasons that provide much to do about 
judicial review and independence, which is particularly significant for any tax 
system including China. One perspective - focusing on the taxpayers, not the 
tax administration or IRS - is the deliberation on choice of forum in 
advocating taxpayers' rights or cost-efficiency concerns. Another problem, 
also from the taxpayers' perspective, is on how to handle increasing complex 
cases in the tax context. In this sense, it is imperative to formulate necessary 
considerations that taxpayers, as the petitioner against IRS, may put forth 
invoking the tax court jurisdiction. Otherwise, tax court is of no jurisdictional 
value or structural contribution in the judicature system. 
3.2.1. Discretion ofthe Tax Court 
The statute of limitations on assessment is suspended when a case is pending 
167 See generally Lederman, supra 17. Professor Lederman has been quite critical in reviewing 
the status of tax court and suggests a reform proposal to include the Tax Court under 
management of AOUSC 
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at the Tax Court. 168 Usually, due to the workload and complexities of the cases, 
the IRS sometimes does not come to all issues in its examination. The 
jurisdiction of the Tax Court covers reviewing all items in the taxable period 
at issue in a deficiency case, so the amount of deficiency may increase before 
making a final decision. 169 However, the Tax Court usually considers whether 
an increased deficiency jeopardizes a taxpayer's financial interests and IRS's 
capacity to take more burdens of proof. 170 
3.2.2. Timeline171 
Similar to the statute of limitation, timing is a foremost jurisdictional issue that 
both tax authorities and taxpayers attain. A taxpayer may take time to locate 
available tax-optimal methods in filing a suit while the IRS has to figure out a 
reasonable time for revenue collection. Failure to petition at the Tax Court in a 
timely fashion after the issuance of the notice of deficiency may foreclose the 
taxpayer's options. Passing the 90-day unextendable deadline 172 will 
inevitably invite a motion to dismiss from the IRS Office of Chief Counsel, 
which usually will be granted by the Tax Court. For a refund request of 
overpaid tax, a taxpayer must file an administrative claim within three years of 
filing a return or within two years of payment, whichever comes later. 173 Then 
a refund suit may be filed within six months after the claim is filed and ending 
168 I.R.C.§6503(a)(l) 
169 See generally W. Patrick Cantrell, supra 15 
110 Id. 
171 /d. 
172 The deadline is ISO days if the notice is addressed to a person outside the United States 
173 I.R.C.§6Sll(a) 
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two years after the denial of the claim by the IRS. 174 Usually, the statute of 
limitations begins running when the IRS denies the claim. 
3.2.3. Complexity of the case 
Another factor in evaluating the role played by the Tax Court is the 
complexity of the case. Usually, straightforward claims filed require less 
coordination between taxpayers and the IRS, but complex cases often 
encourage settlement before the Tax Court makes final determination. The 
virtue of settlement is significant - as long as revenue collection is realized in 
a cost-efficient way - as the IRS usually views complex cases as a bother 
rather than a bonus. 175 
3.2.4. Cost-efficiency 
The Tax Court does not require a full payment of taxes due before filing a suit 
against IRS's assessments, but full payment of tax liabilities is necessary for 
filing refund claims before a district court or the Court of Federal Claims. 176 
The financial ability to pay a potential assessment if the Tax Court makes a 
final decision is a key factor in the taxpayer's calculus before filing a petition. 
Having this in mind, a taxpayer should weigh her financial capacities and the 
potential costs with the merits of the case and market interest rates as 
174 l.R.C.§6532(a) 
175 See generally Cantrell, supra 15 
176 
See Greenaway, supra 15, at 311, 318, noting that the "full payment" rule also applies to 
estate and gift tax refund suits but not to refund suits litigated in bankruptcy 
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d 177 compared to underpayment an overpayment rates. 
3.2.5. Discovery178 
A key element in the U.S. discovery process is the taxpayers' right to 
confidentiality. Business secrets and corporate operation privacy are 
particularly sensitive to petitioners when filing a tax claim. Taking this a 
concem, the Tax Court may encourage mutual consulting and collaboration 
between the IRS and taxpayers in the discovery process for stipulating a 
reasonable judgment before the case is made to pubic. However, depositions 
are rarely taken in the Tax Court except in complex cases where the parties 
depart. Discovery practice in refund litigation at the district courts is more 
formalized than discovery in Tax Court, and deposition practice is common in 
refund litigation. 
3.2.6. Settlement 
Adjudicating a settlement between a taxpayer and the Office of Appeals of the 
IRS is an important part of tax judges' daily routine. Unless the IRS Chief 
Counsel purposefully designates a case or an issue within a case for litigation, 
a taxpayer may opt to settle with the Office of Appeals. Moreover, any refund 
or credit greater than $2 million, whether triggered by an accepted 
administrative claim, an overpayment in the Tax Court, or refund litigation, is 
177 /d., quoting GE v. United States, 103 A.F.T.R. 2d 2009-858, presenting the importance of 
overall consideration of financial capacity and merits of the case, especially under the 
financial crisis settings 
178 See generally Cantrell, supra IS 
374 
subject to review by the Joint Committee on Taxation at the Tax Court.179 
3.2.7. Trial 
Tax Court judges mostly make final determinations based on stipulated facts: 
either the case is adjudicated by a Tax Court judge, or the case is submitted for 
decision fully stipulated under Rule 122. 180 Is a trial the most efficient way in 
resolving a dispute? The answer varies. As long as a trial is necessary for the 
benefits of the taxpayer and the IRS, yes. Complex cases often lead to either a 
settlement or on motion, however. The Tax Court does not have a jury trial but 
the litigation in district court is before a jury. 
Trials in the Tax Court are relatively short, even summary judgment is often 
used. Given the Tax Court's emphasis on stipulation, most Tax Court judges 
have little patience for laborious trials where trial counsel attempt, through 
testimony or unstipulated exhibits, to introduce evidence susceptible to 
stipulation. 
Proceedings in the Tax Court are conducted under the Tax Court Rules, while 
the trial of the "Small Tax Case" ("S-Cases") where the amount in dispute is 
less than $50,000 has specific procedures. 181 The advantages of "S-Cases," as 
they are colloquially known, are several: more choices as to the place of the 
trial, less discovery, and relatively informal procedural and evidentiary 
179 I.R.C.§6405(a) 
180 See generally Honorable Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., Tax Court Trials: An Updated View 
from the Bench, 47 Tax law 587 (1994) as quoted in footnote 112 by Greenaway, supra 15 
181 I.R.C.§7463 
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standards at trial. 182 
3.2.8. Appeals 
Appeal is probably the last resort for the taxpayer or the IRS, but it happens 
often. A key factor for appeal is how the case is adjudicated by the Tax Court, 
and under which controlling precedent or in stipulation. However, the right to 
appeal has to be given to either party to guarantee procedural justice. 
3.3. Summary 
The above description of the U.S. tax judicature system obviously is 
oversimplified and selectively tailored. It is not the goal of this thesis to 
furnish a critical review of the U.S. tax judicial construct. However, all factors 
have to be put together as reference in submitting a proposal catering to 
potential reform needs of China's tax judicature system. Taxpayers and the tax 
authorities share similar concerns, such as discretion of the court, timeline, 
cost-efficiency, complexity of the issue, settlement potential, trial and appeals. 
And these issues should be considered under the general framework of the 
judicial system, overall financial capacities of taxpayers and social policy 
needs. Again, there is no uniform model that can be globally applied in tax 
judicature reform. Rather, a few commonly acceptable factors should be 
considered in designing a reform. 
182 See generally Tax Ct. R. 174(b) 
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IV. A triple whammy- prospects of Chinese tax judicature reform 
Improvements of the Chinese tax judicature system in the past three decades 
have been characterized by irregular adaption of the general administrative 
procedures in the tax context, a lack of thoughtful attention to taxpayers, and 
obstinate interference from political and administrative actors. The tax dispute 
resolution has taken on problematic deficiencies similar to those of the general 
administrative judicature framework into which it is embedded. Therefore, the 
Chinese tax judicature reform falls into two areas: the peculiarities of the tax 
system and the upgrade of the overall Chinese judiciary. Due to space 
limitations, this subchapter focuses on the flaws in and debates over the 
current tax judicature. It considers the second prong, i.e., the competence, 
autonomy and independence of the Chinese judiciary in general, much more 
briefly. After all, it is continually important to note the substantial differences 
in the procedures in terms of administrative and judicial bodies that hear tax 
cases in different systems. 
4.1.A system full of peculiarities 
The tax dispute resolution system in China looks similar to many other 
established frameworks: taxpayers have the right to appeal an adverse decision 
of the tax administrations. Since tax authorities are party to a dispute, 
approaches that are often adopted in civil disputes such as negotiation, 
mediation, and arbitration rarely are applicable. Chinese tax disputes are 
therefore mostly administrative in nature. Tax disputes generally fall into two 
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categories based on their resolution methods: tax administrative 
reconsideration and tax administrative litigation. The former is usually 
conducted by the tax authority one level up within the administrative hierarchy, 
and the latter is governed by the jurisdiction of the Chinese administrative 
court. Criticism of the Chinese tax judicature often fastens on the following 
aspects. 
4.1.1. A pre-trial tax administrative reconsideration 
Tax litigation on collection of tax is occasioned by a required pre-trial tax 
administrative reconsideration. In general, an aggrieved taxpayer who refuses 
to accept an official administrative decision has a straightforward choice of 
forum: filing an application for an administrative reconsideration, or invoking 
a lawsuit directly with an administration court seeking relief such as the 
repudiation or adjustment of the administrative decision. 183 Sharply different 
from administrative litigation in other areas of law, before initiating a tax 
dispute arising from the tax collection, a taxpayer is required to file an 
application for an administrative reconsideration. Only when a taxpayer 
refuses to accept the administrative reconsideration can she file a law suit. 
However, it is noted that for disputes based on punishments, asset secured 
measures, or mandatory enforcement by the tax administration, a taxpayer has 
forum selection options similar to other administrative cases, i.e., either filing 
183 See Articles 37 and 38, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa [The 
Administrative Procedure Law ofthe People's Republic of China] ~$AJ:~jtifiJ001ri!&i!fi!~ 
~(effective as of October 1, 1990) 
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an application for an administrative reconsideration or directly filing a lawsuit 
with the court. 184 
This conditional afflicting procedure of a pre-trial reconsideration is not 
without merits. First, from the administrative efficiency perspective, the 
implementation and enforcement of the tax laws fluctuates in different 
localities. Externalities resulting from varied competence and understanding of 
the tax laws render a tax administrative reconsideration efficient by filtering 
out obviously erroneous tax decisions and easily settled controversies. In 
addition, this should limit the number of frivolous tax suits. Second, from an 
enforcement perspective, the reconsideration is usually made by a tax 
authority of the next level in the administrative hierarchy. This internalization 
of tax disputes serve taxpayers interests in terms of ensuring the tax expertise 
of the decision-making body. Reconsideration normally results in a settlement 
between tax authorities and taxpayers; therefore, the enforcement of a 
reconsideration decision is clear-cut. Third, based on the doctrine of equitable 
recoupment, the pre-trail reconsideration can better guarantee revenue 
collection, which dominates tax authorities' behavior. Bad taxpayers may take 
advantage of a court dispute process to drag the payment process out longer 
and avoid paying taxes on time. An administrative reconsideration, in this 
sense, drives taxpayers to fulfill compliance without hindering the pace of 
collection. 
In spite of these perceived merits of the Chinese system however, its many 
drawbacks overwhelm its benefits. A primary concern is whether tax 
authorities' discretion is too expansive to avoid arbitrary administration. In 
184 See Article 15, the Rules for Tax Administrative Reconsideration of the P.R. C. (Trial 
Implementation) [hereinafter "Tax Administrative Reconsideration Rules"], as amended 
effective as ofMay 1, 2004 
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reality, other than restrictions on the physical freedom of a taxpayer, Chinese 
tax authorities probably have jurisdiction governing almost all aspects of 
taxpayers' activities: registration, administration, audit, investigation, 
collection, imposing penalties, asset secured measures, enforcement, and 
reconsideration. According to a Chinese judge, the reconsideration may be 
viewed as an expansion rather than a control on tax authorities' discretion. 185 
Furthermore, the independence of the agent making reconsideration decision is 
subject to serious doubt. The extensive relationship between lower and higher 
level tax authorities may impair objective measurement and the trust given by 
taxpayers. Sometimes, this dualism drives the reconsideration unit to act as a 
"coordinator" rather an "administrative magistrate". In addition, the 
jurisdiction of reconsideration units at different localities may conclude 
different tax decisions on the same issue. This raises a jurisprudential question: 
is there any need to establish a national "appeal" reconsideration unit? How to 
correlate the tax administration and the court taking tax cases? Last but not 
least, returning to a jurisprudential analysis, tax disputes involving the other 
types of tax administrative decisions such as punishments, asset secured 
measures, or mandatory enforcement are not conditioned with this pre-trial tax 
administrative reconsideration. If the unwritten speculation that a tax 
administrative reconsideration is imposed mostly for revenue collection 
purposes turns out true, the stake of imposing an additional barrier to 
taxpayers on seeking legitimate relief is against constitutional protection of 
185 See Wang Song, Nashuiren Quanli Baohu Shijiao xiao de Shuishou Sifa Gaige [The Tax 
Judicial Reform from the Point of View of Protection of Taxpayers' Rights] (£:f'~, «~l'JtA 
tVl'Ui~Hf'f.miH ri¥11'5/.i&:fbi'ti:&.!J)) (2006)), Tax Judicial Reform Proceeding, pp74-77, at 
77. Wang Song is a judge from the He' nan Provincial High Court and is in charge of tax 
disputes in China 
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taxpayers' property rights. The legislation of this due process pre-trial 
requirement would therefore be a matter of fierce debate. 
4.1.2. The full payment rule 
By statute, a taxpayer must first pay or remit tax payments, surcharges, and 
late fees (if applicable) due or provide a guarantee of payment before filing an 
application for the tax administrative reconsideration or a lawsuit. 186 This full 
payment rule has been vehemently criticized by judges and scholars in China. 
First, the criticism is based on the principles of equity and ability to pay. Cases 
that could be accepted for an administrative reconsideration encompass a wide 
variety of issues. The unilateral jurisdictional acts conducted by tax authorities 
include the identification of the taxpayer, subject of tax, applicable tax rate, 
tax deduction, tax exemption, tax refund, tax basis calculation, tax jurisdiction, 
timing, and tax collection method. In this sense, tax authorities can single-
handedly use any of those factors to substantiate the issuance of an initial tax 
decision. Tax authorities may over-assess the tax liability borne by taxpayers. 
If a taxpayer fails to pay an over-estimated assessment due to limited financial 
capacity, she may never go through the due process to file claims and seek 
relief. And tax authorities cannot rule out the possibility of making erroneous 
decisions. Therefore, the full payment requirement jeopardizes taxpayers' 
186 See Law concerning The Administration of Tax Collection of the P.R. C. (hereinafter Tax 
Collection Law), effective as of May I, 2001; see Article 88(1) of the Tax Collection Law 
provides that "if any tax dispute between the tax authority and a taxpayer, withholding agent 
or tax payment guarantor occurs, the taxpayer, withholding agent or tax payment guarantor 
must first pay or remit the taxes and the late fee in accordance with the decision on tax 
payment made by the tax authority, or provide corresponding guaranty, and then after may, 
apply for an administrative reconsideration in accordance with the law. If they object to the 
decision made after the administrative reconsideration, they may bring a suit in the people's 
court in accordance with the law" 
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legitimate rights to plead, appeal and gain legal relief. Meanwhile, if two 
taxpayers have similar cases but one petitioner withdraws the case due to 
financial incapacity, the equality of taxpayers cannot be realized in the tax 
system, and taxpayers' rights protection becomes inequitable. 
Second, from the point of view of the principle of proportionality, the full 
payment rule adds the burden of proof on the taxpayers' side, and this worsens 
the already imbalanced bargaining position between taxpayers and tax 
authorities. An excuse that tax authorities in assessing tax liabilities is that 
taxpayers hide authentic book and corporate records in a tax audit or 
investigation which leads to a wrongful determination. This defense, however, 
does not remove the burden of proof from the tax authority side in reaching a 
reasonably adjudicated assessment. Equally misleading is that tax authorities 
may manipulate an over-estimated tax liability as a measure to "squeeze" 
taxpayers for tax payments. Aside from charges of selective and corrupt tax 
audits, this approach clearly violates the principle of proportionality of tax 
liabilities. 
Third, the full payment rule is an improper inference of the variance doctrine, 
which is applied to circumscribe refund suit jurisdiction. It is important to 
mention that the full payment rule adopted in China deals with disputes 
relating to collection of tax only. But the variance doctrine prevents a taxpayer 
from presenting claims in a refund suit that substantially vary from the legal 
theoretical and factual bases set forth in the tax collection claims presented to 
tax authorities. Given the charge by tax authorities that taxpayers may conceal 
authentic tax-related information, as long as a taxpayer does not file a refund 
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claim, it lacks the jurisprudential basis to subject a taxpayer to a quasi-penal 
tax payment. 
Is this condition of full payment exclusively applicable to unfortunate Chinese 
taxpayers only? Absolutely not. In the U.S., the Tax Court and bankruptcy 
courts usually are prepayment forums, as the statutes and case law demand full 
payment of tax liabilities before a district court or the Court of Federal Claims 
may take jurisdiction over a refund suit. 187 The "full payment" rule also 
applies to estate and gift tax refund suits but not to refund suits litigated in 
bankruptcy. 188 However, the key difference must be identified here - a full 
payment of tax assessment is required only if a taxpayer files a refund suit. 
The reasoning is quite straightforward - a taxpayer cannot get a refund 
without paying it first. As to China's full payment requirement for disputes 
arising from tax collection, other than fiscal policy considerations of 
guaranteed revenue collection, there is no basis in law or policy for such a 
provision. 
4.1.3. Competence of judges adjudicating tax disputes 
When a tax dispute is filed at a court, the expertise and competence of the 
judge hearing tax case is of great significance. Competence of judges in 
adjudicating tax disputes refers to their ''technical expertise ... in evaluating 
factually and legally complex disputes." 189 Following the dishonorable 
187 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(l) (2006); see also Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 
(1960). 
188 See Greenaway supra 15, at 317-18 
189 See Nicolas C. Howson, Judicial Independence and The Company Law in the Shanghai 
Courts (in Judicial independence in China: Lessons for Global Rule of Law Promotion (R. 
Peerenboom, Ed.), Cambridge University Press, PP 134-153) at 137 
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tradition of low professionalism in the Chinese judiciary, judges that 
specialize in corporate, securities, or tax laws are hard to find, especially in 
hinterland or less developed provinces. This is not surprising. Although China 
has made unprecedented efforts to build the competence of its judiciary, such 
as recruiting graduates from university law schools, requiring the passage of 
the Jurisprudence Exam and the promulgation of the "Judge Law", the 
competence of judges still undermines the Chinese judiciary. This deficiency 
is even particularly salient in the tax judicature system. 
First, the training of tax law expertise in university law schools has been weak 
or rudimentary. Law graduates majoring in tax usually prefer working in the 
fiscal or tax sectors. Second, as the talent pool is so concentrated in the tax 
authorities, given the close connections between courts and administrations, 
judges are not willing or particularly incentivized to develop tax expertise. 
Rather, they take tax authorities' opinions as authoritative guidelines or 
instructions. This in turn damages taxpayers' interests unilaterally. Third, due 
to the prerequisite tax administrative reconsideration, judges are not given 
enough opportunities to adjudicate tax cases, most of which are filtered by tax 
authorities. In this sense, the judgment of tax disputes may remain somewhat 
unsophisticated, since the tax administration is unlikely to challenge itself by 
encouraging taxpayers to file tax lawsuits in courts. Tax cases usually are filed 
at the lowest-tier court in the system, at which complex cases are neither 
anticipated nor common. Finally, the number of tax cases of first instance filed 
has been consistently low. For example, for the years 2002, 2003, and 2004, 
the number of tax cases of first instance accepted nationwide was 1496, 803, 
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and 1032,190 respectively. The complexities of cases also diverge. Without a 
significant number of cases available to adjudicate, the judges cannot build 
their competence in this area. 
4.1.4. Summary 
Chinese tax disputes are administrative in nature, and they include two 
avenues: tax administrative reconsideration and tax administrative litigation. 
However, the tax judicature system is plagued by several systemic flaws, in 
practice. The requirement of pre-trial tax administrative reconsideration 
renders tax authorities' discretion too expansive to avoid arbitrary 
administration. The full payment requirement for disputes arising from tax 
collection is poorly justified from the perspective of justice and efficiency and 
receives vehement criticism from both judges and scholars. Moreover, due to 
limited number of less complex tax cases accepted by the administrative court, 
the competence of judges in tax laws has not markedly improved, nor has 
robust application of the doctrine of stare decisis. All these defects, coupled 
with tax authorities' adamant efforts to increase revenue collection, call for an 
upgrade of the Chinese tax judicature reform. 
190 See generally, China Statistics Yearbook (2002-2004) 
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4.2.An interesting debate - the Chinese tax court 
To many commentators' surprise, the proposal to set up the Chinese tax court 
system was first raised in the mid-1980s. 191 However, different from the U.S., 
China's tax judicature system still does not contain a court that hears tax cases 
only. But the debate on whether China should establish a tax court and follow 
which model has gone on for the past decade between and among tax 
academia and judges from the administrative courts that hear tax cases. 192 In 
general, there are three distinguishable views regarding establishing the tax 
court in China: (1) an opposition, which suggests it is too early to set up a tax 
court given the current political and legal situation in China; (2) a supportive 
position that a tax court system should emerge to further the tax judicature 
reform; and (3) a middle path, somewhat vaguely defined, that a special tax 
tribunal within the current court system for tax disputes, similar to the 
questions perpetuae for criminal cases, would be best. Based on less than 30 
available articles and conference papers on the tax judicature reform written in 
Chinese, this section aims to summarize those major positions on this topic 
and offer a few observations on the flaws of China's general judiciary system, 
which are manifested in the tax context. 
191 The author, when attending Review Conference of World Bank 4th Phase Project- China's 
Tax Law Reform held in Beijing in May 2005, remembers that then SAT Vice-Governor Xu, 
Shanda mentioned that the proposal of setting up a Chinese tax court was raised in an IMF 
report in the mid 1980s 
192 Professor Douglas Kahn from the University of Michigan Law School noted that there are 
at least two concerns to be considered prior to setting up a tax court system: first, the 
uniformity of judgment and how to select a panel of judges for tax cases; second, the tax court 
system may require a separate court of appeals for tax cases as necessary (notes on file with 
the author); See generally in the Proceedings of International Conference on "Harmonious 
Society and Tax Judicial Reform in China", Peking Univ., May 2006 (hereinafter " Tax 
Judicial Reform Proceeding") 
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4.2.1. Open-minded oppositionist's view 
Opposition to the establishment of a tax court system of any type is based on 
the following arguments. 193 
4. 2.1.1. The current tax judicature functions well 
China's current tax judicature system operates well in meeting taxpayers' 
needs for challenging adverse tax assessments by employing tax 
administrative reconsideration and tax litigation. True, there are flaws in 
policy orientations, legislation, and enforcement in tax governance, but overall 
the system does not materially dampen taxpayers' rights. Therefore, specific 
amendment of problematic rules, such as the full-payment requirement as 
discussed above, is preferable to the overhaul of the judicature system 
entirely. 194 
4.2.1.2. Very limited caseload of tax disputes 
193 There are two major groups of oppositionists: 1) judges presiding or supervising tax 
disputes in practice. See Wang supra 62 and 2) tax scholars who have firsthand experience in 
legislation and practice, see e.g., Xiong Wei, Zhongguo you Biyao Jianli Shuiwu Fayuan rna 
[Does China need Tax Courts Right Now?] flHl~, « 9=t OO:ff 16'JfJt.1zJ.liJH*Jl3t~? )) Tax 
Judicial Reform Proceeding, ppl78-185. Xiong is a professor of tax law from Wuhan 
University, China. 
194 Id., Wang at 77 
387 
The caseload of tax disputes brought to the lowest-level courts is too 
limited, 195 inter alia, tax disputes can be appropriately handled and 
adjudicated by judges on board already, and "the urgency of establishing a 
court dealing with tax disputes only is nebulous." 196 However, such small 
caseload of tax disputes deserves deliberations before concluding that 
taxpayers are satisfied with tax administration. 
Consistent commercial operation: consistent business operation in the 
same tax jurisdiction demands the enterprise taxpayers keep a sociable 
and secure relationship with tax authorities without initiating conflicts 
through tax disputes, which may invite revenges from tax authorities; 
Judicial autonomy and independence: taxpayers usually distrust the 
autonomy and independence of a court in adjudicating tax disputes 
against the tax authority defendant. "Many cases are simply not 
accepted due to public or internal bureaucratic direction or precisely 
because of the case's political coloration, or even if initially accepted, 
such cases are not subject to adjudication again for fear of bumping up 
against extralegal power." 197 In particular, 1) the tax expertise of 
judges hearing tax cases sometimes is guided by tax authorities' 
technical support, so the judgment of a tax dispute may be distorted 
against taxpayers' rights; 198 2) the relationship of court and tax 
administration is intertwined. The connection of the two falls along 
two axes: the budget and spending of local court is supported by local 
195 !d. see also Xiong, at 179 
196 
See Xiong supra 70 at 176-77, presenting that from 1998 to 2004, the overall tax caseload 
accepted at the first phase decreased from 2,069 to 1,032 
197 
See Howson supra 66 at 138, summarizing his understanding and watch on case 
acceptance or dismissal in China's court 
198 See Wang supra 62 at 77 
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fiscal revenue, and local People's Congress is responsible for rejecting 
or approving court administrative budgets.199 The court, for the sake of 
local revenue collection and interests of itself, may reach unfavorable 
decisions against taxpayers. Meanwhile, local judges, especially the 
chief judges of the adjudication committees and judges in key 
tribunals, are appointed or at least approved by the local peoples' 
congress. 200 This bureaucratic undertaking might compose an 
important factor in adjudicating a tax dispute. Another source of 
political influence comes from the fact that the People's Congress 
exercises stipulated "individual case supervision". According to the 
Supervision Law passed in 2007, local People's Congress may 
supervise courts by investigating specific issues, appointing and 
dismissing judicial officials. In practice, the supervision may lead to 
indirect intervention to the adjudication process. 
The expansive discretionary power of tax authorities: according to the 
Tax Collection Law, tax authorities are entitled to impose a penalty 
ranging from 50 percent to 5 times of tax assessment due for behaviors 
such as tax evasion or improper handling of unsecured assets.201 Such a 
199 See Xiong supra 70 at 180 
200 See generally Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Jiancha Fa [The Law on 
Administrative Supervision of the P.R. C.] [hereinafter Supervision Law ofthe PRC] ((9=J:$.A 
~;J:tiflllil1'fii;l(~~¥*» , effective as ofMay 9, 1997, as amended on June 25,2010 
201 See e.g., Article 63 of the Tax Collection Law, stipulating that [t]or a taxpayer who evades 
taxes, the tax authority shall pursue the payment of the taxes unpaid or underpaid, the late fee, 
and impose a fine with the amount from 50% to five times of the taxes unpaid or underpaid; 
Article 64 of the Tax Collection Law, "Where a taxpayer does not file tax returns, or does not 
pay or underpays the taxes payable, the tax authority shall pursue the payment of the taxes 
unpaid or underpaid and the late fee, and impose a fine with the amount from 50% to five 
times of the taxes unpaid or underpaid." 
Article 65 of the Tax Collection Law, "where a taxpayer fails to pay the taxes payable, or 
hinders the tax authority from pursuing the payment of the taxes unpaid by means of 
transferring or concealing the properties, the tax authority shall pursue the payment of the 
taxes unpaid and the late fee, and impose a fine with the amount from 50% to five times of the 
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wide range of discretion inevitably leads to potential corruptions and 
unethical collection routines. Moreover, tax authorities may violate the 
principle of legality because to a large extent tax collection is based on 
administrative quota or budgetary order but not on legitimate 
I I . f )" b"l" 202 ca cu atwn o tax 1a 1 Ity. 
The full-payment rule: by statute, a taxpayer must first pay or remit tax 
payment, surcharge, and late fees (if applicable) due or provide 
guarantee in the first place before filing an application for the tax 
administrative reconsideration or a law suit. 203 This rule bars 
financially incapable taxpayers from exercising the right to access to 
seek relief through administrative or judicial tribunals. 
As noted by oppositionists, the case load of tax disputes does not warrant the 
establishment of a separate tribunal to accept and adjudicate tax cases only. 
Seeking relief through tax litigation is even an inefficient approach disliked by 
taxpayers; rather, settlement usually is reached at the tax administrative 
reconsideration stage. The flaws of the judicial system manifest in the tax 
judicature operation as well, such as its lack of independence and autonomy. 
Moreover, this thesis seconds oppositionist' notion on the demand-supply 
logic between tax cases and establishment of the tax court. In this sense, it is 
clear that setting up a tax court does not necessarily encourage filing of tax 
taxes unpaid; if such acts constitute an offence, criminal liabilities shall be investigated in 
accordance with the law." 
Article 68 of the Tax Collection Law, "where a taxpayer or withholding agent which has been 
ordered by the tax authority to pay, within a prescribed time limit, the amount of taxes which 
should be paid or remitted but have not been paid or have been underpaid within the time limit, 
fails to pay the amount of taxes within the time limit, the tax authority may, in addition to 
pursuing the payment of the amount of taxes the taxpayer or withholding agent has failed to 
pay or underpaid by the mandatory measures as prescribed in Article 40 of this Law, impose a 
fine of 50% or more of the amount of taxes which have not been paid or underpaid but not 
more than five times of the said amount." 
202 See Xiong supra 70 at 181 
203 See Article 88(1) Tax Collection Law of the P.R.C. 
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disputes, rather, tax cases should prompt the institutionalization of the tax 
204 court system. 
4.2.1.3. The nebulous architect of the proposed tax court system 
Another argument put forward by those opposing a tax court is that no 
practical architect is available for the tax court system. The establishment of 
the tax court, they argue, is more theoretical than practical. According to 
oppositionists, the tax court system would be complicated by the following 
factors. 
The supervision of the tax court: both supporters and oppositionists 
agree that tax authorities or the SAT must be kept from supervising the 
tax court. Therefore, the Supreme People's Court of China should 
supervise the operation and management of the tax court, but no details 
have been provided regarding how this would work;205 
The setting of the tax court: if the tax court is part of the judiciary 
system, is it a separate sub-system paralleling the current structure with 
four tiers of court hierarchy, or just a tribunal paralleling 
administrative, civil and criminal tribunals? Is it necessary to have tax 
tribunals in all levels of court?206 If it has a principal office location, 
are tax court judges able to sit "at any place within China" and travel 
204 See Xiong supra at 183. The demand-supply logic centers on one of the divergence 
between oppositionists and supporters 
205 !d., at 182 
206 !d. 
391 
nationwide to conduct trials in various designated cities, as is U.S. 
practice?207 How to appeal a tax court decision? 
Competency oftax court judges: given the specialty oftax laws, judges, 
have expertise in the tax laws, and are tasked to "apply that expertise in 
a manner to ensure that taxpayers are assessed only what they owe, and 
no more. "208 The same rationale applies to future judges of Chinese tax 
court as well. Therefore, aside from general requirements under 
China's Judge Law, how to select, appoint, manage, train, evaluate and 
compensate qualified judges is unclear. How, for example, can China 
guarantee the tax expertise, rotation, and tenure of judges? Will the tax 
court recruit judges from "the pool of tax officials" 209 or from 
elsewhere? 
Right to representation: a consistent supply of lawyers litigating tax 
cases is a vital component of U.S. Tax Court operation. China, 
however, does not have this luxury. Even as the number of qualified 
lawyers in China has increased 800 fold over the past thirty years 
reaching over 200,000 by the end of 2010,210 there remains an urgent 
need for qualified and well-trained tax practitioners, and there will for 
the foreseeable future. 211 Therefore, is it necessary to entitle CPAs and 
CT As the representation under the tax court jurisdiction? How to 
standardize the tax professionalism? 
207 I.R.C§ 7445 
208 
For more detail, see http://www.court.com/article/view/united-states-tax-court , (last visited 
on March 15, 2011) 
209 See Xiong supra 70, at 182 
210 
For a summary of development of Chinese legal profession for the past 30 years, see 
generally http:l/china.findlaw.cn/law/506581/viewspace-22221 (in Chinese) (last visited on 
March 15, 2011) 
211 See Li Jiyou, Three Restrictions against the Development of the Tax Planning Practice 
(Tax Judicature Reform Proceedings, 2006) at 522 
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4.2.1.4. Summary 
As noted, those opposed to the establishment of a tax court treat the idea as 
impracticable under the current political and judicial situation in China. The 
establishment of the tax court system may lead to an overhaul of the overall 
judicial system and reform212 including the civil and criminal court systems. In 
addition, the idea of a tax court system needs approval from the NPC Standing 
Committee.213 However, it is important to mention that any major judiciary 
reform originates from social and political needs.214 
4.2.2. Supporters' over-romanticized view 
Supporters of establishment of the Chinese tax court system are hardly a 
minority in the Chinese tax academia. 215 Their substantiation for the tax court 
stands on three basic propositions: (1) taxpayers rights would be better secured 
by the tax court system; (2) the tax court system helps realize judicial 
independence and autonomy; and (3) the tax court system would make more 
consistent the current tax adjudication practice, which suffers from 
inconsistency nationwide. However, proposals supporting tax court construct 
212 See Xiong supra 70, at 178 
213 See Article 29, Zhongguo Renmin Fayuan Zuzhi Fa [The People's Court Organization Law 
ofthe People's Republic ofChina] ((J:fOO.AJ~d*I~Hil~.>H*» , effective as of May I, 1979, 
as amended on October 31, 2006 
214 !d. 
215 Among all articles and conference papers reviewed on tax judicature reform complied in 
the Tax Judicial Reform Proceeding, 10 out 28 articles support the establishment of a tax court 
system, 13 oppose and 5 prefer a midlist view of setting a tax tribunal in the existing court 
system 
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remain more hypothetical than realistic. In responding to the challenges of 
skeptics, the following arguments are raised. 216 
4.2.2.1. Proposed organizational structure ofthe tax court system 
According to supporters, the setting or organization structure of the tax court 
should follow current geographic economic essentials and development 
prospect rather than sticking with current nationwide administrative hierarchy. 
In this sense, tax jurisdiction nationwide will be divided into five or six 
regional tax jurisdictions. The tax court should be headquartered in Beijing 
under the direct supervision of the People's Supreme Court, and be structured 
in three tiers handling two levels of adjudications: the first trial and an appeal. 
Within each regional tax jurisdiction, tax court judges may travel to different 
sites to adjudicate tax disputes. 
4.2.2.2. Enlarged scope of cases accepted 
In addition to regular tax assessment or enforcement decisions, supporters 
boldly suggest expanding the scope of tax judicial review to cover local tax 
rulings and notices that are released by lowest hierarchy of tax bureaus. This 
proposal is extraordinary. By statute, Chinese administrative courts should 
dismiss petitions asking courts to overrule administrative actions with 
216 See Zhu Daqi and He Xiaxiang, Lun Woguo Shuiwu Fayuan de Sheli [About Establishing 
the Tax Court System in China], Vol. 21, No.3 pp17-22 Contemporary Law Review, May 
2007 [hereinafter Zhu and He] **~' 1PJiEH-F, H~fltOOm1Ht~JGI¥Ji9:J'l.)) ~1~¥t~~ 
21 ~m.:=.M. The author notes that supporters are cautious in safeguarding their positions in 
terms of the speculative proposals they have. Zhu and He probably contribute one of 
persuasive pieces in this connection. Zhu is a professor of tax law from People's University of 
China 
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generally binding force, 217 such as binding administrative regulations or 
rulings passed by administrative organs that are authorized or delegated by the 
legislature. Therefore, subjecting local tax rulings to dispute in courts would 
add to tax judicature reform an unintended shift in established legal 
hierarchies. 
This proposal is nevertheless supported in two ways. First, corruption and 
irregular tax administrative acts usually are based on unsophisticated or 
otherwise perverse local tax rulings. Even with nationwide or provincial 
guidelines, local tax bureaus may twist policies for unstated rationales. Those 
supporting the establishment of tax courts point out that this sort of 
administrative arbitrariness leads to a large portion of controversies or 
disputes. 218 Second, complaints about uncontrolled, expansive and 
manipulative local tax policies are harsh. Aside from regular revenue 
collection, equally important is political pressure to increase local GDP for 
personnel promotion and inflate resources in developing local economy. 
Therefore, local-specific tax rulings are employed to "squeeze" as much tax 
payment as possible and reallocate financial burdens to taxpayers. To this end, 
distorted tax administration and uncontrolled or manipulative local tax rulings 
are supposed to be regulated by the envisioned tax court system. 
217 See generally Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa [Administrative 
Litigation Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China] (effective as of October 1, 
1990).[hereinafter "the Administrative Litigation Procedure Law"] « 9=t $A ~;tli;fll 00 1Jll;5( 
Vfi'~$)) . In particular, Article 2 of the Administrative Litigation Procedure Law proscribes 
"If a citizen, a legal person or any other organization considers that his or its lawful rights and 
interests have been infringed upon by a specific administrative act of an administrative organ 
or its personnel, he or it shall have the right to bring a suit before a people's court in 
accordance with this Law." However, Article 12 (I) the Administrative Litigation Procedure 
Law provides that "The people's courts shall not accept suits brought by citizens, legal 
persons or other organizations against administrative rules and regulations, regulations, or 
decisions and orders with general binding force formulated and announced by administrative 
organs" 
218 See Zhu and He supra 93 at 20 
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4.2.2.3. Small Tax Cases 
Another concept proposed is the definition of small tax cases, which is pretty 
in line with the U.S. Tax Court handlings. As noted above, special procedures 
on trial of the "Small Tax Case" in the U.S. cover disputes for less than 
$50,000.219 Usually, the trial of"S-Cases" entails less discovery and relatively 
informal procedural and evidentiary standards. 220 Regrettably, supporters 
discuss this point very briefly. 
4.2.2.4. Reduction of intervention by administrative reconsideration 
According to supporters, the procedural advantage of tax administrative 
reconsideration is over-emphasized and thus should be abolished. In this 
respect, supporters' position is more aggressive and clear-cut while the 
opposition still have pragmatic ideas of keeping the administrative 
reconsideration mechanism as a filter to remove externalities caused by 
disputed tax assessment. 
4.2.2.5. Summary 
A key dividing line between supporters and oppositionists is whether the tax 
court system invites tax disputes or not. Supporters are more optimistic while 
those who oppose it are not. Paradoxically, there is no right or wrong answer 
219 I.R.C.§7463 
220 See Tax Ct. R. 174(b) 
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to this question. Although supporters propose a different mechanism for 
reform, the two groups share similar criticisms. First, the full-payment rule for 
seeking administrative or judicial relief should be abolished. Second, the tax 
administrative reconsideration is not appropriate. Third, taxpayers need more 
realistic protection of their rights. In this sense, conflicting views of two 
groups display like a fair charge but are not incompatible. 
4.2.3. A midlist view 
An intermediate position between the opposition and supporters proposes 
inserting a tax tribunal into the current court system, parallel to China's civil, 
criminal and administration tribunals. The tax tribunal would, by definition, 
hear tax cases only and sits in each hierarchy of the court system, i.e., from the 
Supreme People's Court to lowest-level People's Court.221 However, there are 
many complications to this plan despite its merits. 222 
First, how could China structure the appeals of lower tax court judgments? 
Would they go to an upper level of the tax court, an upper level administrative 
court, or would either suffice? This question is left largely unanswered. 
Second, a waste of judicial resource such as judges, administrative forces and 
operational spending is inevitable if the tax tribunal appears in every court on 
each level. After all, the need to set up a tax tribunal is not clear at each level 
of the courts given the limited, irregular, and widely dispersed tax caseload. 
Third, although setting up a tax tribunal in the current court system does not 
need approval from the NPC Standing Committee, but it is unlikely that a 
221 See Xiong supra 70, at 183 (quoting Zhai Jiguang, who is an adamant supporter of the 
middle ground) 
222 See Zhu and He supra 93,at 17 
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nationwide tax tribunal system would escape the scrutiny of the Supreme 
People's Court, which is heavily colored by issues of institutional 
independence. In this sense, the intermediate proposal seems to avoid 
shortcomings in the arguments of supporters and the opposition. However, it 
invites harsher challenges on eradicating the dilemma of its transitory nature 
and has its own issues of impracticality. To this end, the tax tribunal 
proposition somewhat suffers from illiberality of twisting the Confucian gold 
rule of mean for reforming the tax judicature construct in allowance towards 
catering to both supporters and oppositionists. As a result, ultimately this 
middle path has some theoretical merit, but little present pragmatic value. 
4.2.4. Summary 
As noted above, three factions of thoughts co-exist in proposing agenda of 
establishing the hypothetical Chinese tax court system, and each has its merits. 
Equally important is that they share similar reform proposals such as the 
removal of the pre-trial administrative reconsideration mechanism and 
abolishment of the full-payment rule. Overall, the opposition prefers a mild 
but pointed plea without inviting an overhaul of the current system. The 
supporters, on the other hand, are more aggressive or optimistic in seeing the 
tax court as a rare opportunity to reform both the judicial system and tax 
administration. A middle path approach is attractive at first glance, because it 
seems to avoid obvious problems in each of the other two positions. But its 
transitory nature and over-conformism misidentifY a few key considerations in 
construct a compromise constrained by impracticality. Again, there is no clear 
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answer to the speculative pursuit of tax judicature reform. The establishment 
of the tax court system ultimately seems a proxy for political and social 
policy 223 debates rather a solemn pursuit on the Chinese legal reform 
agenda.224 
4.3. A legitimate need of tax administration 
China's tax judicature reform is a three-front battle, as it must orient itself 
simultaneously toward tax administration, the general judicial system, and 
China's taxpayers. In China, tax law remains heavily reliant on tax 
administration. The enforcement and reconsideration of adverse decision of 
the tax administrations are inherently hierarchical. Subordinate tax officials' 
position in the tax administrative hierarchy determines for them the simplest, 
most direct, or most cost-efficient manner to seek relief. Therefore, tax 
administrative reconsideration is historically rooted in China's general 
administration framework. China does not have a court hearing tax cases only; 
rather, the administration tribunal within the People's Court system is the only 
available channel to seek judicial remedies. The taxpayers' position is 
disadvantaged given the dominance and authority of tax administrations. In 
spite of various prescribed rights, taxpayers are hindered in filing tax disputes 
against tax authorities in terms of procedure, financial capacity and political 
pressure. Therefore, the tax judicature reform is determined by these three 
pillars. Due to the limited space, the prospects of tax judicial review will be 
introduced in the following two sessions, and the taxpayers' right protection is 
223 See generally Xiong supra 70 
224 See Zhaodong Jiang, The Administrative Use of Law in China: The Baori Golf Club Tax 
Case, 12 Colum. J. Asian L. 191, at 193-95 
399 
detailed later this thesis. 
4.3.1. Irregularity in local tax administration 
Tax administration must accommodate both national guidelines and local 
interests and needs. Even though tax laws and regulations promulgated by 
NPC, the State Council, or the tax administrative apparatus225 are applicable 
nationwide, various local tax rulings, notices, and directives give effect to and 
define the content of these laws in practice. 226 This local particularism is 
amplified by the local need to deal with new issues that have not been 
considered by the SAT or MOF. 227 These local tax documents 
jurisprudentially are "entitled to respect" to the extent they "have the power to 
persuade". 228 First, not all local tax documents accurately convey the 
administration intent enclosed in superiors' order or instructions. Local self-
interest and discrepancies in understanding cause uneven enforcement of same 
legislation. Local tax administrations are also understaffed, underpaid, and 
undervalued. The tax administration embodies a reverse triangle hierarchical 
structure in terms of staff forces and enforcement of tax policies thereof. 
Today, over 1,000 officials work at the SAT in Beijing, hundreds of tax 
officials on the provincial level, over a hundred on the city level while only 
less than a hundred at the basic or county level. Given the fact that over 2,000 
226 See generally two circulars issued by the Ministry of Finance: (86) Cai Shui Zhi No. 143, 
and (86) Cai Shui Wai Zi, No. 170. Government ministries, such as, the Ministry of Finance, 
and departments, such as the State Administration of Taxation, may issue orders or directives 
and promulgate rules within their respective ministerial or departmental jurisdictions 
227 See Article 90, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo xian fa ["XIAN FA"] [the Constitution of 
the P.R.C. (1982).] Ministerial pronouncements refer to directives and rules issued in the 
name of government ministries or departments, such as the SAT and the MOF 
228 See generally, Del Commercial properties Inc. v. Comm 'r., 251 F.3d 210, 214 (D.C. Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 903 (2002) 
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rulings, notices and legislative interpretations form the law which must be 
applied by basic tax bureaus, local tax officials are short of expertise, time and 
uniformity in their enforcement. 229 The over-expansive discretion of local tax 
bureaus may induce these underpaid tax officials to manipulate tax assessment 
to solicit unreasonable remuneration or bribes by trading tax assessment for 
unlawful personal gains. These irregular tax administrative actions all 
contribute to adverse tax enforcement or decisions. 
4.3.2. Concerns regarding tax administrative reconsideration 
Expertise and independence are two of the foremost issues involved in the 
critique of the administrative reconsideration mechanism. Tax expertise at the 
superior level usually is stronger than its subordinate tax officials. However, 
given the extensive scope of discretion entertained by the tax authorities in 
general, it is dubious that superior tax official may reach an overall just 
consideration in reviewing the controversy filed. For example, for tax 
collection only, determination of issues such as identification of the taxpayer, 
subject of tax, applicable tax rate, tax deduction, tax exemption, tax refund, 
tax bases calculation, tax jurisdiction, timing, and tax collection method are all 
unilaterally controlled by tax authorities. In this sense, any single item may 
again be reviewed against taxpayers. Moreover, the expertise of tax officials is 
constrained by the shortage of up-to-date training to identify legitimate tax 
planning activities. Often, decisions on tax evasion made by local tax official 
229 See Xiao Zhumei, Shuishou Sifa Piruan de Zhengzhuang, Bingyin ji Zhenzhi Fang'an [The 
Manifestation, Causes and Countermeasures of Judicature Weakening in Taxation] ~ t'f:fij 
«#t~~'ijjjt;;J1UXI¥J1.JE:tl\, :W!!Effi&i~¥&:1J~)) , Tax Judicial Reform Proceeding, pp87-91, at 
89 
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manifest a crude understanding or ignorance of justifiable enterprise tax 
l . h d 230 p anmng met o s. 
The independence of the tax administrative reconsideration unit faces distrust 
from taxpayers. Usually, local tax officials take internal reporting channels to 
seek their superiors' understanding and support even before they decide 
special tax issues. Taxpayers are given little room for argument and this 
dualism renders the reconsideration only a formal process rather than an 
independent review as anticipated. Records of such hierarchical internal 
communication such as reports, requests, instructions and directives largely 
kept from public circulation. To this end, taxpayers, when facing an adverse 
enforcement decision, often deem it more cost-efficient or administratively 
safer to seek settlement with either the tax administrative reconsideration unit 
or its subordinate officials. Political pressure and local GDP development 
needs also compose critical roles in reaching reconsideration decisions. 231 
4.3.3. Advance rulings 
There is always ambiguity in the application of tax law to specific transactions. 
Even the SAT and the MOF publish voluminous notices, ruling, guidelines 
and directives on dealing with tax issues arising from specific scenarios or 
transactions. Chinese tax laws in general remain inherently ambiguous and 
incomplete. In line with modem tax administrative practice, taxpayers 
especially those involved in foreign investments may desire to consult the tax 
consequences of a proposed transaction so that controversial issues may be 
230 The author, when practicing tax law in China, remembers that a district local tax bureau in 
Beijing erroneously issued a penalty notice based on unsubstantiated legal reasoning 
231 See Xiong supra 70, at 183 
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avoided or negotiated beforehand. Tax authorities may advise generally but 
such "unofficial" opinions usually are not legally grounded or reliable, nor 
may they be raised in proceedings against the tax authority if controversy 
arises. Therefore, the practice of advance ruling is preferred by taxpayers 
wishing to obtain legally binding instructions from tax authorities. This 
practice is increasingly common in the U.S. and many OECD countries, which 
formally recognize the binding effect thereof. 
Chinese tax administration, however, has been fairly conservative in 
employing the practice of advance ruling until recently. In limited 
circumstances, Chinese tax authorities may approve advance rulings upon 
application by taxpayers, but the scope of applicable transactions is quite 
narrow. 232 A few recent cases adopting advance rulings sort out pricing 
agreements for cross-border transfers of goods and services among 
subsidiaries of multinational companies which have a large commercial 
presence in China. 233 Advance rulings may create procedural peculiarities such 
as applications to two or more tax jurisdictions234 and careful tax planning to 
avoid pricing discrepancies. Due to technical and procedural formalities, the 
232 See generally Guanlian Qiyejian Yewu Wanglai Yuyue Dingjia Shishi Xize (Shixing) 
[Rules for Advance Ruling of Closely-held Enterprise Transactions (Trial Implementation)] 
(guoshuifa) No. 118, 2004, issued by the SAT G~!l*~.!lki13l.ill!.~H!*f9W~~ift~tli~J!Ij 
(litrr)} (Ciil~t~[2004]118-'%), see also Guanlian Qiye Wanglai Shuiwu Guanli Guicheng 
[Guidelines on Tax management of Closely-held Enterprises Transactions] (guoshuifa) No. 59, 
1998, published by the SATCiil~m~~Jiiij O~~~.!lk.!lk~tt:*m~~i!~m> [Ciil~t~ 
( 1998)59~ ], prescribing that upon application, tax authorities may approve advance ruling on 
a case-by-case basis" 
233 From 1998 and 2008, there are at least 6 advance rulings are negotiated between the SAT 
and multinationals, such as the Walmart ruling in 2007 and the Toshiba ruling in 2005. See 
Zhongmei Dacheng Shouli Shuangbian Yuyue Dingjia Xieyi [The First Advanced Ruling 
Concluded by China, U.S. and Walmart] ~ ~ 34 pX, ~ '19~ ~ U2 JY! t~ ~ '1ft ~ ~ , 
http:/ /news.cnnb.com.cn/system/2007 /01112/005235319 .shtml (in Chinese) (last visited on 
March 15, 2011) 
234 !d., Walmart submitted dual application to the IRS in the U.S. and the SAT in China; 
Toshiba submitted applications to Japan, the SAT in China and at least two local tax 
jurisdiction in China 
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application and approval of advance ruling usually drag a long time ranging 
from six months to a year. The term of the advance ruling usually is two to 
four years and is extendable up to five years. 
Advance ruling is an increasingly accepted practice in China, usually 
conducted between taxpayers and the SAT. However, the use of advance 
ruling in China is still primitive and sometimes the SAT may refuse to even 
consider issuing a ruling on a case-by-case basis. Rarely there is any advance 
ruling approved by provincial or local tax authorities, because local tax 
officials are largely risk-averse and usually fail to match professional tax 
advisors in terms of tax expertise and tax planning tactics. In this connection, 
tax authorities should be more open in embracing and reviewing advance 
ruling from local enterprises or at least offer written opinions prior to 
transactional activities in the hope to avoid potential tax controversies. 
4.3.4. Summary 
Today, the tax administration is the most important part in structuring 
modernization of China's tax system. Despite some progress, efforts at its 
reform have failed in several ways. First, the irregular enforcement of tax laws 
and regulations applicable nationwide creates discrepancies which invite tax 
dispute. Moreover, provincial and local tax bureaus are entitled with too much 
discretion in handling tax collection and dealing with taxpayers. Second, the 
expertise and independence of tax authorities is subject to challenge and 
improvement in many ways. The dualism of superior and subordinate tax 
officials may make taxpayers' rightful claims futile and impractical. Records 
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of such hierarchical internal communication such as reports, requests, 
instructions and directives have mostly been kept out of pubic availability. 
Therefore, taxpayers' right to know is severely discounted by tax authorities' 
persuasion to accept settlement. Third, China's tax administration is 
resourceful in preventing tax controversies. The issue is how adamantly and 
flexibly it wants to honor taxpayers' legitimate requests. Advance ruling, in 
this sense, exemplifies one of the cost-efficient approaches available to 
China's tax administration. 
4.4. Judicial review through the lens of tax judicature 
Dicey defines the rule of law in terms of judicial review that requires thaf35 
only an ordinary court can punish law breakers and equality must be 
guaranteed regardless of social, economic, or political status in terms of 
substance and procedure.236 Raz further details that uniformity, independence, 
transparency and procedural justice should be established in the judicial 
review system to effectuate the rule of law. Meanwhile, an independent, 
effective and true judicial authority is essential to compliance with China's 
WTO commitments. The Protocol mandates the establishment of tribunal, 
contact points and procedures for the prompt review of all administrative 
actions relating to the implementation of the laws, regulations, judicial 
decisions, and administrative rulings of general application referred to in the 
WTO rules. Obviously, the tribunals must be independent of administrative 
organs and thus are required to be "impartial and independent of the agency 
235 See generally Dicey, supra 7 
236 See generally Palekar, supra 8 
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entrusted with administrative enforcement and shall not have any substantial 
interest in the outcome of the matter."237The tribunals may be administrative 
or judicial, however, right to appeal must be granted if the case is originally 
submitted for an administrative review following due process. 
The tax judicature system is vital to China's general judicial framework. As 
noted above, judicial review of tax administrative discretion is doctrinal. 
Tribunals hearing tax cases with judicial review power should examine tax 
authorities' actions that are incompatible with constitution, written tax laws 
and regulations, and related procedures. Meanwhile, the tax judicature system 
is a key component of modem tax governance. As China does not have a 
strong institutionalized separation of powers, the tax judicature reform 
implicates changes in the relationship between courts and the administrative 
structures created by and for China's one-party state. There should be a 
realistic expectation of the role that can be played by the tax judicature in this 
context. The tax context has its peculiarities. This section would take tax 
judicature as an example to briefly analyze flaws embedded in China's general 
judicial review structure, and submit proposals for its reform. Again, it is 
continually important to mention that the procedure and scope of judicial 
review is a case-by-case undertaking by each country based on different social, 
economic, political and legal settings. 
The past three decades have witnessed an improvement of China's judicial 
structure in many ways. It remains to be seen whether such progress will entail 
broader application. However, many scholars still keep a skeptical, albeit 
optimistic, view of China's judicial review mechanism. Among the reasons 
237 See Accession of the People's Republic of China, WT/L/432 (Nov. 10, 2001), Part I, para 
2( d), http://www.uschina.org (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
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given by these academics for their skepticism, the following particularly 
implicate China's tax judicature reform which has a longstanding emphasis on 
stipulation and enforcement. China's judicial review system suffers from non-
uniformity, political intervention, impartiality, deficiency of expertise, and 
narrowed scope of case load. Non-uniformity in the tax judicature system is a 
consistently recognized problem. Political interference is notorious. 
Impartiality primarily refers to the dynamics among taxpayers, tax 
administration and judicial tribunals. Tax expertise demands deliberation in 
terms of the complexity and caseload of tax disputes and even more so when a 
proposal for summary judgment is posted. Overall speaking, discussing flaws 
specifically associated with the tax peculiarities is crucial. Equally 
contributive for this thesis is to introduce proposed thoughts that should be 
considered for improving competency and legitimacy of the system. 
4.4.1. Uniformity 
As noted, the consistently asymmetrical enforcement of local tax bureaus 
prolongs the problem of non-uniform enforcement of tax laws nationwide in 
China. The same rational applies to local courts hearing tax disputes. In theory, 
tax laws should subject all taxpayers to equal treatment. Because tax 
adjudication falls to whichever local administrative tribunal has jurisdiction, 
there is an opportunity to have divergent applications of the same tax laws 
governing similar issues. The principle of equality requires that courts 
nationwide adjudicate similarly situated people on analogous basis. Otherwise, 
the tax administration would be arbitrary in and abusive of entitled discretions. 
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Moreover, given the cross-region or even cross-border mobility of capital and 
labor as well as simultaneously conducted commercial operations, for the 
same taxpayer, a selection of different tax jurisdictions, i.e., the administration 
courts, may invite quite different judgments for the similar tax dispute at issue. 
This mess may be interpreted as either bad or good. It is bad in that it may 
create tax jurisdiction shopping which may be manipulated as an incentive to 
attract outside investments. It is good in that it may promote vigorous 
competition of expertise or adjudication techniques among judges on a shared 
bothersome tax issue for the benefit of taxpayers or the tax administration. If 
the good aspect turns out valid, any appeals in this connection then have 
opportunity to get into uniformity. 
Is national uniformity on adjudicating similar tax issues a possibility? Yes. 
Two types of efforts can bring this about. First, a top-down approach is 
employable by the People's Supreme Court or the SAT to release a uniform 
official standing on the issue, and a tax scholar may serve as ex officio 
endorsing the reasoning. Second, a spill-over process is taken by the taxpayer 
to bring in an acceptable judgment to other tax jurisdictions might promote 
consensus among all jurisdictions involved. The need for uniformity may also 
promote the development of a national tax court with exclusive jurisdiction, 
which, if established, could render better uniformity. 
4.4.2. Political intervention into judicial independence 
Obstruction by political influences is an acknowledged complication for 
judicial independence reform in China. Courts hearing tax cases are no 
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exception to this affliction. For example, one of most recent political 
impositions on judicial independence has resulted from the "Three Supremes", 
which holds that the undertaking of the Party, the interests of the people, and 
the Constitution and laws (in the order as originally stipulated) must all be 
given the utmost consideration in law enforcement and adjudication. 238 But the 
"Three Supreme" actually makes only the "Party Supreme"239 insofar as "the 
Party's exclusive supervision over the court system must be guaranteed."240 In 
addition, commentators raise the following charges as to political intervention 
into judicial independence in China. 
The expenditure and budgetary line of local judicial tribunals and 
compensation of local court judges are funded by local governments or 
authorities in sectors concerned. This is particularly noteworthy 
because local tax bureaus or public finance bureaus are directly 
responsible for disbursing funds to local courts. It is very likely local 
tax bureau tool its "treasury" role in influencing adjudication of tax 
disputes where the local tax bureaus is the defendant. The local tax 
bureau may even hold a better position than other administrative 
apparatuses in persuading local tribunals to award the winning to the 
local bureaus. 
238 See Hu Jintao's Speech at the National Conference on procuratorial, judicial and public 
security work (December 26, 2007) (~~;;lJ1fi:§!IiS()!IfF~iSUri!5.t~} (in Chinese) 
239 See He Weifang, Sange Zhishang Shui Zhishang [Three Supremes, Who is the Most 
Supreme?] ~]lJJ' {.=:1'-~...t."it:?iU:.?} , 
http:/ /blog.sina.com.cn!s/blog_ 488663200 I OOatga.html (in Chinese) (last visited on March 
15, 2011) 
240
See generally • Deepening the Theoretical Research on the "Three Supreme" Guideline :It! 
-~;~1c" == 1' ~J:."fE!~ JGJJ'Jtt!"lfltt~~ · 
http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200906/26/362750.shtml (in Chinese)(last visited on 
March 15, 2011) 
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The judges of local judicial tribunals are appointed by the local 
People's congress at the same hierarchy, which forces the courts to 
subject judicial review to the desires of the local political organ; 
The adjudication or case handling of local judicial tribunals is subject 
to supervision of the local People's congress at the same hierarchy. As 
per the China Supervision Law, the areas of supervision include (1) 
reviewing annual and specialized work reports submitted by courts; (2) 
investigating the enforcement of laws and regulations; (3) filing and 
reviewing judicial interpretations and other normative legal 
documents; ( 4) questioning judicial personnel about relevant cases; (5) 
investigating specific issues; and (6) appointing and removing judicial 
officials. Therefore, almost all elements of judicial independence are 
supervised or monitored by the local People's Congress, which is 
under the direct leadership of the Party-state. 
Returning to political economy studies, tax policies sometimes 
represent or reflect social or political policy orientations, directly or 
indirectly. Therefore, the adjudication of tax issues may relate to 
promotion or public signal on specific public policy issues. The 
constraints from general political and social settings cannot be 
understated for tax judicature. 
4.4.3. Impartiality 
As noted above, there is always ambiguity in the application of tax law to 
specific transactions, and Chinese tax laws in general remain inherently 
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ambiguous and incomplete. This invites deliberation of tax laws by both tax 
authorities and courts hearing tax disputes. Therefore, it is of high legitimate 
significance to examine whether the tax judicature system can honor 
impartiality in adjudicating tax disputes between taxpayers and the tax 
administration. This part aims to briefly review the current system and suggest 
proposals for its reform. 
Administrative tribunals adjudicate tax cases prejudicially. Empirical evidence 
clearly confirms that tax administration wins more often than the taxpayer. 
Numbers discover that impartiality is nearly nonexistent given the sharp 
disparity as shown below. In 2009, out of all administrative cases at the first 
phase from the "Other Cases" category which includes tax disputes, cases in 
favor of the defendant administrative body, i.e., cases "affirmed," 
"invalidated," "fulfillment of administrative responsibilities," and "dismissed," 
account for over 25% and cases "settled" account for 20%; while cases in 
favor of petitioner. The "annulled" and "awarded administrative compensation" 
cases only compose less than 2% of the total case load. This empirical simple 
empirical observation at least shows the scarcity of impartiality in the tax 
judicature system. There are a number of causes of the evident pro-
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4.4.3.l .Legitimate reasons for disparity 
The burden of proof and the merits of tax disputes may somehow 
proffer better litigation leverage to tax administration. Generally, the 
burden of proof as to tax cases at the administrative tribunals falls on 
the tax administration. The tax administration may present better 
evidence to persuade judges to favor its position, while taxpayers 
usually manifest deficiency m submitting evidence to prove tax 
authorities' errors. Chinese tax laws and regulations are quite 
straightforward, and not as intricate as those in western jurisdictions. 
The issues of tax cases are sometimes without merit. Rather, they may 
arise out of a misunderstanding of the law, poor advice from an 
associate, the stubbornness of a corporate management, or simple 
obstinacy by the taxpayer. Some taxpayers are either unable to pay or 
simply want to take the chance of litigating to reduce tax liability if at 
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all possible. 
Experience matters. With a larger and better trained staff, the tax 
administration usually is more experienced in litigating tax disputes, 
while a single taxpayer may have limited tax knowledge or 
unfamiliarity with the administration tribunal. Even though a taxpayer 
might consult a lawyer the cost-efficiency concern of fighting the local 
tax bureau may prevent her doing so. Even if the taxpayer wins in the 
first trial, the tax administration usually chooses to appeal and often 
still has good chance to win the case. Having said the above, how the 
administration tribunal applies the tax laws is still a factor in weighing 
experience. 
The discretionary strength of the Chinese tax administration may 
persuade the administrative tribunal judges to accept the government's 
position in many ways. As to tax collection cases, tax authorities' 
unilateral administrative construction embodies a wide range such as 
the subject of tax, applicable tax rate, tax deduction, tax exemption, tax 
refund, tax bases calculation, statute of limitation, and tax collection 
method. Any single act derived from this long list howsoever may arm 
the tax administration to use equitable judicial doctrines for its own 
favor. 
4. 4. 3. 2.Judicial Independence 
The obvious lack of judicial independence in many cases may make a taxpayer 
skeptical of benefit of pursuing a claim. Aside from the political intervention 
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in the financial security of local judges as noted above, local administrative 
tribunal judges are inclined to coordinate a settlement rather than releasing a 
one-sided judgment. This is a tacit and ever-present manifestation of the desire 
to promote social harmony and keep a healthy relationship between the 
government and taxpayers. Meanwhile, the political hierarchy sometimes 
drives local judges to have the mentality that the government and judiciary are 
on the same team, in opposition to taxpayers. Local judges may also have a 
mentality to enforce tax administrative decisions for local benefits, given the 
contribution of tax revenues to local GDP growth. 
4.4.4. A deficiency of expertise 
Another burden impairing the autonomy and independence of judicial system 
is the deficient expertise of judges.241 This problem is particularly applicable 
in the tax judicature context. Since the state's power to tax fundamentally 
limits the scope of taxpayers' private property rights, tax expertise employed 
in adjudication for interpreting and substantiating this power must be 
competent and proficient. In terms of judicial autonomy, tax adjudicators' 
expertise guarantees the just legitimacy and functionality of China's judicial 
system. As to judicial independence, tax expertise would empower 
adjudicators with neutral and decisive judgments and restrict the tax 
administration from interfering with the administration of justice. Moreover, 
tax expertise of local tribunal judges has been criticized and somewhat 
241 See generally, Donald C. Clarke, Introduction: The Chinese Legal System Since 1995: 
Steady Development and Striking Continuities, 191 China Q. 555, 556 (2007), discussing the 
expertise of judges impedes further development of the Chinese legal reform 
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doubted by both taxpayers and tax administration. There are a few factors 
contributing to this deficiency. 
First, usually local judges are not trained in the specialty of tax. Rather, when 
tax disputes are filed, the tribunal appoints a judge who is familiar with the 
transaction where tax issues arise. A judge presiding a tax dispute may be 
appointed just because she is more acquiescent with the tax administration or 
the taxpayer. This is sharply different from the U.S. practice where judges at 
the Tax Court are chosen from among former IRS employees and veterans of 
tax private practice. 
Second, most tax experts are employed by the tax administration. Since the 
talent pool is so concentrated, given the bureaucratic connection between 
courts and the tax administration, judges are willing to seek advice from 
experts within the administration - a major conflict of interest in the minds of 
many observers of the system. Taxpayers question the autonomy of local tax 
judges in terms of influence from tax authorities. Often, judges hearing tax 
cases take tax authorities' opinions as authoritative guidelines or instructions. 
Third, the continual tax training of local tribunal judges is not significant. 
Rather, since tax disputes mostly are filtered through the tax administrative 
reconsideration mechanism, tax disputes before courts are of one of two types: 
simple issues with answers identifiable without much judicial deliberation, and 
vexing issues that are beyond the expertise of local tribunal judges. When 
adjudicating cases in the second category, judges have no choice but to seek 
expert opinions, which is not wrong by itself, but creates a conflict of interest 
when the expert is from tax authority. Moreover, the caseload of tax disputes 
is limited. Such shortage even gives judges less exposure to cutting edge tax 
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issues. For example, very few judicial staffs may be capable of articulating a 
working knowledge as to tax avoidance, tax evasion or tax planning. 
In summary, deficiency of tax expertise in local judiciary leads to an 
impairment to tax judicature. The autonomy of tax adjudicators is weakened 
by the tax administration and its own incompetency. Moreover, an 
independent opinion on tax a tax dispute can be unattainable due to tax 
administration's dominant position in interpreting the tax laws. Regretful is 
that this deficiency is unlikely to change in the near future given the 
prescribed pre-trial administrative consideration for tax disputes. 
4.4.5. Narrowed scope ofcaseload 
The scope of judicial review in China is arguably narrow. In China, general 
rules made by administrative agencies are not excluded from judicial review, 
such as local administrative rulings, notices, and directives. This means that, 
even if a local tax notice or enforcement procedure is based on a distorted 
understanding of superior administrative orders, taxpayers have nothing to do 
unless upper level of tax authorities repudiate it by way of an internal order. 
This is particularly sensitive to taxpayers as it often results in the unjust taking 
of their property. Moreover, taxpayers' right to know is limited with regard to 
access to forthcoming local rules, which would help taxpayers proactively 
conduct tax planning and corporate management. 
Further, too many local administrative rulings, notices, and directives under 
guidelines and instructions flood into the judiciary. This propensity toward 
complexity and uncertainty in the implementation of the law is partly caused 
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by the lack of a mechanism for judicial review. The extensive local 
administrative documents on one hand dilute administrative efficiency, and 
create irregular local actions on the other. Local administrative tribunals may 
be distracted by relatively meritless cases. To this end, there should be a 
"quality control" mechanism to identify legitimate cases, concerning specific 
administrative acts, for judicial review. Not all administrative adverse 
decisions should be unconditionally allowed to be submitted for litigation even 
for those which have completed the administrative reconsideration procedure. 
Although criticism about pre-trial tax administrative reconsideration is widely 
shared, there are fewer consensuses about the value of the "filtering" function. 
The outstanding issue is about how to control the administrative 
reconsideration but not the pre-trial procedure itself 
4.4.6. Summary 
This subchapter briefly reviews flaws of tax judicature system and, to a 
limited extent, drawbacks in the general judicial review system in China. 
There are a few factors attached to China's tax judicature deficiencies. First is 
non-uniformity. Distorted understanding and peculiarities of the tax laws and 
the influence of local interests create non-uniform adjudication of tax disputes. 
Cross-jurisdiction irregularity in judgment may be brought against the same 
taxpayer and lead to jurisdiction shopping. However, national uniformity 
might be achievable under the supervision of the Supreme People's Court and 
the SAT. Second is about political intervention entailed in supervision from 
local People's Congress, local tax authorities, and general political and social 
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policy arrangements. Third refers to the impartiality in terms of the flawed 
disparity in favor of tax administration in the adjudication practice. A few 
factors contribute to such disparity such as burden of proof, merits of tax cases, 
litigation experience and techniques, and over-expansive discretion enjoyed by 
the tax administration. Fourth involves in the tax expertise of local tribunal 
judges. Deficiency of tax expertise is caused by weak training, shortages of 
cases, irregularities in the caseload, and the dominance of expertise 
concentrated within the tax administration. Finally, the arguably narrow scope 
of judicial review in the tax context is another potential focus for reform. The 
scope should include abstract administrative acts such as local tax rulings, 
notices and directives, ifthey clearly violate laws of higher authority. Further, 
tax disputes derived from overly extensive local tax administration acts should 
not be unconditionally filed. The "case-merit control" should be incorporated 
but not limited to an upgraded pre-trail tax administrative reconsideration 
"filter". 
4.5. The Taxpayers' rights perspective 
The third and last cornerstone of a robust tax judicature framework deals with 
taxpayers' rights protection.242 In any modern tax government, taxpayers have 
the right to appeal an adverse decision of the tax administrations. Tax 
judicature in turn delivers just decisions by performing a judicial review of tax 
authorities' discretions and protecting taxpayers' private property from 
unfounded extraction. China has a legitimate need to develop a set of rules for 
242 
See infra Chapter VII for details on the protection of taxpayers' rights protection in China. 
This section only presents a brief introduction of the topic 
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promoting taxpayers' rights, the awareness of which emerge in a meaningful 
and pragmatic manner for bettering outcomes of economic behavior and social 
policy implementation. Taxpayers' rights primarily are divided into primary 
and the secondary rights. Meanwhile, almost all deficiencies and drawbacks of 
human rights protection and the tax law system fall into the taxpayers' rights 
area. The constitutional enrichment of primary taxpayers' rights is weak 
because of a misunderstanding of how to situate taxpayers to claim or interpret 
primary legal rights. Secondary taxpayers' rights are supposed to be enriched 
with enough clear-cut rules in detailing taxpayers' administrative and 
legislative rights, but China's current framework fails to contribute those 
details in a satisfying manner. Although the Tax Collection Law, the 
Proclamation and relevant administrative procedural laws facilitate, to some 
extent, clarification and expansion of rights available to taxpayers at first 
glance, those stipulated rights remain short of jurisprudential significance and 
practical value, showing the necessity to identify each category of taxpayers' 
rights with enough details. 
As to China's tax judicature reform, the most substantive rights are taxpayers' 
right to know, right to plead, right to a fair hearing and right to appeal. The 
right to know guarantees predictability of tax consequences after a taxpayer 
learns details of applicable tax laws and regulations. Right to plead refers to 
tax authorities' responsibility to explain details and evidence for reaching an 
adverse decision against a taxpayer. Right to a fair hearing requires an 
occasion where taxpayers and tax authorities can present arguments during a 
pre-trial process. Usually, this happens when an administrative reconsideration 
is filed. Right to appeal is the last resort that a Chinese taxpayer may rely on; 
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however, it in quite many cases it leads to a settlement between the taxpayer 
and tax authorities. To this end, the issue centers on the realization of 
taxpayer's protections but not those found solely in legal documents. 
Being mindful about frustrations of taxpayers' rights protection, it might be 
over-cynical to understate the progress and merit of rights protection reforms 
in China's tax context. Overall, China's tax mix still provides a formulated, 
yet promising, framework to facilitate access to available legal remedies, both 
administrative and judicial, for taxpayers. In particular, the administrative 
lawsuits filed by taxpayers attain more respects and identification, although 
such awareness is discounted by the "non-contentious" or "settlement" culture 
in China. 
In line with tax judicature reform, the protection of taxpayers' rights serves as 
a key element substantiating China's construct of the rule of law order and 
fulfillment of WTO principles. Both the tax judicature and the taxpayers' 
rights provisions should embrace a fair, transparent, certain, consistent, 
equitable, effective, and clear tax law for the sake of promoting the rule of law 
order. The WTO principles require similar inculcation, into China's tax 
judicature, of principles of transparency, uniformity and impartiality and 
judicial review. 
4.6.Summary 
This subchapter focuses on the status quo and flaws of China's current tax 
judicature, and to a much less extent, reviews the general Chinese judiciary 
framework in terms of the competence, autonomy and independence through 
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the lens of tax judicature. Mostly, the tax judicature system suffers from flaws 
and particularities penetrated from both the tax context and China's general 
judicial framework. 
The first section suggests that the Chinese tax judicature system includes two 
components: the tax administrative reconsideration and tax administrative 
litigation. In particular, a few obvious flaws are discussed: (1) the condition of 
the pre-trial tax administrative reconsideration; (2) the full payment 
requirement for disputes arising from tax collection which receives 
vehemently criticism from both judges and scholars; (3) the deficiency of 
competence for judges hearing tax cases. All these flaws, coupled with 
adamant efforts to increase revenue collection, call for an upgrade of the 
Chinese tax judicature reform. 
The second section reviews an interesting debate among Chinese tax scholars 
as to the establishment of a tax court system. Arguments from three factions: 
an opposition, supporters, and a middle path, are reviewed. (1) The opposition 
treats this goal as impracticable under the current political and judicial settings 
in China. They are skeptical of what they believe to be a requirement in the 
plan of a complete overhaul of the entire judicial system and reform. Major 
arguments include that the current system generally functions well and only 
needs adjustment, an enforceable model is not available, and any major 
judicial reform must come from and be oriented toward actual social and 
political needs. (2) Supporters optimistically believe that a tax court system 
invites tax disputes. Paradoxically, both supporters and oppositionists share 
similar criticisms of the full-payment rule and the pre-trail tax administrative 
reconsideration. A supporters' key point is that taxpayers need deliberations 
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and more realistic protection of their rights through a tax court system. (3) The 
intermediate view seems to strike an attractive compromise between the two 
polar opposite positions at the first glance, but its transitory, costly and 
overhauling nature and over-conformism misidentify a few key aspects of a 
basic court system. 
The third section reviews China's tax administration for a better construct of 
the tax judicature system. A few flaws are identified. (1) The irregular local 
enforcement of tax laws creates discrepancies which invite tax disputes. Local 
tax administrations are entitled with overly expansive discretion in handling 
tax collection and dealing with taxpayers. (2) The expertise and independence 
of tax authorities are subject to challenge and improvement. The dualism of 
superior and subordinate tax officials may make taxpayers' claim futile and 
impractical. Taxpayers' right to know is severely discounted by tax authorities' 
persuasion to accept settlement. (3) China's tax administration is resourceful 
in preventing tax controversies. The issue is how adamant and flexible it wants 
to honor taxpayers' legitimate requests. Advance ruling exemplifies one of the 
cost-efficient approaches available to tax administrations. 
The fourth section briefly reviews flaws in the general judicial review system 
in China through the lens of the tax judicature system. (1) Non-uniformity: 
distorted understanding and peculiarities of the tax laws and locality self-
interests create non-uniform adjudication of tax disputes. Cross-jurisdiction 
irregularity in judgment may be brought against the same taxpayer and lead to 
jurisdiction shopping. (2) Political intervention: mostly, pressures from three 
factors, including local People's Congress, local tax authorities, and general 
political and social policy orientations, impair the tax judicature system. (3) 
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Impartiality: there is always an empirically-proven, flawed disparity in favor 
of tax administration in adjudication practice. A few factors contribute to such 
disparity such as burden of proof, merits of tax cases, litigation experience and 
techniques, and over-expansive discretion enjoyed by the tax administration. 
(4) Tax expertise: the deficiency in tax expertise is caused by weakened 
training, shortage of case load, and dominance Of expertise concentrated within 
the tax administration. (5)The narrow scope of judicial review: this flaw has 
two prongs: the scope should include abstract administrative acts such as local 
tax rulings, notices and directives, and tax disputes derived from uncontrolled, 
over-meticulous and voluminous local tax administration acts should not be 
unconditionally filed. The "case-merit control" should be incorporated but not 
limited to the pre-trail tax administrative reconsideration "filter". 
The fifth and last section briefly discusses the role of taxpayers' rights in 
reform the tax judicature system. Mostly, taxpayers' rights should accord to a 
rule of law order inviting a fair, transparent, certain, consistent, equitable, 
effective, and clear manner within the tax law context. WTO principles 
similarly require an inculcation of principles of transparency, uniformity and 
impartiality and judicial review into the Chinese tax system. 
V. Submission of proposals for China's tax judicature reform 
5.1.Two Prongs of tax judicature reform 
The tax judicature reform in China has two major prospects. 
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First, in light of the peculiar situation ofthe Chinese tax system in its legal and 
institutional framework, the role of tax judicature should not be exaggerated in 
regard to its potential for overhauling or extending to the whole tax law field. 
Rather, the progress of judicature reform itself should be integrated into the 
system piecemeal. Another key point is that taxation involves a balance among 
extraction of taxpayers' private property, tax collection, and social wealth 
distribution. Judicial review of tax administrative discretions should give 
consideration to both the exigencies of tax collection and the protection 
taxpayer rights. Any bias toward one of these elements impairs the other. 
Therefore, uniformity of decisions, tax expertise in the judicature and 
restriction of rights exploitation should be pursued with equal vigor. 
Second, the penetration of flaws and established settings of China's general 
judiciary framework into the tax laws arena must be carefully examined and 
evaluated. Proposals for tax judicature reform should feature the judiciary 
system in an efficient way. Fantasies about using the tax judicature reform to 
fabricate a whole new judiciary system or expecting an immediate overhaul of 
China's judicial reform will prove futile and rootless. Therefore, proposals 
should be tailored realistically and pragmatically, with regard to their benefit 
to administrative efficiency and rights protection. 
It is essential that tax judicature reform, in line with upgrades of the tax 
legislature, administration and taxpayer's rights protection, must be grounded 
in the rule of law order embracing a fair, transparent, certain, consistent, 
equitable, effective, and clear judicature. Meanwhile, it should also 
incorporate WTO principles of transparency, uniformity and impartiality, and 
judicial review. Those principles might not be directly translated into due 
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process enclosed in the tax judicature undertakings, but the jurisprudential 
value reflected in the general judiciary framework must be incorporated. 
Based on these notions, this thesis would submit the following proposals in the 
order of tentative feasibility and significance. 
5.2.Repudiation of the full-payment rule 
This thesis shares the position that China should eliminate the full-payment 
rule.243 By statute, a taxpayer must first pay or remit tax payments, surcharges, 
and late fees (if applicable) due or provide guarantee in the first place before 
filing an application for the tax administrative reconsideration or a law suit.244 
As discussed, this rule should be abolished for the following reasons. The full-
payment rule bars financially incapable taxpayers from exercising the right to 
seek relief through administrative or judicial tribunals. The full-payment rule 
is not in line with principles of equity and ability to pay. Based on the 
principle of proportionality, it is suspected to add the burden of proof on the 
taxpayers' side, and this worsens the already imbalanced bargaining position 
prejudicing taxpayers. 
5.3. Summary judgment for small tax cases 
Summary judgment is increasingly encouraged by the Supreme People's 
Court,245 especially for the adjudication of administration cases.246 However, 
243 See irifra section 4.1.2. for analysis and accompanying footnotes 
244 See Article 88(1) of the Tax Collection Law 
245 See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Kaizhan Xingzheng Susong Jianyi Chengxu Shidian 
Gongzuo de Tongzhi [SPC Notice on Experimental Work on Advancing Summary Judgment 
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this rigorous effort has not been extended to the tax field yet. The past three 
years have seen an increase in the number of administrative cases decided on 
summary judgment. Most of that growth has come in rulings in the industrial 
and commercial areas. The tax judicature system should take this 
unprecedented opportunity to include summary judgment in its reform agenda. 
Moreover, the U.S. Tax Court practice shares the same trend of increasing use 
of summary judgment for tax collection due process suits. 
Summary judgment of tax cases should be offered to collection due process 
lawsuits. In particular, taxpayers should be entitled to elect a "small tax case" 
procedure, which would allow for summary judgment, if the amount in dispute 
is less than a prescribed value, say RMB 100,000. If the tax administration is 
not comfortable with losing discretion, the summary judgment could even be 
limited to such small tax cases. 
Adopting summary judgment for small tax cases has two advantages. (1) 
Keeping the current pre-trial tax administrative reconsideration procedure 
unchanged, if a taxpayer has a qualifying tax collection case, she may check 
the box for a summary judgment. This adds efficiency for all three parties 
involved: the taxpayer; the tax administration; and the tribunal. (2) The 
summary judgment process provides unparalleled opportunities to train judges 
in the tax field. The caseload in this area is larger and issues are more 
straightforward. Further, this training process also prepares judges to staff a 
tax court, should it ever be created in China. Summary judgment also enjoys 
for Administration Lawsuits] (SPC No. 446, 2010) {:fti!iA.~$i!}f;~=.f7f~rriS!:i.lfillfm ~ 
~~li\:;@.If1=a9JM~} ($ (2010) 446 ~) 
http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show.php?file_id=146359 (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
246 Hainan Province started the experimental work on summary judgment in April 2010 and 
received very good feedbacks from both judges and petitioners, 
http://www.cpd.eom.cn/n1695/n3569/c 1406229/content.html (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
426 
several other advantages: lower burden of proof, less discovery practice, 
relatively cooperative procedural standards at trial. To this end, the settings of 
"small tax case" procedure, i.e., summary judgment, creates a win-win 
situation. Also, the summary judgment helps reinforcing the longstanding 
emphasis on stipulation and informal cooperation. 
5.4.Cautious restructuring of the tax administrative reconsideration 
The thesis cautiously agrees, with those who oppose the creation of a tax court, 
that improving the structure of the pre-trail tax administrative reconsideration 
mechanism is more feasible. 247 It shares an opinion with the opposition to the 
tax court that realistic reforms must be pursued first. It may be too brusque to 
abolish this pre-trail reconsideration procedure. Further, such reconsideration 
does have value in "filtering" meritless cases or plainly dogmatic application 
of laws. Finally, it might be feasible to set up a separate "internal tribunal" 
unit within the tax administrative framework to perform the reconsideration. 
However, this "internal tribunal" can be best made possible by political drives, 
but not for the sake of administrative efficiency. 248 
5.5. Building up tax expertise 
Promotion of tax expertise in judges is straightforward. It requires selecting 
junior judges with strong tax training and specifically assigning them more tax 
cases, and expanding the current pool of judges with tax expertise by hiring 
247 
See irifra section 4.1.2. and accompanying footnotes 
248 See Xiong supra 70, at 184 
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experienced tax experts from the tax administration. This could create 
conflicts of interests, but the risk is worth it. Also, hiring tax scholars with 
adjudication experience for expert opinions on an ad hoc basis is quite feasible 
given that the authority of tax judges can be established with tax scholarship, 
which is a key factor in the Chinese court practice. 
5.6.Subject general administrative actions to judicial review 
Following the WTO principle of judicial review, discretionary actions made 
by administrative authorities are subject to judicial review in WTO member 
countries. These discretionary actions generally include abstract administrative 
acts, such as promulgation or enforcement of locally-tailored tax rulings, 
notices or directives. Under Chinese law, even they clearly violate or are not 
in line with laws of higher authority, such abstract tax administrative acts 
would escape from judicial review.249 The best a taxpayer can do is to report 
such discrepancies but have to wait for a superior administrative order which 
sounds nebulous in practice. A clear proposal is to subject certain illegitimate 
local tax rulings, notices or directives to judicial review by the administrative 
tribunal of the same hierarchical level. In particular, a county's (the lowest 
administrative hierarchy) tax rulings should be subject to review by the basic 
administrative tribunal in the same jurisdiction (the lowest tribunal available). 
At the moment, this judicial review has to be kept at the lowest level of the 
administrative hierarchy in selected localities for two reasons: (1) the potential 
of creating administrative turmoil there is slim; and (2) selected localities 
249 See generally The Administrative Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China, 
(effective as of October 1, 1990). 9=t:f¥!A~~.fOIJ1rll&Wi'ti';f, 
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should at least include coastal economic development zones where better 
services and tax officials are available for preventing contingencies. 250 
5.7. Tax Court 
Seconding the views of those opposed to the establishment of a tax court, this 
thesis does not advocate establishing such a tax court system at this stage or in 
the foreseeable future, nor does it concur with the middle path of inserting a 
"transitory" tax tribunal within the current court system. It makes two reform 
suggestions along these lines. 
5. 7 .1. The Structure of tax court system 
Even if a tax court system were to be adopted, the desirable structure would be 
a circuit tax court exercising both original and appellate jurisdiction. Original 
jurisdiction would make it a court of first instance, but it would exclude those 
summary judgment cases in which the amount in dispute was less than, say, 
RMB 100,000. The circuit tax court should sit permanently in six to eight 
regions covering nationwide territory and report to the SPC Tax Tribunal 
based in Beijing. The designated High Tax Tribunal is an SPC subsidiary, 
paralleling peer criminal or civil tribunals. It should have the ultimate 
appellate jurisdiction over tax cases appealed at circuit tax courts and 
250 In the field studies at local tax bureaus at Waigaoqiao Free Trade Zone in Shanghai, this 
proposal was even praised by tax officials who believe, unofficially, such judicial review will 
help them concentrate on interpretations rather than promulgation (notes on file with the 
author) 
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provincial high courts and responsibility for tax court system administration or 
management. 
5. 7 .2. Policy orientations and tradition 
The intermediate view described above should be denounced as well. First, 
aside from shortcomings as noted above,251 the eventual goal of the middle 
path is still adopting a tax court system, but doing so as a spin-off of the 
current system. Given the complications brought in by the midlist structure 
such as inserting a tribunal to each level of court at every locality, its 
transitory, costly and overhauling feature and its impracticality render it 
infeasible. Second, an established but unwritten routine for tax law or judicial 
reform in the past three decades mostly follows a pattern of reaching 
finalization through experience of experimental work in selected localities, but 
rarely took the detour of transient proposal. Again, this thesis shares with 
oppositionists' view that the establishment of a tax court system is a decision 
based on political needs and social pressure. 
5.8.Summary 
This subchapter submits a few proposals for China's tax judicature reform. 
Mostly, the proposals remain based on the following theoretical analysis: (1) 
the tax context has its particularities. Tax judicature's role therefore should not 
be exaggerated in overhauling or extending to the whole tax law field. (2) 
251 
See infra Section 4.2.3. and accompanying footnotes for detailed discussions. 
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Flaws and established settings of China's judicial framework translated into 
the tax law context must be carefully examined and evaluated.(3) the tax 
judicature should ground itself on the rule of law order emphasizing a fair, 
transparent, certain, consistent, equitable, effective, and clear system. (4) The 
WTO principles of transparency, uniformity and impartiality and judicial 
review should be fulfilled utmost extent possible with a set of niceties and 
convenient courses of action, even those principles might not directly apply to 
the tax context. 
The following proposals are raised in this subchapter. (1) The full-payment 
rule should be abolished. For an adverse tax collection decision, a taxpayer 
does not need to pay the assessed payment or provide guarantee at the first 
place before filing an application for a tax administrative reconsideration. (2) 
A summary judgment procedure should be established for small tax cases as a 
tax collection due course procedure. The summary judgment generally enjoys 
several advantages: keeping the current reconsideration procedure untouched, 
promoting tax expertise of judges, lower burden of proof, less discovery 
practice, relatively cooperative procedural standards at trial. (3) A better 
scheme should be designed for the tax administrative reconsideration 
mechanism, but the structure must be calculated and designed. (4) Tax 
expertise can be strengthened by teaming up more experienced personnel with 
those who specialize in tax. (5) At the lowest level of the local bureaucratic 
hierarchy, abstract administrative acts should be subject to judicial review. 
This reform could be implemented, at first, in a few coastal localities which 
have better tax talents. (6) If a tax court should be established, the desirable 
structure is to adopt a circuit tax courts framework with all courts exercising 
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both original and appellate jurisdiction and sitting permanently in six to eight 
regions covering a nationwide territory and reporting to the SPC Tax Tribunal 
based in Beijing. The designated High Tax Tribunal is an SPC subsidiary and 
should have the ultimate appellate jurisdiction over tax cases appealed at 
circuit tax courts and provincial high courts, and perform tax court system 
administration or management. 
VI. Conclusion 
The Chinese tax judicature involves three fundamental actors and perspectives: 
tax administration, the general Chinese judiciary, and taxpayers. Tax 
judicature reform is not an isolated undertaking. It calls for considerations 
from various related contexts. China's tax law framework has its peculiarities. 
The role of tax judicature, as a key component, should not be prolonged for 
overhauling the whole tax law arena. Flaws and established settings of China's 
judiciary framework translated into the tax judicature must be carefully 
examined and evaluated. Any over-romantized tax judicature reform proposals 
must be proactively reviewed in the context of the general judicial situation in 
China. Under China's socialist legal system, the tax judicature should ground 
itself honoring a rule of law order emphasizing a fair, transparent, certain, 
consistent, equitable, effective, and clear framework. Meanwhile, the WTO 
principles of transparency, uniformity and impartiality and judicial review 
should be incorporated to the utmost extent possible. Overall, "China's tax 
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judicature should reflect its social and economic development situation before 
. d . t. fi 1 ,252 mtro ucmg pragma tc re orm proposa s. 
First, the administrative law system reform expects to submit tax authorities' 
discretion for a functional and productive judicial review process. Taxpayers' 
awareness raises the request to find a more taxpayer-friendly and just tax 
judicial setting for rights protection. Overwhelming but irregular local 
legislations efforts in the tax areas create inconsistency. The goal of uniform, 
impartial, and transparent tax administration encourages the assimilation of an 
upgraded reform of the tax judicature system. More importantly, the market 
economy and the rule of law order urge the tax judicature to accommodate 
diversified economic interests and social needs in a fair, impartial, accessible, 
efficient and clear-cut manner. Pressures from international interests derived 
from the WTO principles raise the bar for Chinese tax judicature reform 
according to transferable practice from other tax jurisdictions. In addition, a 
tax judicature system contributes competitive advantages to Chinese economy 
by keeping and encouraging foreign investments and improving revenue 
collection. 
To this end, the precedent and experience of other established tax judicature 
systems are of high reference value. It would be foolish to suggest the direct 
transfer of techniques from the discussion of the U.S. Tax Court particularities. 
Rather, certain relevant factors in the U.S. system might cater to pragmatic 
reform needs in China's tax judicature system. Roughly, like many other tax 
judicature systems, U.S. taxpayers and the IRS share similar concerns, such as 
the discretion of the court, the litigation timeline, cost-efficiency, complexity 
252 See generally Xu supra 2 
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of the issue, settlement potentials, trial, and appeals. These factors must be 
measured under the general framework of U.S. judicial system based on 
separation of powers, overall financial settings, and social and fiscal policy 
needs. Again, there is no uniform, globally applicable model that could be 
applied widely in any tax judicature system. The most informative takeaways 
should be those commonly accepted factors for tax judicature reform. 
Second, the status quo and flaws of China's current tax judicature might be 
used as a reference for understanding the general Chinese judiciary framework 
in terms of the competence, autonomy and independence. The tax judicature 
system suffers from flaws and particularities coming from both the tax context 
and China's general judicial framework. China's taxjudicature system has two 
components: the tax administrative reconsideration and tax administrative 
litigation. In particular, a few identified flaws include the pre-trial tax 
administrative reconsideration, the full payment rule for tax collection due 
process, and the deficiency of judicial competence in hearing tax cases. All 
these flaws are aspects of national efforts to increase revenue collection. 
There has been a heated debate among Chinese tax academia on the 
establishment of a tax court system. Arguments from each of three factions -
those who oppose and those who support a tax court, as well as an 
intermediate position - are not without merits. This thesis shares more 
common ground with the opposition, finding that this goal is impracticable 
under China's current political and judicial situation and that any major 
judicial reform must be oriented to social and political needs. A key difference 
between oppositionists and supporters is whether a tax court system in China 
creates tax disputes. After all, the current tax judicature system generally 
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functions well and no realistic tax court system model has been meaningfully 
proposed. Paradoxically, both supporters and oppositionists share similar 
criticisms on the full-payment rule and the pre-trail tax administrative. A 
major contribution that supporters make is that taxpayers need deliberations 
and more realistic protection of their rights through a tax court system. The 
least acceptable is the midlist view which looks attractive at the first glance. 
But the transitory, costly and overhauling nature embodied in midlist-ism and 
over-conformism misidentifies a few key considerations in both Chinese court 
construct and its reference to the U.S. Tax Court system. 
China's tax system primarily is administrative in nature. Therefore, a few 
flaws in the tax administration system directly influence the underrating of tax 
judicature system. For example, tax disputes may arise when irregular local 
enforcement of tax laws creates discrepancies. Local tax administrations are 
entitled with too-expansive discretion in handling tax collection and dealing 
with taxpayers. Meanwhile, many scholars question the expertise and 
independence of tax authorities. The dualism of superior and subordinate tax 
officials may pose taxpayers' claim futile and impractical. Equally noteworthy 
is that tax administration is so resourceful that settlement becomes a preferred 
approach in removing tax controversies. Flaws and discrepancies in the 
general judicial review system in China also penetrate to the tax judicature 
system. Some identifiable flaws are non-uniformity, political intervention, 
impartiality, shortage of tax expertise, and the narrow scope of judicial review. 
As to the tax judicature, a "case-merit control" should be incorporated but not 
limited to the pre-trail tax administrative reconsideration "filter". 
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Moreover, taxpayers' rights should be guaranteed in structuring the tax 
judicature reform. Mostly, taxpayers' right should accord to a rule oflaw order 
inviting a fair, transparent, certain, consistent, equitable, effective, and clear 
manner within the tax law context. The WTO principles attach similar 
assimilation into tax judicature in terms of honoring the transparency, 
uniformity and impartiality and judicial review principles with a full set of 
details and convenient courses of action. 
Third, this thesis contributes a few proposals for China's tax judicature reform 
based on above-noted theoretical analysis: the particularities in China's tax 
context, flaws and established settings of China's judiciary framework, the 
rule of law order construct, and the WTO principles fulfillment. 
Proposals tentatively submitted include: (1) the abolition of the full-payment 
rule. (2) Establishment of a summary judgment procedure for small tax cases 
as a tax collection due process procedure. (3) The calculated adjustment, but 
not the abolition, of the pretrial tax administrative reconsideration mechanism. 
(4) Strengthening the tax expertise of the courts by teaming up more 
experienced personnel with those who specialize in tax. (5) At the lowest 
bureaucratic level, making abstract administrative acts subject to judicial 
review. This reform could start as an experiment in a few coastal localities 
with better tax talents. (6) If there is a tax court system established, the 
adoption of a circuit tax courts framework in which courts exercise both 
original and appellate jurisdiction, sitting permanently in six to eight regions 
covering nationwide territory and reporting to the SPC Tax Tribunal based in 
Beijing. The designated High Tax Tribunal is an SPC subsidiary and should 
have the ultimate appellate jurisdiction over tax cases appealed at circuit tax 
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courts and provincial high courts, and perform tax court system administration 
or management. 
Overall, the tax judicature reform in China should consider both the idea of 
permanence and that of flexibility. It must balance the dynamic between tax 
administration, the general judicial framework, and taxpayers' rights. As law 
supports the government's political authority as well as the power of the legal 
system, the principles and tenets of tax judicature system should be enshrined 
in a jurisprudential manner, honoring the rule of law order. With hopes to 
deepen the reform, this chapter concludes with a quote from an official excerpt 
proclaimed by the Communist Party for the judicial system reform in China.253 
Our goal is to improve the allocation of judicial powers and responsibilities; 
standardize judicial activities, establish a fair, efficient, and authoritative 
socialist judicial system, ensure that court and procuratorates exercise their 
powers and carry out responsibilities fairly, independently, and according to 
law; strengthen the corps of political-legal workers; and strictly and fairly 
enforce the law in a civilized manner. 
253 
See Hu Jintao zai Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Shiqici Quanguo Daibiao Dahui shang de 
Baogao [Hu Jintao 's Report to the Seventeenth CCP Congress], October 24, 2007, ( «m'ilili# 
1'£rp !E:t-lii""Jt:m+-tlJ\1:!E{~~::k% l:fnW.15 )) }(in Chinese) 
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Chapter VII 
Taxpayers' Rights Protection -An Under-Delivered Promise 
I. Introduction 
The awareness of taxpayers' rights has influenced China's tax law reform in 
the past decade. 1 The understanding that "political rights involve political 
duties ... [a]mong them is certainly the duty to pay taxes"2 substantiates the 
latest development in the taxpayers' movement to challenge the rights 
protection status quo in China. As China has been called the most miserable 
Asian country in terms of tax3, this issue is particularly important, because the 
increase of Chinese tax revenue has been greater than its GDP growth in the 
past decade.4 Coupled with an inflationary currency and high CPI, this fact has 
driven tax payers to demand reform. Taxes are imposed by law, and as a result 
1 See Xu Shanda, Zhongguo Shuiquan Yanjiu [China Tax Jurisdiction Research], (China 
Taxation Press, 2004) Preface 
2 See Edwin R. A. Seligman, Essay in Taxation (101h ed. 1931), at 111. Seligman is an early 
contributor in advancing formation of international tax standards and principles was cherished 
by his involvement in the earliest transnational collaboration on coordination in international 
tax matters. This is not to suggest that no other literature articulates these ideas, but only to 
point to an early piece of analysis as one source of such a perspective 
3 See "China ranks the second in Forbes Tax Misery Index" and accompanying discussions at 
http://forum.globaltimes.cn/forum/showthread.php?t=10043 (last visited on March 15, 2011); 
see also, The Forbes Tax Misery Index 2009, 
http://pdfforbes.com/media/pdfs/TaxMisery.pdf(last visited on March 15, 2011) 
4 For more details on China's GDP development, see supra Chapter I 
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they compose an indispensible element of China's legal framework. 
Moreover, enlarged tax basis has caused taxpayers to examine the public 
benefits they receive compared with the level of tax they pay, and inevitably 
seek rights protection against unreciprocated taxation. 
Meanwhile, Chinese government's official endorsements of universal values 
and generally accepted human rights principles 5 advance the debate on 
reframing China's legal and social settings.6 However, traditional tax policy 
discourse7 lacks a framework for exploring whether or how taxpayers' rights 
paradigm may guide and impact China's pursuit of sensitive human rights 
protection goals that would help promote social order and an international 
image as a country in which individual rights and freedoms are fully realized. 
This Chapter argues that taxpayers' right protection could be an avenue to 
dealing directly with the problems of social welfare and economic inequality 
in China. For instance, a list of pragmatic and proactive taxpayers' rights 
promotes human rights protection, which is both morally defensible and 
politically viable. 
The concept of taxpayers' rights is not isolated from general legal and social 
environment. It is generally defined to limit the state power to promulgate, 
5 Hu Jintao, China's President, in concluding the Convention for Sino-Japan Strategic 
Beneficial Relationship, on May 7, 2008, posited that universal value is a mutual 
understanding of international community and China would embrace such notion in fostering 
human rights protection with Chinese characteristics, see generally Zhongri Guanyu 
Quanmian Tuijin Zhanlue Huhui Guanxi de Lianhe Shengming [Declaration for the 
promotion of Sino-Japan Strategic Beneficial Relationship], May 7, 2008, i!iJ'I.m~ {Jtll::t ~'T 
~MHIJtt6i~1i~~~i¥gl!XftJBIIA} 20081¥5 ~ 7 l::t; See, e.g., Shi-kun Li, Chuyi Jiazhi 
Shehui Zhuyi Hexin Jiazhi he Pushi Jlazhi [Thinking About Value, Socialist Core Value and 
Universial Value], Journal of Beijing Union University (Humanities and Social Sciences) 
(2009-04), In Chinese 
6 See generally /d., Li 
7 
See, e.g., Jian Fan, Lun Shuishou Zhengguan Zhong de Wei Nashuiren Fuwu [Serving 
Taxpayers in Tax Administrative Collection], (Taxation Research, 1998-04), in Chinese (1G:IJ£: 
«~:fJl45c1iEt'f*'B<l"79~f~J\JIH5·")) , «m*WfJ'L)) 1998 if~ 4 WD 
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administer and enforce the tax laws and to bindingly obligate uniformity, 
transparency and procedural justice. The rule of law in this sense warrants 
taxpayers' reliance on rights protection. 8 On an international level, the 
protection of taxpayer rights has received widespread attention and 
legislations of various sources define and defend taxpayers' rights. Many tax 
administrations and international organizations have promulgated bills, 
declarations and manuals specifically designed for the protection of taxpayer 
rights. 9 The competitive advantage provided by taxpayer rights protection in 
international markets further ensures against interference to taxpayers' rights, 
and the WTO exemplifies a robust multilateral regime embracing capital 
mobility and free trade. Rights exercised by taxpayers demand that protection 
standards on par with international standards be incorporated into China's tax 
law system to safeguard both revenue collection and fuel economic 
development. 
This Chapter reviews China's taxpayer's rights framework and proposes 
reform guidelines for enforceable taxpayers' rights protection under China's 
rule of law conception and in accord with WTO principles. Subchapter II 
\ 
describes the rationale for taxpayers' rights 10 based on the relationship 
between taxation and the state. The discussion grounds on a theory of the 
state, which holds that legal rights are meaningless unless they are accessible 
8 See generally G.S. Cooper (ed.) Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law (Amsterdanm, IBFD 
and ATRF, 1997) for an early review of rule of law and taxpayers' rights 
9 For example, U.S. passed the "Declaration of Taxpayer Rights" in 1988 (and amended in 
1996); Canada passed the "Declaration of Taxpayer Rights'' in 1985, and OECD constituted a 
Model Tax Convention for its member countries 
10 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to document voluminous literatures on the origin, 
definition and interpretation, see generally, C. Wellman, "Concepts of Rights" in L.C. Becker 
and C.B. Becker (eds), Encyclopedia of ethics, Duty and Obligations Vols 1 and 2 (New York, 
Garland Publishing Inc., 1992) 
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and enforceable. 11 It therefore posits that taxpayers' rights are primarily part of 
civil and political rights, concerned with harmonizing taxpayers' rights against 
and duties to the state. It also posits that broader human rights protection can 
be achieved following the construction of a set of meaningful taxpayer's 
rights. Subchapter III critically accesses the taxpayers' right structure in 
China, in terms of constitutional interpretation, primary rights and secondary 
rights available for Chinese taxpayers. Subchapter IV identifies how the 
conception of rule of law and the WTO principles affect the reform of 
taxpayers' rights. It also contributes a proposed guideline with high practical 
significance. 12 
II. The Rationale for Chinese taxpayers' rights protection 
Discussion of taxpayers' rights has been limited and did not carry much 
weight until recently in China 13 • A conscientious search of constitutional 
sources for taxpayers' rights embarrassedly shows that, other than a prescribed 
duty to pay tax under Article 56 of the Chinese Constitutional, there are no 
explicit protections or statements about the normative relationship between 
state and taxpayer. Only a few vague constitutional rights are even indirectly 
associated with the basic framework for safeguarding individual rights as to 
tax administration, collection, and enforcement. Given the notorious futility of 
Chinese Constitutional Law in practice, the constitutional conception of 
11 See OECD, Taxpayers' Rights and Obligations: A Survey of the Legal Situation in OECD 
Countries (Paris, OECD, 1990), discussing the accessible legal rights available to taxpayers in 
OECD members 
12 A list of taxpayers' rights is listed based on the summary of interviews conducted by the 
author from 2005 to 2008. The author presents this order as a proposal of practical value and 
an outcome of his long-stretched attention in Chinese taxpayers' rights. The interviewees are 
12 experienced tax collection officials working on first-front tax services from 12 local I 
municipal tax authorities across China 
13 This chapter submits respectfully that the seemingly voluminous literature (in Chinese) 
about taxpayers' rights is of ambiguity and utilitarianism 
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taxpayers' rights is not a useful avenue for challenging the State's power to 
tax. 
The Chinese tax system however, in its attempt to incorporate international 
market standards and empower taxpayers and its situation in a broader 
campaign to improve public service in China, it is an important and fertile area 
for rights protection reform in the Chinese legal system. The official notion of 
"small government, big society," endlessly government corruption scandals, 
and the steady growth of the civil service corps have driven Chinese taxpayers 
to question the distribution and handling of their tax payments. The rising 
expectations of individual liberty nowadays further propel Chinese taxpayers 
to demand reciprocation from the state for the taxes they pay. This Subchapter 
sets out the rationale underlying why a timely articulation of Chinese 
taxpayers' rights is essential especially in the context of socialist rule of law 
construct, human rights protection and the fulfillment of WTO principles. 
2.1. Taxation, the state and rights 
Theoretically, taxation is usually viewed as a restriction on fundamental 
individual property rights. 14 Taxpayers make tax payments according to laws 15 
in the hopes of receiving quality benefits returned to them by the state. Tax, 
therefore, essentially envisions a balancing of necessary state fiscal and 
administrative power and individual rights. Articulation of individual property 
14 See Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice (New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2002) at 6 
15 
See supra Chapter III of this thesis for discussions on Rule of Law and accompanying 
footnotes on divergent views on origin oflaw 
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rights presumes basic individual liberty and an established legal framework 
ensuring exclusivity and ownership. 16 State power to levy tax must recognize 
individual property rights17 as part of a citizen's natural entitlement and the 
basis for social welfare accumulation. 18 The origin of taxation 19 is 
fundamental to theories of the state, 20 and therefore can be justified as a check 
on individualliberty21 or essential to the finance, operation, and growth of the 
public order22 and to uphold economic development.23 However, China's tax 
system, founded on a Marxist public ownership ideology, traditionally has 
paid little respect to individual property rights and framed the tax law as 
collecting financial sources for the redistribution of social wealth?4 
Although legal reasoning developed by influential jurists and theorists25 can be 
equally applied to the tax law, 26 tax scholars' focus has been centered 
16 The author submits that different definitions of rights and duties provide various 
understanding of taxation 
17 See Murphy and Nagel, supra14, at 42-45, discussing Consequentialist and Deontological 
theories 
18 !d., at 44 
19 See David Bentley, Taxpayers' Rights: Theory, Origin and Implementation (Kluwer Law 
International, 2007), at 3-5 
2° For a general discussion on the theory of the state, see generally Robert L. Carneiro, A 
Theory ofthe Origin of the State, New Series, Vol. 169, No. 3947 (Aug. 21, 1970), American 
Association for the Advancement of Science, at 733-738, see also, Hazard, Geoffiey C. Jr., 
General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 241 (1965) 
21 See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980), at 155, 
276-277, positing a type of common good that is not fundamental, but which allows members 
of a community to collaborate to attain reasonable objectives supported by a legal system that 
is specific, not arbitrary and mains reciprocity between subjects of the system and its lawful 
authorities; See also Murphy and Nagel, supra 14 at 42-45 for a discussion on the 
deontological theory 
22 See Murphy and Nagel, supra 14 at 8 
23 /d., at 43, see also generally Reuven Avi-Yonah and Joel Slemrod, (How) Should Trade 
Agreements Deal with Income Tax Issues? (September 2001). Michigan Law and Economics 
Research Paper No. 01-008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=285345 or 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.285345 (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
24 The definition of taxation is interpreted quietly differently based on various understanding 
of individual rights, see generally, R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York, Basic 
Books, 1974), emphasizing that taxation as necessary to uphold the state's pursuit of goals but 
limited as far as possible based on its direct interference with the basic concept of maximizing 
individual choice; see also A.P. d'Entreves, Natural Law (London, Hutchinson University 
Library, 1967), Chap VI, viewing taxation as a means of distributing important social goods 
and has a wider role. See Bentley, supra 19 at 14 for summaries of both examples 
25 
See infra Chapter III of this thesis, Rule of Law and accompanying footnotes 
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primarily on framing a robust tax legislative, administrative, and judicial 
structure for the purpose of raising revenue and distributing social goods 
efficiently and fairly. 27 Rarely, however, have they focused on taxpayers' 
rights. This is apparent in the 1200-page two-volume treatise authored by 
Victor Thuronyi on tax law design, in which only two pages are spent listing 
impracticable taxpayers' individual rights, 28 showing little interest in 
contemplating or detailing their substance. Not surprisingly, the voluminous 
literature on international tax and multilateral tax collaboration published in 
the last several decades shares the same lacuna, 29 and such exclusion also 
extends to procedural rights and arrangements especially pertinent to 
taxpayers. 
The development of taxpayers' rights and obligations formulation has 
evocative merits. Essentially, the conception of taxpayers' rights suggests two 
lines of inquiry: capturing the dynamic relationship between tax authorities 
and taxpayers with enumerated rights expressed in law, 30 and encouraging 
taxpayers' compliance with tax law,31 especially in the globalization era with 
increased capital movement and free trade. 32 On the tax administration level, 
the taxpayer-oriented client service approach is a major recent improvement in 
26 !d., re-interpretation as legal theories are presented including tax theory due to conflicting 
values and social orders. Radin specifically raises that theories developed on a case-by-case 
interpretation 
27 See Victor Thuronyi, Tax Law Design and Drafting (IMF, 1996), at 110 
28 /d., at 111-12 
29 !d. 
30 See A. Sawyer, A Comparison of New Zealand Taxpayers' Rights with Selected Civil Law 
and Common Law Countries- Have New Zealand Taxpayers been "Short-Changed? (1999) 
32 Vanderbilt J. of Transn'l L, 1346-47; see also generally, Philip Baker and Anne-Mieke 
Groenhagen, The Protection of Taxpayers' Rights - An International Codification (London, 
European Financial Forum, 2001); see M. McLennan, The Principles and Concepts in the 
Development of the Taxpayers Charter" (2003), 32 Australian Tax Review, 22 
31 
See Thuroyni supra 27; see also generally Benley (ed.) Taxpayers' Rights: An International 
Perspective (Gold Coast, Revenue Law Journal, 1998) 
32 
See generally Valerie Braithwaite (ed.), Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance 
and Evasion (Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2003). 
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the direction of taxpayer rights protection. Tax authorities have shifted from a 
controlling or coercive position to that of a friendly collection service 
provider. Although it is entitled with state power to collect taxes, the tax 
administration has begun positioning itself almost as an interface between 
taxpayers and the state. This encouraging transformation may partially be 
attributed to increasing cross-border transfer of capital and taxpayer-friendly 
policies provided by many developing countries, which face harsh challenges 
for keeping their tax base when so much of it is predicated on large capital 
exportation. Similarly, because of the direct economic advantage received 
from their services to foreign investors, tax authorities, especially those in 
developing countries, have inner motivations to consistently maintain quality 
services for taxpayers to keep and attract investments from the outside. 
From the point of view of compliance, voluntary fulfillment of obligation to 
pay tax due is rewardingly encouraged. An obvious drive is the enlarged social 
welfare scale and high density of economic activities, which are beyond 
traditional capacity of tax authorities to monitor closely of taxpayers' 
behaviors. Coupled with enforceable criminal sanctions, taxpayers' 
obligations to pay taxes are generally interpreted broadly to circumvent 
calculated evasion and noncompliance. Voluntary compliance is a cost-
efficient strategy to carry on business and maximize investment profits. 
Further, in the international marketplace, the convergence of global taxpayer 
treatments restrains tax-avoidance-shopping investment behaviors to a 
minimum without the potential for manipulation by any state actor. Given the 
limited room to explore evasion possibilities, taxpayers have a rational interest 
in monitoring the scope of their rights and the extent of protection therefrom. 
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As a result, taxpayers' rights are alternatively strengthened by compliance 
together with the dynamic relationship built between the tax authorities (state) 
and taxpayers. 
Overall, taxpayers' rights require a valid recognition of individual property 
rights and their obligations to the state. The state's power to tax cannot be 
arbitrarily enforced. It is also critically important to emphasize democracy and 
the rule of law in a social and legal order in order to ensure tax laws are not 
subject to arbitrary enforcement. The conception of taxpayers' rights firstly 
has to accept a set of generally accepted, accessible and enforceable individual 
liberties. For instance, taxpayer's rights in originally derive from a framework 
human rights, but they embrace influences from a broader scope of political 
and civil rights. 
2.2. A practical recourse to human rights protection 
The conception of taxpayers' rights attaches to and presumes a basic 
framework of human rights including individual property rights. A legal order 
without recognition of universally accepted human rights and values likely 
would render taxpayers' right futile and rootless. At the same time, a robust 
system of taxpayers' rights to a large extent advances and translates into 
realization of human rights protection. This Chapter assumes a positivist view 
of the rule of recognition but not of the inherent nature33 of rules, and further 
33 
See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press 1994) at 250-251 
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puts front a presumption that there is a "common"34 set of universal human 
rights standards that nations can pledge, although the formulation, clarity and 
content of those western-dominated standards are subject to debate and 
selective customization by signatories to international human rights treaties. 
This assumption also calls for prerequisites of an able legal order that can 
accommodate the accessibility and enforceability of those universally accepted 
standards. 
This positivist assumption for taxpayers' rights has merit and is not groundless. 
The "universal nature of the rights and freedoms" is an acknowledged 
consensus 35 and is "beyond question," 36 and such universality and some 
freedoms are "fundamental." 37 Cultural traditions, religious preference, 
political ideologies and diversified customs are also valued in supporting such 
universality: "all human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent 
and interrelated." 38 Meanwhile, "universal human rights emerge with 
sufficient flexibility to respect and protect cultural diversity and integrity. The 
flexibility of human rights to be relevant to diverse cultures is facilitated by 
the establishment of minimum standards and the incorporation of cultural 
rights," 39 but "cultural consideration in no way diminishes States' human 
rights obligations."40 In this connection, recognition of rules composes the 
34 See Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted on 
December 10, 1948 by the General Assembly of the United Nations proclaims it as a 
"common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations". 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
35 !d. 
36 !d., Article I; see also Diana Ayton-Shenker, The Challenge of Human Rights and Cultural 
Diversity, United Nations Background Note, quoting Vienna Declaration and Program of 
Action, http://www.un.org/rights/dpil627e.htm (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
37 !d., see also Article 5 of the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action 
38 
See Articles 1 and 2 Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 




rational for adopting a set of universally accepted rules with the understanding 
of cultural, religious and social diversities. 
Inherited from the minimum standards of human rights, recognition of 
taxpayers' rights at least can be interpreted with universality and flexibility. 
Analogically, a set of rules embracing basic taxpayers' rights should be 
established and commonly accepted. For instance, there is no need to create a 
new set of rights specifically for taxpayers, rather, many rules are in place 
already and need only be customized to the tax context. To a state that has 
needs to design and reform taxpayers' rights system, many technically well-
designed taxpayers charters and models are available to adapt to specific legal, 
cultural, political and economic settings. On the other hand, taxpayers' rights 
as political and civil rights are less debatable, and more importantly, less 
sensitive or disturbing to states than human rights. Therefore, threats caused 
by the codification and enforcement of minimum taxpayers' rights would be 
unlikely to jeopardize revenue collectability of states. 
Approaching human rights through the lens of taxpayers' rights supports a 
focus on fairness in social policies. For example, taxpayers' rights would 
denounce an order which tends to "distribute tax burdens towards more 
economically vulnerable groups."41 This approach also brings in efficiency 
aspects in evaluating of a given social policy by considering the potential costs 
of taxpayers. The reciprocal dynamic derived from the balance between 
taxpayers' rights and the government is quite informative or crucial to human 
rights protection, especially for developing countries where the status of 
41 
See Allison Christians, Fair Taxation as a Basic Human Right, 9 lnt'l. R. Const. 211 (2009) 
at 22 
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taxpayers is generally more favorably treated than citizens with general claim 
of basic human rights. Philosophically, an established, accessible, and 
enforceable set of taxpayers' rights facilitates the realization of basic human 
rights. Even though the tax context is limited in nature, a social and legal order 
without adequate taxpayers' rights protection can hardly be a society 
embracing basic universally accepted human rights standards. Fulfillment of 
taxpayers' rights easily may spill-over to other areas of laws, all of which 
contribute to a bettered protection of human rights. Ultimately, taxpayers' 
rights might lead to a reconsideration of the relationship between individuals 
and state, the way we debate what fairness requires and with respect to whom, 
and the way we balance fairness against efficiency and other tax policy 
goals42 . 
2.3. A pragmatic demand for tax law reform in China 
The subject oftaxpayers' rights has progressively shaped public and academic 
discussion of tax law reform in China. The official agenda of China's legal 
construct also generates the need for taxpayers' rights protection to fuel 
economic development and to help achieve a harmonious society. Growing 
awareness of individual property and social rights cultivate taxpayers with 
concern on the fair redistribution of social wealth and enthusiasm in public 
affairs participation. An emerging service-orient and client-friendly culture in 
daily economic activities, on the other hand, compels authorities, including the 
tax administration, to refine their manners in properly handling constituency 
42 /d. 
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and state dynamics. Meanwhile, an increasingly complicated tax system and 
systematized international influences shift the concentration of intensifying 
investment to modernizing a well-rounded full-service tax system, in which 
taxpayers' rights are indispensable and of significance. 
China's legal development over the past three decades has, in many ways, 
shaped the motivation and needs for safeguarding taxpayers' rights. A primary 
driver is the conception of inviolable individual property rights incorporated 
into the Amendment to China's Constitution, enshrining a clear-cut private 
property establishment but conceptually obscuring its borders with the 
previously dominant public ownership model. The full-bodied legal 
development in major arenas of economic activities promotes quality market 
participation in the hope to create a social order based on libertarianism and 
citizenry. Anger over corruption and erosion of individual rights together with 
wealth disparities suggest growing expectations for the quality, fairness, and 
transparency of government services. Exposure to western lifestyles and the 
availability of information from the internet and international relationships 
also foster the awareness and pursuit of individual liberty in China. All these 
vigorous searches contribute to a forceful push for taxpayers to demand 
respect and safeguards of their rights. 
The imbalanced structure of the Chinese tax law reform for the past three 
decades by itself also spawns desires for taxpayers' rights. Large portions of 
tax policies oriented mostly toward attracting and catering to foreign 
investments, and a capably managed tax regime has been formed at least as to 
governing tax matters of foreign and domestic enterprises. An improved 
turnover tax system was also formulated to channel capital mobility and 
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redistribution of social goods, but such indirect-tax-dominant system cuts do 
not engage the contact between the state and actual consumers who take the 
final burden of tax payments. Tax administration, on the other hand, based on 
computerization upgrades and the dual-track central-local structure, has 
produced steady trends of tax audit and evasion reduction with criminal 
sanctions and encouraging voluntary compliance. Returning to jurisprudential 
analysis, however, systematic measures to secure taxpayers' rights have been 
neglected, if not intentionally avoided. Adopting taxpayers' rights is 
discounted m legislation and very few efforts are aimed at integrating 
taxpayers' rights into the tax system. Procedural rights available to or 
specifically designed for taxpayers, similarly, are subordinated or loosely 
attached to the existing nascent administrative or civil procedural reforms. For 
individual or enterprise taxpayers, a framework of rights for administrative 
reconsideration composes a burden dealing with tax authorities. Meanwhile, 
political pressures of improving GDPs and preserving investments entail tax 
authorities especially local officials to develop a set of taxpayers' rights, at 
least on paper, to show their friendly gestures to taxpayers. For instance, it 
continues to be important to reveal irregularities of tax administration in 
practice across regions and sub-provincial localities. 
Taxpayers' calls for rights can be attributed to an extraction of emerging 
litigant culture deposited in commercial activities and formed over thirty years 
of economic complexities - taxpayers are not collectively "non-contentious" 
anymore. The inefficient dispute resolution scheme in practice fails to 
safeguard legitimate pursuits of taxpayers, which creates a mindset of 
victimism and an aversion to authorities including tax administration and 
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judiciary incompetence. In this sense, taxpayers as revenue contributors 
gradually build up a determination to challenge and litigate against tax 
authorities following procedures. Information available according to the 
Information Disclosure Regulation (effective as of May 1, 2008) and various 
local regulations of the same nature encourage and invite taxpayers to inquiry 
tax administrations as to budgetary arrangement and revenue distribution. 
However, the lack of enforceable taxpayers' rights renders such legitimate 
concerns futile. In this connection, out of unpredictable benefits, taxpayers 
have strong inclination to safeguard a set of rights for their own sake. 
A key drive underlying taxpayers' rights development originates from 
principles of the rule of law and compliance with international obligations, 
including China's WTO obligations. In constructing the socialist rule of law 
order, taxpayers' rights nimbly accommodate basic elements ofthe rule of law 
in terms of demanding for notice or publicity, prospectivity, clarity, 
conforrnability, stability, and congruence. The rule of law order requires that 
taxpayers' rights be procedurally just and an existing legal framework to make 
those rights accessible and enforceable, in certain extent in connection with 
morality and social etiquettes exercised by tax officials. International 
organizations such as the WTO and international treaties on human rights 
protection demand transparency, uniformity and neutrality in tax 
administration on one hand, and prompt acceptance a set of well-accepted 
taxpayers' rights on the other. Foreign investors, experiencing established 
taxpayers' rights regime in developed tax systems, are reluctant to further 
invest after tax preferential policies have been exploited. In this sense, 
taxpayers' rights serve as a measure of comfort and assurance to keep and 
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foster investments. Foreign enterprise taxpayers, are among those active 
boosters in China for institutionalizing an organized taxpayers' rights 
framework. 
Overall, institutionalization of taxpayers' rights enjoys a systematic powerful 
drives from taxpayers themselves, tax administration, general legal settings 
and international influence, all of which are intertwined with human rights 
protection and the rule of law order. The rationale for legitimizing a set of 
taxpayers' rights in China is, in part, to compensate the shortage of tax 
administrative efficiency. It also promotes a dynamic balance between the 
taxpayers and the state, vertically with due process and horizontally with 
fairness norms. China, facing a growing revenue base and a more complex 
administrative structure, needs a set of taxpayers' rights to fill in legislative 
gaps and to remedy the potential erosion of tax bases. 
III. Taxpayer's rights protection in China 
This subchapter aims to critically review China's legislations and status quo of 
taxpayers' rights. It firstly classifies taxpayers' rights as primary constitutional 
and administrative rights and secondary administrative rights. Based on a brief 
appraisal of available rights to Chinese taxpayers, the probable causes for 
deficiencies are analyzed and summarized in the hope of furnishing creditable 
reform guidelines. Discussion of the impact of the rule of law order and the 
WTO principles follows. 
China, in line with its Constitution and embrace of the socialist rule of law 
order, showed reasonable efforts for the protection of taxpayers' rights in the 
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past three decades. Partially designed as a responsive gesture for WTO 
accession, an amended Law of Administration ofthe Levy and Collection Tax 
ofPRC (the "Tax Collection Law" or "TCL") was passed in April2001 based 
on a previously nascent draft promulgated in September 1992. The Tax 
Collection Law, on one hand, enhances the means of tax law enforcement and 
serves as a guideline for tax collection procedures, and on the other delineates 
the relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities in terms of taxpayers' 
rights. Many obscure descriptions of taxpayers' rights in the earlier version 
were clarified and abolished in the 2001 Tax Collection Law such as the right 
to confidentiality, the right to give statement and appeal, the right to relief and 
compensation. However, several generally accepted taxpayers' rights were 
stipulated evasively or too sketchily especially those associated with 
procedural arrangements. 
A recent interesting and informative document on taxpayers' rights is the 
Proclamation on the Rights and Obligations of Taxpayers, released by the 
SAT in December 2009 (hereinafter referred to as the "Proclamation"). This 
first systematic attempt by the SAT summarizes taxpayers' rights and 
obligations prescribed in the Tax Collection Law with detailed explanations on 
enforcement and simple case illustrations. However, the Proclamation did not 
receive the favorable reception from taxpayers and even from Chinese tax 
administration body itself, which it anticipated. Taxpayers remain suspicious 
of the tax administration and taxpayers' rights are regarded as "traps" in 
exchange of formidable taxpayers' duties stipulated in the Proclamation. This 
dilemma is particularly evident as SAT issued many follow-up notices or 
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administrative rulings to integrate the Proclamation into its official 
propaganda. 
3.1. An overview of the classification of taxpayers' rights 
A careful reading of taxpayers' rights protection in the U.S.43 and in OECD 
countries44 would conclude a long list various rights available to taxpayers 
under different criteria. For simplicity's sake, two major types of rights are 
identified, which can further be classified into different categories based on 
their enforceability45 . Addressing the vertical relationship between the state 
and taxpayers, the first type deals with interaction between tax authorities and 
taxpayers in terms of administration, collection, and enforcement with fairness 
and efficiency, and envisions the anticipation of protection predicated upon 
legitimate compliance. The second type of rights comprises a balance of 
dynamics between the taxpayers and the tax laws in terms of compliance, 
operation and application.46 This second type of rights in substance is enforced 
by administrative and legislative mechanisms for the fundamental operation of 
tax laws.47 
43 See U.S. Taxpayer Bill of Rights (amended in 1996) 
http://www.irs.gov/advocate/article/O,id=98206,00.html (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
44 See generally, Taxpayers' Rights and Obligations: A Survey of the Legal Situation in OECD 
Countries (OECD, 1990); see also Minoru Nakazato and J. Mark Ramseyer, Tax Law, Hiroshi 
Kaneko, and the Transformation of Japanese Jurisprudence, 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 721 2010, for 
a discussion of Japanese taxpayers' rights; D. Albregtse and H.P.A.M. van Arendonk (eds), 
Taxpayer Protection in the European Union (Kluwer Law International, 1998) 
45 The author submits that there are many criteria to classifY rights which can be broken down 
into meticulous categories. There is no right or wrong, better or worse, classification of rights 
as different barometers is applied In this connection, for an ably detailed summary of 
classification of taxpayer's rights, see generally Bentley supra 19 Chapters 4 and 6 
46 See Bentley supra 19 at 186-89, arguing that a third type of rights but drops it as 
administrative in nature 
47 As evidenced by the next two paragraphs, the author obligates to posit that this thesis adopts 
a sharply different analytical method of taxpayers' rights that David Bentley employs in 
"Taxpayers' Rights: Theory, Origin and Implementation" (Kluwer Law International, 2007). 
455 
Revisiting a brief jurisprudential analysis as conceptualized by legal positivist 
H.L.A. Hart, a further distinction between primary and secondary legal rights 
has considerable merits if it appropriately applies to the taxpayers' rights 
context. According to Hart, a primary rule or right governs conduct while a 
secondary rule or right deals with the procedural methods by which primary 
rules are enforced, operated, prosecuted and so on 48 . Hart specifically 
enumerated three secondary rules which have particular reference value for 
analyses of taxpayers' rights.49 First, the rule of recognition, the rule by which 
any member of society may check to find out what the primary rules of the 
society are. As stated by Hart, the recognized rule might only be what is 
written in a sacred book or what is said by a ruler. Second, the rule of change, 
the rule by which existing primary rules might be created, altered or deleted. 
Third, the rule of adjudication, the rule by which the society might determine 
when a rule has been broken and prescribe a remedy. In conjunction with two 
prescribed types of taxpayers' rights: primary and secondary, Hart's 
enumeration proffers practical guidelines on classifying taxpayers' rights to an 
extra categorization, and the similar approach also applies to other major areas 
of law as well. 
Accordingly, a further classification deserves consideration for a meaningful 
examination of main the categories of taxpayers' rights therein. First, the 
primary legal rights generally center on processes of tax law making, such as 
validity of the imposition of a tax and certain constitutional limitations. This 
category covers rights promulgated by legislatures, administrative agencies 
Bentley mostly tailors classification of taxpayers' rights for his ambition of designing a 
worldwide acceptable model. This thesis aims as simple as laying a positivist background to 
review the deficiency of taxpayer's rights protection in China. 
48 See H.L.A. Hart, supra 33, at 251-52 
49 !d. 
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and those interpreted through case law by the judiciary. However, due to the 
historical constraints on drafting of Constitutions, primary rights may appear 
in either in express or implied terms. In countries such as the U.K. without a 
Constitution, the description oftaxpayers' rights is different. 
The secondary level of taxpayers' rights includes enforceable rights focusing 
on specific operations of the tax law such as its administration, collection, 
enforcement procedures, and includes Hart's rules of recognition, change and 
adjudication, respectively. In daily operation of the tax law, secondary rights 
are those rights that taxpayers are more familiar with and practice, such as 
rights for confidentiality, rights of being informed oflatest tax regulations, and 
rights to request an impartial hearing or initiating dispute against tax 
authorities. Secondary rights also prescribe special procedures and processes 
available to taxpayers such as individual requests for deductions or advanced 
rulings negotiated with tax authorities. Secondary rights sometimes are 
stipulated in administrative regulations, and are similar to primary 
administrative rights - although the issues that these two categories cover may 
be similar, but the nature of the rights is different. Having said the above, there 
are also administrative rights that do not belong to any of the categories above, 
because they are not rights per se and often arise in the form of social 




3.2. An overview of Chinese taxpayer's rights- primary legal rights 
Since primary legal rights are usually the measure of the validity of the tax 
law, Constitutions, if available, are supposed to provide the strongest 
protection of enforceable primary taxpayer's rights. China's Constitution, 
however, only stipulates, in Article 56, taxpayers' duty to pay tax due 
according to law. There is no expressed language of taxpayers' rights or any 
exact description of tax per se except those generally prescribed citizenry 
rights, which may be applied to taxpayers. 50 Given the public finance and legal 
situation in China, this thesis shares the regrets and vehement criticism of 
these omissions of taxpayers' rights in China's Constitution, 51 but it suggests, 
after reviewing available Chinese tax scholarship, that such a lacuna is 
arguably tolerable, and the necessity of amending China's Constitution for 
inserting the taxpayers' right language should be considered by both 
constitutional legislatures and tax academia. 
50 See generally, Chapter II, Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens, Constitution of 
People's Republic of China [XIAN FA (1982)(P.R.C.), as amended] 
51 See, e.g., Weiguang Li, Gonggong Caizheng de Xianzheng Siwei - Gonggong Caizheng 
Jingshen Quanshi [Public Finance and Constitutionalism: An Interpretation of Public Finance 
Spirit], in Strategy and Management (zhanlue yu Guanli) 2002-3 ::~.Hi§ ::l't : 0 ;J:~:; m;1-il&~':\til&,\!l. 
~t-0;J:~:; m;1-D&~1$iiff: <<~~!31!fri >> 2002 4~ 3M 
http://www.xschina.org/show.php?id=848 (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
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Constitutions are diversified in overdrives and magnitude to which they 
provide for taxpayers' rights. Some Constitutions stipulate express and 
implied taxpayers' rights, but some fail to do so. 52 In countries that are 
prominent for tax collection not being a major source of state revenue, such as 
some middle-eastern countries, which rely on petroleum trading, rarely would 
enquiring tax scholars bicker the significance of relevant literally provisions 
on taxpayers' rights available in those relevant Constitutions. But this does not 
mean that taxpayers' rights are not protected in those countries. Some 
Constitutions do not contain elaborated expression of taxpayers' rights at all, 
but may have meaningful implied rights available to taxpayers. For example, 
Sweden's Constitution only has a prohibition against retroactive effects of tax 
statues. 53 The United Kingdom does not even have a formal Constitution, but 
British taxpayers enjoy quite commendable protection of their rights. 
Consequently, for some critics of the omission of taxpayers' rights in China's 
Constitution, there is a need for a certain broadening of scope from the 
Constitutions ofthe United States and Germany in the process of looking for a 
viable transplant provision. 
One important question to be considered is whether the lack of an explicit 
taxpayers' rights provision in China's Constitution violates the principle of 
legality 54 as to Chinese taxpayers' rights. The principle of legality 55 as to 
taxpayers' rights is more constitutionally interpretative than literally 
52 See Thuronyi, Comparative Tax Law, at 48-49 
53 See Anders Hultqvist, Taxpayers' Rights in Sweden, Revenue Law Journal: Vol. 7: Issue. 1, 
Article 4 (1997), http://epublications.bond.edu.au/rlj/vol7/iss1/4 (last visited on March 15, 
2011); see also generally, Sawyer supra 30 
54 It is beyond of this thesis to review the discussion on the principle oflegality but quite a few 
Chinese tax scholars and economists evidently display conflicting understanding in this 
connection. 
55 See generally in Thuronyi, supra 52, discussing major tax families and their comparative 
advantages 
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descriptive. A few Chinese tax scholars embrace Hart's positivist view that 
any member of society may search for what the primary rights through the 
Constitution, but exclude another aspect of same positivism that the 
recognition rule might only be what is written in a sacred book or what is said 
by a ruler 56 on the other. However, a narrowly defined or manipulatively 
applied principle of legality by itself does not substantiate the notion that 
taxpayers' rights in China are without constitutional legality. Neither does the 
omission of an explicit provision for taxpayers' rights in China's Constitution 
necessarily impair constitutional protection of Chinese taxpayers' rights. 
Philosophically, the idealized provision for taxpayers' rights, if inserted in 
China's Constitution, does not necessarily initiate taxpayers' rights but 
somehow would discount the essentialism which is fully-embodied in the 
positivist view of taxpayers' rights protection. In this sense, this thesis argues 
that a more sophisticated discussion of the principle of constitutional legality 
should prioritize its application to the topic of taxpayers' rights as primary 
legal rights. 57 
Approaching human rights through the lens of taxpayers' rights also 
complicates the insertion of an explicit provision into China's Constitution. A 
set of fundamental human rights, bearing selectively interpretable universality 
and flexibility, is endorsed literally in Chapter II of the China's Constitution, 
and provides the foundation for enforcing taxpayers' rights in the specific tax 
context. Taxpayers' rights cannot escape from the general circumstance of 
56 See generally Li supra 51; see also Weiguang Li, Lun Gonggong Caizhng de Shiming [The 
Historical Role of Public Finance], Public Finance Research 2002-3 and 2002-4 ($:1$:]1[; (( i~ 
0;t:!JJj!;)(i¥JBJ 51:~$)) , O:fj!;)(WfJL)) 2002 :¥ 3, 4 M)( in Chinese) 
57 See generally Thuronyi, supra 52; see also, Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law: Towards an 
Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and Development (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1999) 
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human rights protection. As long as those fundamental human rights, at least 
as arguably shown on paper, are subject to flexible adaption to the tax context, 
the legislature in providing specific provisions for taxpayers' rights might 
weaken the minimum protections provided by general human rights norms. 
After all, there is no special category such as bankers' rights or farmers' 
rights, and taxpayers' as a term philosophically may lower the minimum 
standard of treatment or weaken the enforceability of what are actually general 
human rights norms. Meanwhile, opponents of such provisions argue that 
worldwide human rights treaties such as the UDHC and Vienna Convention 
do not automatically endorse a worldwide acceptable set of taxpayers' rights. 
This is unlikely what supporters of the taxpayers' rights provision hope to 
dispute given the diversified customization tailored by various subscribers of 
some international treaties. 
Returning to the taxpayers' duty to pay taxes due as stipulated in Article 56, a 
seemingly straightforward argument raised by supporters of a taxpayers' rights 
provision is the "symbiotic" mutuality of rights and duties -a duty must have 
a concomitant right to accord with the principle of legality. 58 This 
oversimplified reasoning is of little value in jurisprudential analysis. Legal 
positivism does not support duty recognition, and duties can be unilaterally 
prescribed by laws without proffering any rights. A careful reading of much 
Chinese tax scholarship shows that supporters of this reasoning are not a 
minority. 
58 
See Shaoying Cheng, Lun Zhongguo Nashuiren Quanli Baohu [Analysis of Chinese 
Taxpayers' Rights Protection], arguing that a duty must have a concomitant right and 
therefore the Chinese Constitution should contain taxpayers' rights, 
http:/ /www.eftl.org/ Article/Show Article. asp? ArticleiD=240 (last visited on March 15, 
2011)( in Chinese) 
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The problems of statutory drafting may further complicate notions of 
incorporating such an express provision for taxpayers' rights into China's 
Constitution. Chinese tax scholarship usually stops at the point of urging such 
a provision without extending to thoughts on how to draft it. This welshing 
displays a lack of legislative drafting studies and may prejudicially be 
attributed to a flap in studies over taxpayer's rights. This thesis submits that, at 
the current stage of legal setting, the statutory drafting of an insertable 
Constitutional provision about taxpayers' rights is hard to achieve, if not 
impossible. First, definitions of "taxpayer" and "rights" are controversial and 
not subject to consensus. China's tax system relies in large part on the indirect 
or turnover tax regime, so the nominal taxpayers are not identical to citizens 
who actually bear the burden of paying tax, which makes the scope of 
"taxpayers" vague. An expansively generalized term of"taxpayer" may not be 
advantageous for legislators to accept. The definition of "rights" itself creates 
further sensitivity and invites selective interpretation, and the definition of 
"taxpayers' rights" remains difficult to make explicit. Second, China's 
Constitution already has a whole chapter on fundamental rights and duties, 
singling out a "taxpayers' right" might be redundant or create confusion as to 
its relative status to these fundamental rights. If the legislative intent of 
prescribing "a duty to pay tax due" in Article 56 could be explained by the 
dominant ideology of putting national interests over everything else, the 
legislative purpose for defining taxpayer's rights, as the counterpart of 
taxpayers' duties, is therefore analogically hard to search for its ideological 
roots. Third, linguistically the exact wording "safeguarding taxpayers' 
interests" is complicated to translate. Wordings in Chinese such as 
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"guarantee" (baozhang) and "protection" (baohu) are employed 
interchangeably, if not confusedly, and create nuances. For a legislative bill 
with Constitutional significance, a provision as to taxpayer's rights has to be 
made clear. 
Finally, a review of the four amendments made to China's Constitution so far 
since 1982 shows that constitutional revisions are usually colored by highly 
political strains or subject to political manipulation. The establishment of 
socialist rule of law order, market economy setting and protection of private 
property may in some senses enjoy jurisprudential proclaims, but a conscious 
reader of other inserted terminologies may confess strong underlying 
ideological influence therein. 59 Amending the constitution for the sake of an 
explicit provision for taxpayers' rights would require a significant social and 
political constituency. Further, such proposed amendment would entail an 
overhaul in the legal and public finance schemes as well. However, this thesis 
suggests for these reasons that a taxpayers' rights provision will be 
unprocurable in the foreseeable future. 
To summarize, taxpayers' rights on the level of primary legal rights, i.e. as 
formulated in an explicit provision, in China's Constitution is not attainable. 
This thesis shares the notion that taxpayers' rights can be read into China's 
Constitution60 under the positivist view, and agrees that the omission of an 
explicit provision arguably tolerable. The approach of employing an 
amendment to China's Constitution to insert a taxpayers' right provision is not 
of much practical value or jurisprudential meaning at the current stage. 
59 See Larry Cata Backer, Chinese Constitutionalism, Sange Daibiao (the "Three 
Represents''), and the Rule of Law, 16 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 29, 33-34 (2006) for a 
detailed analysis of the rule of law reform and the "Three Represents" 
60 See generally Li supra 51 
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3.3. An overview of Chinese taxpayer's rights -secondary legal rights 
Secondary legal rights in the tax context, i.e., secondary taxpayers' rights, 
compose the main body of modern taxpayers' rights system in international 
practice. Modern tax systems stipulate secondary taxpayers' rights dealing 
with the taxpayer's dynamics with the operation of the tax laws in terms of 
administration, collection, adjudication, as well as procedural justice and 
budgetary planning. Secondary taxpayers' rights in practice integrate the 
administrative, judicial and legislative branches to construct an enabling tax 
jurisdiction. Secondary taxpayers' rights can be located in major tax laws and 
administrative regulations. Those rights on one hand presume a foundation in 
primary rights and an established legal order to enforce them. They further 
expand the interpretation of general human rights. Administrative agencies by 
and large dominate the daily implementation of secondary taxpayers' rights 
through orders, notices, proclamations and interpretative notes, and sometimes 
may overlap with enforcing administrative primary rights concerning 
constitutional protection, if any. Statutory protection is often arranged to fit in 
a general procedural framework to ensure a fair and impartial decision making 
process avoiding prejudice against individual taxpayers. 
Secondary taxpayers' rights in China features the above-mentioned routine, 
i.e., a system of secondary legal rights, administrative rights and the principles 
of good conduct of tax authorities, but they are not without limitations. 
Particularly, for the operation of the Constitution and the Tax Collection Law, 
SAT and MOF as tax administrative bodies promulgate statutory regulations 
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and guidelines on secondary taxpayers' rights in almost all aspects. Processes 
involving the operation of Chinese tax laws are integrated into the general 
framework of civil, criminal and administrative procedural requirements, on 
both central and local levels. Meanwhile, China's secondary taxpayers' rights 
system is young, and a few general frustrations in China's rights protection 
regime are visible in the tax context as well. It is also important to mention a 
few drawbacks specific to secondary rights in the Chinese tax context. 
3.3.1. The 2001 Tax Collection Law 
The 2001 Tax Collection Law 61 (TCL) enacted on the eve of China's 
accession to the WTO, in the hope of enhancing tax law enforcement and 
catering to international expectations, represented the one and only of four 
pieces of legislation eventually passed by the NPC exclusively managing tax 
related issues by then.62 It aims to serve and guide the operation of the tax 
laws in general, and tax collection, administration, and protection of 
taxpayers' rights in particular. Previously opaque but imperative taxpayers' 
rights are enumerated in a categorized, albeit loosened and irregular, structure 
carding in the laws, which provides for the right to confidentiality, the right to 
give statements and to appeal, and the right to relief and compensation, among 
others. In conjunction with a set of detailed implementing rules (the TCL 
61 
See Xiaoyu Guo, Shuishou Zhengshou Guanlifa Xiuding Gongzuo Yi Quanmian Qidong 
[The Revision and Amendment ofTCL Started] November 20, 2010, Legal Daily ($~a~~. f5t 
~)!:{i£~)!:1fl'l~1~iJI1'FS~TIOJa$J)U~IB B1a 2010 if 11 ,FJ 20 8)( in Chinese) 
62 
The other three pieces of tax legislation is the Agricultural Tax Regulation (abolished in 
2004), The Individual Income Tax Law (revised three times in the 1990s') and the FIE Income 
Tax (replaced by the new FIE Income Tax Law as ofJanuary 1, 2008) 
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Implementation Rules), 63 the Tax Collection Law, for the first time, enriches 
the Chinese tax system by grafting its operation with China's Criminal Law by 
imposing administrative penalties and criminal sanctions of accuracies in the 
hope to rationalize dynamics between taxpayers and the tax laws. 
A cautious reading of the Tax Collection Law and its implementation details 
would reveal Chinese taxpayers' rights designed as the following: 
Rights to confidentiality (TCL Article 5): information subject to 
confidentiality primarily includes legal trade secrets (bank account, 
production/operation and corporate finance) and valid personal data 
(property and marital status) oftaxpayers and withholding agencies; 
Right to choose suitable means of tax return filing upon prior 
approvals (Article 30 of the TCL Implementation Rules); 
Right to apply for extension of tax payment due (TCL Article 31): 
this privilege is usually given if hardships such as bankruptcy or 
financial insolvency cause a tax payment due not to be paid on time. 
In practice, however, enterprise taxpayers mostly would choose a late 
penalty rather than going through a unpredictable process of 
application; 
Right to request refund of overpaid tax (TCL Article 51): the merits 
derived from this right are significant in terms of privileging taxpayers 
to review tax returns done and submitting tax authorities to make a 
63 See generally Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shuishou Zhengshou Guanlifa Shishi Xize 
[The Detailed Rules for The Implementation of the Law of The People's Republic of China To 
Administer The Levying and Collection of Taxes], effective as of October 15, 2002 ( { "P:$A 
~~~oo~~~~w~*~-~~»l 
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way to accept taxpayers' feedbacks. Although tax authorities must 
refund the overpaid tax within a reasonable time, in practice, tax 
authorities usually prefer offsetting the forthcoming tax liability for 
the next year rather than getting a check from state treasury; 
Right to apply for deduction or exemption of tax payment due: the 
application of this right is primarily for encouraging enterprise 
taxpayers with foreign investment to keep after-tax profits in the same 
local tax jurisdiction. 
Right to apply for preservation measures upon tax payment or tax 
enforcement: the implementation details of this right deserve 
consideration because those details are scattered throughout the TCL 
and the TCL Implementation Rules, and also because this right is not 
specifically singled out for taxpayers to initiate. This right mostly 
serves as part of the safe cradle to cure potential mistakes made by tax 
authorities', if any; 
Right to request State compensation (TCL Article 43): this right, back 
in 200 I when firstly initiated, was not novel. It is derived from 
China's State Compensation Law rather than a specific tax right; 
Right to pursue liability for defaults in the tax law enforcement: this 
right is stipulated in the Pursuit of Liability for Law Enforcement 
Defaults in Tax Collection (Trial Implementation). However, 
conscious taxpayers would find a friendlier way to handle filthy 
undertakings of tax officials, if any; 
Right to request a hearing, appeal or make statements: (TCL Article 
8): this right is nothing but an applicable split of the generalized right 
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to appeal in the tax context under China's Administrative Penalty Law 
(Article 6). Taxpayers are not different from other citizens in 
employing this right; 
Right to use the challenge system against some tax enforcement 
personnel: this is another application of generalized procedural rights 
based on the withdrawal system in the tax context; 
Right to use a tax administrative reconsideration or review: this is an 
application of generalized administrative procedural rights in the tax 
context. But the Tax Collection Law stipulates a set of minimum 
requirements for employing this right, such as the thresholds of 
penalty, determination of the respondent tax authority, and specific 
tax-wise procedures; 
Right to initiate administrative proceedings: this right is also an 
application of generalized right to institute administrative proceedings 
in the tax context. Taxpayers are treated the same as regular 
petitioners. 
Right to claim reward for exposing tax evasion or illegal enforcement: 
the value of this policy is dubious although it is supplemented by a set 
of detailed notes in exercising this right. 
As outlined above, taxpayers' rights stipulated in or advocated by the TCL and 
relevant implementation details are less rich in than expected in reality. For 
example, the right to request rewards for reporting tax violation is 
counterproductive to the spirit of impartial administration and is a violation of 
the principle oftransparency in administration. The economic logic underlying 
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this measure is groundless as it takes the advantage of to-be-paid revenue as 
an incentive. The TCL does not clarify the necessary qualifications of a 
reporter, which in tum may arouse confusion or distrust in daily handlings. 
Even assuming such a reward is sustainable, detailed rules on how to classify 
contributions are available, it is unclear whether the reward should be 
determined according to the amount of tax evasion, the social impact of the 
case, the scale of the tax liability, or other criteria. More importantly, tax 
authorities may abuse the information provided by anonymous reporters in 
interfering repartee's business operation with a catch-all "economic crimes" 
statement. The lack of implementing rules in this connection is also not in line 
with the spirit of the deepening transparency as set out in the general 
provisions ofthe TCL. 
Three lessons can be derived the stipulation of taxpayers' rights under TCL. 
First, some rights especially those associated with administrative procedures 
are not particularly tailored for the tax context and are at best derived from 
existing generalized rights available to citizens and reiterated in the tax 
context. Second, a few important rights, even with implementation details, 
need further procedural substantiation, such as the right to confidentiality, the 
right to know, and right to request rewards for reporting tax evasions. Third, 
limitations imposed on implementation of some rights may dishearten tax 
authorities to cooperate rights claims initiated by taxpayers. For example, the 
scheme and procedure to claim refund of overpaid tax usually take recourse of 
offsetting rather than immediate bank transfer. Moreover, the right to claim a 
reward for exposing tax evasion requires identification of the reporter, and this 
practice subjects reporting individuals to revenge by suspected violators. To 
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this end, the Tax Collection Law, although it makes advances in taxpayers' 
rights protection, frustrates the ultimate purpose of giving qualified play of 
taxpayers' rights protections. 
3.3.2. The Proclamations of Taxpayers' Rights and Obligations 
The most recent document on administrative taxpayers' rights is the 
Proclamation on the Rights and Obligations of Taxpayers (hereinafter referred 
to as "the Proclamation") released by the SAT in December 2009, which is 
further decoded by the "Interpretation of Proclamation" published by the SAT 
to celebrate the anniversary of releasing the Proclamation. 64 This move is 
inspiringly informative, and without question this Proclamation mostly serves 
to broaden tax bases and augment revenue collection, marginalizing the 
dynamics between taxpayers and the tax laws as a side effect. It is the first 
time that SAT has purposefully clarified and sorted out the scattered 
provisions concerning the rights and obligations of taxpayers contained in a 
number of different laws. In this sense, The Proclamation hardly can be 
viewed as an expansion or enrichment of meaningful rights, rather, it only 
represents a synopsis of the totality oftaxpayers' rights that already have been 
prescribed in the TCL Implementation Details, the State Compensation Law, 
China's Administrative Procedural Law, and relevant laws and administrative 
regulations in taxation. 
64 See Shuiwu Zongju Fabu Nashuiren Quanli yu Yiwu Gonggao Jiedu [SAT Releosed 
Interpretation of the Proclamation on the Rights and Duties of Taxpayers] ( f_lt§5-,~fflj~$ 
« < M f#. A t~ ;f!J Ej 5!.. 95- 0 i1r > irJ¥ w; » ), http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/20 ll-
Ol/19/content_I788395.htm (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
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3.3.2.1. Taxpayers' rights 
The Proclamation and its official interpretation stipulate that taxpayers are 
entitled to 14 rights in fulfilling tax liabilities (in the order as prescribed): 
Rights to know: taxpayers have right to get informed of available tax 
legislations and regulations that are directly applicable in the tax 
context; 
Rights of confidentiality: confidential information of taxpayers and 
withholding agencies are subject to protection which is limited only to 
legal information or data without interfering with legitimate 
administrative investigation; 
Rights to supervise tax law enforcement: this policy arms taxpayers to 
report or expose illegal or inappropriate tax enforcement behaviors by 
tax officials; 
Right to choose suitable means of tax return filing upon prior 
approvals in accordance with Article 30 of the TCL Implementation 
Rules; 
Right to request extensions in tax return filing; 
Right to request extension for paying tax due; 
Right to request refund of overpaid tax; 
Right to enjoy tax preferential measures: usually those measures refer 
to deductions, exemptions or other special tax treatments; 
Right to engage representation of an agent (CPAs or attorneys) to 
handle tax matters; 
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Right to make statements and plead: this right empowers taxpayers to 
make pleading or explanation in front of tax authorities before any 
formal administrative procedures are taken; 
Right to refuse investigation: If tax investigation certificate or notice 
is not exhibited or presented, taxpayers may refuse to any form of 
investigation of tax related matters such as searches of their enterprise 
books, financial records or bank accounts. 
Right to seek legal remedy: taxpayers are entitled to have accessible 
and available resources to initiate administrative reconsideration, file 
an administrative suit and claim State compensation iftheir legitimate 
rights are infringed or violated. 
Right to request a hearing: in the case where penalties are determined 
by tax authorities, taxpayers may request a hearing on causes, 
decision-making process and amount of penalty after receiving the 
notice of penalty imposition; 
Right to obtain receipt of tax payments made: taxpayers are entitled to 
receive legal proof or receipt of tax payment made for corporate 
booking, evidence for administrative reconsideration or claiming 
credits for withheld taxes. 
A careful comparison between the enumeration of taxpayers' rights stipulated 
in the TCL and the Proclamation reveals a few appealing observations. First, 
the Proclamation mostly summarizes and details stipulated taxpayers' rights 
contained in various provisions relating to tax matters, but does not expand the 
scope of the taxpayers protections. In this sense, the status quo of under-
472 
protected taxpayers' rights remains unaffected systematically. Secondly, the 
Proclamation selectively attenuates or evades discussing a few taxpayers' 
rights prescribed in the TCL, such as the right to challenge administrative 
enforcement. Third, the Proclamation elaborates in detail regarding how to 
realize taxpayers' administrative procedural rights, which is a pleasant sign for 
commentators. However, the timing of the release of the Proclamation in 
December 2009 makes it unclear whether it was promulgated for the sake of 
taxpayers, as a part of the general administrative reform undergone during the 
same period of time, or both. There has been a strong move to upgrade and 
reform the administrative sector since early 2009. 65 Rights available for 
taxpayers such as to challenge tax authorities or to monitor behaviors of tax 
officials, after all, may signal a much stronger message of rectifying internal 
management of tax authority itself but putting it in the name of protecting 
taxpayers. If this speculation is validated, the underlying significance of the 
provisions for taxpayers' protection by the SAT would be highly discounted. 
Fourth, taxpayers' rights prescribed in the Proclamation and the Tax 
Collection Law are still sketchy as compared with the Taxpayers' Manual in 
the U.S. or the taxpayers' protection laws in Europe. Finally, the 
"Interpretation of the Proclamation" contains a number of case analyses to 
introduce the rights available to taxpayers. However, those case illustrations 
appear to create a misunderstanding that taxpayers' rights are confined to 
those illustrated only, and this limitation fails to resolve the shortage of 
implementation guidelines in a systematic manner. 
65 See Zou Keyuan, Administrative Reform and Rule of Law in China, discussing the 
administrative Jaw reform in China after the WTO accession, 
http:/ /rauli.cbs.dk/index. php/ cj as/article/viewDownloadlnterstitial/814/829 (last visited on 
March 15, 2011) 
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3.3.2.2. Taxpayers' obligations 
In line with taxpayers' duty to pay tax due as stipulated in China's 
Constitution, the Proclamation, not surprisingly, stipulates 10 obligations that 
taxpayers have to earnestly fulfill as a condition to enjoy stipulated rights. 
They include (listed in the order they are prescribed): 
obligation of fulfilling registration as a taxpayer: this obligation 
obviously targets enterprise taxpayers that are reluctant to file 
registration in a timely manner; 
obligation of establishing, and safekeeping of account books and 
relevant documents and issuing, employing, acquiring and 
safekeeping invoices: this obligation is quite a challenge to small-
sized enterprises or private enterprises that have less needs to establish 
a fantasized full-bodies corporate accounting practice; 
obligation of adopting financial accounting rules and accounting 
software: this requirement, similarly, lacks general applicability to 
small-sized or private enterprises in terms of operational scale and 
financial capacity; 
Obligation of installing and utilizing tax control devices (software): 
the author submits that this obligation represents a central, and 
surprisingly harsh reason behind the Proclamation. This obligation is 
the center and basis for eliminating tax evasion and enjoying available 
taxpayers' rights; 
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obligation of declaring tax liabilities timely and faithfully; 
obligation of paying taxes in a timely manner; 
Obligation of withholding and collecting tax on an agent basis: this 
obligation invites a mutual monitoring scheme among taxpayers and is 
a direct undertaking by tax authorities to expand their administrative 
jurisdiction. 
obligation of accepting tax investigations; 
Obligation of providing information in a timely manner: this 
obligation looks quite straightforward but embodies a set of problems. 
First, the scope of the information is not defined and this gives tax 
authorities uncontrolled discretion in setting the boundaries of the 
information; Second, the type of information in the "Interpretation of 
Proclamation" provides unclear guidelines for application; Third, the 
wording "in a timely manner" confuses taxpayers; 
Obligations of reporting other tax-related information: a few concerns 
arise with regard to this obligation. First, the scope of tax-related 
information as prescribed is too broad and even includes certain 
confidential information such as trade secrets or individual data that 
are not appropriate to disclose such as merger and acquisition details, 
secured transactions and bankruptcy. In this sense, the balance of 
exercising the right to confidentiality and this obligation is hard to 
achieve. Second, tax authorities' usage of tax-related information is 
not subject to control and monitoring by taxpayers. The management 
of information might be of concerns to taxpayers. Finally, looking at 
the illustration in the "Interpretation of the Proclamation," even if 
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certain tax-related information provided to tax authorities is sensitive 
enough from the point of view of taxation, tax authorities may have 
limited discretion to transfer such information to other non-tax 
authorities. 
As summarized above, significant obligatory requirements for Chinese 
taxpayers and narrowly-interpreted rights are present in the same document, 
but show different rule-making rationales. First, obligations stipulated in the 
Proclamation are calculated and over-expansive. They are likely to hamper the 
compliance of taxpayers, who view them as cost-inefficient burdens rather 
than reasonable duties. Second, taxpayers' obligations mostly were described 
in general terms until the Proclamation detailed them. The effect of stipulating 
those obligations may inhibit the ongoing process of rapprochement between 
Chinese taxpayers and administrators. Third, certain obligations are not 
applicable to all taxpayers, rather, they are derived from particularistic 
administrative deficiencies that are not generalizable throughout China or 
across taxpayer groups. For instance, the behaviors of enterprise taxpayers are 
constrained while less discussion is given to individual taxpayers. Indeed 
many of these measures are procedural and have been articulated elsewhere, 
making their specific adaptation to the tax context here redundant. Finally, 
taxpayers' obligations by themselves are limited to the tax context, therefore, 
how taxpayers may fulfill the obligations is in large part based on tax 
authorities' discretion. If the obligation is concerned with tax officials, the 
value of accepting the obligation is not guaranteed. Taking the obligation to 
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accept investigation as an example, taxpayers may find it difficult to protect 
their rights while submitting to the overbearing requirements of tax officials. 
3.3.2.3. Summary 
The merits ofthe Proclamation cannot be understated. It facilitates taxpayers' 
apprehension of rights in paying tax liabilities, facilitating their capability to 
protect their own interests. It further notifies taxpayers of corresponding 
obligations to comply with relevant tax procedures and payment obligations, 
facilitating and incentivizing full compliance in the system. It also helps to 
standardize tax administration, administrative enforcement, and a service-
oriented culture to enhance the dynamics between taxpayers and the tax laws. 
However, the Proclamation frustrates taxpayers in many respects as well. 
First, the legislative status and enforceability of the Proclamation is a concern. 
It is only an administrative document released by the SAT, not in a regular 
form of regulation, ruling, or notice which has interpretative authority in tax 
administration. In this sense, the Proclamation serves as an explanation or a 
report, and is not enforceable itself. Second, the burden brought by stipulated 
obligations is too overwhelming to taxpayers. Third, the Proclamation 
stipulates many obligations that are associated with operation of tax 
authorities. However, such operational details are not available to taxpayers 
and thus subject to manipulative interpretation by tax authorities. Fourth, the 
Proclamation is drafted with an unbalanced initiative, putting too much focus 
on enterprise taxpayers, substantive details, administration, and less focus on 
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meaningful rules as to individual taxpayers, procedural requirements, 
adjudication, and tax audits. 
3.3.3. Other tax-related laws and regulations 
Secondary taxpayers' rights are also found in many other tax-related laws and 
regulations. In particular, better-prescribed individual rights are offered in the 
Individual Income Tax Law and its implementation regulations. A major 
hotspot oftax reform in China is how to promote supervision of individual tax 
filing and withholding for those taxpayers with higher annual income. Without 
a doubt, the reform of individual taxpayers' rights deserves more attention to 
watch. The Golden Taxation Project guidelines on computerization of 
enterprise tax and indirect tax filing provide detailed rights related to tax audit, 
record keeping and corporate booking. Centrally-owned SOEs usually may 
have privileges in negotiating with tax authorities on specific filing procedures 
and audit routines. It is repeatedly important to mention the undergoing reform 
of administrative law system in which many procedural rights of taxpayers are 
embedded. For instance, the State Compensation Law outlines procedures and 
requirements for claiming tax authorities' liability. The administrative 
reconsideration procedures are also under revision. Meanwhile, various 
notices and rulings have been released on compliance of taxpayer's 
obligations as well. 
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3.4. Summary 
This subchapter explores the classification of rights in the hope to analyze the 
Chinese taxpayers' rights system: primary legal rights, secondary legal rights, 
administrative rights and the principles of good conduct of tax authorities. 
Those rights are offered in a variety of tax-related laws and regulations. 
Paradoxically, taxpayers' rights are expanding simultaneously with the 
expanding economy scale and a larger tax enforcement force. Following the 
positivist rule of recognition, both legislative and administrative rights should 
be available for the protection of taxpayers. 
The discussion of Chinese taxpayers' rights shows the necessity to identify 
each category oftaxpayers' rights with enough details. Chinese tax authorities 
should feel the insufficiency of setting up a hasty comprehensive framework 
of tax without considering taxpayers' rights and obligations. The connection 
between the general administrative law framework and the tax law context 
should be better defined to determine whether an application of specific 
provisions in the tax context is appropriate or not. This comprehensive 
approach should include both legal and administrative rights, looking 
extensively at all factors that may affect taxpayers. 
Taxpayers' rights deal with dynamics between taxpayers and the operation of 
the tax laws. Chinese taxpayers' rights, in this connection, are limited by the 
inherent deficiency of the general tax framework. This is particularly 
evidenced by the discrepancy in the internal management of tax authorities. 
Moreover, because secondary legal rights, administrative rights and the 
principles of good conduct of tax authorities are put altogether in the Tax 
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Collection Law and the Proclamation, the protection of each right is not 
guaranteed with enough singularity and attention, and the divorce among those 
rules should be surfaced. 
IV. Supranational Taxpayers' Rights for the Rule of Law 
construct 
In line with the supranational undertaking for the protection of basic human 
rights, taxpayers' rights have evolved with similar goals and compose part of 
the global convergence of legal rules. Chinese taxpayers' rights protection, in 
the context of the rule of law construct, has striven to incorporate both 
supranational influences and rule of law elements. The scope of the term 
"supranational," for the purposes of this thesis includes: (1) international 
treaties that China has given direct domestic enforceability; and (2) obligations 
the Chinese government has transplanted into its domestic legal system by 
way of legislation and adjudication. The recognition of taxpayers' rights, in 
this sense, embodies basic elements of the rule of law and the WTO principles 
that the Chinese government has striven to uphold. 
4.1. Taxpayers' rights protection from the rule oflaw construct 
Returning to the debate of the contested conception of the rule of law, primary 
legal rights are fundamental to the operation of the legal system in general, 
and can be customized to the tax context in particular. There are three basic 
questions central to the definition of the rule of law and its requirements for 
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China's tax law reform. First, what is a valid rule? Answers to this question 
must consider the principle of legality and basic elements required for the 
validity of a rule. Second, what is a good rule? This question implicates 
notions of morality, and presumes an established social and legal order. How 
should we enforce valid, meaningful, good rules. Answers to this question 
have included notions of democracy and a limited government. Primary 
taxpayers' rights, in this connection, should be interpreted on the basis of the 
makings of valid rules incorporating basic elements; and secondary rights, 
should be set up and built in the legislative and administrative framework to 
employ better implementation of tax laws, both substantive and procedural. 
The validity of rules elaborating taxpayers' rights is measured according to the 
same jurisprudential rationale as rights protection in other areas of the law. 
Dicey elaborated three characteristics of the "the rule or supremacy of law": 
absence of arbitrary power on the part of government; ordinary law 
administered by ordinary tribunals; and general rules of constitutional law 
resulting from the ordinary law of the land. 66 In this connection, Dicey's 
thoughts are germane to the design and making of taxpayers' rights. 
Taxpayer's rights presume the absence of interference from the arbitrary 
power of tax authorities. Taxpayers' rights should fit into the general 
administrative and judicial procedures. Most importantly, primary taxpayers' 
rights implicating the principles of legality are part of the constitutional law. 
Taking Dicey's thoughts further, Lon Fuller's instrumental conception of the 
rule of law advocates an adaptation of details and interpretations for 
taxpayers' rights. To realize the "inner morality of law", taxpayers' rights 
66 
See A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 179-92 (1908) 
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without a doubt demand a relative certainty and uniformity in their 
application, regular and impartial administration, 67 whereby the tax system is 
hopefully regarded as "the product of a sustained purposive effort" fulfilling 
certain moral qualities68• To this extent, the tax legislature and administrative 
authorities may use the institutions of tax laws and the method adopting the 
enforcement of taxpayer' rights as an instrument of tax policy in terms of 
separation or dynamics between the tax laws and taxpayers. For instance, 
Fuller outlined eight elements whereby to measure the rule of law, which 
include "the inner morality" that makes taxpayers rights protection meaningful 
and practical: generality; notice or publicity; prospectivity; clarity; consistency 
or non-contradictoriness; conformability; stability; and congruence. 69 
Failures to adhere to Fuller's elements would render the tax laws incomplete 
thus constrain the protection of taxpayers' rights futile. Translating those 
elements into the tax laws would formulate a better reference to the rules of 
Chinese taxpayers' rights protection. For instance, taxpayers' rights under the 
rule of law order should incorporate the following the rights at minimum. 
Tax must be imposed by law (taxpayer's rights following the principle 
of legality) 
Tax law must be published (taxpayer's right to know) 
Tax law must not be retroactive (the tax consequence of a transaction 
is legally predictable in the Chinese tax laws) 
Taw law must be applicable, fair, certain, understandable, and non-
contradictory (taxpayers' right to know the certainty, transparency, 
67 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 235 (1971) 
68 /d., at 107-09 
69 
See Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U.L. Rev. 781 (1989), at 
785-787 
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clarity and details of the tax laws , and taxpayers are able to obey the 
Chinese tax-related laws and regulations); 
Tax law must be consistent (the change, reform, or upgrade of 
Chinese tax laws and regulations must not undermine prescribed 
taxpayers' rights) 
Taxpayers must not pay more than the correct amount of tax or be 
subject to double taxation (tax laws must be certain and transparent 
based on the principle of proportionality) 
Taxpayers should be treated equally (tax laws must be fair, non-
discriminatory and equitable in treating all types of taxpayers 
irrespective of source of capital, ownership and or wealth of an 
individual) 
Taxpayers should have rights to access of information, privacy, 
secrecy, and confidentiality (tax laws must be fair in promoting 
economic activities) 
Taxpayers should have access to procedural protections and redress 
from judicial tribunals (tax laws should be fair to realize procedural 
rights and justice): 
o An independent tribunal (either administrative or judicial) 
o A fair and public hearing to a tax case and promulgation of tax 
laws; 
o A fair trial 
o Right of representation by a qualified agent, CPA or attorney 
o Receiving judgment in a timely manner 
o Right to appeal and plead 
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o Right to administrative remedies or State Compensation 
Returning to a jurisprudential analysis based on a rule of law order, taxpayers' 
primary and secondary rights should be contained in various provisions with 
procedural protections. Each right, if established, should be supported by 
subsidiary rules, administrative enforcement, and judicial protections. Chinese 
taxpayers, given the guarantee of a rule of law system, should enjoy these 
supports. In this connection, Chinese legislative, judicial and administrative 
authorities should theme taxpayers' rights in a fair, transparent, certain, 
consistent, equitable, effective, and clear protection within the framework of 
the tax laws. 
4.2. Supranational taxpayers' rights 
Taxpayers' rights are not exclusively derived from taxpayer's home 
jurisdiction. Signatory states are obligated to translate rules and principles 
from international treaties including trade treaties and human rights treaties to 
their domestic legal and administrative systems. Meanwhile, taxpayers may 
invoke the rules and precedents from treaties directly in safeguarding their 
interests without bothering with transplanted rules, but to which extent a 
domestic court interprets, accepts, and applies such rules and is an issue of 
whether the treaty is self-executing. For example, the Constitution of the 
United States may possibly incorporate a ratified treaty into its domestic legal 
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system. Some other common law systems may require an enabling process 
either through legislation or case interpretation to complete such ratification70• 
In connection with taxpayers' rights, multilateral trading regimes of which 
China is a member state, in particular, the WTO, should compose a major 
forum to advance the protection of taxpayers. There are three ways in which 
taxpayers may seek to use this pressure. First, they may appeal to the language 
of international human rights treaties, to which China is a signatory country. 
Second, they may look to multilateral or bilateral tax treaties that China has 
contracted. Finally, they might consult international and multilateral trading 
regimes, of which China is a member state, such as the WTO. As there is not 
an international comprehensive framework of tax law or taxpayers' rights 
protections, 71 taxpayers may have to selectively combine these approaches to 
maximize their protection. 
4.2.1. Inference from human rights treaties 
As to taxpayers' rights protection based on human rights treaties or 
conventions, this pursuit is very immature given China's general framework of 
human rights protection. True, the conception of taxpayers' rights attaches to 
and presumes a basic framework of human rights including individual 
property rights. But, China's legal order or political promise has not matured 
to an extent of fully recognizing or accepting universally accepted human 
70 See Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (3'd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1995), at 114 and 223, for example, France and Germany require an enabling legislation if 
treaty provision demands domestic adaption 
71 See generally Ehab Farah, Mandatory Arbitration of International Tax Disputes: A Solution 
in Search of a Problem, 9 Fla. Tax Rev. 703 (2009) 
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rights and values. This awkward situation renders taxpayers' rights without 
legal foundation. From a jurisprudential perspective, taxpayers' rights are 
generally considered separate from the framework of human rights protection, 
because taxpayers' rights demand a fair and consistent procedural protection 
while human rights are compounded with variably changing interpretation and 
acceptance. 
4.2.2. Limited protection from tax treaties 
Bilateral or multilateral tax treaties might in theory have a profound impact on 
the realization of taxpayers' rights, but in practice they focus almost 
exclusively on double taxation avoidance and international cooperation to 
circumvent tax evasion between countries. In this sense, the pragmatic value 
of bilateral or multilateral tax treaties is constrained by their focus and 
legislative intent. Normatively, tax treaties are designed to safeguard state 
interests in maintaining a stable tax base. Although in fact certain benefits are 
stipulated in tax treaties for taxpayers, such protection conforms more to the 
practice of cross-border cooperation but does not substantiate an architecture 
for taxpayers' rights. To a large extent, tax treaties provide a framework for 
tax laws to be fair and effective, not for substantiating too many detailed 
privileges. To this end, bilateral tax treaties or multilateral tax arrangements 
are one-sided mechanisms for managing the international extension of 
taxpayers' rights. 
4.2.3. Impacts from the WTO on taxpayers' protection 
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Returning to the WTO principles, taxpayers of signatory states may be pleased 
by a cautious expansion of rights in trading and transactional activities, which 
compose the mainstream basis of taxpayers' right claims. Given the limited 
impact of international human rights treaties and bilateral tax agreements, 
China's substantial incorporation of principles prerequisite to WTO 
membership, such as transparency, uniformity and impartiality and judicial 
review, has significantly increased the protection oftaxpayers' rights in accord 
with international standards. 
First, the concept of transparency is central to the WTO agreements as well as 
to the construction of the rule of law. The transparency commitment in 
China's Protocol is substantive. The adaption of transparency principles 
encompasses almost all aspects of taxpayers' rights protection. For primary 
taxpayers' rights governing the relationship between taxpayers and the state, 
transparency in general requires that all laws must be published and applied, 
and taxpayers have legitimate access to courts. Taxpayers' rights in this sense 
should be accessible, and be consistently found in primary legal sources as the 
Constitution and charters. Such primary rights should be guaranteed by 
independent and impartial tribunals, available public hearings, fair trials, and 
rights to representation. 
Secondary taxpayers' rights, in conjunction with the principle of transparency, 
are more important in terms of establishing a complete set of substantive rules, 
but they are expressed differently from primary rights. Secondary taxpayers' 
rights should advocate taxpayers' rights with more precision, clarity, and 
enforceability in terms of their promulgation and application. Taxpayers 
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should be able to predict the tax consequence of specific trading and 
transactional activities. To this end, the tax laws should not be imposed 
retroactively. On the other hand, to fulfill the transparency requirement, 
taxpayers are entitled the right to privacy, confidentiality, and secrecy in 
themselves and, at the same time, access to information about laws and 
regulations. 
The transparency principle for taxpayers' rights is evident in efforts to comply 
with the national treatment provisions under the WTO. Specifically tax rules 
should not discriminate, and there should be equality before tax laws. 
According to national treatment provisions, China is required only to provide 
foreign taxpayers "no less favorable" treatment than those offered to domestic 
interests. Foreign enterprises have legitimate grounds to request non-
discriminatory treatment as a taxpayer, and to anticipate in advance the 
consequence in terms of frustrating local protectionism. 
Second, the WTO principle ofuniformity and impartiality in administration is 
particularly decisive to the protection of Chinese taxpayers' rights. China 
agreed in the Protocol to apply and administer all laws, regulations, and other 
measures in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner. Actually, a major 
challenge confronting China's protection of taxpayers centers on enforcement 
of the tax laws, which presumes impartial tax authorities and qualified tax 
officials staff with clear lines of authority and the capacity to submit neutral 
decisions on taxpayers' pursuits. In reality, uniformity in the substance and 
application of the tax laws relies heavily on the commitment and fortitude of 
tax authorities. 
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The concern of uniformity and impartiality in tax administration has plagued 
Chinese tax authorities in many ways. Unprofessional or inappropriate tax 
enforcement tops this list. Taxpayers often are quite frustrated by unexpected 
enforcement or tax audits conducted by tax officials, especially where those 
activities impose harassment or interference with daily operation. Similarly, 
the irregular quality of services provided by tax authorities creates further 
frustration. In coastal or otherwise more developed economic areas, this 
discomfort is not evident. However, in emergent economic regions and 
hinterland areas, requesting legitimate tax services often proves to be an ordeal. 
Taxpayers are therefore disincentivized to deal with tax authorities. Another 
common affliction in Chinese tax administration is corruption, which 
manifests in many ways such as holdup tax collection of closely-related 
taxpayers, delaying in replying individual tax service request, setting up 
barriers in tax filing and soliciting bribes. 
A highlighted problem for the uniformity and impartiality in taxpayer's 
protection centers on administrative procedural compliance. According to the 
TCL and procedural rights prescribed in generally applicable Administrative 
Procedure Law and Administrative Reconsideration Law, taxpayers are 
concerned with how to effectively file an administrative claim within the tax 
framework, which is a prerequisite to file an administrative lawsuit. Although 
current laws offer public hearings, the right to representation, and the rights to 
a timely judgment and pleading, taxpayers are insecure about whether their 
reasonable claims will result in just rewards or simple vengeance from the tax 
authority on the ground that they are troublemakers. Meanwhile, taxpayers are 
required to pay the full amount of tax payment, whether correct or not, before 
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they can file an administrative claim. In this sense, the stake of fulfilling 
administrative rights for Chinese taxpayers is too high, and the limitation on 
discretionary judgment by tax authorities is too low. 
Third, China's Accession Protocol to the WTO mandates the establishment of 
tribunals, contact points, and procedures for the prompt review of all 
administrative actions relating to the implementation of the laws, regulations, 
judicial decisions, and administrative rulings of general application referred to 
in the WTO rules. As the judicial review principle under the WTO applies to 
taxpayers' rights protection, a Chinese court hearing tax cases or taxpayers' 
requests must be independent of Chinese tax authorities and shall not have any 
substantial interest in the outcome of the tax matters. Tribunals hearing 
taxpayers' rights claims may be administrative or judicial, however, the right 
to appeal must be granted if taxpayers originally submit the case for an 
administrative review following due process. 
Tax laws in China formally offer a comprehensive set of measures for 
administrative and judicial review available to taxpayers. Taxpayers, as 
citizens, are able to enforce their legitimate rights in challenging 
administrative decisions, including those made by tax authorities. Chinese 
taxpayers mostly are able to file administrative lawsuits only against 
administrative decisions. Two concerns are worthy of attention in this regard. 
First, there is a concern that tax administrative lawsuits are procedurally 
flawed and subject to more general problems with administrative and judicial 
trials in general, such as administrative reconsideration procedures and 
petitioners' rights in administrative lawsuits. The other problem is specific to 
the tax context where taxpayers are positioned in a particular position: the 
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dilemma of revenue contribution of taxpayers and the limitation on tax 
administrations. 
A reading of the Proclamation reveals that taxpayers are not fully aware the 
means to seek legal remedies or those rights associated therewith. Here, a 
discrepancy between the awareness as a taxpayer and awareness of effective 
taxpayers' right protection involves. This divergence manifests both the 
weakness of legal protections of taxpayers' rights through judicial review and 
a deeper concern about taxpayers' ignorance of their protections in this regard. 
Judicial review of tax administrative decisions in this way may be little more 
than a propaganda mechanism to safeguard the authority of tax administration 
rather than promotion of taxpayers' rights. Regarding China's judicial review, 
The WTO principle of judicial review, in its focus on regularity and the use of 
mechanisms such as precedent requires a movement away from the current 
state of affairs in which administrative and judicial reasoning and decision-
making is inconsistent and poorly reasoned across jurisdictions. 
4.2.4. A proposal from tax administration's perspective 
Returning to the structure of taxpayers' rights, a jurisprudential analysis based 
on requirements of the rule of law order and WTO principles would help this 
thesis to submit a sensible proposal for an improvable awareness of protection 
for Chinese taxpayers. Outlined below is a summary of surveyed taxpayers' 
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rights from local tax administration perspective, m the order of their 
anticipated practical value:72 
Notice: taxpayers should have the right to be informed of a tax 
assessment, a decision on adjudicated payment due. 73 Tax payment 
amount is the foremost concern for Chinese taxpayers, a better 
knowledge of such amount will help taxpayers evaluate which remedy 
they may prefer, or just make the payment as a cost-efficient 
calculation; 
Explanation: Chinese taxpayers in general are rational individuals and 
enterprises with good standings. An assessment, therefore, should be 
substantiated by a reasonable, timely and accommodating explanations 
made by tax authorities or courts. Such explanation is expected to be 
delivered in a friendly way under a professional setting; 
Rational audits: investigation or audits by tax authorities are not 
averted by Chinese taxpayers in general. However, such audits should 
not interfere with ordinary financial order of an enterprise taxpayer, 
and tax officials should not harass taxpayers with unfounded informal 
or random audits that impede operation of taxpayers; 
72 This order is a summary of interviews conducted by the author from 2005 to 2008. The 
author presents this order as a proposal of practical value and an outcome ofhis long-stretched 
attention in Chinese taxpayers' rights. The interviewees are 12 experienced tax collection 
officials working on first-front tax services from 12 local I municipal tax authorities across 
China: Eastern China (Shanghai (2 branches: Puxi and Waigaoqiao), Southern China 
(Shenzhen (2 branches: Luohu and Nanshan)), Guangzhou, and Hangzhou), Northern China 
(Beijing (2 branches: Chaoyang and Haidian) and Ji'nan), Western China (Chengdu), and 
Central China (Zhengzhou (2 branches: Jinshui and EDZ). Interview notes are on file with the 
author for reference 
73 See I.R.C. §633l(d)(3) for a similar but more detailed description applicable to US 
taxpayers 
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Hearing and recording: Chinese taxpayers are entitled to hold a 
hearing in front of tax authorities from which they can present 
evidence or explanation of specific tax behaviors. In this sense, an 
effective interaction between taxpayers and tax officials is appreciated 
before reaching adjudication. Tax authorities should honor a request 
for a hearing in a professional and considerate way. Meanwhile, 
taxpayers should be firmly entitled to receive a record of meeting 
minutes and hearing deposition as the basis for their understanding or 
evidence for any prospective lawsuits; 
Confidentiality: Chinese taxpayers are sensitive about their reputation 
and trading or business secrets. Tax authorities should prioritize 
protection of taxpayers' confidential business information without 
sacrificing a reasonable investigation; 
Discovery: Chinese taxpayers expect to be more active and voluntary 
in seeking and understanding evidence that tax authorities will employ 
in adjudicating their cases. A clear perception of the government's 
substantiation in adjudicating somehow predicts possible attitudes or 
behaviors that taxpayers may initiate- acceptance, aversion, or appeal; 
Appeal: Chinese taxpayers dislike filing appeals, because they want to 
maintain a friendly, professional or mutually beneficial relationship 
with tax authorities and appeal in nature is not cost-efficient. True, a 
comprehensive set of administrative lawsuit procedures are available to 
them in China, but appeal is the last resort that taxpayers want to 
pursue. Taxpayers hope to maintain an orderly operation but dislike 
any appeal that may interfere with their well-being; 
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Counsel: Chinese taxpayers are risk-averse but profit-driven. Even 
they prefer professional counseling or representation from CPAs, 
attorneys, or other qualified agents, as they are not typically in a 
position to recognize and exploit benefits through such representation 
unless they have to. It is an unwritten rule in China that many retired 
tax officials or closely-related friends/relatives of tax officials take 
advantage of such representation. The taxpayer as a rational actor has 
the pressure to save representation charges and litigation costs. 
Fair trials: if cases develop into administrative lawsuits against tax 
authorities, what the taxpayer will want most is a fair trial with a 
timely delivered decision and transparency. Because this is the last 
resort taxpayers may rely on, any discrepancy that hurts taxpayers' 
confidence in China's judicial system is usually magnified. If this 
frustration is set up or spread, at the end of day, the overall local 
economic setting is the most regrettable victim at least. 
Although the taxpayers' rights outlined above are derived from the angle of 
reforms to be implemented by the tax authorities, they are reasonable and 
practical. First, tax authorities believe that these rights are what taxpayers 
want in daily operation, and that taxpayers are more likely to honor their 
responsibility to cooperate in a system that affords them those protections. 
Second, tax authorities, especially those first-front tax officials, believe that 
they can implement those rights in a professional and enforceable way. 
Therefore, the dynamics for a mutually beneficial interaction between 
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taxpayers and tax authorities can be largely achieved through the 
implementation of taxpayers' protections in tax laws. 
To further substantiate the merits of the outlines above, two examples are 
informative. First, the right to applying for relief under the TCL upon tax 
payment preservation measures is open to discussion. It is possible that if tax 
authorities adopt tax payment preservation measure prior to the scheduled tax 
payment period where a taxpayer engaged in production or business operation 
is not involved in an act of tax evasion. Meanwhile, there is no detailed 
implemental guideline on how tax authorities could employ this measure. 
Transparency is severely needed to execute this measure. 
Second, the right to pursue liability for acts committed in the process of law 
enforcement by tax authorities also offers an interesting question. The Pursuit 
of Liability for Law Enforcement Defaults in Tax Collection Procedures (!'rial 
Implementation), promulgated by the SAT provides that taxpayers have the 
right to pursue liability for defaults by tax officers in law enforcement. This 
measure is more than welcome. However, the problem of lacking detailed 
implementing rules arises. In theory this right looks substantial and 
sophisticated, but in practice it is virtually a dead letter as so few details exist 
in law to facilitate and guided its application. As a result, this right is neither 
appreciated by taxpayers nor realistically assists tax officials in remedying 
their wrongful enforcement handlings. 
Beyond proposed rights, the construct of the rule of law order and acceptance 
of the WTO principles direct China's taxpayers' rights protection to 
embracing basic rights consciousness and assimilating international routines. 
The influence, substantively and procedurally, is palpable in terms of China's 
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reforms to promote a service-oriented tax administration and well-grounded 
judicial review establishment. For example, Fuller's instrumental conception 
of the rule of law provides comprehensive theoretical support for designing 
the scope and details of taxpayers' rights. With this theoretical framework in 
mind, Chinese legislative, judicial and administrative authorities should 
establish taxpayers' rights in the form offair, transparent, certain, consistent, 
equitable, effective, and clear protections within the framework of the tax laws. 
Meanwhile, WTO principles attach international force in shaping and 
rectifying the administration and adjudication of Chinese taxpayers' rights. 
Protection measures honoring transparency, uniformity and impartiality and 
judicial review principles embody a full set of details and practical guidelines. 
For example, the uniformity and impartiality in tax administration, if broadly 
realized, would even advance protection of taxpayers' rights. A well 
functioning judicial review mechanism might also root out preventable 
taxpayers' lawsuits. Moreover, since foreign enterprise taxpayers expect to 
receive qualified tax services and non-discriminatory treatment from Chinese 
tax authorities as a baseline, this influence also enjoys far-reaching spill-over 
benefits to domestic enterprise and individual taxpayers. Therefore, a key 
contribution credited to the WTO principles is the growing appreciation of 
taxpayers by tax authorities. Such a respect from administrative organs is not 
common in China and has high realistic value. 
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V. Concluding remarks 
The discussion of this Chapter has two prongs. First, it contributes a review of 
the status quo of China's taxpayer's rights framework. In this connection, 
taxpayers' rights are based on a dynamic interaction between the State, the tax 
system, and taxpayers. Second, it examines China's mechanisms for enforcing 
taxpayers' rights under the rule of law conception and WTO principles and 
proposes reform proposals74 thereafter. 
This Chapter contributes an analysis that the concept and protection of 
taxpayers' rights presumes a generalized enabling framework of human rights. 
At the same time, approaching human rights through the lens of taxpayers' 
rights supports a focus on fairness in social policy orientations, and considers 
efficiency in evaluating social policy by considering the potential obligation 
against taxpayers. Ultimately, human rights protections might be better served 
if a set of taxpayers' rights tended to uphold a professional institutional order 
that balances state interests and taxpayers' necessities. In this connection, the 
situation of China's taxpayers is awkward: the human rights framework is not 
fully incorporated in China's legal system, and the tax law system itself is in 
the nascent stages of its development. 
Furthermore, China has a legitimate need to develop a set of rules for 
establishing and protecting taxpayers' rights, the awareness of which 
facilitates economic, behavioral, and social policy implementation. An 
examination of the primary and secondary taxpayers' rights in China reveals 
that almost all deficiencies and drawbacks of human rights protection and the 
74 See supra Section 4.2.4. of this chapter 
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tax laws system fall under the taxpayers' rights category. This discovery is not 
surprising. The constitutional fortification of primary taxpayers' rights is weak 
due to an absence of the term "taxpayers' rights," but also, and to a much 
greater extent because of a discontentedly misunderstanding of how to situate 
taxpayers to claim or articulate their primary legal rights. Secondary 
taxpayers' rights are supposed to be enriched with enough clear-cut rules in 
detailing taxpayers' administrative and legislative rights, while China's 
current framework fails contributing those details, rather, somehow it 
misidentifies the roles played by administrative primary rights and secondary 
legal rights. The result is that an amalgamation of laws, rulings, and notices is 
displayed out-of-order, and there lacks a systematic certainty of the intended 
system for the protection of taxpayer's rights. Although the TCL, the 
Proclamation, and other relevant administrative procedural laws facilitate, to 
some extent, in clarifying and expanding rights available to taxpayers at the 
first glance, those stipulated rights remain short of jurisprudential significance 
and practical value, showing the necessity to identify each category of 
taxpayers' rights with enough details. 
Being mindful of deficiency in taxpayers' rights protection in China, it is 
excessive to understate or neglect the progress and merits as to rights 
protection regime in China's tax context. Overall, China's tax system still 
provides a formulated, yet promising, framework to channel available legal 
remedies, both administrative and judicial, for taxpayers. From the TCL and 
the Proclamation, continuous efforts and attention are paid by China's tax 
authorities to advancing taxpayers' awareness and recognition of their rights. 
In particular, the administrative lawsuits filed by taxpayers attain more 
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respects and identification, although such awareness is discounted by the 
"non-contentious" or "settlement-preferred" culture in China. This chapter 
also acknowledges the frustration due to the paucity of resources in 
modulating related research, since many questions of this topic left 
unaddressed in full extent or some questions are just not answerable given 
current development stage of the tax legislation reform. 
Meanwhile, the protection of taxpayers' rights is a key element substantiating 
China's construct of the rule of law order and fulfillment of WTO principles. 
Chinese taxpayers' rights should be written and applied in a fair, transparent, 
certain, consistent, equitable, effective, and clear manner within the 
framework of the tax laws. Meanwhile, the WTO principles inject 
international market standards and vitality into the process of designing and 
implementing Chinese taxpayers' rights in terms of administration and 
adjudication. China's tax laws should embody and honor the transparency, 
uniformity and impartiality and judicial review principles that are at the heart 
of their WTO commitments. 
Last but not least, having examined deficiencies, based on the positivist view 
in jurisprudence for taxpayers per se, the construct of the rule of law order and 
the WTO principles, this thesis submits a summary proposal for improving 
China's taxpayers' rights protection. This proposal should attempts to balance 
theoretical goals and practical significance, and largely is underpinned by 
considerations from both tax authorities' and taxpayers' perspectives. In this 
sense, it is not a reordering or rearrangement of existing prescribed rights, 
rather, it is submitted as reflective of and applicable to daily practice. 
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Chapter VIII 
Tax Treatments of Nonprofit Organizations -A Comparative Study 
I. Introduction 
This chapter contributes a comparative study of the tax treatments for the 
nonprofit sector in the U.S. and China for three reasons. First, the development 
of China's nonprofit sector1 has been tremendous in the past two decades, but 
few comprehensive studies have been initiated on reforming China's nonprofit 
tax system - the crucial component that binds nonprofit sector as a partner of 
the state. Echoing China's success in economic growth in the past decades, 
literature on Chinese tax typically focuses on tax incentives for foreign direct 
investment and tax policies catering to economic development. Second, 
collaterally, the rule of law development in the past decade has motivated new 
scholarship regarding the modernizing of China's charity sector with an "all-in" 
charity code 2 or cultivating expansive grassroots NGOs. These idealistic 
1 See generally, Evelyn Brody, Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector", 41 Viii. L. 
Rev. 433-440 (1996), discussing that the third sector often uses the terms "charity" and 
"nonprofit" interchangeably; see also generally D.B. Reobertson Should Churches be Taxes? 
40-68 and Chapters II, Ill and IV(1968). The same problem exists in the limited research as to 
the definition or literal description of"cishan" or "gongyi", i.e., "charity" in China 
2 See generally "China's Draft Charity Law is in shape" 
http://www.chinacom.cn/news/gongyi/20 1 0-08/02/content_ 20620246 _ 2.htm (last visited on 
March 15, 2011) 
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studies, however, suffer from a lack of focus on the tax treatment for the 
nonprofit sector and a consequently unrealistic understanding of the legal and 
political settings in which Chinese NGOs operate. Third, this analysis has 
commercial implications. China's integration into the WTO and the global 
trade system has been met with complaints about national treatment and fair 
competition from both foreign and domestic enterprises. A key issue arising is 
the gradual downplaying and elimination of preferential tax treatment of 
foreign investment in China.3 However, there is no materially meaningful tax 
law regarding the nascent NGO sector. No thought has been given to the 
economic and fiscal potential ofNGOs as foreign investment vehicles. Aiming 
to address concerns above through a comparative study,4 this chapter proceeds 
cautiously along two distinct tracks. 
3 See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis 
of the Welfare State, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1573 (2000), presenting the relationship between tax 
incentives and revenue; Professor A vi-Yonah examines the increased use of tax incentives as 
weapons in the international competition to attract investment. Professor Avi-Yonah argues 
that the establishment of tax havens allows large amounts of capital to go untaxed, depriving 
both developed and developing countries of revenue and forcing them to rely on forms of 
taxation less progressive than the income tax. Professor A vi-Yonah contends that both 
economic efficiency and equity among individuals and among nations support limits on 
international tax competition, and he presents a proposal that accommodates the competing 
concern for democratic states' ability to set their tax rates independently. He proposes the 
coordinated imposition of withholding taxes on international portfolio investment, with the 
goal of ensuring that all income may be taxed in the investor's home jurisdiction. Professor 
Avi-Yonah also proposes that multinational corporations be taxed initially in the jurisdictions 
where their goods and services are consumed. Professor A vi-Yonah outlines that, both 
developed and developing nations would be able to preserve the progressivity of the income 
tax and to broaden and stabilize their tax bases in time to stave off the fiscal threat to the 
welfare state 
4 The literature on comparative tax and federalism is voluminous. See Reuven Avi-Yonah, 
Preface to Comparative Fiscal Federalism: Comparing the European Court of Justice and the 
US Supreme Court's Tax Jurisprudence, by R.S. Avi-Yonah, J. R. Hines Jr. and M. Lang, co-
editors, xvii-xviii. EUCOT AX Series on European Taxation, 14. Alphen aan den Rijn (The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2007); Michael A. Livingston, From Milan to 
Mumbai, Changing in Tel Aviv: Reflections on Progressive Taxation and "Progressive·· 
Politics in a Globalized but Still Local World, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 555 (2006), Professor 
Livingston is one of the topmost contributors of the comparative tax literature and has 
conducted extensive research; see also Victor Thuronyi, Comparative Tax Law, (Kluwer Law 
International (2004)) for a detailed account of comparative tax methodologies and comparison 
oftax systems of over 20 countries 
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First, modern tax studies are debated predominantly in Western terms such as 
progressivity, equity and efficiency, but the scarcity of decent comparative 
legal tax scholarship fails to generate a "lively debate on comparative tax 
works and their methodologies," 5 in general. Meanwhile, "a shortage of 
paradigmatic discourse in comparative tax invites the simultaneous existence 
of bluntly conflicting arguments, taking parallel courses, yet never engaging 
each other." 6 Although some frameworks of comparative tax studies have 
been proposed, 7 there are more theoretical than practical. 8 One pragmatic 
concern with these frameworks is that only very limited areas of tax are 
forcefully analyzable by tax comparativists. This embarrassment is 
particularly challenging to scholars in the Chinese tax context who want to 
exploit the "tax transplant" methodology. 9 In this connection, this thesis 
contributes that a comparative tax study relating to China might be better 
achieved by focusing on a "tax law sub-discipline" rather than on a specific 
tax concept. One reason is that a tax concept, usually a transplanted 
vocabulary of western origin, is too narrow to substantiate a patulous, 
meaningful, productive comparative analysis. The other reason is that specific 
tax provisions are contingent on their contexts and not easily extrapolated to 
5 See Carlo Garbarino, An Evolutionary Approach to Comparative Taxation: Methods, and 
Agenda for Research, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 677, 684 (2009) ("[t]here are three aspects related 
to the peculiar nature of taxation that make comparative research particularly difficult: rapid 
legislative change; the complexity of tax systems; and the heterogeneity of local tax 
concepts"); see also, Omri Y. Marian, The Discursive Failure in Comparative Tax Law, 58 
AM. J. COMP. L., http:// ssrn.com/abstract=1404323, at 1 (arguing that there have been 
several efforts at defining a theoretical framework for comparative taxation, but these efforts 
have been "largely ignored by everybody except their own authors" leading to an ongoing 
"non-discourse" that characterizes the field) (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
6 !d., Omri at 1 
7 /d. 
8 /d. 
9 See Jinyan Li, Tax Transplants and Local Culture: A Comparative Study of the Chinese and 
Canadian GAAR, Theoretical Inquiries in Law: Vol. 11: No. 2, Article 8. (2010) arguing the 
issues arising as to comparing a westernized conceptions, 
http://www.bepress.com/til!default/voll1/iss2/art8 (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
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others. For example, an international tax concept at the maximum can only 
throw in scrappy value to other major tax areas such as turnover tax or income 
tax. 10 
Second, the specific cultural, social, political, and legal roots and contexts of a 
tax governance framework usually are much less discussed or are even 
purposefully ignored by tax comparativists. This "snooping" methodology 
unavoidably provokes abundant "contemptuousness" and skeptics from 
orthodox tax scholarship against tax comparative studies. A tax study 
ultimately has to pay attention to the general cultural, social, political and legal 
contexts in which a tax system is embedded. Otherwise, a comparative study 
may easily turn into descriptive, mechanical and perfunctory analysis. The 
practical and scholastic significance of comparative tax studies can hardly be 
achieved by a limited comparison of the technical elements of a tax concept 
and no more. The "big-picture" perspective nonetheless must be employed to 
conduct a comparative study as to the Chinese tax context. The same rationale 
applies to studies of the impact of both the rule of law development and 
China's assimilation to the WTO system, as well. Therefore, this thesis also 
focuses on the role of philanthropic culture in its comparison between the U.S. 
and Chinese tax systems. 
The development of China's nonprofit sector11 has been marvelous, especially 
after recent natural disasters, 12 the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, and various 
10 /d. 
11 See Brody supra 1 at 436-37, discussing that the third sector often uses the terms "charity" 
and "nonprofit" interchangeably. See also generally D.B. Reobertson supra 1 
12 See China Daily, August 18, 2010, listing recent natural disasters that involving high 
casualty and economic loss including the 2010 South China floods & Yushu Earthquake, 
Sichuan Earthquake in May 2008, the southern China snowstorm crisis in early 2008, etc. 
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latest celebrities' donation scandals13. Regulatory deficiency in the treatment 
of nonprofit organizations has alarmed China's failure to maintain its rich 
tradition of state-centered social provision and the exacerbation of economic 
disparities between rural and urban citizens. Surges of grassroots NGO 
activity, millions of affectionate "netizens" during the natural disasters, and 
faithful volunteers for the Olympic and Paralympics Games also resonate the 
malfunctioned administration and messed allocation of charitable resources. 
Meanwhile, the Chinese government has seriously identified the indispensable 
role played by the nonprofit sector in alleviating the bureaucracy, downsizing 
government, stimulating wealth mobility, reducing regional inequality, and, 
ultimately, promoting a harmonious society. 
The current Chinese legal framework fails to establish an enabling and 
operative nonprofit sector. Mostly, the state fails to regulate it through a potent 
tax system, creating various tax preferences and ensuring no abuse of those 
preferences occurs. Even it had been suggested that a comprehensive charity 
law should be enacted, the existing charity tax laws and regulations sojourn 
discordant, anachronistic and inoperative. Worse is that certain bureaucratic 
management and unprofessional administration have jeopardized the 
incentives and confidence on reforming the nonprofit sector. 
The United States system on tax treatment of nonprofit organizations has been 
a well established and sought-after model for decades. It is regarded as 
particularly appropriate for emerging NGO sections in worldwide. This thesis 
proffers special emphasis on China's tax reform for the charity sector which 
has expanded as a result of remarkable economic growth and legal system 
13 See "Zhang Ziyi began to address quick scandal" 
http://www .hollywoodreporter.com/hr/content_ display /world/news/e3 i4 fe3 d6 7 e44c8b3 addc7 a 
3a9589c41c58 (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
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reform. Although there is no single pattern fitting in various global needs, the 
U.S. model provides quite established principles of federalism, fiscal 
incentives and economic adaptability which make it a powerful system. This 
thesis compares current nonprofit tax rules in China and U.S. in practice, and 
highlights suggestions that may benefit charity tax law reform in China. 
Following this introduction, subchapter II presents a brief overview of China's 
current charity laws and regulations, the historical development of charity tax 
laws and those in practice, especially on charitable tax exemptions. Subchapter 
III outlines a number of institutional and theoretical backgrounds of the 
current U.S. charity tax exemption systems. Subchapter IV highlights the 
institutional and practical similarities and differences between the China and 
U.S. systems. Subchapter V concludes with major findings by commenting on 
potential nonprofit tax law reform in China. 
II. Overview and Background of Nonprofit Laws in China 
2.1 Historical Development 
China runs according to a complex party-state system in a struggle within 
itself to find its way to modernize the nonprofit sector. In 1950, China adopted 
its first 1aw14 to manage societal organizations; however, pre-reform (pre-1978) 
social organizations were government operated non-governmental 
organizations ("GONGOs") and are not "true" NGOs based on the western 
14 See Shehui Zuzhi Zhuce Zanxing Tiaoli [The Provisional Rules on Social Organization 
Management], the first law governing social organizations "Provisional Procedures on the 
Registration of Social Organizations", and it remained e±Tective until 1989 
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definition. Those GONGOs 15 were established and absorbed into the party-
state system as part of government branches. Leaders of those organizations 
are either current or retired senior government officials and their staffs enjoy 
the same benefits and privileges of government officials. Apparently, 
GONGOs are exempt from registration and administration requirements which 
are required of China's NGOs. 
The 1980s' saw the development of a plethora of various forms of NGOs 
surging from economic reform and the "open-up policy." In response to 
liberalization in economic development and the state-owned enterprises 
("SOE") modernization reforms, the state realized its shortage of capacity and 
resources to provide all necessary social services to function a rapidly 
reforming society. In the 1990's, the central government proposed a "small 
government, big society" policy, transferring part of service responsibilities 
that had come from the government to private or nonprofit sectors. Following 
the party-state tradition, private and nonprofit sectors have been consistently 
been treated as auxiliary and subordinate agents of the state in bridging the 
gap between state and the people, especially in areas like poverty relief, 
elementary education support, aging population welfare and environment 
protection. Although the first authentic civil society organizations debuted in 
somewhat embarrassed way in the early 1980s, they have since shown 
remarkable potential to outshine the government as a major platform of raising 
critique and promoting social welfare and justice. However, in sensitive areas 
like human rights, political reform, religion and freedom of speech, the 
government territorially maintained an iron grip in controlling related 
15 Mostly, those organizations are semi-government entities, such as "'the Chinese Communist 
Youth League", "the China Writers' Association", "the All-China Workers' Union", and "the 
All-China Women's Federation" 
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activities and did not allow private sector or nonprofit sector to step into this 
realm. 
In the second half the 1980s, the government was confronted with a clear and 
sweeping demonstration of democratic movements coupled with a 
rudimentary and obsolete system ofNGO management. In particular, the year 
of 1989 witnessed a speedy promulgation of the new Regulation on 
Registration and Management of Social Organization. Not surprisingly, 
tightened measures, such as dual management system, approval and 
management of supervisory unit and membership requirements, all have been 
established since 1989, and the scale of the NGO sector has risen and fallen 
according to rounds of re-registration hurdles. 
Notwithstanding the fluctuating16 numbers of registered NGOs, legislation has 
been unexpectedly friendly to the nonprofit sector in general. Coupled with the 
establishment of specific government branch to manage societal 
organizations, 17 the Article 3 5 of the 1982 Constitution recognizes the right to 
freedom of association, and the General Principles of Civil Law ("GPCL") 
categorized social organizations together with government organs and public 
institutions that are different from commercial enterprises. This tolerance 
continued for over 15 years and led to the 1998 promulgation of two important 
pieces of legislation, most importantly the 2004 Foundation Regulation, which 
even permits entry of foreign foundations. 18 However, quantification of 
16 See MA, Qiusha, The Governance ofNGOs in China since 1978: How Much Autonomy? 31 
Nonprofit & Volumtary Sector Q. 305-306 (2002); see also Qu Di Fei Fa Min Jian Zu Zhi 
Zan Xing Ban Fa [Provisional Rules Banning Illegal NGOs] (promulgated by the Ministry of 
Civil Affairs, effective as of April 10, 2010), targeting mostly at Falungong and other qigong 
movements 
17 For details of the nonprofit organizations management and government apparatus, 
http://cszh.mca.gov.cn/ (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
18 see infra Subchapter III 
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growth of the nonprofit sector in China has been always difficult. A majority 
of NGOs remain unregistered, or registered as for-profit entities' to evade 
arduous administrative proceedings, and many even dissolve before any 
formal registration procedure is taken. 
2.2. Summary of Current Laws and Regulations 
In China, NGOs 19 are classified into three major categories: social 
organizations (SOs or shehui tuanti), private non-enterprise units (PNEUs or 
minban feiqiye danwei), and foundations (jijinhui), according to three 
important NGO legislations: the Regulations on Registration and Management 
of Social Organizations (hereinafter "SO Regulation" or "Shehui Tuanti 
Dengji Guanli Tiaoli"); the Provisional Regulations on Registration and 
Management of Private Non-Enterprise Units (hereinafter "PNEU Regulation" 
or "Minban Feiqiye Dengji Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli"); and the Regulation for 
the Management of Foundation (hereinafter "Foundation Regulation", or 
Jijinhui Guanli Tiaoli). In particular, Chinese citizens may incorporate, 
manage, and participate in SOs and PNEUs, while a foreign citizen can only 
act as the legal representatives of a foundation. 20 
19 See Ma supra 16, the term civil society organizations ("CSOs") is Minjian ( ~fi3]) or 
popular organizations. It is also interchangeably be referred as NGOs. See Na La, Zhongguo 
Caogen NGO de Wenze Xianzhuang yu Wenti, [Analysis and Problems on the Development 
of Grassroots NGOs in China] [hereinafter "Na La"] !z)J~tf:: « 9=t 001iLm NGO 1¥1 !'OJ ~l)ll;jA 
l=i ii'iJ n2! » , discussing the literal meanings of NGO, CSO, NPO, SO and Foundation (in 
Chinese), http://www.nporuc.org/html/achievements/20090907 /167.html (last visited on 
March 15, 2011) 
20 
See Art. 24, Regulations on Management of Foundations [Ji Jin Hui Guan Li Tiao Li] 
(promulgated by the State Council, March 8 2004, effective June I, 2004) [hereinafter "the 
2004 Foundation Regulation''], 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2004-03/18/content_l372870.htm (last visited on March 
15, 2011) 
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The Bureau of Administration ofNGOs (Minjian Zuzhi Guanliju) within the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs ("MCA") (previously the Department of Social 
Organizations or "Shetuan Si") is the primary official agency in charge of 
nonprofit organization and is responsible for the registration and filings, 
detailing implementation rulings and interpretation of laws and regulations in 
the nonprofit sector. Likewise, other government agencies join in regulating 
NGOs in certain areas. Under appropriate delegation of authority, the SAT and 
the MOF issues regulations and rulings on the tax-deductibility of donations, 
tax exemptions or preferences, and internal governance; 21 the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) coordinates non-public 
fund-raising foundations and certain for-profit activities conducted by NGOs; 
and the Ministry of Public Security may police NGOs for certain criminal 
disobedience. 22 In addition, local MCA and other administrative branches 
promulgate various region- or industry-specific rules and regulations to 
manage NGOs23 . 
2.2.1. Social Organizations 
2.2.l.l.Dual management requirement 
21 See Art. 29, Regulations on Registration and Management of Social Organizations [She Hui 
Tuan Ti Deng Ji Guang Li Tiao Li] (promulgated by the State Council, October 25, 1998, 
effective September 25, 1998) [hereinafter "SO Regulation''], 
http://www.cnca.gov.cn/rjwbgs/ztxx/ldgzhbzJ4570 _ 4.shtml (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
22 !d., Art. 35 
23 Beijing is considered to be the most conservative in NGO registration and management due 
to its political sensitivity, while other provinces such as Yunnan and Guangdong take a 
relatively more liberal approach toward NGO management 
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The SO and PNEU Regulations and the Foundation Regulations all require a 
dual management structure. Each type of organization, before it files 
registration at the national or local level office of MCA, must first seek a 
professional supervisory unit ("Yewu Zhuguan Danwd') to review ("Shen 
Cha") and approve ("pi zhun ") such registration, and then monitor NGO's 
operation, governance and finances etc after its establishment.24 Although any 
government agency at the national, provincial, or city level, or any certified 
GONG0,25 can act as an NGO sponsor, NGOs, especially grassroots NGOs, 
do not have much luxury to select appropriate supervisory sponsors. 26 In 
reality, many SOs remain unregistered or even underground barely because 
the potential supervisory units deny such sponsorship or the NGO's proposed 
major purposes and activities do not fall within sponsor's scope of duties,27 
and any operative unregistered SOs risk criminal liability. 28 Therefore, 
24 See Arts. 6-9, 27-28, Provisional Regulations on Registration and Management of Private 
Non-Enterprise Units [Min Ban Fei Qi Ye Dan Wei Deng Ji Guan Li Zan Xing Tiao Li] 
(promulgated by the State Council and effective as of September 25, 1998) [hereinafter 
"PNEU Regulation"], 
http://www.ha.xinhuanet.com/fuwu/kejiao/2004-03/29/content_l869912.htm (last visited on 
March 15, 2011) 
25 See Art. 6 SO Regulation 
26 See generally Na La, supra 19; see also, He and Ashley Opening One Eye and Closing the 
Other: The Legal and Regulatory Environment for "Grassroots" NGOs in China, 26 B.U. 
Int'l J. 29 (2008) [hereinafter "He and Ashley"]. In practice, the dual management 
requirement has proved to be the most difficult hurdle for grassroots NGOs to surmount in 
gaining legal status. In order to secure the support of a government supervisory agency, the 
founders of an NGO must cultivate personal relationships with government officials to 
develop trust and connections. From a government agency's perspective, acting as a sponsor 
to a grassroots NGO creates many new duties, responsibilities, and political risks, but reaps 
few benefits. The extreme difficulty of finding a government sponsor is widely considered to 
be the major reason why over 90% ofNGOs in China are either underground and unregistered 
or registered as commercial enterprises 
27 See Art. 6 SO Regulation Art. 6 
28 See Art. 35 SO Regulation, stipulating that an unregistered NGO operating in the name of 
an SO could be subject not only to civil, but also to criminal liability. According to Article 54 
of the Law on Public Security Administrative Punishments, a person convicted under this 
provision could be subject to up to 15 days in prison and a fine of up to 1,000 RMB. Given 
that many NGOs across China are not officially registered, this provision could be viewed as 
an axe always hanging over their heads 
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granting approval by supervisory units is utterly discretionary, 29 and there is 
no standard filing paperwork requirement on obtaining sponsorship by an 
S0/0 and therefore potential government supervisory sponsors may ostensibly 
stretch the approval process31 or demand unnecessary paperwork maliciously. 
The dual management requirement creates several layers of problems 
reflective of historical fears of uncontrolled social movements. First, it does 
not offer Chinese citizens reasonably accessible venues to the constitutionally 
protected freedom of association to form all kinds of associations. 32 The nature 
of the supervisory units usually dominates the scope of the activities to be 
conducted by the application organizations. Although scholars feel powerless 
to advocate for this precious right, the complaint of the lack of right to 
association has been, somewhat controversially, published in various 
periodicals of academic pursuit. 33 Second, the dual management structure 
inhibits the dynamic development of responsive associations for emergency 
situations. 34 This drawback was particularly evident during the time of 
emergent natural disasters. Many volunteers had to establish ad hoc NGOs to 
conduct relief activities and they were not even able to find supervisory units 
within a tight timeframe. Third, it prohibits NGOs from engaging in activities 
29 See generally Ge Yunsong, On the Establishment of Social Organization under Chinese 
Law, 2 Int'l J. ofNot-for-Profit L. (2000), 
http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol2iss3/art_2.htm (last visited on March 15, 2011); see 
also generally, He and Ashley supra 26, discussing a case study of establishment of an eye 
care center 
30 See generally, !d., Ge 
31 /d. 
32 See Karla Simon Regulation of Civil Society in China, 32 Fordham Int'l L. J. 964. Professor 
Karla Simon is a major contributor in the field of non-for-profit organization studies. 
[hereinafter "Simon"] 




across multiple sectors35 . Usually, a supervisory unit is risk averse and thus 
prefers approving NGO sponsorship within its scope of assigned 
responsibilities and very reluctantly oversees NGOs that carry out unfamiliar 
activities, for example, a healthcare supervisory unit usually would refuse 
supervising NGOs in the education area. Therefore, NGOs have to be 
singularly focused and are not flexible to receive donations from diversified 
sources. Fourth, government agencies may set up an SO as a vehicle during 
government reshuffles to retain their redundant staffs or retirees. 36 Fifth, 
government agencies also often set up GONGOs to raise external sources of 
funding37 and to disqualify private applicant organizations. 
2.2.1.2. Constraints on repeated and cross-regional subsidiaries 
A derivative of the dual management requirement is the "non-repetition" 
constraint. In particular, the supervisory unit or MCA may deny the 
registration of an NGO if "in the same administrative area there is already a 
social organization active in the same or similar area of work. "38 The non-
repetition provision stipulates that in a particular area of activity, such as 
elementary education, only one SO in service is allowed to operate in a given 
geographical region (city, provincial, or national)39 although the definition of 
35 See generally Na La supra 19 
36 !d. 
37 See e.g. Simon supra 32 and He and Ashley supra 26 
38 See generally Ge, supra 29, citing The Interpretation of the Regulation on the Registration 
and management of Social Organization and the Interim Regulations on the Regulation and 
Management of Private Non-enterprise Units 36 (The Dep't of Politics and Law of the State 
Council & The Bureau of Admin. of Non-governmental Orgs. of the Ministry of Ciil Affairs 
eds., 1999) 
39 See He & Ashley, supra 26, at 44-45, noting an example that, if there is already a national 
AIDS NGO, a similar organization could register only at the provincial or city level. This 
limitation reflects the Party's corporatist view of the state-society relationship, considering 
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"area of activity" is quite discretionary. It is well argued that the non-
repetition requirement has the merit of avoiding too many organizations 
"developing without planning," and possibly potential "malicious competition" 
among nonprofit organizations.40 
A further ramification of the non-repetition constraint is that an SO has to be 
real name identification member-based and therefore often subjects its 
members to political surveillance.41 In addition, the SO Regulations prohibit 
cross-regional branching.42 For instance, the administrative hierarchy of the 
supervisory unit delineates the geographical application within which an SO 
can operate. If an SO wishes to reach out its registered geographic region and 
branch a subsidiary or representative office elsewhere, it has to obtain an 
approval in advance from its own supervisory sponsor and even the 
permission of local MCA in the desired subsidiary location which oversees 
similar areas of activities. 43 Literally, national SOs cannot establish branches 
in different provinces although they are merely permitted to conduct activities 
across the country. 44 Moreover, SO subsidiaries cannot set up second-tier 
subsidiaries and an SO legal representative (fa ding dai biao ren) must not at 
the same time act as a legal representative for another S0.45 
SOs' purpose to be to serve as a bridge between the state and society by representing the 
interests of various constituent groups--for example, those with AIDS or, more traditionally, 
women or the disabled--at a given administrative level 
40 See generally Ge supra 29 
41 See generally SO Regulation supra 21 
42 Id. 
43 For instance, a city-level SO can branch within the city, but cannot conduct activities 
outside of its registered city. If an SO wishes to conduct activities in multiple cities of the 
same province, it has to seek a provincial-level government sponsor and register at that level. 
And if an NGO wants to conduct activities in cities outside its home province, to apply the 
language of the regulation literally, the NGO would have to seek a ministerial-level sponsor 
and register a national NGO to legally carry out its mission 
44 See Arts. 12 and 13, SO Regulation supra 21 
45 !d. Arts.14 and 19 
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The non-repetition constraints coupled with branching prohibitions prevent 
locally-registered NGOs to conduct activities across China, and suppress 
networking and resource sharing among SOs. Moreover, an SO must not 
endanger or conflict with the interests and safety of the state and the unity of 
all ethnicities, and must not violate the state interests, public interests, or 
public morals. 46 Those constraints again reinforce the deeply rooted fear 
against mass political movements that may threaten the party-state.47 
2.2.1.3. Exempted Organizations 
Some organizations are exempted from the registration requirement according 
to Article 3 of the 1998 SO Regulation. These organizations include those that 
participate in political consultative meetings, such as the Chinese Communist 
Party-sanctioned eight political parties and nine other associations including 
the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, the Communist Youth 
League, and the All-China Women's Federation. Other exempted 
organizations include 14 well-known GONGOs, such as the China Writers' 
Association, the Song Qingling Foundation, and the Red Cross Society of 
China,48 just to name a few. These GONGOs are usually considered to have 
the same status as administrative branches and are often viewed as part of the 
government bureaucracy. 
46 !d. Art. 4 
47 See Na La, supra 19, Chapters III and IV, discussing that the highly restrictive provisions 
against pluralism, branching, and networking are based on government concerns over an SO 
becoming a rival power and thus threatening the reign of the Chinese Communist Party. For 
instance, national-level NGOs are presumably not able to register at all and usually the most 
closely monitored and controlled by the central government 
48 a complete list of these exempted GONGOs is http://www.mca.gov.cn (last visited on 
March 15, 2011) 
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What is more interesting is the third clause of Article 3, which states that any 
organization that is set up by a government entity or a GONGO and that 
conducts its activities within such entity is exempted from registration. In 
practice, many NGOs exploit this provision and struggle to gain semi-legal 
status by attaching themselves to a governmental or semi-governmental entity 
that holds more liberal attitudes toward NGOs. Higher educational institutions 
are a common example of such liberal entities that shelter and sponsor 
grassroots NGOs 49 and nonprofit organizations of a research and academic 
nature. 
The legal status of a GONGO is a precious resource. Some GONGOs find it in 
their financial interest to offer shelter to grassroots NGOs in exchange for 
membership fees and management dues. The sheltered NGOs are thus 
exempted from registration. Sometimes, GONGOs may even formally sponsor 
NGOs with a second-tier SO status by acting as their supervisory units and 
allowing them to register with the MCA or its local bureau. A nonprofit 
organization may take advantage of such an affiliation with and supervision 
under GONGOs and gain legitimacy and important governmental connections, 
though often at a high financial stake. For example, one GONGO under the 
MCA sponsors a nonprofit organization and charges them annual membership 
fees as high as RMB 200,000 (U.S.$ 25,900).50 
49 See e.g. Jude Howell, New Directions in Civil Society: Organizing Around Marginalized 
Interests, In Governance in China, 143, 155-65 (Jude Howell ed., 2004) 
50 See He and Ashley, supra 26 at 46 
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2.2.2. Private Non-Enterprise Unit 
The Private Non-Enterprise Unit (PNEU) form, first created by the 1998 
Provisional Regulations on Registration and Management of Private Non-
Enterprise Units (PNEU Regulation), is a special NGO category in the 
Chinese context. By definition, a PNEU is a privately-run noncommercial unit, 
and its main purpose is to provide social services,51 mainly in the fields of 
education, public health, technology, and sports. These facilities historically 
have been almost entirely owned and operated by the state. Ever since the 
economic reforms starting in the late 1970s, private institutions have gradually 
proliferated and replaced government agencies m running related 
organizations and PNEUs thus emerged into the picture. The 1998 PNEU 
Regulation formally recognized the legal status of these then state-operated 
now privately-run entities and granted them nonprofit status. In practice, a 
majority of PNEUs are for-profit entities in the areas of education and 
healthcare. The PNEU sector has grown very rapidly since the promulgation 
of the PNEU Regulation. As ofDecember 31, 2006, a total of 159,000 PNEUs 
have been registered52, accounting for about 46% of all registered NGOs in 
China, and roughly half of these PNEUs are private schools. 53 
Many key provisions of the 1998 PNEU Regulations mirror those in the SO 
Regulation, such as the dual management system, non-repetition within the 
51 See PNEU Regulation, Arts 1 and 2 
52 See Sun Weilin, Head of National Bureau ofNGO Management, Zai Quan Guo Min Jian 
Zu Zhi Guan Li Gong Zuo Shi Pin Hui Shang De Jiang Hua [Speech at the National NGO 
Management Coriference] (January 31, 2007), http://www.mca.gov.cn (last visited on March 
15, 2011) 
53 See Zhao Yong, Min Ban Fei Qi Ye Dan Wei You Guan Fa Lu Wen Ti Zhi Si Kao 
[Thoughts on the Legal Issues of PNEUs], in Zhong Guo Fei Ying Li Zu Zhi Fa Lu Mo Shi 
Lun Wen Ji [Collected Essays on the Legal Models of Chinese NPOs], 220 (2005) (in Chinese) 
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same administrative region constraint54, and not surprisingly, similar broad 
and vague languages subject to discretional interpretation by the state police 
power. 55 One additional constraint imposed on PNEU is that a PNEU may not 
set up branches even within its registered administrative region. 56 Difficult to 
substantiate as it is, this provision envisions the disadvantaged position of 
state-run noncommercial organizations (e.g. schools and hospitals) in 
competition against PNEUs. 
Traditionally, PNEUs aim to provide social services and thus are less 
politically sensitive to the government. PNEUs are even encouraged and 
fostered as stated in a recent MCA work report, 57 and adopted by grassroots 
NGOs as a good vehicle to obtain the nonprofit status and the legitimacy 
attached thereto. Noticeably, the PNEU Regulation casts out sincere efforts by 
the government to fashion a tiered-management structure for NGOs and 
diversify NGO categories. 
2.2.3. Foundations 
The 2004 Foundation Regulations marked a major step for China's NGO legal 
framework. Noticeably, for the first time, a foreign NGO, other than a 
chamber of commerce, 58 could legally establish its presence in China as a 
nonprofit entity,59 and a foreign citizen, subject to a three-month residency 
requirement for certain key management personnel, was able to incorporate 
54 See PNEU Regulations, Arts. 5, 8, and 13 
55 See SO Regulations Arts. 4 and 35 
56 See SO Regulations Arts. 4, 13, and 27 
57 See generally Sun, supra 52 
58 See Wai Guo Shang Hui Guan Li Zan Zing Gui Ding [Provisional Regulations on 
Management ofF oreign Chambers of Commerce] (promulgated by the State Council, June 14, 
1989, effective July I, 1989) 
59 See 2004 Foundation Regulation Arts. 6, 13, and 14 
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and participate in domestic private foundations. 6° Foreign foundations are not 
allowed to raise funds inside China.61 
Superior to the 1998 SO Regulation and PNEU Regulation, the 2004 
Foundation Regulation features some modem NGO prerequisites and 
standards in particular, management appointments, internal governance, 
donation and financial management. Not surprisingly, the Foundation 
Regulations disappointed observers by keeping the dual management,62 and a 
provincial level of government sponsor is required, which is more restraining 
than the SO and PNEU regulations. 
2.2.3.1. Categories of Foundations and Capital Requirements 
The Foundation Regulation elaborates separate treatment for domestic 
foundations and for representative offices of foreign foundations. 63 A domestic 
foundation is further classified geographically as a national foundation and a 
regional (provincial) foundation, and also classified either as a private or 
public foundation based on the sources of its funds and donations. 64 A national 
foundation, the representative office of a foreign foundation, or any foundation 
whose legal representative is not a mainland Chinese citizen has to register 
with the MCA and secure the backing of a ministerial-level government 
supervising agency or a sponsor recognized by the State Council.65 
60 !d., Art. 24 
61 !d., Art. 25 
62 !d., Art. 7 
63 !d., Art. 13 
64 !d., Art. 8; see also Na La, supra 19, Chapter III 
65 !d., Art. 7. In particular, a foreign citizen may serve as a legal representative or Chairman of 
the Board for a domestic private foundation, though it is yet to be seen whether this will be 
allowed in practice. At a minimum, foreign citizens or citizens from Hong Kong, Macau, or 
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The minimum capital threshold to set up a private foundation is RMB 2.0 
million (about $295,000), 66 RMB 8 million (about $1.18 million) for a 
national foundation, and RMB 4 million (about $590,000) for a regional 
foundation. 67 Local MCAs may at their discretion impose higher initial capital 
requirements. The initial capital is presumably kept on book and thus cannot 
be used for programming activities. 
2.2.3.2.Constraints on Cross-Regional Subsidiaries and Standards for Internal 
Governance 
A foundation may set up branches upon approval of the MCA or its provincial 
branch, and the civil affairs bureaus have the discretion to deny the 
application. 68 The 2004 Foundation Regulation requires particular internal 
governance requirements, 69 such as the board of directors formation, 70 
appointment of a supervisory official, 71 and a legal representative. 72 Moreover, 
the Foundation Regulation also elaborates financial management standards, 
Taiwan can assume important management positions of a foundation and thus potentially 
control its operations in significant ways 
66 !d., Art. 8 
67 !d. 
68 !d., Art. 12 
69 The SO and PNEU Regulations, in contrast, have almost none. 
70 See 2004 Foundation Regulation Art. 20, stipulating that the board must have between 5 
and 25 members, 2) for private foundations established using the assets of a private individual, 
no more than a third of board members may be close relatives of that individual, and for other 
foundations, close relatives may not serve simultaneously as directors 3) no more than a third 
of a foundation's board members may receive financial compensation from the foundation 
71 !d., Art. 22, providing that the official cannot be a member of the board, a close relative of a 
board member, or on the financial staff of the foundation 
72 /d., Art. 23, providing that the legal representative of the foundation may not concurrently 
represent any other organization and a public or private foundation's legal representative 
should be a citizen of mainland China if the foundation's original funds are of domestic 
Chinese origin 
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such as annual expenditure restraints,73 and capped management compensation 
and capped overhead fees. 74 
2.2.4. Unregistered NGOs 
The taxing registration requirement, especially the difficulty of searching for a 
"supervisory or administration unit," encourages the establishment of many de 
facto NGOs including grassroots NGOs in China that do not seek registration. 
In fact, the unregistered NGOs that operate openly and legally may well 
outnumber registered ones. 75 As mentioned above, a social organization can 
operate as an internal organization of another enterprise and social 
organization without registration. 76 Some de facto social organizations 
incorporate themselves as corporations and are treated the same way as a 
normal commercial enterprise. If the NGO can demonstrate its nonprofit 
nature to the local governmental and tax authorities, even though it is hard to 
prove, there might be some flexible and compromised accommodation can be 
reached between NGOs and local MCA and SAT. 
Many NGOs especially grassroots NGOs simply do not exist as legal entities 
because they never seek registration. However, some of these NGOs operate 
73 !d., Art. 29, stipulating that the amount of money spent annually by public foundations on 
public benefit activities must not be less than 70% of the previous year's income, and private 
foundations' annual expenditure must not be less than 8% of the surplus from the previous 
year 
74 !d., a foundation may not allocate more than 10% of its total expenditure to cover staff 
wages and benefits and other overhead costs. 
75 This thesis excludes secret, underground organizations that operate illegally for discussion 
for two reasons: ( 1) the numbers are not collectable or verifiable in any official means; (2) 
illegally operated underground organizations are loosely associated and sometimes at best are 
motivated gatherings for spiritual pursuit 
76 Often, those organizations reach beyond the scope of serving the affiliated enterprise or 
organization. For example, in many universities, the affiliated social organizations are also 
serving the society in general and the government will often just turn a blind eye to these types 
of activities 
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openly (acknowledged by some governmental entities and officials) and are 
generally accepted in the community. Since Chinese tradition favors a 
tradition of connection (guan xi) and flexibility in resolving problems when 
the official process is burdensome and costly, well connected unregistered 
NGOs will likely continue playing an important role and leading to many 
administrative discrepancies and uncertainties. 
2.3. Tax treatment of Chinese N GOs 
China does not have a comprehensive tax code governing various NGO forms. 
Charitable tax exemptions from major Chinese taxes are mostly based on the 
"nonprofit" conception 77 which is prescribed and interpreted by scattered 
provisions within the various tax laws and regulations, the China Trust Law 
(on charitable trust) and the Public Benefit Donation Law which is the only 
law passed by the National People's Congress governing NGOs. 78 
2.3.1. Tax Treatment of Charitable Donations 
As noted above, rules about income tax treatment of donations scatters in 
various laws and regulation as shown below. 
77 See 2004 Foundation Regulations Art. 2; SO Regulation, Art. 2; PNEU Regulation, Art. 2 
78 See generally in Leon Irish, Jin Dongsheng & Karla Simon, China's Tax Rules for Not-for-
profit Orgs. 12-16 (2004), and in practice, registration with the MCA or its local branch in one 
of the three recognized NGO forms guarantees exemption, even the local bureau of industry 
and commerce may consider NGOs as for-profit commercial enterprises on a case-by-case 
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Individuals and corporations can deduct their charitable contributions with 
some constraints in China. For individuals, "personal contributions to 
educational and other undertakings for public welfare shall be deducted from 
the taxable income in accordance with the relevant regulations by the State 
Council." 79 The regulations thereunder define donations as "donations by 
individual[s] of their income to educational and other undertakings of public 
welfare, and to areas suffering from serious natural disasters or poverty, 
through social organizations or government agencies in the People's Republic 
of China." 80 The regulations further limit the deduction to 30 percent of 
taxable income. 81 
According to the recent unified Enterprise Income Tax Law, which took effect 
on January 1, 2008 and unifies the treatments between foreign and domestic 
enterprises, enterprises are allowed to deduct up to 12 percent of taxable 
79 
See The Individual Income Tax Law ofthe P.R.C., Art. 6 
80 




income for contributions to causes for "public benefits and social welfare."82 
As stipulated in the Provisional Rules and Regulations thereunder, causes for 
public benefits and social welfare are defined in almost the same way as the 
Regulations for the Implementation of the Individual Income Tax Law. The 
EIT Law explicitly states that donations directly to individual donees are not 
deductible. As of July 2006, the MOF and SAT had only approved tax 
deductions for donors to sixty-two organizations, 83 most of which are 
GONCOs. Donations to these twenty-six organizations are fully deductible, 
but for the other thirty-six organizations, individual donors can deduct up to 
30% of taxable income, and corporate donors up to 12% under the recently 
revised Enterprise Income Tax Law, which increases the permissible 
charitable contribution deduction for both domestic and foreign companies 
corporate donors from 3% to 12%.84 
The Chinese tax laws and regulations require that for charitable contributions 
to be tax-deductible, they must meet both a specific "cause" requirement and 
an organizational prerequisite, i.e., to be tax deductible, such contributions 
have to cater certain causes as well as to pledge (through) certain 
organizations. However, there is serious doubt about how important a role the 
tax benefit consideration plays in individuals' or corporations' donation 
considerations. 85 First and foremost, the MOF and SAT stipulate only a few 
organizations that are eligible for receiving tax deductible charitable 
82 See Enterprise Income Tax Law of the P.R. C., Art. 9, (promulgated by the National People's 
Congress, March 16, 2007, effective January 1 2008) [hereinafter the EIT Law ofthe P.R.C.] 
83 See Ci Shan Juan Zeng You Hui Zheng Ce [Preferential Policy for Charitable Donations], 
http://www.juanzhu .gov.cn (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
84 See the EIT Law of the P.R.C., Art. 9 
85 See generally, Chinese Taxation Institute, Report on Tax Policy Studies for Promoting 
Domestic Needs [Guanyu Jinyibu Kuoda Neixu de Shuishou Zhengce Yanjiu Baogao ], ~ r;!llf#, 
*~kc~~*-~r*~•~m~••~~*~» 
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n480462/n7921376/n7921576/n7921766/n7921902/8800885.htm1 
(last visited on March 15, 2011) 
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contributions. Donations made to non-certified NGOs are not tax deductible. 
Second, due to the high volume of donative activities in times of emergency, 
eligible organizations might have insufficient human and resources to collect 
and manage donations. Third, the infrastructure linking individual income tax 
reporting and charitable deductions is weak. 86 Finally, the complicated 
administrative procedure may thwart taxpayers to claim such deduction, the 
nominal value of which is insignificant in most cases. 
In addition, although recent natural disasters in China have stimulated a round 
of personal charitable donations, such economic endowments remain 
infrequent in China for various reasons. First, the feeling of distrust still 
occupies minds of individual donors regarding the likelihood of a reasonable 
and fair allocation of charitable donations. Second, the absence of an estate or 
gift tax in China reduces the motivation for making donations. Third, the 
government adopts an unsympathetic controlling practice toward unregistered 
NGOs, which mostly are underground churches, religious groups and elderly 
care centers. Finally, corruption by government officials overwhelmingly 
impairs their capacity to request further donations. 
According to the PBDL, qualified public welfare organizations are allowed to 
receive public welfare donations under the following conditions: 87 i) activities 
carried out by social bodies and individuals to provide disaster relief, aid for 
the poor, and giving support and assistance to the physically disabled; ii) 
educational, scientific, cultural, public health, and sports undertakings; iii) 
construction of environmental protection facilities and public utilities in 
86 see supra Chapter V on tax legislation 
87 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gong Yi Shi Ye Juan Zen Fa [Public Welfare Donation 
Law] Art. 3 (effective as of September I, 1999), 
http:/ /www.gq b.gov.cn/node2/node3/node5/node9/userobject7ai 1270.html (last visited on 
March 15, 2011) 
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society; and iv) other public and welfare undertakings in society that aim to 
promote social development and progress. 
Noticeably, the donations have to be made to certified public welfare social 
organizations and public welfare private non-enterprise units under the Public 
Welfare Donations Law. Therefore, the importance of achieving registration 
with the MCA as a gateway to receive various benefits is foremost over other 
considerations in establishing an NGO. The 2001 Trust Law provides for the 
first time some promising support to the establishment of a public (charitable) 
trust (with certain limitations). In particular, the purpose of trusts for charity 
and public interests should include poverty relief, emergency relief, assistance 
to the disabled, development of education, science and technology, culture, 
and sports, medicine and health welfare, and environmental protection. 
However, the establishment of a public trust and trustee appointments for a 
public trust are all subject to the approval and oversight of MCAs. 88 
As part of friendly legislations to the NGO sector,89 in January 2007, the MOF 
and SAT jointly have released encouraging measures and rulings for 
promoting tax exemption and deductibility. "All public benefit social 
organizations or foundations established upon approval of the civil affairs 
88 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xin Tuo Fa [The Trust Law of the PRC], Arts. 62, 64, 
65, 67, and 70, which stipulate that public trusts shall establish a trust supervisor. The trust 
supervisor is prescribed by the trust documents or appointed by the public welfare authorities 
if there is no such prescription in the trust documents. The trust supervisor has the right to file 
an action or establish other legal activities in his own name for the benefit of the beneficiary. 
The duties of the trustee of a public trust have been enhanced. The trustee must make a report 
about the disposition of the trust business and the status of the trust assets at least once a year. 
If the public trust expires, the trustee must report the cause and date of the expiration to the 
public welfare authorities within 15 days ofthe occurrence of the event forming the reason for 
expiration of the trust 
89 See generally Simon supra 32, noting that a comprehensive Charity Law is under discussion 
and is intended to address multiple aspects of the regulation of charities in China, including 
tax deductibility of donations. The MCA and MOF have sought broad input on the law, a draft 
of which was circulated for comment in September 2006. See also, Int '! Ctr. for Civ. Soc y 
Law, Comments on the Draft Charity Law for the PRC, 5, Int'l J. Civ. Soc'y L. 12, (2007) 
[Hereinafter the Simon: Comments] 
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administrative department" would be eligible to receive tax-deductible 
donations, subject to a review conducted by MOF and SAT and is designed to 
confirm the organization's public benefit nature. 90 Therefore, the category of 
organizations eligible for charitable tax exemption or deduction expanded to 
include charities such as aging people care centers, ethnic minority education 
programs, and health care centers for the treatment of specific diseases. 91 
Moreover, in 2008 the MCA upgraded its operations dealing with charity 
statistics and other charity activities from a semi-independent "bureau" to a 
Ministry Department. 92 
A further reading of charitable tax exemption laws and regulations reveals that 
passive investment income (interest and dividends earned on investments) of 
NGOs is still subject to tax. 93 Investment income has always been one of the 
major sources of revenue for all NGOs, especially for NGOs in the U.S. 
However, interest income realized by Chinese foundations, which are 
established with a high permanent capital requirement, will mostly end up 
being subject to EIT in the course of an NGO's operation and existence.94 
Therefore, the fragile availability of NGO revenue resources again will be 
hijacked, resulting in actual reductions in charitable finances and low capital 
mobility. Although this problem has not emerged severely within the SO and 
90 See "Guan Yu Gong Yi Jiu Ji Xing Juan Zeng Shui Qian Kou Chu Zheng Ce Ji Xiang Guan 
Guan Li Wen Ti De Tong Zhi" [Notice Concerning Policy and Related Questions on the Pre-
Tax Deduction of Public Benefit Relief Donations] (promulgated by the MOF and SAT jointly 
and effective on January 8, 2007) [hereinafter "the 2007 Notice"] 
91 See Ci Shan Juan Zeng You Hui Zheng Ce Hui Bian [Collection of Preferential Policy for 
Charitable Donations], http://www.juanzhu.gov.cn (last visited on March 15, 2011) 
92 See generally China Adds Government Department for Charity Activities", People's Daily 
Online September 11, 2008, stating that, in China, such escalation of administrative hierarchy 
means a lot in terms of management authority, resources allocation and enforceability ofNGO 
administrative regulations 
93 See infra Subchapter IV 
94 See, e.g., Biqiang Wang, A Taxing Time for China's Non-profits, The Economic Observer 
Online February 19, 2008 
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PNEU sectors, a responsive ruling from the SAT should likely remove their 
fears in this connection. 95 
2.3.2. Procedural reform for charitable tax exemptions 
Messy and sometimes opaque procedural practices are not foreign to the tax 
law field in China, and charitable tax exemption is not an exception in this 
regard. In the 2007 MOF and SAT joint ruling, a procedural scheme is 
provided but is too advanced to fully implement comparing with existing tax 
administrative capacities. Still, smaller sized and more independent charities 
all expect to see an easier fundraising. It may also challenge the domination of 
fundraising by the large government related charities such as GONGOs and 
the municipal charity foundations. 
According to the 2007 Ruling, tax deductible donations may be made to all 
public "welfare social associations or foundations established upon approval 
of the department of civil affairs of the State Council." 96 Apparently, this 
welcoming gesture of the government comforts donors in many ways, 
especially when deductions are permissible for donations made to pass-
through organizations 97 . Given the enormous economic interests such as 
commissions or management fees available in pass-through organizations, 
such procedures for qualifying the organizations that are permitted to receive 
tax deductible contributions are unlikely to be implemented in the near future. 
Furthermore, to qualify as a public welfare organization enjoying deductible 
95 See generally Simon, supra 32, raising that the SAT has taken this issue under advisement 
and may soon release new policies with regard to tax exemption of revenues earned on funds 
held by CSOs. A change to reflect the recommendation in the Tax Report would be welcome. 
96 See 2007 Notice, supra 90 
97 For example, the All-China Charity Federation and the China Red Cross Society 
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contributions, a confirmation letter from appropriate level of tax authorities is 
required.98 To obtain such recognition letters, an application should be filed 
enclosing evidence that the organization, inter alia, is non-profit, is 
established and managed consistently with the law, may not distribute any 
surplus upon dissolution or termination, 99 may not engage in business 
activities unrelated to its public welfare purposes, has an oversight body that is 
not "aimed at making private profits," has an internal financial and accounting 
management, and a charter. 100 
The 2007 Ruling also stipulates instructions on handling donations and 
communicating with its donors. Those instructions include that 1) no donor 
may participate in the asset distributions or take ownership to such assets; 2) 
organizations eligible for donation-based pre-tax deductions shall use public 
welfare relief for specific purposes; 101 and 3) a special voucher for public 
welfare relief donations must be used. 102 The 2007 Ruling also prescribes 
procedures to be followed by donors to claim deductions on their tax returns. 
For instance, the donor must submit the certification by the authorities of the 
donee organization; the original receipt received from the donee organization; 
and other materials as required to be submitted. 
Many scholars 103 have expressed deep interests and completed extensive work 
98 See 2007 Notice, supra 90 
99 !d. 
100 !d. 
101 For example, education, civil affairs, other public welfare undertakings, or for the districts 
that suffer from natural disasters or the poverty-stricken districts. Moreover, the non-profit 
public welfare social associations and foundations, as well as the people's governments at or 
above the county level and their departments'' 
102 The organizations must "separately use the vouchers for public welfare relief donations as 
uniformly printed under supervision of the central or provincial public finance department 
according to the financial affiliation, and affix their respective special financial seals; and shall 
issue receipts if any individual asks for it for his donations." 
103 See generally Rebecca Lee Modernizing Charity Law in China, 18 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 
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toward the promulgation of a comprehensive charity law, which aims to 
embrace all valid factors involving nonprofit organizations. For instance, the 
draft Charity Law provides that current tax laws and regulations fail to detail 
the approaches by which nonprofit organizations obtain licenses to engage in 
public fundraising. Article 24, Paragraph 2 of the draft Charity Law104 states 
that only organizations with a "[ c ]ertificate of the certification for charitable 
organizations" may engage in fundraising activities from the general public 
(shehui gongzhong). This does not apply "if laws or administrative regulations 
provide otherwise." Limiting public fund raising in this manner gives the 
MCA control over the organizations that raise money from the public. This 
should generally be seen as an important consumer protection, and thus it 
would be important to enact similar rules in the final Charity Law. 105 
As criticized by Professor Simon, the various other rules with respect to 
permits for fundraising in the draft Charity Law (Articles 26-27) and the rules 
with respect to public fund raising (Article 28) are, however, not detailed 
enough to protect the public at the present time. 106 While Articles 26 and 27 of 
the draft outline the licensing procedure: "certified charitable organizations" 
must apply at the MCA offices of the people's governments above the county 
level, there is no clarity as to what information will be required for a license, 
etc. In addition, it is important to note that in times of natural disaster, the need 
for a license may inhibit some fundraising--this may prove to be problematic if 
there are no organizations that have sufficient public trust to collect and 
disburse the massive funds needed in cases like the one presented by the 
Sichuan Earthquake. It will be important to put the Charity Law in place 




quickly so as to allow more independent nonprofit organizations to obtain 
h . d fu d . . 1' 107 c anty status an n rmsmg Icenses. 
III. Institutional and theoretical background of the current U.S. 
federal NGO tax exemption system 
The U.S. federal law of tax-exempt organization derives its authority from the 
taxation powers of congress, and related tax provisions are codified in the 
Internal Revenue Code (the "IRC"). In general, a charitable organization is 
defined as the one that "pays no tax on its income and whose donors derive a 
tax benefit as a result of their donations. 108 The U.S. system adopts a 
classification method that lists objective standards for qualifying organizations 
exempt from Federal income tax. 
3.1. The Exemption 
The current language on NGO tax exemption appeared first in section 
501(c)(3) of 1954 IRC. The charitable income tax exemption refers to the 
statutory relief from the obligation of certain nonprofit entities to pay income 
tax. Pursuant to IRC section 50l(c)(3), such relief is automatically offered to 
entities that are granted tax-exempt charitable status upon application and 
approval. A variety of non-charity entities are also entitled to income tax 
exemption.1 09 Moreover, charitable nonprofit organizations, unlike practically 
107 !d. 
108 See Besty Buchalter Adler, Rules of the Road(1999), at 3 
109 
Other forms include social welfare organizations, labor organizations, business leagues and 
social clubs -
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all other tax-exempt nonprofit organizations, are the only tax-exempt nonprofit 
organizations that are also eligible to receive charitable donations from the 
public entitling the donor to federal income tax benefits. The IRC provides 
that individuals and corporations that donate money or property to charitable 
entities may be entitled to receive a tax savings when computing their own tax 
liability. The potential savings can be quite significant depending on the 
amount ofthe donation, the type of property donated, the income ofthe donor, 
and the type of charity to which the donation is given. This ability to receive 
tax deductible donations from the public is the key federal tax law distinction 
b h . . d h fi . . 110 etween c ant1es an ot er tax-exempt nonpro tt orgamzattons. 
An interested nonprofit corporation should file an application with the IRS to 
obtain the tax-exempt charitable status. Not surprisingly, such complex 
paperwork demands accurate and ample information concerning 
organizational structure, principal activities, financial assets, expected and past 
revenue streams, internal policies, and much more. The IRS evaluates the 
information provided to determine if such proposed activities and 
organizational structure are deemed "charitable." Noticeably, the IRS, subject 
to later judicial review, has sole discretion as to whether to grant or deny the 
applicant tax-exempt charitable status based if the information provided on the 
organization's forms do not adequately comply with the law. The IRS may 
even revoke the "charitable" status if the charitable entity does not operate in 
compliance with federal law. Accordingly, a charity must often also update 
annual information reports to the IRS about its operative activities after initial 
filings. 
110 I.R.C. Section 50l(c)(3) 
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These extensive requirements on obtaining and maintaining tax-exempt 
charitable status are only a few of the many aspects of the charitable tax 
exemption including, but not limited to, not paying federal income tax. Under 
the requirement of filing specific forms to obtain the tax-exempt status, the 
forms required for tax-exempt charitable status are much more complicated 
than those required of other tax-exempt nonprofit organizations. Such added 
complexity is mostly due to the additional financial impact on tax revenues 
because charities are also eligible to receive tax deductible donations from the 
public. 111 The IRS, by granting an organization tax-exempt charitable status, 
not only saves the organization from the requirement to pay federal income tax, 
but also communicates assurances to potential donors that donations will be 
used for charitable purposes. 
3.2. Theories of Charitable Exemption 
Traditional theories of the charitable tax exemption are principally based on 
concepts of economic efficiency. These efficiency-based theories explain the 
charitable tax exemption as either a subsidy by government for public goods, a 
necessary result of using net income to define tax liability, or a means of 
compensating charities for capital constraints. Other efficiency-based theories 
contend that the charitable tax exemption is either a payment for an entity's 
ability to garner donations or a means of compensating charities for the risk 
111 See David Brennen, A Diversity Theory of Charitable Tax Exemption- Beyond Efficiency, 
Through Critical Race Theory, Toward Diversity, 4 Pitt. Tax Rev. l. (2006) at 3-5, discussing 
that the added complexity could be related to something that has nothing to do with dollars, or 
perhaps the added complexity has something to do with the nature of charities in a market 
society, and the reason charities are eligible to receive tax deductible contributions is that they 
are required to use these monies for charitable purposes, as opposed to mutual benefit 
purposes as is the case with other tax-exempt nonprofit organizations 
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they assume in providing public goods. Each of these economic theories for 
the charitable tax exemption has its strengths and its weaknesses. They are 
also useful in sculpting the contours of the charitable tax exemption. However, 
these traditional theories lack significant non-economic considerations, which, 
ultimately, make them incomplete. This explanatory deficiency also means 
that these efficiency theories cannot fully guide us in sculpting the contours of 
h . bl . I 112 c anta e tax exemptiOn aw. 
3.2.1. The traditional Public Benefit Subsidy Theory 
The public benefit subsidy theory views the charitable tax exemption as an 
approach whereby the government pays organizations consistently engaged in 
providing public goods. In other words, charitable tax exemption is offered 
essentially to "pay" or "compensate" private entities that supply public goods 
and services as noted in Bob Jones University v. United States.m The theory 
fundamentally assumes that the government subsidizes certain "goods" or 
"services" that it either cannot or will not supply on its own due to various 
constraints, such as constitutional constraints as to religion and political 
constraints as to campaign support. Another assumption underlies this theory 
is that government, under neutral principles, can determine what constitutes a 
public good or service for purposes of the charitable tax exemption. Therefore, 
112 See Rob Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charities: Thesis, 
Antithesis and Syntheses", in P. Bater et al. The Tax Treatment ofNGOs, 253-283 
113 See Brennen, supra Ill at 6-8, arguing that charitable exemptions are justified on the basis 
that the exempt entity confers a public benefit-a benefit which the society or the community 
may not itself choose or be able to provide, or which supplements and advances the work of 
public institutions already supported by tax revenues. History buttresses logic to make clear 
that, to warrant exemption under § 50l(c)(3), an institution must fall within a category 
specified in that section and must demonstrably serve and be in harmony with the public 
interest. The institution's purpose must not be so at odds with the common community 
conscience as to undermine any public benefit that might otherwise be conferred 
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the government somehow takes exemption as a form of financial support for 
charities on what they produce. 
The traditional subsidy theory alone does not fully validate the charitable tax 
exemption. One problem with the theory is that it fails to justify why 
governmental financial support for charities has to be a tax exemption rather 
than a direct grant or privileged access to resources. Meanwhile, this theory 
does not identify a coherent protocol as to what goods and services are for the 
public benefit. For this instance, although the neutral market principles might 
drive the process of deciding what benefits the public, 114 the "neutral" 
efficiency principle alone does not substantiate a basis for understanding how 
a public benefit is determined. 
3.2.2. The Base-Defining Theory 
By pointing out the insufficiency of the public benefit subsidy theory, Boris 
\ 
Bittker and George Rahdert proposed the base-defining theory, which 
essentially states that charities (and many other nonprofit organizations) are 
not suitable targets ofthe income tax and thus should be exempt from income 
tax. Specifically, Bittker and Rahdert argue on the economic aspects of the 
exemption: 
... [Charities] should be wholly exempted 
from income taxation, because [(1)] they do not 
realize "income" in the ordinary sense of that 
114 !d., Brennen presents that, in Bob Jones University, a private university was identified in 
the charitable tax exemption statute as a public benefit-education, yet the Court held that the 
education in that case was not entitled to exemption due to the presence of invidious racial 
discrimination. Brennen further argues that efficiency analysis alone does not provide a 
rationalization for this aspect of charitable tax exemption 
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term and because, [(2)] even if they did, there is 
no satisfactory way to fit the tax rate to the 
ability ofthe beneficiaries to pay. 115 
The base-defining theory explains that measuring the income of a charity is a 
conceptually difficult, if not impossible, task. 116 Since one common 
Congressional exclusion from income is gifts, money or property given with 
"detached and disinterested generosity" is not usually treated as taxable 
income. In checking the sources of a charity's typical revenues such as interest 
on endowment, funds, membership dues, and gifts/donations, Bittker and 
Rahdert summarized that, with the exception of interest on endowment funds, 
charities simply do not realize revenues in of the type that constitute taxable 
income. According to Bittker and Rahdert, membership dues, gifts, and 
donations to the charity preferably would be categorized as excludable gifts 
from members or donors. Moreover, the charitable entity itself behaves as a 
mere conduit for passing the economic enrichment, which may be viewed as 
excludable gifts to the charity's beneficiaries. 
Another intricacy entails counting deductible expenses incurred in acquiring 
revenue. Bittker and Rahdert identified charitable expenditures as potentially 
including items such as staff salaries and medical welfare programs for 
indigents. Firstly, considering a deductible expense as an "ordinary and 
necessary expense incurred in carrying on a trade or business" activity is self-
contradictory because this treats mission-focused charitable activity as a "trade 
or business". Further, even if the definition of "business" includes providing 
115 
See generally, Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal 
Income Taxation, 85 Yale L.J. 299 (1976) 
116 
/d., measuring an entity's income by a determination of the entity's gross income in excess 
of expenses incurred in acquiring the income. Gross income is generally any economic 
enrichment that is not excluded from income by Congress 
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charitable benefits, since ultimately all revenues are committed to charitable 
purposes leaving no revenue to insiders as profits, a charity would essentially 
have no tax liability. 117 Moreover, treating the expense as eligible for the 
charitable contribution deduction is arguably unrealistic since either structural 
impediments in the statute authorizing the charitable deduction or the 
necessary zeroing out of income prohibit such deduction. 
Another concern underlying the base-defining theory concerns the appropriate 
tax rate to apply to charities. According to Bittker and Rahdert, tax rates 
implicate conceptions of efficiency related to either the "benefit" or "ability to 
pay" theories of taxation. 118 Difficulty in identifying beneficiaries necessarily 
causes an inefficient tax on income. Moreover, charity beneficiaries might not 
be able to spot the exact charitable gifts as excludable gifts and make tax 
payment. There is simply no way of design a proper tax rate if charities were 
to be subject to the income tax. 
Although the base-defining theory centers on an economic explanation 119 of 
the charitable tax exemption, it fails to address a few non-economic aspects 
aside from the elimination of a financial obligation, such as justice and 
fairness in resource allocation and opportunities for societal enhancement and 
117 /d., net income-save for some instances of multi-year accumulations for specific purposes-
would always equal zero, resulting in no tax liability. 
118 /d., arguing that a charity's income should be imputed to its beneficiaries for rate 
determination purposes since it is most likely the beneficiary who would bear the burden of 
any tax on the charity's income. The problem, Bittker and Rahdert explain, is that the 
beneficiaries are usually unknown at the time the income is received and, thus, it is nearly 
impossible to determine an appropriate income tax rate. Even if the entity were taxed as a 
surrogate for the beneficiaries 
119 See Brennen supra Ill at 12-15, presenting that, throughout their base-defining theory, 
Bittker and Rahdert explain that, even if the federal income tax were to apply to a charity's 
income, it is quite likely that no tax revenue would result. However, Evelyn Brody explains 
quite well in her sovereignty theory of charitable tax exemption: While most observers have 
described tax exemption as a subsidy, a zero rate of tax differs qualitatively, not just 
quantitatively, from a one-percent rate of tax. Tax exemption maintains an independent 
distance between charities and the state. Similarly, exemption differs in an important political 
way from an equivalent system of direct grants, see also generally Brody, supra I 
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betterment. More precisely, Bittker and Rahdert's thesis fails to fully address a 
few issues including the difference between a zero or near-zero tax liability 
and a tax exemption, political activities and lobbying, the definition of 
"charitable," and private foundation rules. 120 
3.2.3. The Capital Formation Subsidy Theory 
In response to the base-defining theory, Professor Henry Hansmann proposed 
his capital formation subsidy theory on charitable tax exemption. 121 Professor 
Hansmann explains that the rationale for the charitable tax exemption 
concerns the access of charities to capital markets. 122 Professor Hansmann 
argues that the tax exemption compensates charities for the lack of access to 
capital markets, and such "capital subsidy" promotes "efficiency especially for 
industries where nonprofit firms serve consumers better than their for-profit 
counterparts." If markets operate at optimal efficiency, and if nonprofit 
organizations are the most efficient producers of "contract failure" goods and 
services, nonprofit organizations should be subsidized to grow and expand as a 
societal unit. 
A key to Professor Hansmann's capital subsidy theory is the notion of contract 
failure which "derives from the inability of some or most consumers to make 
accurate judgments concerning the quality, quantity, or price of services 
120 !d., presenting that Bittker and Rahdert's base-defining theory uses a similar type of non 
base-defining (non-economic) analysis to fully account for the educational exemption for 
museums, colleges, and orchestras 
121 See H. Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate 
Income Taxation, 91 Yale L.J. 54 (1981) 
122 !d., Professor Hansmann explains: [T]he best justification for the exemption is that it helps 
to compensate for the constraints on capital formation that nonprofit organizations commonly 
face, and that such compensation can serve a useful purpose, at least for those classes of 
nonprofit organizations that operate in industries in which, for various reasons, nonprofit firms 
are likely to serve consumers better than would profit-seeking firms 
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provided by alternative producers." Professor Hansmann typically used the 
American Red Cross 123 to exemplify contract failure in that nonprofit firms are 
more efficient than for-profit firms in circumstances of contract failure. 124 
Professor Hansmann explains that constraints on the ability of nonprofit 
organizations to obtain capital make their income tax exemption appropriate. 
With the three major sources of funding for nonprofit organizations being debt, 
donations, and retained earnings, unlike for-profit firms, charities do not have 
access to equity capital and cannot issue shares. Nonprofit organizations also 
simply fail to obtain appropriate debt capital due to high bankruptcy rates and 
operative risks involving loans. Notably, donations are also problematic due to 
their uncertainties and insecurities. Therefore, nonprofit organizations roughly 
should rely entirely on retained earnings to operate and develop. Professor 
Hansmann further argues that the exemption is necessarily based on the lack 
of access to capital and contract failure experienced by nonprofit organizations. 
Similar to the base-defining theory, the capital formation subsidy theory fails 
to articulate a few issues that have no necessary connection to economic 
efficiency, such as exemption to commercial nonprofit organizations 125 that 
produce simple standardized services, and the assertion that nonprofit 
hospitals should not be eligible for tax exemption. 126 
123 See generally Brennen, supra 111, arguing that, Professor Hansmann thinks nonprofit 
firms are more efficient than for-profit firms in providing certain types of contract failure 
services because of the nondistribution constraint. Consumers are not as concerned with 
nonprofit firms as they would be with for-profit firms about donations being diverted to 
shareholders because nonprofit firms do not have shareholders 
124 Id., at 19-21 
125 ld., Brennen points that Professor Hansmann's view is the statement that "[t]here would 
obviously be little point ... in granting the exemption to a nonprofit hardware store." Further, 
Professor Hansmann misses that even a hardware store might provide the type of benefit, 
under certain circumstances, that society wants, needs, or otherwise values 
126 Id., Brennen further argues that Professor Hansmann's articulated reason for this assertion 
is the lack of contract failure or need for capital evident in the hospital industry. It is important 
to realize-and this is a point that Professor Hansmann and many others miss-that the value 
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3.2.4. Donative Theory 
The donative theory of tax exemption was developed by Mark Hall and John 
Colombo. Under this theory, tax exemption is considered a subsidy, which is 
justified where neither the government nor the private market effectively 
provide a service that is demanded by a significant number (but not a majority) 
of citizens. In order for the government to assume a duty, there must generally 
be majority support. In the absence of such support, the needs of significant 
sector of society may go unmet. A tax exemption thus provides a way for the 
government to subsidize important services without the necessity of majority 
support or the ability to control the organizations providing the services. 
Voters will support tax subsidies for services provided by minority-supported 
organizations in which they have no interest because they, in tum, receive tax 
subsidies for services provided by other minority-supported organizations in 
which they do have an interest. 
Hall and Colombo use donations as a proxy for public support. If an 
organization receives enough public support, the organization can be said to be 
doing something that is important to a significant segment of society, which is 
not being done by the government or the private sector. As such, the 
organization is entitled to tax exemption. The use of donations as a measure of 
inherent in a particular form of charitable organization may not be readily apparent by means 
of traditional efficiency analysis. Brennen also refers to Professor Jill Horwitz's empirical 
research concerning hospitals. Professor Horwitz concludes that-despite the myriad of calls for 
ending tax exemption for hospitals that do not serve the poor-empirical research shows that 
tax-exempt nonprofit hospitals provide societal benefits that for-profit hospitals simply do not 
provide. The special benefits of nonprofit, as compared to for-profit and government hospitals 
include the provision of "more profitable services than government hospitals and more 
unprofitable services than for-profit hospitals." Brennen posits that though Professor Horwitz 
does not conclude that these unique benefits of tax exempt nonprofit hospitals are caused by 
tax exemption, she does acknowledge that this connection has not been disproven 
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exemption-worthiness separates traditional nonprofit organizations from for-
profit institutions, which may also benefit society but which do not receive 
donations. 
3.2.5. Summary 
As the rationales underlying the tax exemption described above reveal, there is 
no generally accepted theory explaining the existence of tax exemption. 
Scholars have different rationales in explaining tax exemption for nonprofit 
entities. When a state designs nonprofit tax exemption laws and policies, it is 
inevitable to include all possible theoretical reasoning for more open and 
inclusive discussions and hearing. It is notable that those theories do not 
explain the rationales for giving tax deductions for charitable contributions 
made to nonprofit entities. 
3.3. Overview of financial incentives in the NGO Sector 
Central to the NGO tax exemption system is the incentive under IRC section 
170 - the tax deduction for charitable contributions. Sections 501(c)(3) and 
1 70 of IRC stipulate an objective formula with measurable standards for 
exemption and deductibility, and 28 categories of nonprofit organizations are 
eligible for exemptions from federal income tax. However, only those that 
qualify under section 50l(c)(3) are entitled for the "most favored" treatment 
per se. While charitable organizations enjoy the generous tax benefits, they are, 
at the same time, subject to the most stringent monitoring. 
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A quantitative measurement of public support is to label a public benefit or 
"charitable" organization based on the extent and type of public support it 
receives. Section 50l(c)(3) classifies public support organizations into "public 
charities" and "private foundations". Public charities are further categorized 
into three types: donative charities under section 509(a)(l); service provider 
charities under 509(a)(2); and supporting organizations under 509(a)(3). Each 
type of pubic charity has its respective tax treatment based on the extent and 
nature of their public support. A donative charity must raise at least one-third 
of its total eligible revenues from a combination of gifts, grants and contracts 
from the public sector. A service provider charity must raise at least one-third 
from a combination of revenues derived from fees, admission sales, and 
revenues from the sale of related products, as well as from public gifts and 
grants. A supporting organization need not raise funds from the public because 
of it unique affiliation with another publically supported charity. 
A charitable organization has to pass the "organized" and "operated" tests 
under section 501 ( c )(3 ), and certain objective standards are applied in this 
connection. A nonprofit organization is recognized as exempt if it is organized 
for a recognized exempt purpose and is operated in service of such exempt 
purpose. Since subjectivity and discretion plays an insignificant role in these 
determinations, the analysis and test procedures are ascertainable and 
standardized. Any organization soliciting exemption should affirmatively seek 
recognition of its exempt status from the IRS. On the other hand, IRS merely 
performs the role of applying and recognizing exemptions according to the 
objective standards. 
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IV. The Charitable Tax-exemption System in Practice - a Further 
Comparison 
After briefly evaluating fundamental features of China and U.S. NGO tax 
treatment systems, some important provisions in both systems are worthy of 
detailed comparison. This subchapter explores the details of the differences 
between the U.S. and Chinese systems. Again, this comparison is selectively 
oversimplified to embrace concepts are that interpreted differently in the U.S. 
and Chinese tax contexts. Therefore, the goal is to exemplify in which settings 
those terms are introduced or interpreted rather than focusing on the technical 
meaning of elements involved therein. 
4.1. Formation and Registration 
4.1.1. u.s. 
In the U.S., the organization must be "organized" for an exempt purpose. The 
IRS has no discretion to approve or deny exempt status based on subjective 
factors, provided the applicant organization can demonstrate that it has been 
properly formed under state law and that its charter contains the appropriate 
language required by Federal Law. The process is straightforward and 
predictable. The applicant organization submits an "Application for 
Recongnization of Exempt Status under Section 50l(c)(3)" (IRS Form 1023) 
supported by a conformed copy of the Articles of Incorporation, corporate 
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bylaws, various financial schedules and a narrative describing current and 
planned activities programs and contemplated fundraising strategies. An 
applicant organization will satisfy quite easily the organizational tests if the 
governing documents articulate the organization's exempt purpose. 
4.1.2. China 
In China, every law student studying NGO laws knows about the difficulty of 
establishing and registering an NGO. As discussed in Part II above, there are 
several issues central to the registration and application ofNGOs China. 
4.1.2.l.Dual Management 
The dual management requirement forces many NGOs to remain unregistered 
or even operate subversively because the potential supervisory agencies 
probably will refuse to oversee applicant organizations. Worse is that there 
may be even no appropriate supervisory agency willing to take on such a 
role. 127 Although slackness to perform supervision may result in a judicial 
review, obtaining approval for registration from government branches or 
GONGOs that are sought as sponsoring organizations does not appear to 
require them to act at all - the granting of permission is entirely discretionary 
on the part of supervisory agencies. Additionally, even a tentatively complete 
127 See generally Simon supra 32, suggesting only those SOs that choose to be and are 
defined as charity organizations, would be subject to strict scrutiny under the drafted Charity 
Law. If this were to be done, the new Charity Law would contain the provisions to accomplish 
the type of organizational integrity and the institutional oversight necessary for organizations 
operating for public benefit 
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list of required documents for submission to obtain supervisory sponsorship by 
an appropriate entity does not exist. This is but one of the reasons potential 
supervisory sponsors can ostensibly prolong the application process by 
imposing unreasonable paperwork requests. 
In this manner, the dual management requirement offers the government the 
ability to manipulate the number of organizations that can be registered in a 
given territory. Moreover, the Ministry of Civil Affairs may deny registration 
if "in the same administrative area there is already a social organization active 
in the same (xiang tong) or similar (xiang si) area of work, there is no need for 
a new organization to be established." On the one hand, this provision helps to 
create an orderly situation that avoids organizations with duplicated purposes, 
and to eliminate malicious competition for limited social resources. On the 
other, however, a this also allows the government, if it wants to control certain 
area of social services, to establish an NGO beforehand or during the 
application process so as to rule out the possibility of the registration of a real 
NGO applicant seeking to do the same work. 
The dual management system should be revoked, not only to remove barriers 
to establish NGOs, but also to realize the fundamental freedom of association 
as stipulated in China's 1982 Constitution Law. Advantages of removing the 
dual management structure are obvious. Many temporarily formed NGOs have 
made great impacts during early stages of natural disaster relief and rescue 
activities. The government has been intentionally silent and permissive of 
those activities conducted by unregistered NGOs, and it has thereby de facto 
eliminated unnecessary administrative barriers. Arguably, a revised provision 
as to dual management is more desirable allowing special or emergent 
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formation of NGOs. This solution has also been implemented well in other 
. h J 128 countnes sue as apan. 
4.2.1.2.High Endowment Requirement for Foundations 
The 2004 Foundation Regulation provides two different types of foundations: 
private foundations (formed by individuals or private businesses) and public-
fundraising foundations. The former kind of foundation is intended to 
encourage affluent individuals and moneyed corporations to form their own 
foundations to carry out charitable activities. There has clearly been a positive 
response in that regard, as the giving statistics from 2007 and press reports 
regarding new foundations indicate. 129 Public fund-raising foundations in 
practice are mostly institutions organized nationally and staffed throughout the 
country by the party-state itself. 13° For instance, a public benefit purpose is 
required for a public fund-raising foundation, and additional review as to 
formation and registration of such fund-raising foundations is validated and 
expected in the application process. 
Admittedly, the requirement that foundations have to maintain high 
endowments or capital reserves needs further deliberation. As illustrated in 
128 /d., drawing an interesting comparison between the China and Japan NGO management 
system similarly preserving the fundamental freedom of association, which the Chinese 
constitution guarantees the Chinese people. Only those SOs that choose to be and are defined 
as charity organizations, would be subject to strict scrutiny under the new Charity Law. If this 
were to be done. the new Charity Law would contain the provisions to accomplish the type of 
organizational integrity and the institutional oversight necessary for organizations operating 
for public benefit. 
129 /d. 
130 !d., Simon further argues that the regulations appear to permit the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
to act as the registering and oversight agency with regard to large national private foundations, 
and the experience ofthe Narada Foundation offers proof that MCA will assume this role. The 
language of the regulations also opens the possibility that as a practical matter MCA may not 
necessarily enforce the dual management requirement of the 2004 regulations with regard to 
smaller foundations when it chooses not to 
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Part II, a national private foundation is expected to keep at least two million 
RMB yuan as a permanent endowment; a local private foundation that does 
not engage in fund-raising is expected to invest at least two million RMB yuan 
as permanent endowment. As to public fund-raising foundations, a local one 
should invest at least four million yuan (U.S.$58,400) as permanent 
endowment, and a national one should invest at least eight million yuan 
(U.S.$116,800). Notwithstanding the legislation goal of nurturing solid and 
well-standing foundations, these thresholds are somewhat haughty and may 
thwart enthuse of interested parties to form and develop fund-raising 
foundations. 
4.2. Recognized Exempt Purpose and Definition of Charity 
4.2.1. u.s. 
There are seven purposes listed in the U.S. law as recognized exempt 
purposes 131 under IRC section 50l(c)(3) which are inclusive and intentionally 
broad. Among the seven purposes, treasury regulations mostly interpret three 
purposes comprehensively: charitable, educational, and scientific purposes. In 
the meantime, the U.S. system has adopted extensive flexibility in interpreting 
the other four purposes according to social realities and economic 
131 J.R.C. Section 501(c)(3) stipulates ''Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or 
foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for 
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur 
sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic 
facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the 
net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no 
substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, 
to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not 
participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any 
political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office." 
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development initiatives. 132 As a result, the U.S. system has bolstered the 
nonprofit sector by enabling creativity, such as through joint ventures between 
the enterprise and government to serve both the investment capital needs and 
encourage continued commitment to public benefit. 133 As to the educational 
and scientific areas, the Treasury has expanded the original tax treatment by 
providing a mechanism for accommodating distance learning technologies and 
unconventional classrooms along with interactive internet activities. 
4.2.2. China 
The exempt purpose determination usually depends on the definition and 
coherency of the term "charity" in China. A careful reading of current laws 
and regulations will reveal several different definitions of "charity." In 
practice, the adoption of the conception "public benefit" to define charitable 
organization is widely accepted by many jurisdictions. For example, the 
English Charities Act 2006 clarifies the definition of "charity" by emphasizing 
that public benefit be created. 134 
The definition of charity also appears to differ from that of "public welfare" 
for public welfare trusts (gongyi xintuo) stipulated in the Trust Law, while the 
"public benefit" terminology used in the 2004 Foundation Regulation and the 
132 See GCM 36993 (1977), providing that innovative enterprises qualify under section 
501(c)(3) for passing the organization test as long as they I) lessen burdens of government, 2) 
promote community welfare by lessening neighborhood tensions, 3) eliminate prejudice and 
discrimination and 4) defend human and civil rights served by law or 5) combat community 
deterioration and juvenile delinquency. 
133 See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-12, I.R.B. 6.; see also Redlands Surgical Services v. 
Commissioner, 242 F. 3'd 904 (91h Cir. 2001), both of which determined that a nonprofit 
hospital and a for-profit healthcare company could form an LLC to benefit both parties, on the 
conditions that the nonprofit serve as the general partner and that the exempt purpose drive the 
enterprise. Furthermore, the LLC's board would be required to reflect the majority interest of 
the exempt organization and retain its control over the nonprofit hospital. 
134 See generally supra 19 
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tax rules defines charity with broader scope. Gong yi is the term used in 
almost all of these legal documents. It is defined in Article 60 of the Trust Law 
in the context of "public welfare trusts" and in Article 3 of the Public Welfare 
Donation Law in the context of "public welfare undertakings" (gongyi shiye). 
The Foundation Regulations include no definition of "public welfare," but 
refer to the term public welfare institutions (gong yi shiye) in Article 2 to 
define foundations. And the language in the new tax rules with regard to 
entities qualifying to receive donations is that they must use the money "for 
education, civil affairs, other public welfare undertakings, or for the districts 
that suffer from natural disasters or the poverty-stricken districts." In fact, the 
word for "charity" (cishan) 135 has only been used one time, at the time of this 
writing, in Chinese laws and regulations. In Article 1 0, Paragraph 2 of the 
PWDL, there is a reference to the regulations of social organizations being 
established "with the principal aim of developing charities." 
According to Professor Karla Simon, the definition of "charity" in the draft 
Charity Law incorporates certain enumerated purposes in Article 3 of the 
PWDL: 136 
- Emergency and crisis relief for regions, individuals and groups in 
difficulty; 
- Relief for disadvantaged people; 
- Education, health, science, culture, sports for social benefit; and, 
- Promotion of urban and rural community development and 
environment. 
In addition to the above specifically enumerated categories, Article 3, 
135 !d., stating that there has been some consideration in the Chinese literature of whether the 
meaning of the two terms is actually the same or different. 
136 See Simon supra 32 at 946 
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Paragraph 5 also includes the term "other charitable activities," which 
provides for future development of the concept of charity. 
Therefore, an expansive definition of "charity" should be considered and 
adopted. As Lee proposed, a charity should be regarded as an eligible charity 
so long as it: 1) is organized and operated exclusively for public benefit 
purposes by engaging in public welfare activities (including emergency relief, 
relief for the poor, education, health and social benefit, promotion of 
community development, etc.); 2) contains restraints on distribution of profits, 
dividends, or assets to its members (non-distribution constraints) and 3) is 
required to spend its remaining assets on charitable purposes after its 
termination. 
4.3. Requirement of Operation for an Exempt Purpose 
4.3.1. u.s. 
The operational test in the U.S. system views the organization's financial and 
program activities as indicators of its operations, and such review is monitored 
on an annual basis. 137 Usually, the IRS will wait and see how newly formed 
and approved nonprofit organizations operate and behave by issuing a 
provisional "advance ruling" for a four year period, in which the organization 
can demonstrate its operations in a more concrete manner. At the end of the 
four-year period, the IRS assesses the organization's level of public support 
and makes a final determination as to exempt status. 
137 See Brennen supra Ill, at 6-8 
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Admittedly, the operational test has been quite flexible over decades of 
development and practice. It recognizes the importance of monetary resources 
for the nonprofit organizations. Mostly, it enables the organization to charge 
fees for services and general dues and non-dues-based revenues without 
compromising its exempt status. 
An exempt organization needs to file an annual information return (Form 990) 
to the IRS if it receives more than $25,000 in annual revenues and is not a 
church. The Form 990 asks pointed questions about the organization's 
program, activities, contributions, grants, compensation and administrative 
expenses. Moreover, the U.S. system recently improved accountability of 
exempt organizations by posting all related available information online to 
promote visibility and exposure. Undoubtedly, this practice makes ensures the 
exempt organizations continue to operate in the interest of their initial exempt 
purpose. 
4.3.2. China 
Monitoring the operation of nonprofit organizations in China presents one of 
the crucial problems in the development of nonprofit sector. It is not even 
clear he extent to which currently registered nonprofit organizations of all 
three types need to go through administrative applications and oversight 
processes in order to become "verified charities" or the exact benefits if they 
get verified. 
A primary problem is determining institutionally which government organ is 
the overseeing authority as to the activities of nonprofit organizations. Given 
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the dual management requirement for nonprofit organizations, it appears that 
an additional layer of supervisory authority is necessary, however burdensome 
this might be. It has been suggested that a new agency should be created to 
oversee all the aspects of institutional development, transparency and 
accountability (reporting requirements) without involving a sponsoring 
organization in the formation process. 
Unlike the IRS in the U.S. system, the Chinese MCA and SAT are most likely 
to involve the verification process of all nonprofit organizations, however, due 
to the intergovernmental conflicts and staffing problems, nonprofit 
organizations are not able to cost-efficiently manage the administrative 
reporting procedures to two departments, especially for deciding the exempt 
status. As evidenced in the 2007 Ruling, there are very weak links between 
MCA accreditation and SAT approval of tax exempt status. Therefore, 
scholars have proposed a separate "Public Benefit Commission" to supervise 
the charitable status of all nonprofit organizations. However, due to the 
infrastructure complexities in the party-state China, this proposal is too ideal 
to implement. 
In addition, due to the blurred boundaries among the three types of nonprofit 
organization in China, a uniform reporting form like the U.S. Form 990 is 
neither wise nor feasible. On the other hand, if each form of nonprofit 
organizations has its own reporting scheme, the administrative costs will limit 
the government's ability to adopt further monitoring and verification 
procedures. 
Finally, many nonprofit organizations in China may even want to register as a 
commercial enterprise to carry on its exempt purpose. This is especially true 
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of a few foundations set up by foreign individuals or international 
philanthropic organizations. These foundations still benefit from taxpayer 
friendly provisions to enjoy tax holidays while avoiding arduous NGO 
registration and operative process. 
4.4. Prohibition of Private Inurement 
4.4.1. U.S. 
The IRS historically took a zero tolerance policy for personal benefits inuring 
to any person with influence over the decision-making affairs of a charitable 
organization. The IRS had to revoke the exempt status after it found a 
violation of this rule. However, to balance the IRS and charitable community, 
the Congress added a new provision IRC Section 4958, i.e. the Intermediate 
Sanction clause, to the IRC. The Intermediate Sanctions focused on "excess 
benefit transactions" by disqualified persons and legislated a two-tier excise 
tax designed to punish the wrongdoer while spring the charity. Under this rule, 
it is unjust enrichment transactions and their perpetrators that are sanctioned, 
but not the charitable organizations. 
By adopting the Intermediate Sanctions, the U.S. scheme again exhibited its 
flexibility in balancing interests and competing tensions. Congress admits that 
most charitable organizations behave properly; the Intermediate Sanctions 
creates a safe harbor for the majority of nonprofit organizations and their 
volunteers, staff and directors. Under Section 4958, an organization is 
compliant with section 501(3)(c) if it i) maintains proper records, ii) obtains 
comparability data regarding compensation arrangements and iii) has a 
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conflict of interests policy. 
4.4.2. China 
The nonprofit sector has been infected with accountability issues since the 
every outset. In particular, the efficient and responsible use of the funds is now 
a public concern. A challenging accountability problem relates to corruption. 
China's notorious corruption makes it less certain that charitable donations 
reach the hands of those most in need and that no personal interests of 
management personnel are involved. Widespread fears of corruption or 
misappropriation of donated funds even stop the general public to donate or 
switch to foreign nonprofit organizations which presumably have less 
accountability issues. 
A frustrating observation as to China's nonprofit organizational scheme is that 
the values of accountability, transparency, and performance evaluation are so 
downplayed in practice. Not surprisingly, the bad practice of non-observance 
and lax implementation is displayed here. Article 21 of the Public Welfare 
Donations Law provides for the donor's right to access information about the 
use and management of the donations. The Foundations Regulations have 
similar provisions. All current laws contain regulations on submissions of 
annual reports to the relevant administrative authority. However, only the 
Foundation Regulations contain a duty of disclosure of information, requiring 
foundations to make the relevant annual reports public through media channels 
to provide for public enforcement of accountability. Thus, compared to 
information disclosure requirements of for-profit listed companies, disclosure 
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requirements for charitable organizations are still very primitive and under-
developed. 
The misalignment of interests and information provides charity management 
with great decision-making discretion. In order to prevent abuses, appropriate 
checks and balances must be put in place to protect charity assets and ensure 
the accountability of persons who control them. Appropriate use of checks and 
balances to improve governance would be beneficial to the charitable sector as 
a whole. Well-governed charitable organizations are more likely to enjoy 
greater public confidence, which is critical for fund-raising. Conversely, 
ineffective charitable governance may reduce the ability of the charitable 
organizations to carry out their missions. 138 
Another aspect deserving attention is that internal government and financial 
management remains under-regulated. For example, Article 15 of the Social 
Organizations Regulations requires that a social organization set out the 
qualifications, powers, and duties of its members. However, the Regulations 
give little additional guidance. For example, the Regulations do provide that 
the highest authority rests with the members, but does not specify the scope of 
their authority. The Regulations should clearly delineate the powers and 
authorities that members can exercise at their meetings, including the power to 
amend the organization's constitution, appoint or remove directors, and 
dissolve the organization. The Regulations should also include procedures for 
138 See Simon supra 32, suggesting that ninety-nine percent of corporations in China did not 
engage in any form of charitable donations. While this may be explained partly by the fact that 
any concept of corporate social responsibility is still embryonic among Chinese corporations, 
it also partly reflects the lack of efficiency and accountability, and in turn, the lack of public 
confidence in the charitable sector 
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calling meetings and passing resolutions. 139 
Regarding the duty of loyalty, only the Foundation Regulations prohibit a 
director and the director's associates from engaging in "self-dealing" with their 
foundation. This approach must be amended so that all senior officers and 
board members of a charitable organization are subject to duties of care and 
diligence, as well as a fiduciary duty of loyalty that prohibits them from 
having actual or potential conflicts of interest. Guidelines on how to deal with 
board conflicts would help the management understand its responsibilities. At 
the same time, because a voluntary board of trustees usually governs 
charitable organizations, the law should provide that they may be relieved of 
personal liability for breaches of certain duties if the court believes they acted 
honestly and reasonably or in "good faith." 
4.5. Political Activity and Support by NGOs 
4.5.1. u.s. 
Although the U.S. tax exempt scheme has evolved showing flexibility and 
tolerance to various economic needs and social services, the ban against 
political action remains absolute. This prohibition insures the separation of 
fiscal policy and political interests, thereby protecting the integrity and the 
independence of the nonprofit sector. Direct or grassroots lobbying is 
139 
See generally supra 103, stating that good governance starts with the ability to recruit and 
retain an effective governing board. This requires clear rules on the procedures for the 
appointment and removal of directors, the qualifications and number of directors, the duration 
of their appointments, and the terms of remuneration. The Regulations should also specizy the 
duties and the potential liabilities of the board. While all laws currently governing the main 
types of charitable organizations prohibit misappropriation of the organization's funds, they 
fail to stipulate any duty of care for directors respecting their management duties 
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permitted so long as it not substantial. The IRC section 501(h)'s "election" 
provides a mechanism by which an organization can elect to exceed specific 
amounts of lobbying activity in exchange for voluntarily submitting to an 
excise tax tied to its lobbying expenditures. 
4.5.2. China 
Political and lobbying activities are rare for and foreign to the nonprofit sector 
in China. The party-state China almost prohibits nongovernment entities to be 
involved in any potentially harmful activities or association to the communist 
reign. For instance, the government itself intentionally forms certain semi-
governmental NGOs to perform social services that are not appropriate for the 
party-state to carry over. Fine examples ofthose semi-governmental NGOs are 
Chinese Writers' Association, All-China Workers Union and All-China 
Women Federation, and usually government officials are appointed to serve in 
leading or management roles in those organizations, some NGOs even have a 
branch of the party as a monitoring organ to supervise related activities. 
Therefore, some scholars argue that certain activities are politically sensitive, 
but piercing the veil would reveal that those semi-government NGOs be real 
government organs and political activities are almost never conducted without 
being controlled by the government. 
This situation reflects historical concerns about the potential of NGOs to 
foment political dissent. The distrust of NGOs still limits the access to the 
constitutional right of freedom of association, and also stalls the development 
of NGOs as a responsive and flexible sector to supplement government 
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services. 
4.6. NGO Asset Management upon Dissolution, Termination and 
Liquidation 
4.6.1. u.s. 
The U.S. scheme requires that charitable assets remain within the charitable 
sector. An exempt organization may not dissolve, terminate or liquidate 
without insuring that assets remaining after paying outstanding liabilities 
remain within the charitable sector. The board of directors of a dissolving 
organization may select an appropriate charitable recipient with a similar 
mission; however, under no circumstance can those assets be diverted to non-
charitable recipients or for no-charitable purpose. This rule was tested 
repeatedly in the 1990's when nonprofit organizations, usually community 
healthcare institutions, merged with for-profit hospital chains. As a result, 
foundations were set up to administer charitable assets after closing, and this 
situation prompted various states' Attorneys General to implement protocols 
to govern such transactions and to seek court approval for the allocation of the 
assets before the transaction was completed. 140 
140 This thesis shares Professor Douglas Kahn's concerns that unrelated business tax (UBT), 
which has been established in the U.S. for decades, has not receive enough attention from the 
Chinese tax authorities. Moreover, the current tax legislature is not evident in monitoring the 
business activities ofNGOs. 
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4.6.2. China 
The treatment of dissolved or liquated NGOs is a deep loophole in China's 
NGO legislation. Provisions on termination and liquidation of three forms of 
NGOs in China are scattered over various laws and regulations, and most of 
them are hard to implement or lack specific guidance in practice. For example, 
Chapter 6 of the Trust Law stipulates the definition, creation, and termination 
of a trust. However, there are no delineated rules on how to treat the assets 
after paying all liabilities. Moreover, as discuss in Part II 141 , the 2007 Ruling 
by MOP and SAT stipulates that exempt organizations "may not distribute any 
surplus upon dissolution or termination," but this requirement is vague. 
Typically, the 2007 Ruling does not establish any detailed procedures to 
handle assets after dissolution and termination. 
4.7. Tax Culture 
4.7.1. u.s. 
The divergence between the nonprofit tax exemption in practice in the U.S. 
and China can be attributed to the significant distinctions in the tax cultures of 
the two countries. First, the U.S. tax exemption scheme evolved through a 
long process, by balancing social needs and economic development, as well as 
bridging the gap between the Congress, the IRS, and the nonprofit sector. In 
China, the first law dealing with a rudimentary form of nonprofit organizations 
141 See supra 90 
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of modem conception was only adopted in 1989, after the party-state system 
was shocked by the democratic movement and surges of grassroots social 
movement. The development of nonprofit tax exemption scheme in China has 
been a long painful process, even there are quite many transplantable values 
and principles underlying modem tax law, such as, rule of law, the ideology of 
freedom of association and cohesive legal infrastructure. While the SAT and 
MCA have conducted quite good preparations by inviting leading scholars and 
legislation consultants to design the charity law and related lessons from other 
countries, the gap between the law on paper (which has been transplanted 
from the West) and the law in action (which is defined by local conditions) is 
still huge. 
Moreover, the U.S. scheme is created in a federalist system, which has two 
sovereign governments - state and national - each has its own authority on the 
nonprofit sector. China, in contrast, is a party-state system that one central 
government has formal authority over administrative subdivisions that 
promulgate and implement the law. This creates the low efficiency in China in 
carrying out and designing detailed rules for specific questions, let alone the 
huge disparity as to the development level among different localities in China. 
In addition to an established system of financial incentives including tax 
exemption and tax deduction, U.S. history has created a culture of giving and 
philanthropic activities, especially those associated with church and healthcare 




These factors are currently deficient in China. The Chinese style of tax law 
drafting makes it difficult for nonprofit organizations to engage in the charity 
sector and related tax planning common in the U.S. To begin with, the text of 
the law is unclear in many respects, such as the definition of charity, the 
regulations on internal governance, the registration process, judicial review, 
and administrative processes. While the U.S. scheme mostly rests on sections 
50l(c)(3) and 170, the IRS has promulgated various regulations, rulings, and 
notices to guide the practice, and case law also makes up a substantial part of 
the content of the existing scheme. In China:, however, the situation is almost 
the opposite of the U.S. scheme. The scattered regulations as to tax 
exemptions and tax deduction are vague and subject to too much discretional 
review of MCA and SAT. The "opaque" nature of tax legislation also fails 
taxpayers in following the laws and drives applicant organizations into lengthy 
process of application and registration. 
Another important point is that the general public in China has a long tradition 
of philanthropic and charitable giving. However, the distrust or fears for 
unreasonable usage and corruption do inhibit charitable giving even after more 
functional tax laws and regulations are promulgated in the future. This concern 
in return leads to the formation of many grassroots or underground NGOs, 
which sometimes again deepen the insecurities of donors of their charitable 
giving or donations. 
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V. Conclusion- An egg vs. an orange 
This chapter contributes the comparisons ofthe tax exemption schemes in U.S. 
and China in three folds of consideration. First, given the tremendous 
development of China's nonprofit sector, not many comprehensive studies 
have been completed on reforms thereof. The tax treatment of nonprofit 
organizations, as the crucial component to construct a nonprofit sector, is 
unsophisticated and short of practical significance. Echoing China's success in 
economic growth in the past decades, literature on Chinese tax typically 
focuses on tax incentives for foreign direct investment and tax policies 
catering to economic development. This shortage shows the prejudice against 
the nascent nonprofit sector as a partner of the state. Second, under the rule of 
law construct in the past decade, some scholars suggest China might 
modernize its nonprofit sector through an "all-in" charity code or 
unrealistically cultivate expansive grassroots NGOs. The study of the 
nonprofit sector has to embody a down-to-earth understanding of China' legal 
and political settings. Third, commercial implications of the nonprofit sector 
invite studies of its tax treatment. Given China's integration into the WTO and 
heightened complaints over national treatment and fair competition, a key 
issue arising is that the profitability of foreign investment shrinks as the tax 
preferential treatment is gradually discounted. The profitable potential of 
nonprofit organizations as foreign investment vehicles may induce 
inappropriate tax planning activities. Therefore, it is never too late to develop 
a tax framework for the nonprofit sector. 
The expansion of the nonprofit sector in the past decades has resulted in many 
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problems with its tax framework. Doubting the suggestion of promulgating a 
comprehensive charity law, this thesis does not suggest any unrealistic idea of 
transplanting all valid and enabling values under the U.S. tax exemption 
system to China. The prime incentive for the tax deduction has not been 
solidly rooted in the general public. There is a lack of stimulating push for the 
tax authorities and MCA to adopt a systematic responsive reform measures. 
However, some positive reforms especially on the tax exemption and tax 
deduction in the nonprofit sector are more implementable and manageable. A 
comparison of tax treatment in U.S. and China on nonprofit sector would 
reveal the following observations. 
First, the public benefit or charity purpose of nonprofit organizations has not 
been coherently defined. This confusion predictably inhibits the development 
of the nonprofit sector by stalling interested corporate and individual donors to 
take exemption and tax deduction. 
Second, China has not set up an enforceable fiscal incentive system to promote 
charitable donations. The administrative procedure of obtaining a tax exempt 
certificate is arduous and discourages donors from donating or causes them to 
abandon obtaining the certificate, which worsens the efforts to modernize the 
scheme. 
Third, there are still burdensome requirements for the application and 
registration of nonprofit organizations, such as dual management, high 
threshold of capital endowment for foundations and prohibition on cross-
region development; 
Fourth, the administration and supervision on the internal management, 
human and resource, and financial and accounting management of nonprofit 
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organizations are very weak. China's complex administrative system for the 
nonprofit sector, including the MCA, MOF and SAT, is bad at managing fund 
raising, appropriate usage of donations, and profiteering from donations. 
Corruption has also been a major concern of the general public discouraging 
them from making donations. 
Fifth, the determination of tax-exempt status and review of such status is ad 
hoc and different from locality to locality. Such irregularities on one hand 
invite unethical manipulation of tax preferential policies, and create resistance 
to making donations through locally available venues. 
U.S. tax system for the nonprofit sector arguably embraces maturity, 
objectivity, flexibility and accountability. Evolving throughout the course U.S. 
history, the U.S. scheme relies solidly on regulatory authority, government 
authority checks and balances, and confidence in the rugged individualism of 
American democracy. The qualification requirement to enjoy benefit of tax 
exemption is objective and subjects to minimum level of discretional review. 
Meanwhile, as an outcome-based set of measures, it enables the nonprofit 
sector to adapt to new economic development and strike a continuous balance 
between external regulation and internal government. 
From a jurisprudential perspective, in the Chinese tax context two cautions are 
methodologically identified. First, the scarcity of decent comparative legal tax 
scholarship in general does not support quality comparison. A shortage of 
paradigmatic discourse shows the simultaneous existence of bluntly 
conflicting arguments, parallel courses, and irregularities in analysis. Although 
some comparative tax frameworks have been proposed or compiled, their 
value to the Chinese tax context is not evident. For this reason, this thesis 
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argues that a comparative tax study relating to China might be better achieved 
by focusing on a full "tax law sub-discipline" rather than on a specific tax 
concept. One reason is that a western-originated tax concept might be too 
narrow to meaningfully inform a Chinese policy orientation. The other reason 
is that it lacks generality necessary to apply it to other subsidiaries oftax law. 
Second, the tax cultural traditions and social, political and legal settings of a 
systematic tax governance framework should be included in tax comparativists' 
theorizations. A tax study ultimately has to be conducted from a "big-picture" 
perspective in which a tax system is embedded. Otherwise, a comparative 
study may easily turns into descriptive, mechanical and perfunctory analysis. 
The practical and scholastic significance of comparative tax studies can hardly 
be achieved by a limited comparison falling on the technical elements of a tax 
concept. This "big-picture" perspective is also in line with the rationale 
applicable to both the rule of law construct and assimilation to the WTO 
system. This thesis therefore tentatively incorporates tax culture into its 
considerations to compare primary elements of nonprofit tax schemes of U.S. 
and China. It argues that a comprehensive tax transplant effort of valued ideas 
and practices, whilst bold and uncomfortable for the recipient country at the 
beginning, is what China needs to build a robust nonprofit sector. 
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CHAPTER IX 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This thesis aims to prepare a reasonable, handy and realistic foundation with 
which to evaluate the progress of the Chinese tax law reform. Pushing this goal 
further, this thesis tentatively submits - on the basis of debates on the rule of law 
and understanding of the WTO principles applicable to China - a tailored, 
pragmatic and practical set of proposals for the tax reform under China's current 
legal infrastructure. The proposals are underpinned by instrumental notions of the 
rule of law rhetoric, inter alia, generality, clarity, consistency, enforceability, 
stability, congruence, and substantive notions of judicial independence, human 
rights and the limitations of bureaucratic government with regard to the nonprofit 
sector. 
In terms of background, this thesis submits that economic globalization has been 
realized not only through supranational legal regimes such as the WTO, but 
through reforms to regulatory regimes and national laws advocated by 
international institutions. These reforms have furthered deliberate policy choices 
to liberalize trade and capital mobility, deregulate markets, increase commercial 
participation, and eliminate cross-border transactional barriers. Moreover, the 
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post-World War II development strategy of many developing or transitional 
economies has included a special role for tax policy. All types of taxes, 
particularly trade related taxes, are legitimate tools of the state in monitoring the 
development process. Today, tax reforms mainly aim to establish a diverse mix 
of taxes that will encourage savings and capital investment in open market 
economies, since development priorities have shifted from promoting self-
sufficiency and subsidizing domestic industry to encouraging export-led growth 
and improving global market participation. Legal system reforms typically 
involve transplanting legal theories and institutions across borders. Tax 
governance, with its focus on institutional reform and (re)construction, has been a 
focal point to facilitate legal system construct. This thesis also engages a short 
empirical survey before discussing relevant theories, principles and analyses and 
raising reform proposals on specific tax law topics. Such statistical analysis aids 
understanding of the rationales that the overall circumstances of social and 
political settings, economy size, position in global trading, international voicing 
power, national treasury scale, and composition of tax revenue call for a set of 
quality proposals in the Chinese tax context. 
As tax reform has been a crucial component of economic development initiatives 
and structural adjustment programs for developing countries, it usually focus on 
universal development goals including a single-rate, broad-based VAT to replace 
older-style sales taxes, a low-rate, broad-based corporate and personal income tax, 
tax neutrality, and the reduction or eventual elimination of tariffs. Moreover, the 
WTO distinguishes its role by indirectly interfering in domestic tax law reforms 
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under the aegis of protecting free trade in domestic tax systems. The General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) underlying all WTO activities includes 
the key principles of non-discrimination and liberalization of trade. The non-
discrimination obligation is comprised of the Most-favored-nation (MFN) 
principle, 1 which demands that trade concessions granted to any country be 
extended equally to all other WTO members, and the National Treatment (NT) 
principle,2 which requires that no internal tax, charge, law, regulation or other 
measure should discriminate between domestic and foreign suppliers. 
A decade after China formally became the 143rd member of the WTO on 
December 11, 2001, the WTO's technical assistance has been more than plugging 
up loopholes or to crafting an implementation structure; rather, it aims to imbue 
tax reforms with broader legal theories and structures conducive to international 
trade. This thesis believes that an overview of China's rule of law order and post-
WTO legal reform is necessary for a discussion of the tax system reform. In 
particular, the establishment of a "socialist rule of law order" and commitments 
by the government to act "in accordance with law" have been incorporated as 
amendments into China's Constitution. Consideration is also given to contested 
rhetorical conceptions of the rule of law. Debates between instrumental and 
substantive, positivist and natural law, and thin and thick models of the rule of 
law, as well as the economic development rhetoric discussed ad infinitum in the 
literature are all reviewed. 
1 See General Agreement on Tariffs And Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, Art. I, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 
55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
2 /d., Art. III 
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This thesis suggests that the need to conceptualize a "rule of law-Chinese tax laws 
reform rhetoric is too grand and too premature to undertake. First, the 
development of a socialist rule of law is a paradox, being receptive to market 
economy principles and modernizing state and private enterprise governance on 
the one hand, while unabashedly preserving an autocratic form of socialism on the 
other. Such a paradox can only be described as "the socialist rule of law with 
Chinese Characteristics." Second, the tax law reform, which contains elements of 
traditional conceptions of the rule of law, cannot be understood independently 
from China's social, political, economic and legal inheritances. Different from 
Western jurisdictions with liberal democratic frameworks, under China's quasi-
socialist, soft authoritarian system, the social-political evolution influences the 
theory and interpretations of the rule of law in many ways as to China's tax 
reform. 
This thesis argues that China's accession into the WTO has been a double-edged 
sword. A close examination of China's accession commitments reveals that 
effective economic reform and trade liberalization call for substantiations from a 
matching legal infrastructure reform. This is particularly evident in the Chinese 
tax law context. WTO principles and the rule of law requirements must be 
introduced and evaluated together in tax law reform proposals. WTO principles of 
transparency, uniform and impartial administration, judicial review match the 
instrumentalist's rule of law elements of consistency, generality, predictability, 
enforceability, stability and congruence, and the substantive rule of law 
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framework's requirements of democracy, limited government, accountable 
administrative decision-making, and judicial independence. 
This thesis further presents that China's tax law system is administrative in nature 
but this characterization is complicated by legislative and judicial functions in the 
tax law. In this sense, the tax law reform benefits from as well as is circumvented 
by the post-WTO legal reform. The accession to WTO bounds China calling for 
transparency, consistency, simplicity and certainty in terms of tax legislations at 
both national and local levels. The hierarchical tax administration structure should 
not impede enforcement of tax laws. Uniform and impartial administration of tax 
regulations at various local levels should be eliminated or reduced to a level 
acceptable to guarantee well-grounded tax administrative decisions and facilitate 
tax judicature independence. Given the growing awareness of taxpayers' rights, 
tax authorities should not dwell at the stereotype "monitor" position proclaiming 
obligation to pay tax, rather, a workable system of protections should be 
established and honored. Moreover, the tax treatment of the nonprofits sector as 
the third sector of the society should be formulated and enforced. This thesis 
contributes a few findings after examining the status quo of China's current tax 
law system. 
As to tax legislation, Chapter V concludes that the tax legislation reform has 
endured a painful process of simplification, unification and the revenue sharing 
scheme. Tax legislation started as FDI driven and incentive-focused, and so the 
structure of tax legislation was imbalanced from the very beginning without 
honoring tax equity and efficiency. Meanwhile, China's tax legislation reform is 
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complicated under WTO Agreements and the rule of law order. In particular, rules 
and principles of WTO Agreements call for China's turnover tax, enterprise 
income tax and individual income tax legislation and reform to incorporate non-
discrimination principles and the transparency requirement. Chapter V further 
shares and agrees with Avi-Yonah's proposal that, answers to fine-tune China's 
tax legislation system might be found in an international tax arena through a 
multilateral solution. It is essential that the fundamental goals of taxation and 
WTO principles should be achieved in terms of revenue collection, social wealth 
redistribution, transparency, uniform and impartial administration, and judicial 
review. Equally important is to incorporate elements of the rule of law order as 
well as to integrate China's tax legislation with an international perspective of 
facilitating development and institutionalization of the tax system. 
As to tax judicature, Chapter VI concludes that the tax judicature reform in China 
should consider both the idea of permanence and that of flexibility. It must 
balance the dynamic between tax administration, the general judiciary framework, 
and taxpayers' rights. As law supports the government's political authority as well 
as the power of the legal system, the principles and tenets of the tax judicature 
system should be enshrined in a jurisprudential manner, honoring the rule of law 
order. 
Chapter VI also submits the a few proposals for China's tax judicature reform: (1) 
the full-payment rule should be abolished. For an adverse tax collection decision, 
a taxpayer does not need to pay the assessed payment or provide guarantee at the 
first place before filing an application for a tax administrative reconsideration. (2) 
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This thesis contributes the novel notion that a summary judgment procedure 
should be established for small tax cases as a tax collection procedure. (3) China 
should design a better scheme for administrative reconsideration, but the structure 
must be calculated and designed. (4)Tax expertise can be strengthened by teaming 
up more experienced personnel with specialty in tax. (5) At county or lowest 
hierarchical government levels, abstract administrative acts should be subject to 
judicial review, and this reform may start as experimental at a few coastal 
localities with better tax talents. (6) Echoing the debates regarding the imaginary 
Chinese tax court system, this chapter submits a tentative proposal. The desirable 
structure is to adopt a circuit tax courts framework exercising both original 
(conditioned first instance) and appellate jurisdiction sitting permanently in six to 
eight regions covering nationwide territory and reporting to the SPC Tax Tribunal 
based in Beijing. The designated High Tax Tribunal should be an SPC subsidiary 
and should have the ultimate appellate jurisdiction over tax cases appealed at 
circuit tax courts and provincial high courts, and perform tax court system 
administration or management. Meanwhile, the transitory, costly and overhauling 
midlist "spin-off' structure should be denounced based on tax policy routines. 
As to taxpayers' rights, Chapter VII evidences that Chinese taxpayers' rights are 
limited by the inherent deficiencies in the general tax framework. This is 
particularly manifested by the discrepancy in the internal management of tax 
authorities. Moreover,.because secondary legal rights, administrative rights and 
the principles of good conduct of tax authorities are put together in the Tax 
Collection Law and the Proclamation, the protection of each right is not 
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guaranteed with enough singularity and attention, and the separation of those rules 
and its impact should be considered. 
Chapter VII summarizes that, China's tax system overall still provides a 
problematic, yet promising, framework to channel available legal remedies, 
administrative and judicial, for taxpayers. This thesis further supports the 
protection of taxpayers' rights centers as a key element substantiating China's 
construct of the rule of law order and fulfillment of WTO principles. Chinese 
taxpayers' rights should theme with a fair, transparent, certain, consistent, 
equitable, effective, and clear manner within the framework of the tax laws. 
Meanwhile, the WTO principles attach assimilation into international taxpayers' 
rights routine and vitality in designing and rectifYing Chinese taxpayers' rights in 
terms of administration and adjudication. China's tax laws should embody and 
honor the transparency, uniformity and impartiality and judicial review principles 
with a full set of niceties and convenient courses of action in taxpayers' protection. 
Chapter VII concludes a summarized proposal for refining China's taxpayers' 
rights protection, based on the positivist view in jurisprudence for taxpayers, the 
rule of law order, and WTO principles. This proposal balances practical 
significance and largely is underpinned by points of consensus among tax 
authorities and taxpayers alike. In this sense, it is not a reordering or 
rearrangement of existing prescribed rights, rather, it is submitted being reflective 
of daily practice. 
As to NGO tax treatment and comparative tax, Chapter VIII identifies two 
methodological notions as to comparative law in the Chinese tax context. First, 
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the scarcity of decent comparative legal tax scholarship in general does not 
support quality comparison. A shortage of paradigmatic discourse shows the 
simultaneous existence of bluntly conflicting arguments, parallel courses, and 
irregularities in analysis. Although some comparative tax frameworks have been 
proposed or compiled, their value to the Chinese tax context is not evident. For 
this reason, this thesis argues that a comparative tax study relating to China might 
be better achieved by focusing on a full "tax law sub-discipline" rather than on a 
specific tax concept. One reason is that a western-originated tax concept might be 
too narrow to meaningfully inform a Chinese policy orientation. The other reason 
is that it lacks generality necessary to apply it to other subsidiaries of tax law. 
Second, the tax cultural traditions and social, political and legal settings of a 
systematic tax governance framework should be included in tax comparativists' 
theorizations. A tax study ultimately has to be conducted from a "big-picture" 
perspective in which a tax system is embedded. Otherwise, a comparative study 
may easily turns into descriptive, mechanical and perfunctory analysis. The 
practical and scholastic significance of comparative tax studies can hardly be 
achieved by a limited comparison falling on the technical elements of a tax 
concept. This "big-picture" perspective is also in line with the rationale applicable 
to both the rule of law construct and assimilation to the WTO system. This thesis 
therefore tentatively incorporates tax culture into its considerations to compare 
primary elements of nonprofit tax schemes of U.S. and China. It argues that a 
comprehensive tax transplant effort of valued ideas and practices, whilst bold and 
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uncomfortable for the recipient country at the beginning, is what China needs to 
build a robust nonprofit sector. 
Putting the comparative tax as to tax treatment of the NGO sector, Chapter VIII 
contributes the comparisons of the tax exemption schemes in U.S. and China in 
three folds of consideration. First, not many comprehensive studies have been 
completed on reforms thereof. The tax treatment of nonprofit organizations, as the 
crucial component to construct a nonprofit sector, is unsophisticated and short of 
practical significance. Second, under the rule of law construct in the past decade, 
some scholars suggest China might modernize its nonprofit sector through an "ail-
in" charity code or unrealistically cultivate expansive grassroots NGOs. The study 
of the nonprofit sector has to embody a realistic understanding of China' legal and 
political settings. Third, commercial implications of the nonprofit sector invite 
studies of its tax treatment. Given China's integration into the WTO and 
heightened complaints over national treatment and fair competition, a key issue 
arising is that the profitability of foreign investment shrinks as the tax preferential 
treatment is gradually discounted. The profitable potential of nonprofit 
organizations as foreign investment vehicles may induce inappropriate tax 
planning activities. Chapter VIII provides the following observations as to the 
comparison of tax treatment in U.S. and China on nonprofit sector. First, the 
public benefit or charity purpose of nonprofit organizations has not been 
coherently defined. Second, China has not set up an enforceable fiscal incentive 
system to promote charitable donations. Third, there are still burdensome 
requirements for the application and registration of nonprofit organizations, such 
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as dual management, high threshold of capital endowment for foundations and 
prohibition on cross-region development; Fourth, the administration and 
supervision on the internal management, human and resource, and financial and 
accounting management of nonprofit organizations are very weak. Fifth, the 
determination of tax-exempt status and review of such status is ad hoc and 
different from locality to locality. Such irregularities on one hand invite unethical 
manipulation of tax preferential policies, and create resistance to making 
donations through locally available venues. 
In summary, this thesis intends to put forth a reasonable, practical and realistic 
foundation to evaluate the prospects and progress of the Chinese tax law reform 
on the basis of debates on the rule of law and understanding of the WTO 
principles applicable to China. This thesis also contributes a tailored, pragmatic 
and practical set of proposals for the tax reform under China's current legal 
infrastructure and China's goal of setting up a socialist rule of law order. For quite 
many Chinese tax topics such as NGO tax treatment, taxpayers' rights and tax 
judicature reform, it is a first step that calls for further theoretical and empirical 
research for emerging economies in general and for China in particular. 
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